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Unfinished as a Person is the life history of an
eighty-year-old woman. In addition to extensive interviev/s
with the subject, the data of the study includes her two
sem.i-autobiographical works of fiction, a journal, and a
detailed account of her schizophrenic experience and years of
hospitalization. The purpose of the study is to contribute to
a bridge between theories which focus on intraphysic
organization and those which concentrate on interpersonal
process. The similar goals of the life history movement in
psychology are noted and the conceptual problems in working
with retrospective biographical data—which contributed to the
failure of the movement—are discussed. A dialectical
perspective on human time is presented, and incorporated in
the model of clinical inquiry which is employed in the present
study. Concepts from two theoretical systems also based on a
dialectical perspective—Piaget's developmental psychology and
V
Boszormenyi-Nagy ' s theory of loyalty bonds—are integrated in
analyzing the role of attachment in the subject's structuring
of her experience over time. Concepts from Epstein, Sullivan,
Erikson, and Freud's clinical theory are also used to
articulate the model of personality development which is presented
in this study. Support for the model is offered in its ability to
account for four m.ajor problems in the subject's life: her
schizophrenic break, her vulnerability to experiencing
depersonalization, her perception of abstract dancer in
interpersonal relationships, and the repetition of strikingly
similar situations of difficulty in her life.
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C F A P T E P I
LIFE HISTORY RESEARCH
INTRODUCTION
Man is a race curious to know the lives of others.
St, Auaustine ( The Confessions )
Crude biographical accounts, found in the tombs of
the early Egyptian kings, are among the first of man's written
documents. The apparent purpose of these initial efforts at
life history was to recommend the deceased to the gods
(Garraty, 1957). By the tim.e that Augustine noted the human
urge "to know the lives of others" (ca. 420), the purpose of'
biography had shifted substantially from, alorification of the
subject to examinat.i on— a transition to which Augustine himself
contributed
.
Psycholoqy would seem to be the natural heir to this
latter, investigative tradition in biography. Modern thought
on human nature has, in fact, been significantly affected by
two specialized approaches to the study of individual life
histories: existential phenomenology and psychoanalysis. Karl
Jaspers, a pioneer of phenomenological biography, sought to
identify "the forms of inner experience" through an "inward
understanding" of the events of a person's life—an approach
which reshaped European psychiatry (Havens, 1973). In Freud's
hands, the historical reconstruction of individual lives became
both the data base and the primary mode of investigation in
2psychoanaly5is--an approach which reshaped man's view of ran.
But, despite the impact of psychoanalysis and existential
psychiatry, the status of the individual life as a focus of
research has remained persistently ambiguous within the social
sciences in general.
During the period rouahly between 1920 and 1950, life
history research had a number of enthusiastic proponents spread
throughout the social sciences. They shared a common set of
concerns over the direction that research in the social
sciences was taking and, above all, the belief that adopting
the individual life as a basic unit of analysis m.iaht redirect
attention to the central issues of social life—the basic
principle of what can be called the "life history movement.
"
The movement included, at least temporarily, a num.ber of the
best minds of the pre-World War II generation of social
scientists, e.g.. Allport (1942), Dollard (1935), Park (1929),
Murray (19 38)
,
and White (19 52) . The spirit of the movement
was best expressed by t\^/o of its first members, Thomas and
Znaniecki
:
We are safe in saying that personal life^records
constitute the perfect type of sociological material,
and that if social science has to use other materials
at all, it is only because of the practical
difficulty of obtaining at the moment a sufficient
number of such records to cover the totality of
sociological problems [1918, in 1927, p. 132 f.n.,
original emphasis]
.
Although their enthusiasm was widely shared, Thom.as
and Znaniecki were alone in their estimate of safety; a sense
3of methodological insecurity surrounds the literature produced
by the life history m.ovement. Although clear on their goals,
life history researchers never fully articulated the means to
achieve them. They frequently expressed confusion over the
the investigator
,
the nature and place of interpreta-
tion, and how, in general, to structure a life historv. Thev
tended also to accept standards of evaluation, such as the need
to demonstrate deterministic causality, which could never be
met. Critics, while acknowledging the coals of life history
research as laudable, remained unconvinced that analysis of a
single life could ever provide an adequate basis for scientific
statem.ents. In particular, Blumer's monograph (19 39)
summarizing the findings of the Committee for Appraisal of
Research of the Social Science Research Council—the major
critique of the movement— found life history research as
inherently unable: (1) to show what the data v;as representa-
of, (2) to establish the reliability and validity of
interpretations, and (3) to make adeauate generalizations.
Although monographs were written in defense of life history
research (e.g.. Allport, 1942, Gottschalk, et al. , 1945) —
a
defense based largely on the necessity of its goals for the
social sciences—major work in this mode of investigation
ceased within a decade of Blumer's (1939) report. The
proponents failed to convince even themselves that their work
was feasible.
4The research which I am presenting here is a life
history, a collaborative reconstruction of the development of
an eighty-year-old
,
once schizophrenic woman, Hilda Kroner.*
Because I share the broad goals espoused by the life history
movement—as well as intimate familiarity with the
methodological problems which it encountered— I woul.d like to
introduce m.y own goals and methods by outlinina what r.v pre-
decessors attempted, and suggesting why they foundered.
Three central ideas inform.ed the life history
movement. The first was the need for a unified social science.
Many of the proponents of life history research expressed
concern over the trend toward increasingly disparate fields of
endeavor. Several were influential in the attempt to integrate
personality theory, social psychology, cultural anthropology,
and sociology within a single departm.ent at Harvard, Yale, and
the University of Chicago. They felt that the individual life,
taken as a discrete unit of analysis, might serve as a basic
building block or point of integration in a unified science of
"culture and personality";
One of our most urgent needs ... is that for a
workable psychology . . . from the standpoint of
systematic cultural knowledge. This psychology seems
most likely to emerge from the continuous refinement
of our observation on the individual life and
especially from treating this life as a unit event
[Dollard, 1937, p. 288].
*A11 names of people and places are, of course, disguised for
the sake of anonym.ity.
5Psychology was asked to contribute what Dollard (1935, p. l)
called "a significant concept of the person" toward this
i-^tegration of culture and personality~~the second goal widely
recognized within the movenent. Two aspects were seen as
especially important: a longitudinal perspective on
personality, and a holistic view of the person. White (1952,
p. 22) emphasized the need for the "long view." He spoke of:
"a gap at the center of our knowledge about personality. The
neglected area can be identified as continuous development over
periods of time amid natural circum.stances . " Allport (1942
, p.
17) additionally stressed the need to view personality as an
organismic whole: "The essential and significant unities in
personality cannot be determined by cross-sectioning; they must
be studied longitudinally as the life process of the
individual." Murray (1938, p. 36), in a characteristically
comprehensive sweep, expressed the need in terms of a concept
of the person as a: "motile, discriminating, valuating,
assimilating, adapting, integrating, differentiating, and
reproducing temporal unity within a changing environmental
matrix .
"
The third motive behind the life history movement was
reminiscent of Jasper's phenomenological goals of "inward
understanding" and "living into the subject's experience," what
Thomas and Znaniecki (1929) referred to as the need "to secure
the subjective factor." The goal was for a more direct
understanding of the "concrete particulars" of individual
6experience. Kluckholm (1945, p. 134) saw in the life history
"the closest picture of cultural structure as actuallv
experienced. Park (1929, p, 47) emphasized the "direct"
nature of life historical data which "nearly always illuminate
some aspect of social or moral life which we have known
hitherto only indirectly."
These were ambitious goals to attach to what is in
one sense the most m.odest of research vehicles, the single case
study. The problem was not, however, that the goals were
inappropriate for the vehicle—the life history is, in fact,
uniquely suited to accomplish all three tasks of integrating
disparate theoretical perspectives, expanding holistic and
developmental concepts of personality, and introducing the
compelling quality of a. first person perspective on
psychological phenomena. Nor were the v/ell recognized problems
of representati'^^eness and generalizeability necessarily
crippling. Both critics and supporters of the life history
mc'T'ement devoted far too much attention to questioning the
adeauacy of the single life for science, rather than reversing
their focus and questioning whether the model of science v;hich
they were applying was appropriate for the life history. Their
search for ways to eliminate sources of subject and
investigator bias, for example, was misdirected. A person's
history is not "out there" waiting to be recorded in the same
sense that an event in the physical environment can be seen as
existincT independent of the observer, A retrospective life
7history is always a reconstruction, the creation of something
new—especially in the case where the reconstruction is a
collaborative effort between the investigator and subject. It
is important to understand the perspectives of both parties,
but Quixotic to attempt to separate them from the data. The
perspective of both parties is an integral aspect of the data
itself. The life history movement was unable to differentiate
such distinctive features of their research from, the context of
a conventional experiment. Although acutely aware of the
unique potential of the life history, they failed to develop a
conceptual framework which could meet the special reauirements
of their research—and this is the real point on which they
foundered
.
The absence of an adequate conceptual framework is
reflected in a number of ways in the life histories which cam.e
out of the movement. One of the primary symptoms is ccnfusicn
over the relationship between subject and investigator
—
Freedman and Krantz (1980) consider neglect of this issue as
the flaw which continues to plague life history research. On
one extreme, a number of researchers attempt to give the
illusion that they have no real involvement in the subject's
narrative. They present their work, as Freedman and Krantz
(Ibid
.
,
p. 10) put it, "as if the investigator were an
invisible cloud hovering o^^er an event." Analysis in these
works tends to be sharply separated from, the narrative, either
appearing at the end of the narrative, as a sort of elaborate
8afterthought, or presented in footnotes to the onooing storv,
as if the presence of the investigator were an enbarrassirent to
be minimized. On the other extreme, the subject's narrative is
overwhelmed by the analysis in guite a few works. This occurs
either through simultaneous discussion of a number of
histories, which turns the work into a kind of impressionistic
CTOSS sampling, or through using a single case exclusively^ for
the purpose of illustrating a theoretical perspective, a use
which obscures all the features of the subject's life v/hich do
not neatly exemplify the investigator's theory.
Neither extreme is research in the sense of an actual
investigation of the fit between theory and data. Just as
being extremely reticent and m.onopolizing a conversation are
alternate ways to avoid engaging in interaction, both
approaches minimize the dialogue betv/een theory and data which
is at the core of life history research. The tendency to swing
betv/een these two extremes v;as noted as a problem within the
movement (e.g.. Allport, 1942), but it could not be corrected
in the absence of an interpretive perspective distinct from the
framework of a conventional experiment.
The second major conceptual problem in the output of
the life history movement is more subtle, but equally serious.
It shows up in White's (1952) Lives in Progress , one of the
best works from the era. V7hite's analysis of his subjects'
histories alternates between three deterministic models of
explanation: social, biological, and psychodynamic. Each
9soinewhat contradicts the other and, r:ore sion if icantly
,
all
3 strong bias on the analysis~“a probleir recognized
by White [Ibid
.
,
pp. 24-25]: "current interpretations of
behavior put selective emphasis on determination by drives of
external shaping forces." White deftly mitigates the bias in
his own interpretations, but true correction lies beyond the
ken of a mechanistic model of determination.
^Alternative concepts exist. Levinson (1978), for
example ,' speaks of an "interpenetration of self and the world."
Pascal (1960, p. 181) describes the self as "not a property but
a trust," that is, a product of participation in the social
world. Poszorm.enyi-Nagy (1965) refers to an "interdependence"
between self and other which defines personality. None of
these concepts can be reduced to a sequence of direct cause and
effect; they rely, instead, on what dialectical theorists refer
to as "reciprocal causality" (Meacham, 1977) . Without such a
construct, the joint goals of articulating a "significant
concept of the person" and an integrated theory of "culture and
personality "
—
that is, the goal of understanding how the person can
simultaneously structure and be structured by his participa-
tion in the v/orld—remain unattainable.
Mv own goals in undertaking Hilda Kroner's life
history^—attempting to integrate concepts from intrapsychic
personalitv theory with the perspective of an interpersonal
svstems theory—are hardly less ambitious than those of the
10
earlier life history researchers. I also follow tradition to
the extent of falling considerably short of achievina a full
integration. Put in a favorable light, what I am presenting
is a picture of work in process—my progress in grappling,
on the filed of Hilda's history, with several of the major
conceptual problems in clinical psychology. Freedman and
I^i^sntz (1980
, p. 11) say that "life histories . . . reguire an
expansion rather than a contraction complexity in order to
explain the phenomena." This is one requirement which I meet
in addressing Hilda's life, albeit sometim.es at the expense of
clarity.
My work on Hilda's history is also an effort at
defining an appropriate framework for studying the individual
]ife. Again, this is an exploration in. progress— I have not
discovered any shortcut to realizing the unfulfilled promise of
3 ife history research. I do, however, have a clear
understanding of the methodological and conceptual
difficulties, and a partial understanding of how to ameliorate
them. In the following pages I present a statement of the
goals of my research, identify the model of science which is
most problematic for the life history in psychology, and offer
a set of methodological and constituitive assumptions which
begin to define a model of inquiry more friendly to life
history research. In the latter half of the chapter, I turn to
the specifics of m.y research, introducing Hilda Kroner and
11
describinQ our collaborative effort in reconstructinq her
history
.
METHODS AND GOALS
Statement of purpose
.
My broadest ambition in this work is to contribute to
a bridge between intrapsychic concepts of personality and the
interpersonal systems perspective on functioning. I approach
this problem by examining a parallel gap in psychoanalytic
theory: the disparity between Freud's clinical theory and the
underlying metapsychology.
My interest in these two problems of divergent levels
of explanation arises from my own clinical work. Like many
recently trained clinicians, I have grown accustomed to
shifting between different theoretical perspectives in my work.
On the one hand systems theory provides a clear framework for
analyzing things which occur between people, e.g.. , comm.unica-
tions, states of relationships, and modes of interaction. It
offers an enormously useful array of what McKinney (1976) calls
"mini-theory," i.e., a conceptual framework for a circumscribe
class of person-situation interactions, such as scapegoating or
triangulation. On the other hand, like many other clinicians,
I find a need for the "grand theory" which has evolved from
Freud's work. It offers a framework for interpreting the
meaning of an extensive range of thought, feeling, and behavior
and presents a comprehensive picture of the person as, in
12
Murray's (1938) words a "discriminating, integrating, differ-
entiating
. . . adapting temporaral unity." Clinicians who
describe themselves a eclectic often mean that thev have come
to live with the need to shift between a systems perspective
and some psychodynamic outgrowth of Freud's model.
Faced V7ith a steady stream, of different problems,
logical consistency and theoretical integration are secondary
concerns for the clinician. Eclecticism is feasible.
Consistency and integration become primary concerns, however,
when the clinician turns theoretician. At this point,
subscribing to divergent levels of analysis becom.es a problem.
So long as the clinician remains v/ithin the framework of
Freud's clinical theory—the language v;hich Freud developed for
describing psychologically meaningful action, e.g.,
identification, ego defense, and oedipal rivalry—the problem
is not acute. Systems theory and intrapsychic concepts of this
sort can be seen as alternate perspectives on an event,
competing with but not necessarily negating each other. VJhen
the clinician moves on to abstract explanation, however, the
problem becomes serious. It becomes necessary to invoke an
inner world of conflicting propulsive forces and substantive
entities—Freud's metapsychology—which cause the person's
action. At this level of analysis, svstem.s perspectives and
intrapsychic theory do negate each other; behavior cannot be at
once dependent upon its context and wholly determined from
within. Even v/orse, the psychodynamic model of explanation
13
relegates inany of the descriptive concepts, such as defense and
identification, which seem most compatible with a systems
perspective to a status of marainal reality, definina them as
the superficial m.anifestations of an underlying interplay of
energies. Eclecticism becomes untenable.
One measure of Freud's genius is his success in
developing two such contradictory models of analvsis: a
clinical theory which adds meaning to behavior by focusing on
the complexities of purposive adaption and socialization and a
metapsycholoay which is meant to render the clinical
descriptions scientific by reducing them, ultimate],y, to a
pyhsio-chemical process.
The distinction between the two models is subtle in
Freud's work—he saw them as one. In the hands of his
follovrers, both sides of the theory have become more elaborate.
The divergence has become sharp. It appears, for instance, in
the frequent use of a double language of description in psycho-
analytic writing, sometimes within the space of a sinale sen-
tence :
It has been fascinating to observe how the prototype
of outward-directed attention cathexis evolves—how
the normal infant's differentiation process is guided
by the pattern of 'checking back' to the mother
(Mahler, 1968, p. 17).
Ironically, it is the clinical theory which now seems
more scientific. This’ problem has been receiving increasing
attention within the psychoanalytic community (G. Klein, 1965;
Home, 1966, Rycroft, 1966; Holt, 1972; and Schafer, 1976).
14
V7hil© these authors differ in the solutions they propose, thev
are in broad agreement in their analysis of the problem: the
metapsychology inhibits psychoanalysis from accounting for
adaptive striving and the person's active role in structuring
his experience, and it interferes with understanding how the
person's ongoing participation in the social world shapes his
experience—very similar problems to the ones the life historv
movement sought to address.
Klein (1976) suggests that the best course for
dealing with the problems of the m.etapsychology is, for the
time being, to put aside the idea of abstract explanation in
favor of refining and expanding the body- of clinical insights.
He proposes a number of. improvem.ents in the methods of
observation, such as video-taping analytic sessions or opening
them to third party observers, in line with this goal. Klein's
solution is similar to an approach v/hich Allport (1962) recom-
mends for dealing with the problem of generalization in life
history research: developing "ideographic" measures (anchored
in the individual) for studying the "morphoaenic" dimension
(unique features) of personality. Abstracted as a general
approach, these proposals are the solution of naive empiricism.
It is an attractive approach, but it has one serious flaw.
In order to see data as meaningful, you have to
impose a construct upon it. Kuhn (1970) shows that a construct
must, in turn, be related to a general paradigm, an overall
model of the relevant universe. To work explicitly outside one
15
paradigm—as Klein suggests in terms of the metapsychology
—
means m.oving implicitly inside another.
The prevailing paradigm acts as a Zeitgeist
, a
constant influence on inquiry embedded in the language and
implicit assumptions of a field. As the experience of the life
history movement shows, the Zeitgeist cannot safely be ignored.
Making a person's life, rather than a trait or a learning
curve, the focus of inquiry is not in itself sufficient.
Adopting an alternative technology of observation, no matter
how sophisticated, is not enough. It is necessary first to
identify the barrier in the current model of inquiry, and then
to replace it with an alternative set of assumiptions . In the
next pages I attempt these two steps, first giving a negative
definition of life history research and then outlining the
alternative assumptions which guide my reconstruction of Hilda
Kroner's life.
Troublesome assumptions.
Life history research is not part of the role which
Hebb (1949) ascribes to the psychologist:
The role of the psychologist (is) to reduce the
vagaries of thought to a mechanical process of cause
and effect . . . Modern psychology takes completely
for granted that behavior and neural function are
perfectly correlated, that one is completely caused
by the other. There is not a separate soul or life
force to stick a finger in the brain now and then
. . .
there is no room for a mysterious agent that is
defined as not physical and yet has physical effects.
16
Hebb expresses, in bald terms, the modern evolution
of Cartesian thought as it applies to psychology. Yankelovitch
and Barrett (1970)
,
two authors who have made a major effort at
untangling the philosophical underpinnings of psychoanalysis,
trace the problem of Freud's metapsychology in psychoanalytic
theory to Descartes' dualism of mind and matter. Because the
modern elaboration of Cartesian thought, scientific
materialism, is sometimes taken as the onlv basis for
psychology, I will briefly summarize their analysis of
Cartesianism to show where it is inappropriate for clinical
inquiry
.
Prior to Descartes, physical objects had been
invested with vital forces, such as purpose and becoming.
Descartes redefined the physical world as abstract matter
extended in space. He reserved the vital forces for the mind,
a non-material entity which Pyle (1949) terms "the ghost in the
machine." In Cartesian thought, certainty and precision derive
from the operations of the mind. Descartes sought a monolothic
ideal of knowledge and found it in mathematics. He initiated
the doctrine of "clear and distinct ideas," i.e., that
knowledge is achieved by reducing a complex state to its
simplest, ideally quantitative, components, which can then be
subjected to analysis. Through Newtonian physics this
cosmology evolved into scientific materialism, which views the
universe as the sum of elementary particles of matter and
energy located in space and interrelated through a fev;
17
drnmutable laws. In this ^^iewpoint, Descartes’ immaterial mind
is no longer necessary. Knowledge derives from the reductive
^rialysis of a complex whole into its additive components, which
register on the senses or measuring device of the observer and
act in accordance with their lawful regulation.
A great many phenomena admit to reductive analysis,
to the extent that it is often equated with "scientific"
analysis. It contains, howe^^-er, an opportunity to engage in
two logical fallacies, which Whitehead (1925) terms "misplaced
concreteness" and "simple location." Whitehead defines the
former as "neglecting the degree of abstraction involved when
an actual entity is considered merely insofar as it exemplifies
certain categories of thought" (in Korzybski, 1958, p. 369).
Yankelovitch and Barrett (1970, p. 230) describe the latter
fallacy as "the attempt to circumscribe the place of any
phenomenon in an oversimple and absolute way."
In applying materialistic assumptions to
psychological phenomena, the potential to engage in these
companion fallacies is strong. Both are exemplified in the
above quote from Hebb; thought and behavior are reified as
mechanical processes which can be traced ultimately to events
which occur in the synapse between neurons.
Few contemporary psychologists in social or
personalitv research would "take completely for granted the
materialistic assumptions expressed in Hebb's statement. On
the other hand, many would find it hard to envision functioning
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without the subjective sense of security which comes in working
from Cartesian-Newtonian assumptions, i.e., from reducing
phenomena to a framework of "clear and distinct" abstractions
which admit to precise, ideally Quantifiable, measurement. So
long as the abstractions are sufficiently clear and the
appropriate calculations are applied, any single investigation
in this model can deliver an immediate sense of certaintv,
e.g., that the investigator has significant grounds for
rejecting his null-hypothesis. At the same time, the cost of
basing inquiry exclusively on this model is that it creates
irresolvable uncertainty over the existence of phenomena v/hich
do not admit to clear measurement. This problem can be seen in
the continuing debate over the question of scientific study of
the "self" (see Mischel, 1977), and in the fact that this
debate is often conducted solely in terms of the devices
constructed for measuring the "self."
The im.pact of the materialistic model is also
reflected in the fragmented output of current research in
social and personality psychology, and the virtual
disappearance of work on "grand theory" (McKinney, 1976) . A
new generation of critics decries the same gaps in knov^ledge
first noted by the life history movement, what Sanford (1965)
calls the arowth of a "psychology-without-a-person
.
" Critics,
in fact, have become so numerous that one can wonder who is
left to criticize. Carlson (1973), however, makes it clear
that the vast majority of researchers opt for the immediate
19
security of the Cartesian-Newtonian model of inquiry, at a
great cost to integration of theory. In a detailed analysis of
the research published over the course of a year in two leading
journals of social and personality psychology, Carlson finds
that: " not a single published study attempted even minimal
inquiry into the organization of personality variables within
the individual ” ( Ibid
.
,
p. 209, original emphasis).
In physics, discovery of the bev;ildering world of
interrelated processes which constitute an atom, has redefined
the idea of "location” as a high abstraction and the notion of
deterministic causality as a convenient fiction. It seems
unlikely that a similar discovery in psychology could reorient
the field. In borrowing its basic assumptions from, a distant
field of inquir''^, psychology may have cut itself off from the
tendency toward self-correction and revision normally built
into a model. The immediate sense of certainty which comes
from manipulating "clear and distinct" abstractions ironically
supports an attitude of blind faith in reductive analysis.
Hebb
,
for example, can take his materialistic assumptions
"com.pletelv for granted" because he has such a potent ally in
the unknown—the gap between thought and neural process is so
wide, both logically and empirically, that he might always be
able to cite insufficient current knowledge to account for
the
failure to show a causal linkage between . phenomena on
two
disparate levels of abstraction.
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If we start by abandoning the larger issues of
personality as unscientific, it is unlikely that we will ever
come around to a scientific understanding of them. I have
built up to this point at such length in order to show that,
regardless of whether the assumptions I propose are adequate,
some alternative set—which relates specificallv to the
pi^oblems psychology seeks to address—
—is sorely needed.
If the Cartesian—Newtonian model of inauiry can be
taken to represent an extreme position on one end of a
continuum, the extreme of reliance on preconceived
abstractions, phenomonolgy and naive empiricism would occuoy
points at the opposite extreme. Husserl's "to the things
themselves" and Wittgenstein's "don't think, look!" both imply
an extreme confidence in the possibility that, once he has
"bracketed" his preconceptions, the investigator can "see" the
phenomena under study in som.e true form. Certainty, in this
model, is "out there" to be discovered in, as Barker (1964, pp.
5-6) puts it, "phenomena as they exist unarranged by the
investigator and without input from the methods used to reveal
them.
"
The model of research which I am proposing for the
life history occupies a middle ground between the extremes of
confidence in preconceived abstractions and faith in the
ability to see "the things themselves." In this middle
position knowledge is conceived as a product of the interaction
between the investigator, who imposed preconceived theoretical
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cons tructiions on the data, and the subject, who can provide new
data to confirm, contradict, redefine, or otherwise alter the
investigator's constructions. Because there is no logical end
point to this transaction, no single investigation can
establish findings with the certainty that, say, hypothetico-
deductive procedures convey. Because the investigator employs
a conceptual framework which, from the start, defines and
places the relevant data within a preconceived context, no
claims to "discovery," of the sort advanced by the radical
empiricists can be made. Certainty and discovery are
themselves transactional concepts in this model, defined
through correction and elaboration of an investigator's work
within a community of social scientists—which occurs, in any
case, whenever an experimenter attem.pts to generalize beyond
his immediate data.
Clinical inquiry as a dialectical process .
One curious feature of psychoanalysis is that a
number of Freud's major clinical concepts are now accepted as
established facts, while the way in which he established them
remains obscure. Unconscious motivation, oedipal rivalries,
and intrapsychic conflict, for example, are recognized as
commonplace truths, even by many v/ho would not credit Freud
with employing a valid mode of research. Most of the members
of the life history movement, unfortunately, fell into the
Had they been able to regard, as Murray (1938,latter group.
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p. 33) put it, "the deep, significant
. . . and Questionable
speculations of psycho-analysis" v/ith a less ambivalent
attitude, they might have begun to refine a model of
interpretive reconstruction from the example presented by
Freud. Part of the problem was that Freud's understanding of
his own techniaue developed gradually; his belief in the
uncovering of a literal past and his notion of manipulating
psychic energies obscured his understanding of the ai^^e-and-
take between patient and therapist which is at the core of
psychoanalytic exploration. Even outside of psychoanalysis,
all but the most manipulative or dogmatically here-and-now
orierted models of psychotherapy rely on a dialogue between
patient and therapist to construct a picture of the patient's
relevant history. I will refer to this process of
collaborative exploration as clinical inquiry and use the term
interchangeably with life history research.
The psvcholoqical life history has been revitalized
in recent years within the emerging field of adult developm.ent
(e.g. Maas and Kuypers , 1974; Vaillant, 1977) . Levinson
(1978)
,
who has made a particularly significant contribution to
this revitalization,, employs several of the main principles of
the model of clinical inquiry which I am attempting to define.
Rather than restrict himself to the focus on a
discrete stage of development in occupational or family career,
Levinson attempts to construct a picture of the entire course
of adult development from biographical data collected
through
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interviews with forty male subjects. In addition to regarding
the individual life as his basic unit of analysis, Levinson
shares another of the central ideas of the life history
movement: "we need to encompass both self and society ... to
take seriously the idea that the self exists in the world and
its evolution is intimately bound together v/ith that world"
(1978, p. 47). He approaches this goal by analyzing what he
calls the "life structure" of each of his subject:
. . . the underlying pattern or design of a person's
life at a aiven time . . . Through it we may examine
the interrelations of self and world— to see how the
self is in the world, and the world is in the self
[Ibid
.
, pp. 41-42]
.
Levinson includes three broad features in his
definition of a life structure: (1) the individual's
sociocultural context, (2) the conscious and unconscious
aspects of self as described in the psychodynam.ic model of
personality, and (3) the individual's "participation in te
world . . . [the] transactions betv/een self and world" (Ibid . ,
pp. 42-43) . He examines the latter and most important
component of a life structure by focusing on the individual's
"choices." To make a choice, as Levinson uses the term, means
to establish a conscious or unconscious relationship to
something: "The relationship becomes the vehicle for living
out certain aspects of the self and for engaging in certain
modes of participation in the world" (Ibid . , p. 44). Levinson,
in other words, uses the concepts of "choice and life
structure" as a way of viewing inner experience and outer
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behavior as interdependent, mutually entailing aspects of a
person's involvement in social life, thus eliminating the hard
distinctions between subjective and object’ or personality and
social structure which plagued earlier life history research.
He also differs from his predecessors in that he comfortably
accepts the interpretive role of the investigator:
We began by immersing ourselves in the interview
material and working tov/ard an intuitive
understanding of the man and his life. Gradually we
tried more interpretive formulations and, going back
and forth between the interviews and the analysis,
came to a construction of the life course [Ibid., p.
16] .
Although Levinson never uses the term, what he
describes is a model of dialectica*! inquiry. Rather late in my
own work on Hilda's life, I came to recognize that the
dialectical perspective provides a useful framework for
describing the approach which I had adopted.
It is difficult to give a concise definition of
dialectical inquiry. Sennet (1977, p. 6), who takes a
dialectical approach in his analysis of change in attitudes
toward public life, states that; "A dialectical inquiry means
that the argument is complete only when the book comes to an
end"—the whole of what he has to say about his use of
dialectics. I will be somewhat less cavalier and promise that
what I mean by a dialectical perspective should be clear by the
end of chapter three, outlining here only points which apply
directly to data gathering and analysis.
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A principal assumption in the dialectical perspective
is that the relevant universe is a totalitv of interrelated
elements, as opposed to an arrangement of fixed entities. No
element can be understood when detached from its relations,
each defines and is defined by the others (Meacham, 1977 )
.
Applied to psycholoay, this perspective focuses inquiry on the
person's modes of relating to, or ways of integrating himself
v^ithin his world—as encom.passed in Levinson's concept of a
"life structure." In directing attention to how the person
simultaneously structures and is structured by his world, a
dialectical perspective assigns an equal status to inner
experience and outer behavior.. Rather than seeking to reduce
one to the other, dialectical inquiry attempts to establish the
relationship between the private and public aspects of an
event, to determine how one implies the other—Levinson's
"choice" is an example of a concept which can refer
simultaneously to both .aspects . The inquiry in the therapy
situation is frequently directed toward exactly these goals,
i.e., toward building a contextual understanding of the patient
and seeking to connect his thought and feeling with the events
in his life.
Knowledge, in the dialectical view, is an active
construction, rather than a record of static facts. It derives
from a dialectical interplay between theory and data the "back
and forth" activity which Levinson describes in relation to his
interpretive formulations and interview records. Although the
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goal of this interaction is synthesis, or v/hat Becker (1970)
calls grounded theory , ” it is often achieved by seeking out
and highlighting contradiction—another close parallel to the
process of exploration in psychotherapy.
In life history research, the process of resolving
contradictions belongs more to the stage of analysis than
interviewing, both because the contract to interpret and
confront implicit in the therapy situation is missing in the
life history interview and because the investigator is in a
position to attempt a synthesis of the entire range of
material. During the interview stage, the investigator's task
is more a matter of facilitating contradiction, that is, it is
desirable to keep the interviews sufficiently unstructured so
as to maximize the subject's opportunity to present material
which contradicts the investigator's preconceived formulations.
In presenting Hilda's history, I have attempted to
preserve this quality of dialectical tension in several ways.
In order to give the reader an impression of my role in the
unfolding of Hilda's story, I present a number of the excerpts
from our interviews intact, with m.y questions and comments
included. I move back and forth between Hilda's narrative and
my analysis throughout the presentation. In the early
chapters, these separate passages are in large blocks. Chapter
two is largely a presentation of excerpts from our interviews,
with mv contribution directed toward highlighting the problems
for synthesis. Chapter three, a discussion of theoretical
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concepts, refers back to Hilda's account, but contains few
direct quotes. In the succeeding chapters I intermix analysis
and narrative more freely, to the point where, ideally, Hilda's
account and my theory unfold hand in hand.
Clinical inquiry as history .
Clinical inquiry relies extensively on the subject's
ability to reconstruct the past. It must therefore start with
a clear understanding of (a) the nature of memory and (b) the
process of historical reconstruction. In chapters two and
three I discuss these issues in detail, focusing first on the
particular qualities of Hilda's reconstruction and then turning
to general theoretical considerations. I will preface this
discussion with a few basic points.
Several studies have documented the unreliability of
the person's memory of an event as a source of literal data
(Yarrow, 1970? Lieberman, 1971). The fact that what people
remember of the past may not correspcnd closely' with what
actually happened only presents a problem, hov;ever , when it is
not recognized. Freud's discovery that some of what his
p£itients remembered was shaped by fears and wishes considerably
advanced, rather than invalidated, his clinical theory. Freud
moved closer to an understanding of what Muller describes as
the essence of historical inquiry;
Historians can more nearly approach the detachment of
the physicist when they realize that the historical
"reality" is symbolic, rot physical, and that they
are giving as well as finding meanings. The
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ii^portant meanings of history are not simply there,
lined up, waiting to be discovered
. . . The progress
iri historical knowledge has not been a steady advance
toward absolute truth
, .
. [but] a progressive
clarification, a fuller consciousness of what
happened and how and why [1952, pp. 32-33].
Wyatt draws on a similar understanding of history in
analyzing the role of the therapist in a patient's reconstruc-
tion of his past;
Interpretation is ... a ^’ery general name for a
variety of therapeutic actions which have in common
only that the therapist "intervenes" by establishing
a relationship between the various statements the
patient has previously produced. In doing so the
therapist arrives at a proposal of a meaning
. . .
Far from pretending certainty, [interpretations] are
devises to search out and arrive at a plausible
construction [1963, p. 316, original emphasis].
The therapist and historian, in other words, both
deal with data which cannot be understood in isolation fromits
context. Both aive meaning to their data by reconstructing the
context, "establishing a relationship between various
statements." Defining clinical inquiry as an historical inves-
tigation is another way to state the dialectical principle of
focusing on interrelationship.
The need for a theory of reasons.
Causality is a slippery concept in psychology. Ryle
(1949) draws an important distinction between causes and
reasons. He uses the example of a stone breaking a sheet of
glass to illustrate the distinction. There are two senses in
which the event can be explained; "because the stone hit it,"
or "because ’the glass was brittle." The first draws a direct
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cause and effect relationship between the stone and the broken
glass; the second describes a property of the glass, its
brittleness, and serves as a conditional statement, if struck
it would break. Ryle considers the latter a reason and not a
cause
.
Schafer (1976, pp. 228-232) draws out several of the
implications of Ryle's distinction for psychology. He argues
that the goal of the clinical theory which developed in tandem
with Freud's metapsychology is the explication of reasons. He
points out that hov^ a person acts in a given situation is an
expression of his personal definition of the situation, and
notes that this definition implies a psychic reality: "In
order to take into account psychic reality or the world as
experienced, which is the world of meaning and private
activity, one must shift to explanation in. terms of reasons
rather than causes or conditions." Clinical inquiry, in other
words, is less concerned with determ.ining the proximate cause
of behavior than with understanding why people do what they do.
The reasons which a person can give to account for
his actions are necessary but not sufficient for a full "ex-
planation in terms of reasons." On top of the potential
complexity of factors which enter into a situation, there are
what Schafer calls "all those additional difficulties
introduced by one's intricate and consequential reasons for not
faithfully recognizing or acknowledging all of one's reasons to
oneself as well as to others." Part of the role of the
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i^''^®stigator is to refine and expand upon the reasons
which the subject supplies by drawing on a general theory of
the problems people have with reasons, e.g.
,
the theory of
defense in psychoanalysis,
Schafer's definition of psychic reality is close to
the dialectical view that the separate aspects of a totalitv
mutually define each other. He argues that the terms reason,
meaning, action, and situation all ”co-constitute" or co-
define each other as psychological concepts. What he means by
"co-constitution” is that to give a reason for an action is to
define its meaning in a given situation. If you include
thought and emotional reaction in the term action, as Schafer
does, the person's situation is, in turn, co-defined by his
action in it. Schafer sees this conglomerate construction of
psychic reality as saved from chaotic relativism by a.
fundamental assumption that "whenever one sees oneself as being
in the same situation, one will react the same way"—his
rephrasing of Freud's concept of repetition compulsion. In
other v7ords, clinical inquiry becomes a matter of interpreting
the reasons a person acts in the particular way he does through
recurring significant situations in his life.
I v/ould add two other factors which can prevent
analysis of reasons from becoming a chaotic approach to
inquiry. The first is that the investigator can employ a
svstematic model of m.eaning, such as the models of relationship
in psychoanalytic or family systems theory, to aid both in
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selectinq which actions to focus on and in inteqratina a
person's particular reasons within a framework of general
meanings. The second factor is that, if you expand the term
situation to include developmental stages and broad adaptive
tasks, general theory can again provide a useful context in
which to anchor the actions of a particular person.
Explanation as redescription
.
Defining explanation in clinical inquiry as a form of
redescription is a way to summarize the preceding points:
achieving synthesis between data and theory, interpreting the
meaning of events by reconstructing their context, and
abstracting the reasons for a person’s actions from an analysis
of their situation are all redescriptive explanation. The main
implication of this overlap between description and explanation
in life history research is that rigorous attention m.ust be
paid to the language used in both the narrative and analytic
sections of the finished work. In preparing Hilda's history I
have tried to follow three general rules:
(1) To narrow the gap between my explanatory language
and Hilda's terms of description insofar as possible. This
rule can be iustified in a number of ways. It follovrs, for
example, from the idea of grounded theory; in order to remain
anchored in the data, the theory must be expressed on at least
remotely similar terms. Put abstractly, a true synthesis must
transform the original elements without destroying them.
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(2) To doscribe Hilda as an activa aoant in h©r
psychological life. Of the several proposals for correcting
the problems imposed by the metapsychology in psychoanalytic
theory, Schafer s (1976) is the most radical; excise anv
suggestion of internal physical entities, personified agents,
drives, mechanisms, or forces by adhering stringentlv to the
rules of an action language. Schafer's fundamental rule is
that
;
One shall regard every psychological process, event,
experience, response, or other item of behavior as an
action, and one shall designate it by an active verb
and, when appropriate and useful, by an adverbial
locution that states the m.ode of this action [Ibid.,
p. 363].
The intent of Schafer's rule is to avoid the
reification of emotion and misattribution of responsibility for
behavior which is implicit in everyday, as well as
psychoanalytic, language. It is a rule which I honored more in
its breach, that is, it helped me to recognize the issues of
locus of responsibility and "doing v. undergoing" in both
Hilda's and my own descriptions of her experience. It was
particularly helpful in alerting me to expressions of
dissociation. But I found it often too constricting—many
experiences are best described as undergone and require the use
of metaphor.
(3) To use theoretical terms which imply inter-
^•0 lation sh ip . Some actions entail a mutual structuring or in
terpenetration of subject and object. These are often
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to describe in a single term. Levinson's concepts of
"choice" and "life structure" are examples of terms designed
for this purpose. The ones which I have adopted in
reconstructing Hilda's life are Piaget's concepts of "schema"
and "accommodation," and Boszormenyi-Nagy
' s "loyalty bonds."
The use of the collaborative relationship
.
The product of the collaboration between investigator
and subject in life history research is a two person personal
document; each invests significant aspects of self in the work.
The intimate relationship which naturally develops is a
uniquely valuable and difficult source of information. It
provides in vivo evidence of the subject in interaction with a
significant other. It gives the investigator a live picture of
the general expectations and issues which the subiect carries
into a close relationship. Hov/ the subject handles the comings
and goings of the investigator, the requirem.ent of
self-revelation, and the inevitable frustrations in the work,
for example, are all important considerations.
Equally important, the subject has an impact on the
investigator——an experience which serves as a substrate to the
entire work. Knowledge of how it feels to work closely with
the subject gives the investigator a valuable perspective on
the entire range of the subject's descriptions of interactions
and opens the way for empathic identification, a response which
both facilitates the interview process and deepens the
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investigator
'
s
'understanding of the subject's experience. It
also introduces the problems of projection and countertransfer-
ence, Clinical training and experience in anelyzing the ways
in which he selectively perceives and affects others can
lessen, but never entirely eliminate, the distorting effect of
the investiaatcr ' s projections—he can never be an entirelv
veridical "clinical instrument." LeBarre suggests that "field
ethnography
. . . may be a species of autobiography" (quoted in
Freeman and Krantz
, 1980, p. 5). He has a valid point, but
takes it too far; the investigator unavoidably sees some of
himself in the subject, but he does not invent the other
person. Accurate empathy, which is essential to the work, is
on a continuum with projection. The investigator must
concentrate on determining where one shades into the other, but
it is not a line which he can draw entirely on his own. This
is another respect in which certainty is external to the work,
dependent upon the judgment of colleagues and readers--and
another good reason to include a substantial body of excerpts
from the interviews in the finished work.
To summarize, my primary methodological assumption is
that the notion of direct causality which obtains in the
phvsical sciences cannot be used to account for psychological
functioning through major and complex life situations. It is
necessary, instead, to approach explanations through recon-
structing the meaning of a person's actions within their life
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situation as they define it. Explanation occurs when the
person's reasons are interpreted within the framework of a
general theory which states why people behave similarly in
similarly defined situations. The activity which this model
prescribes for the investigator follows the pattern which
Levinson (1978) describes, i.e., going back and forth between
the interview data and progressively refined interpretive
formulations. The end product is what Becker (1970) refers to
as "grounded theory," a plausible theoretical construction
which preserves the content of events as experienced. While
certainty is unobtainable in this model, plausibility can be
established through the following steps: (1) specifying
initial theoretical assumptions; (2) following a clear approach
to the selection and descriptive interpretation of events and,
above all (3) presenting sufficient interview data so that the
value of the theory as an integrative construction can be
judged in relation to a broad range of events as described by
the subject.
Theoretical Background
None of the theoretical concepts which I employ in
analyzing Hilda's life are original. I draw liberally on ideas
from several theoretical perspectives, in part because my goal
is to synthesize theory and, equally, because the adequate
psychological treatment of a life requires an expansive, rather
than a reductive analysis. Although I am responsible for the
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particular forrr that my synthesis takes, I follow lines of
integration suggested by a number of other writers. What
clarity I have, both in my view of Hilda's life and in seeing
the points of convergence in the field, is achieved by standing
on a good many shoulders. In order to acknowledge mv debts at
the outset, I would like to mention a few of the theorists who
have influenced my thinking, but do not appear prominentlv in
my theoretical discussion in chapter three.
A number of theorists in recent years have been
seeking to connect the two schools of thought which developed
in parallel from Freud's original clinical theory: ego
psychology, which focuses on the processes of establishing
and maintaining intrapsychic organization; and object relations
theory, which addresses itself to the strong tendency toward
interpersonal attachment. Several theorists with roots in the
latter school (e.g. Jacobson, 1964; Mahler, 1968) stress the
influence of interpersonal attachment on cognitive developm.ent
.
Mahler's (1975) work on symbiosis and individuation, in
particular, is a strong background influence on my thinking.
Loevinger (1969) and Breger (1974) som.ewhat reverse the
emphasis, focusing on the way in which cognitive development
facilitates integration in the interpersonal world. Both of
these theorists connect Piagetian concepts with traditional ego
theory. Although my use of Piaget differs from theirs, they
provide my model—especially Breger who contributes sub-
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stantially to my understanding of the cognitive aspect of
dissociation
.
The idea that Boszormenyi-Nagy
' s interpersonal theorv
opens the possibility of an integration betv;een intrapsychic
and relational theory has been suggested by several of my
colleagues (Baker, 1974: Karpel, 1976: and Starker, 1980).
Stierlin (1969) shows the value of a dialectical perspective in
undertaking such an intearation—another important part of the
background of my thinking, particularly on the issue of
schizophrenia
.
Finally, I owe my view of the self as an organization
of experience—as well as my interest in first person accounts
of schizophrenia as a focus of research— to Epstein. His
theory of personality as a hierarchical structure of "major
postulate systems for the nature of the world, the nature of
the self, and their interaction" (Epstein, 1972, p. 11) was my
first introduction to the idea that the insights of ego
psychology and object relations theorv could be freed of their
accompanying baggage of metaphysical energies and reified
entities. It also showed me that the structuring of experience
could be viewed as a motivational force—two ideas which are at
the heart of my attempt to integrate intrapsychic and
relational theory.
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Hilda Kroner
Hilda is a short, sturdily built woman, in her early
eighties. A red complexion and high level of activity give her
an appearance of health. Her mental acuity and stamina seem
little impaired by age. She has considerable nervous energy.
Hilda has a number cf attributes v/hich m.ake her an
ideal subject for my project. The m.ost significant is that she
is a highly self-ref lective/ self-absorbed person. She has
devoted a considerable portion of her life energy to what she
terms "figuring out" her past experience and relationships.
She is also gifted with an acute mind and can be remarkably
—
though often idiosyncratically—expressive in describing her
emotional experience and interpersonal relationships.
Hilda's chronology .
Hilda was born at the turn of the century. She was
the first daughter and second of eight children in the Mendahl
family. Her father, Jacob, was a Ph.D. chemist who spent most
of his career in private industry. Emily, her mother, ran the
household, participated in a woman's literary group, and was
active in the PTA.
Hilda was ill frequently during her earliest years.
The Mendahls also moved several times in this period. They
settled, when Hilda was six, in Hudson, a medium-sized city
several hours up river from New York. The first signs of
emotional disturbance in Hilda's life appear during her mid-
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childhood: she suffered periodic depressions, pervasive
feelincfs of beina "not worth it," and thouahts of suicide. She
felt she was regarded as "continually bad" in the home.
Particularly in the eyes of her mother.
Adolescence was a brighter period. Hilda became a
member of a clique of young women in her church, dated several
men, and became engaged to a classmate, Richard, just prior to
leaving for college.
Her first year of college was a jolting experience.
She was beset by fears that she would be forced into a homo-
sexual relationship, and the humiliating experience of
initiation into a sorority precipitated her first breakdo\m, a
recurring experience of intense and uncontrollable screaming.
She returned home and married Richard.
Hilda and Richard lived together for six years,
moving several times between his parent's home and various
apartments in a nearby state. Durina this time Hilda had a
miscarriage and two successful deliveries, both sons. The
marriage, never stable, was increasingly stressed by the needs
of child rearing. During the last year or so of this period
Hilda wrote her first book. Fire of Spring .
Hilda left Richard and moved into the house of a
friend in Altam.ont, an artists’ community near Hudson, where
she became involved in a triangular relationship with an
artist, Phillip / and his wife Susan. For the next six years
Hilda lived with Phillip and Susan, worked as a cook and
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teacher in a progressive school which they jointly ran, and had
a daughter, Ruth, by Phillip. During this tine her mother
became overtly psychotic and had to be kept under close watch
by the family—several of whom moved home for the purpose.
Af'ter three years of confinement at home, she committed
suicide. These events prompted Hilda to write her second book,
Beauty, I Wonder
,
which she describes as an attempt at
"rectifying the image of my mother in my mind." Her approach
was to reconstruct her own and her m.other's experience of
childhood and marriage fused into the life of a single
protagonist.
After her mother's death, Hilda entered a period of
gradually mounting crisis. She began to experience her
triang^lar relationship as oppressive.
She wrote a third book, Ishtar
,
which, in contrast -to
the explicitly personal content of her previous tv.’O works, was
a synthesis of Persian and Judaic mythical them.es of femininity
and fertility. Initial difficulties in negotiation for
publication upset her, and she angrily withdrew the book from
consideration. She experienced the birth of a second child by
Phillip, Peter, as a severe traum.a. Shortly following Peter's
birth, she had her first prolonged psychotic break, attempted
to drown her daughter Ann by "baptizing" her in the brook which
runs through the Altamont property, and v;as removed to
Boxborough State Hospital.
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Hilda spent the next year and a half at Boxbcrouqh,
immersed in vivid sensory hallucinations, delusions of world
catastrophy
,
rituals of birthgiving and salvation through
dancing and string unravelling, and in the constant company of
inner voices. Follov/ing a near fatal infectious fever, she
enjoyed a rapid remission and was released from the hospital.
Hilda was reluctantly accepted back into her family's
home. An unhappy year followed in which she became
increasingly withdrawn, finally experiencing a full
recrudesence of her psychotic symptoms.
She returned to the hospital and spent the next seven
years on a v/ard for chronically psychotic women. This ward was
administered under a rigid "rule of silence"; the patients were
not allowed to talk. Signs of hallucination or listening to
voices were punished by beating. Hilda remembers being beaten
often
.
Because Hilda was at a higher level of functioning
than the other women, she was given considerable responsibility
for cleaning and housekeeping duties on the ward. At the end
of this period a change in administrative personnel brought her
to the attention of a new psychiatrist, who eventually assisted
in her obtaining a discharge.
By now Hilda was in her early forties. She had been
effectively rem.oved from society for a decade, missed the
Depression and most of World War II, and felt lost with regard
to such relatively simple matters as appropriate dress. She
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did not wish to return to Richard, her family would not take
her back, and she saw no place to go— a dilemma which she
resolved by choosing to remain at the hospital as a member of
the ward staff. Hilda moved into a nurses' dormitory and
resumed contact with the outside v/orld in sparsely m.easured
doses
.
For the next tv.'enty-four years Hilda continued to
v7ork at Boxborough State Hospital. She slowly advanced from
the position of attendant to practical nurse and, eventually,
to being given responsibility in administering a ward. She
carefully saved enough money over these years so that she could
give each of her children the equivalent of the current cost of
four years of college. She also bought, together with her
daughter Ruth, a portion of the Altamont property,
Phillip went, insane in this period, becam>e a patient
at Bcrborouah
,
and died. After twenr.y-six years of legal
marriage, Richard obtained a divorce from. Hilda. Fiftc-c:n years
after her discharge, Hilda wrote a 2C0-paae manascript on her
psychotic experience. Several years later she started Journa
1
at Sixty
,
which focuses on her feelings of isolation in
approaching old age.
A period of serious jll.iess, including an operation
for cancer, followed. On readinv-? Hilda's journal, her daughter
Ruth insisted that it v/as time for her to retire and move back
to the Altamont property.
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^®tir©in0nt, Hilds hss b©©r living in a studio
adjoining Ruth's house. Until recently, Susan, Phillip's v;ife
also maintained her house on the property. Richard died a
short time before the first summer of our interviev/s.
The Data
Background of our involvement
.
My initial contact v/ith Hilda came through her
manuscript on her psychotic experience. A colleague, who was
also interested in first person accounts of schizophrenia, had
obtained the manuscript through a friend related to Hilda.
Impressed by the vivid detail in Hilda's account, I contacted
her and enlisted her participation in a series of biographical
interviev;s over the course of a summer.
Vly original conception of research on Hilda’s life
was to provide the phenomologica 1 equivalent of Barker's (1954)
"specimen records" of uninterpreted behavioral descriptions of
3 segment of a subject's life, i.e., to organize all the
"concrete details" of her experience into a body of "raw data"
uiicontaminated by preconceived theoretical notions. The
product of this effort (James, 1S77) persuaded me that it is
easier to be naive than empirical.
Through subseouent clinical work with schizophrenics,
I becam.e increasingly aware of the force and ccmplexitiy of
attachment in psychological functionina. I axso came to see
that Hilda had focused much of her account of the past or her
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attachments. I recontinued interviews with her two summers
after our first contact for the purpose of this oroject.
Our interviews
.
I met with Hilda for a total of ten days of
interviev/ing
,
seven in the first summer, three in the second.
This represents about 55 hours of formal interviewing, 32 of
v/hich have been tape recorded and transcribed (two days were
lost due to equipment and operator failure).
Cur interviews v/ere relatively unstructured. For our
first several meetings, I prepared a number of questions
regarding points in her writings which I asked her to amiplify.
My original rationale for this approach was to avoid im.pcsing
my cv;n structure on Hilda's story-— in retrospect, it v/as a way
to lessen the anxiety cf facing the vast expanse of a
stranger's lifetime experience. Discussion of points from her
writing rem.ained the nominal structure for about half of our
meetings. But even from the start, Hilda readily fol.Lov;ed the
train of her own associations—a tendency which I encouraged.
She was a very active informant. She thought a great deal
about the project during the weeks between. i.nterviews, and
often presented nev/ areas she wished, to cover. Hilda was
respectful of my role as investigator, but rarely let
inopportune Questioning interfere with her pursuit of a
subiect—structure, in short, was substantially in her hands.
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The second summer of interviewing had a different
quality; it was more casual, and I engaged more activelv in
discussion of Hilda's experience. I directed the interviews
toward filling gaps in her history, particularly during later
adulthood, and discussing her important relationships,
especially with her mother.
Her writing .
I use four of Hilda's writings in reconstructinc her
history: two published semi-autobiographical fictions, Beauty
,
I VJonder (1929) and Fire of Spring (1928) and tv;o
autobiographical accounts, her manuscript on schizophrenia and
her Journal at Sixty .
Beauty, I V7onder follows the experience of a young
woman from, mid-childhood to early adulthood. Significant
experiences include: a troubled relationship with her mother,
a barren marriage, and eventual involvement in a triangular
love affair.
Fire of Spring describes thp experience of a teenage
girl on a summ.er's visit to her father's relatives. The girl
becomes intensely engaged with evangelical religious meetings,
falls into a romance with her visions of Christ, and ultimately
rejects Christ for a human lover.
Both of these books include numerous subplots viewed
from the eyes of characters other than the protagonist. Some-
times these subplots and multiple perspectives integrate, often
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thc^y remain unrelated. The writing style, described on one of
the jackets as "stream of consciousness," is occasionally
disjointed or elliptical, but the stories all follow a definite
plot structure as far as the main character is concerned.
As psychological evidence, I regard both of these
books as, to use Hilda's terms, attempts at "rectifying images"
of significant others in her mind, that is, as an effort at
mastery of difficult emotional situations by recreating then in
fantasy. I v;iil introduce passages from, her fiction—clearly
labelled as such—at the points which seem appropriare in
reconstructing her history.
Her non-fiction autobiography tends to be straight-
forward reporting, particularly her account of schizophrenic
experience. The only area in v/hich her autobiographical
writing consistently fails to comm.unicare a sense of
authenticity is in the v/ay people will m.istreat her for no
apparent reason. She was able to suggest some motivations in
discussing incidents durina cur interviews, but in general this
is a gap in her understanding.
The main criticism which has been levelled against
her writing in general is that she writes about relatively few
life incidents and rarely transcends her own concerns. Whether
or not these qualities are literary flaws, they make the
writing particularly attractive as psychological evidence.
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Her memory
.
Hilda appears to have a superb memory in the
conventional sense of the word. She can recall scenes and
events from the past in minute detail, giving, for example, an
elaborate description of the styling on a prom dress worn ever
half a century ago. , Her descriptions of a situation, when
repeated in different interviews, tend to be very consistent.
In fact, her reliability across the 32 hours of transcribed
tape is striking, particularly when you consider the likelihood
of self-contradiction over such a period interviewing.
Reliability, however, is separate from validity, and
validity has to be defined. Ruling out what Wyatr (1963) calls
the "chimera of a literal reconstruction of the past," the
question of what it is that Hilda reproduces so reliably
becomes rather large. I devote a large portion of chapters two
and three to examining this question.
Our relationship .
Hilda is a person acuraly av/are of the risks to self
in a relationship.
Hilda: I don’t think of myself as a whole person. But when
I react to people, I think I am.—well I do think of
myself as an entity, that way ... I don't analyze
mvself, exactlv. i analvze my reactions to other
people! and rh'eir'.. to mi . . . It's like an
_
interplay that's very dangerous, and very hard to
mianaae
,
and somiet.lmes very dalighrful.
In reconstructing her history, I have attempted no
exercise a similar level of vigilance in analyzing my
reactions
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to her. To the extent that I am accurately aware of it,
Hilda's impact on me is uniquely valuable evidence of her
personality. I have had am.ple opportunity to gather such
. My work on her life has spanned a five ^'^ear period.
We correspond intermittently and I attended her eightieth
birthday party—we have become participants in each other's
lives. For the most part, this level of participation has had
a beneficial influence on my work as a piece of research. I
have gained, for example, an in-depth understanding of the
danger she describes experiencing in her interactions. I have
come to understand her sense of vulnerabilitv at an
intellectual and empathic level, and al.so experienced it as a
disruptive influence and occasional barrier to exploration in
our inuerviews. As I mentioned above, this sort of inform.ation
is the foundation for an interpretive reconstr'accion of her
experience. Insofar as I can communicate it in the finished
v/ork
—
perhaps more implicitly than explicitly— it is what
brings the compelling quality to a life history.
To say that I ha-'^’e an empathic understanding of
important aspects of Hilda's experience is not, of course, to
claim an undistorted view of her as a whole person— if such a
perception is even possible. I have been able no recognize
several areas of distortion. In the initial stages of our
contact, these tended to be problems of distancing. j under-
took the project with the notion that I would be studying a
schizophrenic in her natural setting. I also subscribed to a
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roinantiicized idea t:hat special wisdom follov/s frcr experiencing
an unusual degree of suffering in life. Both of these somewhat
^®^^^^^ichory objectifications were eroded as I came to know
Hilda as a person. At mom.ents of frustration in our
interviews, however, I tended to reintroduce them. VJhen Hilda
was persistently ambiguous in describing an experience, for
example, I tended to perceive her resistance to being
understood—or perhaps my own resistance to understandinc-'-as
either an example of the remnants of pathology or an attempt to
express the ineffable. Both views served to protect m.e from,
confronting our mutual limitations as informant and inter-
viev?er
.
The ongoing collaboration of our interviews vrorked to
correct the distortions of distance, but introduced more subtle
and potent problem.s of closeness. Erikson (1969), in the
conzext of discussing his personal reasons for undertaking a
biography of Gandhi, points out that unconscious motivation
inevitably influences the investigator's work on a life
history, from the stage of selecting a subject onward. The
chief dangers in having an unconscious investment in the work
are, of course, the risks of seeing myself in Hilda, working
cut issues from my own life on the material of hers. There are
good grounds for m.e to be apprehensive of these risks. As an
associate once observed, several features of Hilda's life
parall0 l aspects of miy own. We correspond rather closely in
several of the abstract qiialities of family background. We
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each grew up in a family which was somewhat isolated from its
community, dislocated in the general class structure, and in
the habit of communicating strong values and ideas of sperial-
ness am.ong its members. We have both experienced the dilemma
of feeling simultaneously angry at and protective toward a
parent who has difficulty coping with the reguirements of adult
addition to these similarities of backaround
,
we
several personax charscteristics ; 3 tendenc’' to ruminate
and place a high value on our thoughts and perceptions; an
appreciation for irony; and, when stressed, the habit of adopt-
ing a stance of cautious participation with others, based in
part on a heightened perception of the risks to self in
interaction. All of these similarities are a strong invitation
to see myself in Hilda.
Yet at the same time, projective identification is
not simple’' a risk but a reauirem.ent of life history research.
A moment of sharing an appreciation for Hilda's particular
sense of irony, for instance, might raise the level of intim.acy
in the interviews a notch—rendering the possibility of being
understood slightly more real to Hilda. At the level of
analysis, the parallels in our lives put me in a far better
—
albeit more problematic
—
position to interpret her experience
than, say, the average psychologist off the street. The
identification brings the empathy which is required to
construct a reasonably full picture of a person.
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Hornstein (1976) describes empathy as a process of
"I” and "them” becoming a bond of "we.” Boszormenyi-Nacy
(1973) holds that all bonds between self and other are
maintained by what he calls "invisible loyalties"— a factor
I
which adds considerable difficulty to the task of analyzing the
countertransference in this research. One com.ponent of what
I
I
I
Nagy defines as a loyalty bond is an implicit commitment not to
I
1
violate the boundaries of the relationship, not to transcend
I
the other person's definition of self in the relationship.
I
This is a commitment which I have felt acutely in relation to
; Hilda, and it has had an inhibiting effect on my analysis of
j
her life. In my first effort at presenting her life, it led me
consistently to avoid offerinc any explicit interpretation
! which might threaten what Pascal (1960) calls the subject's
I
"life illusions." During this period, I took a comm.ent which
Murray (1938, p, 17) makes in relation to the analysis of a
I
life historv far too literally: "It must necessarily do
I
I violence to hum-an feelings ... it is the substitution of
I
!
heartless, denotative, referential sitnbcls for the moving
immediacy of living."
Like projection, a sense of loyalty to the subject is
I
!
a double-edged sword; it can have important positive as well as
j
negative implications for the v/ork. For one thing, it makes
' the investigator's ethical responsibility to the subject an
I
j
emotional as. well intellectual commitment. My responsibility
to Hilda, as her life historian, is great. She has handed over
I
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to me what is in a sense her life work—reconstructing her past
for the purpose of understanding herself. To the extent that
she felt a commitment from me over the course of the inter-
views, it no doubt enriched the data gathering. In the analy-
sis, my feelings of responsibility to her probably carry me
through a number of points where I might otherwise lapse from
responsible interpretation in favor of a tempting theoretical
speculation
.
In terms of the construction of theory, it is
interesting to consider how different psychology might be if
all investigators were required to deliver their theoretical
analysis directly to their subjects. Theory.would probably be
constructed along the lines .which interpretation in
psychotherapy naturally takes, i.'e., phrased in terms
comprehensible to the average person; free of reified internal
objects, metaphysical causal agents, and far-fetched specula-
tion? and, at its best, combining sharp discrimination of
details with cognizance of a broader context. The in’^estiga-
tor '
s
imjnediate responsibility to the subject in a life history
can militate, as an internal control in the research, in favor
of these qualities. In pursuing my other commitment to an
adeeuate theoretical analysis of Hilda's life, I have tried to
ensure that mv feelings of loyalty to her result in
interpretations ^>^hich Hilda can recognize, on some level, as
valid.
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Organization and. Presentation
I have reconstructed Hilda's history out of a wealth
of material. The practical demands for organization have been
great. I have employed four devices for this purpose:
(1) Throughout the interviews, and particularly in
our early m.eeting, one of my main interventions was to ask
Hilda to locate events which she was describing v.’ithin the
general sequence of her life—often a minor concern in her own
presentation. I have abstracted the result into a chronology,
presented in a condensed form earlier in this section.
(2) I have made a brief outline of the main topics
covered on each half-hour tape. This enables m.e to look at the
overall sequence of topics in our interviews, and to locate any
lengthy discussion of a particular topic.
(3) I have keyed specific passages in her
aurobioqraphical manuscripts with the corresponding points in
our in.terviev/s . Because I was never able, in the interviews,
to obtain a clear sense of the relationship betv/een events
described in her fictional works and her actual experience, I
abandoned efforts at a detailed analysis of these works.
(4) My main organizational tool is a box of cards
which index, our interviews and Hilda's autobiographical
writing. Each card concerns a specific topic and contains
references, usually with a condensed quote, to the points in
the data where Hilda touches on it (references relevant to more
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than one topic are duplicated on separate cards)
. I am not
sure hov; many cards I have in all— the stack is slightly over
six inches deep when compressed. They are organized into
twelve major categories—e.g.. Family Experience, Self in
Interaction, Work, Marriage, and Our Relationship—most contain
a number of subdivisions. I selected the categories largely on
an apriori basis, but a number of subdivisions emerged from the
data. For example, instances of irrational cruelty on the parr
of others toward Hilda proved to merit a separate subsection in
Self in Interaction. The final shape of the index also changed
my conceptualization of the data somewhat. I v/as surprised to
find, for example, that the category of Self (e.g., self de-
scriptions, feelings about herself, statements of interests,
talents, etc.) was only a fraction of the size of references to
Self in Interaction with others.
J intersperse sections from Hilda’s writing and,
especially, passages from the interviews throughout my
presentation of her history. I try to keep the transitions
between my narrative and her's clear by presenting all
interview oassaces c'^er four l ines long as a block guote
,
identifying Hilda and myself when we both speak in a guote.
Whenever T combine excerpts drawn from, different points in the
interviews I m.ark the transition with a dash at the beginning
of the next paragraph. Hilda’s intoxication in describing her
experiences is sometim.es very expressive. I have tried to
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preserve some of this quality by underlining words she
particularly emphasizes.
Four Questions
In closing this introduction, I would like to raise
the four main issues which pose a challenge for a psychological
understanding of Hilda's life.
(1) V7hat makes interpersonal interaction uniquely
"dangerous and difficult to manage" for Hilda.
(2) VJhat accounts for the striking repetition of
certain painful dyadic ar.vd triangular relationships which
characterize Hilda ' s life—what she at one point describes as
the ''dragon" she has to do battle with in her relationships.
(3) What happened, at a psychological le'^'^el, in her
breakdown and recovery from schizophrenia.
(4) How tc account for Hilda's persistently fragile
sense of being "located" the world, her vulnerability tc
feelings of depersonalization.
Hilda: . . . And I say [to mv daughter] "I can't see myself
Ruth !
"
"VJell, you could if you wanted to," she says—This i
not true, though.
C.J.: Could you say more about that?
Just as in the same way I can't even believe this is
happening. I can't honestly believe I'm sitting her
alive, talking to you. And I've never been able “o
accomplish that, read.ily.
Hilda
:
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C . J . :
Hilda:
C.J. :
Hilda:
How do you mean? In what way has it been hard to
accomplish?
Well, I say: "This is actually happening, I'm here,
Cartney's there, I live here, that's Ruth, my
daughter"—But I say to myself, "You're kidding. No
that's really true, that's happening."
As we sit here?
Anytime I stop to figure it out ... I don't knov;
how other people are located that way ... I have to
insist to myself that it is real, otherwise it
doesn't come to me as real, it can't be— it can't he
that I'm alive, you see?
CHAPTER II
EARLY FAMILY LIFE
Hilda and the Family Past
Hilda's parents, Jacob and Eirily, met at the
University of Minnesota. Jacob Mendahl, the son of German-
American farmers, v;as an assistant professor of chemical
engineering. Emily Hamilton, a scion of Philade]phia gentry,
v;as a "student of languages." They married, set up
housekeeping in Cold Water, a town near the University, and
bore their first two children, James and Hilda. Around the
time of Hilda's birth, Jacob discovered a catalytic agent which
perfected the formula for an alloy of steel soon tc become
important in large scale construction. He was rev/arded fcr
this discovery with stock and a position in a m.ajor steel
companv. Jacob embarked, with the family in tow, or a series
of moves to m.ining towns and camps across the mid-Atlantic
states, where he supervised the ccrstruction of plants which
employed the process he had helped develop. In the course of
these relocations a third child, Isabel, v/as added zo the
family, and a fourth, Eleanor, was born only to die in infancy.
During Hilda's sixth year, the Mendahls settled in
Hudson, a medium sized city in the Catskill region of ^'ew York.
This last move constituted the family's "arrival"; They
occupied a large home in a comfortable middle-class
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neighborhood, servants were added to the household, Jacob began
to establish himself in the business world of New York Citv,
and Emily became active in several social/education groups.
The Mendahls settled into a routine of family life which
held for the remainder of Hilda’s youth. Apart from her few
group involvements, Mrs. Mendahl devoted herself to managing
the household and Mr. Mendahl spent the week v/orking in
Manhattan, returning to Hudson— a long commute even by today's
standards—on weekends. Sundays were the "family day." The
Mendahls would attend Presbyterian church and return to a large
family dinner, after which Emily would retire "with a headache"
and Jacob would take the children for a long walk. These
weekend parental contacts gradually produced four additional
members to round out the roster of Hilda's siblings at a full
seven
.
The preceding sketch of the Mendahl family history is
abstracted from the wealth of recollected events, practices,
and relationships v;hich serves as a main focus for the
considerable energy which Hilda devotes to reviewing and
reworking her past. These early experiences of family life
have remained distinctly "alive" for her. Much of the v/ritir.g
v;hich she has produced over the course of her life is an effort
at depicting or imaginatively reshaping aspects of her early
family context. In her current reconstruction of the past, she
presents the circumstances of her early family situation with
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such a sense of iminediacy that it is easy to lose sight of the
fact that the intrusive siblings she describes are now grav
heired grandparents
,
the parents with whom she can take issue
so vigorously are some three generations in their grave, and
the principal actor—Hilda— is, herself, at the far end of her
life cycle.
Hilda's active involvement v/ith the past gives her
the position of oral historian within her present day family
circle, a role which she pursues with a sense of mission.
Hilda: I now can enjoy [my siblings] as people
,
but I don't
expect to discuss m.yself, my inner . . . soul, so to
speak, to any of them. But I have been very jolly
friends since I . . . retired—especially when we
have get-togethers, family parties now in groups.
And they always say to me, "Now Hilda, you remember
better than any of us, things which occurred way back
in Minnesota, all the things that happened at home,
when we were children. Nov/ tell us this and tell us
that."—And I've become a great storyteller
. . .
sort of. And I don't— I tell it as I rem.ember
it. This—we're very happy to be together at big
dinners, you know, big Thanksgivings, and
Christm.asses
,
and Easters.
C.J. : So in some v;ays you've l-jeccm.e the one that kncv's the
family best?
Hilda: Yes I do— [my daughter] Ruth says I do too. Because
I don't—there's no—there's nothing that ever
happened in any case , to any one of us, that would
keep me from being with them, in some way, you
knove—and having the others realize v/ho this person
is, you know. And I have really kept up with a]l of
them* that way . . . and more or less let the others
realize this, that this is a very disr.inct person
—
"Don ' t miss it !
"
A.s the above passage suggests, there is an element of
confrontation in her family storytelling. When she speaks of
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making the others "realize who this person is," she does not
mean simply fighting against some abstract risk of fading in
the collective memory. She fears, for reasons which should
become clear as her history progresses, that without her
vigilant effort at keeping them "alive," significant events and
people—herself included—might be "written out" of the ongoing
family story. Her overall picture of the- original family
circle can, in fact, differ so radically from that held by her
junior siblings that she has come to adopt the notion of "two
families"— a theory of separate family realities coexisting
within a single household—as a partial explanation for the
conflicting versions of the past. In this view, James, Hilda,
and Isabel are the children of the first family, the four
younger siblings comprise the second, with the short-lived
Eleanor acting as a punctuation mark between the tv;o. Hilda's
campaign to keep her own images of the early family in front of
the present day group— "Don't miss i~!" — is an expression of
loyalty to the members of the first fam.ily and the reality of
family experience which she feels they shared.
Just as her family storytelling involves more than
placid recollection of fond memories, there are elements of
conflict in Hilda’s internal discourse v^ith her family past.
On the one hand, she holds deep respect for her parents and the
other mem.bers of her family background. She continues to
strive toward a sym.pathetic understanding of their situation,
and shows, in the very prom.inence she affords tnem in her
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ongoing mental life, a certain tenacious devotion. On the
other hand, much of her examination of the past is directed
toward identifying what was amiss. She can be sharplv critical
of shortcomings in the values, practices, and basic outlook of
her early family—what she refers to as "that narrow attitude
at nome . " And yet, at the same time, she encounters the very
attitude which she finds so limiting and objectionable firmly
ingrained in her own perspective on life, an ever present
filter on her perception of her self and others.
Hilda
:
C . J . :
Hilda
:
C
Hilda
C.J. :
I think my immediate family was short changed just as
I am. I don't think they had the mature . . . scope
that they should have had in life— at all. V7e had a
very narrow attitude. We lived within a certain
relegated form of position: education was important,
money was important, grades were important,
appearance was im.portant—we didn't have a creative
beauty of an artist's mind—at all. And when I found
a thing similar to that [as a young adult] , I
thought, "Boy, that is something you can have if
you'll work at it. You can discover an artist's
mind. And if you had industry enough in your . . .
perform.ance
,
you could reach way, way, way off, up
there, and find, truths
,
and evaluate life, ard see
all of this.
And you had these feelings of transcending your
background?
Yah
—
you could really get wav , way up there.
But at times you would feel that whole thing, that
endeavor was ugly, that it was wrong.
Well according to their view it was wrong, and
therefore I could see it as wrong. Just as when vou
put the wrong kind of cooking on the table, it's not
done r?Lcrht because it doesn't caste right. According
tTThem'it didn't taste right and therefore it was
v/rong .
And so scm.etimes it would taste wrong to you?
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Hilda
:
u j;.
* ^ stopped to think, let me say,If I had stopped to think
,
I would say: "No you're
wrong to say that; and they're wrong to think” that-It isn’t wrong even to ^ that— it’s right tc proceed
and to accomplish, no matter what the
implement. No matter if it is a little house like[mine], or a fev; dollars, or your whole life. You’vegotten this far and vou wouldn’t exchange it for
another life.
Hilda is presenting here an idealized picture of the
sense of validity she has been able to achieve through a long
and conflicted process of self-appraisal. Her description of
>-he conflict, in which her early family is represented as an
internalized opponent, is presented from the vantage point of
full maturity. Her conclusion— "that it is right to
proceed"— summarizes a number of small victories in a battle
v/hose tide ran against her over m.uch of its course. Hilda
indicates by her repeated emphasis on the conditional— "if I
had stopped to think "—that such reflective clarity was seldom
available in her ongoing experience of her self in the world.
Her analogy of the cooking "tasting wrong" communicates what
may be taken as her far more typical experience of the early
family life as it entered into her present situation, i.e., as
a strongly felt, visceral reaction which can elude conscious
awareness or rational analysis. Most of the times at which
Hilda links aspects of her current situation to her early
family life are, in fact, instances of catching herself
inexplicably living-out patterns from her family background
which run counter to her own consciously held values or goals.
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At these times, Hilda tends to describe the impact of her
family background as a rigid ceiling on her development, an
externally imposed limitation on her ability to engage actively
in life and, even, to function as a full-fledged person.
Hilda: [My daughter] Ruth sees me as very
. . . unfinished
as a person—and I know I am— I know I must be.
V7here would you say you're "unfinished as a person"?
V7ell I think my experiences stopped, at the wrong
time. My experiences stopped when I was a child
because of . . . withheld expression at hom.e. And I
didn't have enough education, as [my brother] James
would say, "class-wise." I wasn't investigating
other classes of thinking people. I wasn't
investigating the Jewish, the^ Negroes, the Catholics
as I should have
. . . the Polish, the Italians—we
were all a bit snobbish in those days, vou see. Mr.
America was a person who- had a certain salary and
lived a certain life, and these other people were
still almost classed as "the immigrant group." I
think that that was a very had rhing for m.y
education.
C. J. : That you accepted that?
Hilda: Well I think— I don't know if I accepted it, but I
think I was affected by it. When Aunt Eleanor said
she was working among the peer, she was really
working among those who I classed as "the immigrant
group." And then when [my husband] Richard went out
to Newburgh, New Jersey with this job for father,
these people v;ere all Polish, I believe, and I
thought "Oh Polish I". And then when [as a young
girl] I was down in Yorktown this baby died— I told
you that I saw?—and it was a Polish fam.ily, I
thought "Polish."
Ruth says she can feel that in me very, very
much— she accuses me of being a very serious snob.
Well Richard and I were alike in -chat way. I v;ould
say to Richard, "that's an- Italian." "Oh no," he'd
say, "that person has Spanish in him." VJe'd go on
like that at great length—now there's something
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with people who do that a lot. That should notbe. There's not time for that kind of thing.
To live fully, you should be able to get up in the
morning and look at what happens every day, and go
out and meet a few people—somehow— l don't know how.
Go up and down the road and knock on houses—we know*
no one on this road, mind you.
C.J.: Well they're mostly GE people.
Hilda: "They're only GEers!"
I have one old Presbyterian Sunday School friend up
the line here. She studies dietetics and her
birthday falls on [mine]
. And she comes back from
California and we chew the fat with each other, read
bocks together, read our horoscope together and al]
that
. . . silly stuff. We have somewhat the same
taste, in a way. But in all events, a very
. . .
frugal experience. Do you see?
In this last excerpt, Hilda touches on several
features of what can be considered her deepest complaint with
her early family. At the heart of m.uch of what she identifies
as amiss in her family background, she sees a pattern of
failure in establishing a viable network of interpersonal and
social connections. The unwanted legacy of snobbism. which she
describes above is both m.cre and less than a discrete body of
racial and class prejudices. She shov/s this in jum.ping
directly from her discussion of her stance tov/ard the
"immigrant group" to her present day isolation within her
neighborhood— a group of families who would seem to fit the
picture of "Mr. America" perfectly. She is depicting an
experience of the family, carried from childhood, as a sm.all
island of "us" in a sea of generalized "them." There is a
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diffusely xerophcbic stance implicit in what she terms her
'•frugal" social experience. These Qualities of the family an
an encapsulated group within a vaguely alien social environment
run throughout her account of their troubled efforts at
engaging either in their immediate community or in a broader
world of "thinking people." This stance is one component of
the "withheld expression" which made her "experiences stop as a
child/' an ingredient v/hich made her later involvement in an
artistic community "taste wrong."
There is a second meaning in Hilda's use of "withheld
expression" which applies to failures of interpersonal
connection within the Mendahl household. "VTithheld expression"
is one of several condensed terns which she uses to label the
impressions of scattered energy and attention, sparse mutual
concern and involvement, and undeveloped relationships which
characterize her memories of early home life. Hilda v;rites, ir
her vJournal at Sixty , that "birth had placed her in a position
of fragmented acceptance." At other points she speaks of her
family not being "related in factual events" and comirents that
she "holds it against then that they weren't more interested in
each ether as people." Hilda frequently brings up the lack of
nurturance and support in her early home. Sometimes she speaks
of the deficiencies quite concretely, in terns of rhe m.oney
allotted and food put on the table. At other times, she moves
into a description of the family as an abstractly enervating
medium, failing to support its members' develcpmenn as
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integrated individuals and dissipating their potential to be
fully functional agents in the world.
In the follov7ing excerpt, Hilda draws a number of
these strains of family unrelatedness into an observation that
the Mendahls never really coalesced into an integrated,
outwardlv expanding social entity, that, in a sense, there is
no familv there.
C . J . :
Hilda
:
C. J. r
Hilda
:
It's a very . . . complicated family that you had.
Isn't it—well there isn't any unit left of it
either
—
yet we all think a lot of each other. I'm
sure we do. In fact, my brother-in-lav; Robert says,
"I never knew such a family as you Mendahls, you all
are so interested in each other," he said, "and it
doesn't seem, to me you're interested in other
people .
"
I guess we all feel responsible for each other, in a
peculiar way.
When you say "no unit," you mean your family now, or
your
—
I mean the whole thing is not a unit.
C.J.: The Mendahls?
Hilda: Not the—when you think of Family, and to read the
old Russian novels, the Norwegian novels, or even the
French, you think of a family as a kind of a group
thing, with a piece of property that they're living
on, with their established properties, and all of
this—and their relationships. And it seems to m^e we
never got that dene— I don't think we ever will; life
is too fast.
C.J.: The Mendahls as w'ell as your own
Hilda: I think so. I think none of us ever really got that
far. For one thing I think—I'm trying to thinx of
that word, when people don't really mature.
called something like "stopped in their tracks.
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We grew up to a certain point, each one of us, andthen past that we didn't. I think each of us is likethat, very immature
, . . adults. In som.e ways quiteperceptive and understanding and so on, but as
adults
,
I don't think any of us really made it.
C.J.; All your brothers and sisters? What about your
parents?
Hilda: No, I don't think they did either
. . . Not
as anything that an adult should be—-when I read
really important thinking ... I imagine these
people meeting in a . . . in a salon or
the—having
—
you kncv/, discussing politics and . . .
having the richt kind of behavior: beautiful social
people.
As [my brother] Jim said, "VJe'll all be declasse'.
Never forget it."
C.J.: Was that som.ething you crew up vjith or is that a
feeling you've come to late in life?
Hilda
:
C . J . :
Hilda:
I don't know— I think I always kept hoping that we
would be . .
.
people. Rut. i don't think we ever
became people.
How about that perception of your parents
. . . that they fell short of
—
Well I'm sure I always felt that way. I'd look at
other people and I'd say, "well they know hovj to have
dinner parties, and they know how to meet together
and be friendly and still be—and be on the surface
and still be loyal at the same time"—There is a kind
of surface conversation which people were able to
employ. I was never able to do it, my father and my
mother were never able to do it—none of us were.
You may have noted several apparenr inconsistencies
in the excerpts above. Similar contradictions appear
throughout Hilda's account of herself in the family and point
toward a basic paradox in lier experience of family relatedness,
first excerpt, for example, v/here she describes theIn the
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jolly friendship" she enjoys with the surviving ireirbers of
current family gatherings, she opens by stating that she does
not expect to open her "inner soul" to the group. Despite her
campaign to include the identities of the early familv within
the ongoing group—to keep her images of herself and the other
members of the first family alive as "distinct people" in the
consciousness of the present day family circle— she needs to
keep some aspect of self, which she experiences as central to
her identity, outside of the group, segregated from, interaction
with the family.
In the excerpt immediately above, the context of cur
conversation is the dearth of vital relationships vrithin the
family, which Hilda summarizes as a failure of the family to
develop as a coherent unit. Yet she opens this passage with
her brother-in-law's observation that the members are
remarkably preoccupied v;ith each other and adds her own comment
on the feelings of "peculiar" responsibility they share.
Elsewhere she speaks of this pull toward each other in the
family as "something that binds us together as people."
While it might seem that Hilda v/ould experience these
ties that bind the family together as a v/elcomed counterforce
against the trend toward dispersion and unrelatedness, her
response is hardly so simple. Several of Hilda's most
disturbing experiences in life appear to be connected v;ith
these ties. She reserves a set of vividly negative images,
evoking feelings of entrapment, suffocation, submersion, and
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noxiou? ertanglenent
,
to communicate these experiences. A
number of these entrapment images appear together in a passage
from her Journal at Sixty in which she is reflecting on her
reaction to news of her mother's death;
VThen the word of death was received in her ear, the
buzz of all her beginnings, years of association,
grapple of facts, against the relatives and for them,
with the blood-v;eb between holding, bleeding,
blinding and binding, did not protect her, but rather
gripped her and wrung her into exhaustion, thought,
body, hear and dulled, dead nerve ... A death of
nerve causing instant suffocation and paralysis. She
spoke without spirit and lived unalive until she
could at last organize and category [sic] the events
of this moment in sequence with the past.
The way in which Hilda presents this aspect of her connection
to the family, with her loosely structured tangle of phrases
and imagery and her use of an oxymoron— "she lived unalive"
—
in itself suggests a deeply confusing and paradoxical quality
in the experience.
In contrast to her often detailed and analytic
attention to the problem of unrelatedness in her original
famiily, Hilda rarely focuses directly on. this seemingly
opposite problem of over-relatedness . She does not present
feelings of an oppressive "blood-web" as part of her overall
picture of early family life. The few times she even alludes
to such an experience occur in the context of Hilda as an adult
either reflectincr on the culf between herselr and ether fami_y
members, as in the above passage, or experiencing difficulty in
an attempt at reintegrating herself v;ith the family. In these
instances, she tends s.imply to evoke the experience in a. few
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strikingly impressionistic terms, rather than describe it with
the kind of clear exposition v/hich she car give to other areas
of her experience. Notwithstanding her concluding comment in
the passage above, she does not "organize these moments in a
sequence with the past"; they tend, rather, to jump out from
the rest of the story. This group of entrapment experiences
was one of the several areas in our interviews where attempts
at exploration seldom, progress beyond a rephrasing of the
initial imagery.
Despite the scant information Hilda offers on this
experience of being gripped in the family blccd-web, several
factors make it important to include in any account of her
history. In addition to the puzzling nature of the
situation—deadly entanglement in a web of family ties which
otherwise seem so frail— the dramatic language she uses in her
few references to it compels attention. The terms she uses to
convey this state are also remarkably similar to her
description of a number of recurrent psychopathological and
dream experiences. For example, one dream which she has had
repeatedly ever the years invol^"es Hilda running through a maze
of "choices," in which a wrong turn would result in being
pulled into a "slimy pit of naked grappelling characters, all
writhing in a heap." Another experience, which she reports,
occurring both as a waking perception during her psychotic
period and as a dream in recent years, consists of "attacking
and being attacked by an incubus" which she describes as; "a
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peculiar meiTibraneous thing, sort of gelatinous, but it has a
suffocating guality to it, and it has a kind of odor“~a
definite fragrance (like] death and funerals and things like
that, that kind of fragrance of a corpse." Many of her
descriptions of other states of abncnral perception are built
around similar images, e.g., feeling "entrapped by filaments
which keep [her] from being," experiencing "a mass of encasing
jelly" clinging to her, or feeling herself "engulfed and
drowning in the thick pressure of a warm black [atmosphere]."
Finally, Hilda remains vulnerable to disturbing experiences of
this sort within her contem.poiry family—one of only a few
situations which make her question her present grip on sanity.
Hilda: I think I'm trving to determine m.y own feeling about
why I alvfays want to back away after been there.
C.J.: Co you ever— at times like the ones you're
describing, of getting back together with your
fam.ily. Do you ever feel "submerged*'?
Hilda: Well in. a way—but I won't permit it to happen—but
it is, it's a very ... a very pressing, suffocating
effect
.
C.J.: Your words, like "encasing," they suggest that.
Hilda: Yah right, I mean I do feel terribly suffocated in
atmospheres— for instance [m.y son] Carroll has the
most beautiful hom.e , and he loves me to come down
there for two or three weeks. "This time you're
staying three weeks," he'll say. And I suffer . . .
I can hardly bear it; minute by minute by minute I
suffer, day and night.
C.J.: That's the "encased" feeling?
Hilda: Being suffocated by the atmtOsphere . Every sound , and
every word, and every movem.ent . I think.
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I c3nnot ‘tsl'i.© it/ I v© Qot to Q©t t>©ck out of hor©."
So this is th© way I'm still crazy, or something
—or
unused to life.
C.J.: Well it's a difficulty you have with people.
Hilda: Very much so.
As Hilda agrees, her longstanding vulnerability to
experience "suffocation by the atmosphere" within her family is
somehow at the heart of her problems with ir terperscnal
involvement in general. I am not, however, raising this or any
of the several dimensions of unresolved conflict in her stance
toward the family past for the purpose of drawing a causal link
between her early family experience and her present
functioning. Instead, I preface her account of early family
life with these examples of unsettled issues as a first step
toward placing her reconstruction of the past v/ithin a
psychologically accurate context. I am trying to suggest both
hov7 significant the past continues to be in Hilda's present
life and how complicated the relationship is between the two.
Past and present are intimately connected, but not in ways
which admit to drawing neat lines which show one development
leading directly to the next. Even in the few examples already
given, the degree and manner of connection between past and
present situations in Hilda's life vary markedly: some aspecus
of her experience of the past are smoothly integrated in the
present and with full awareness on Hilda's part, other aspects
are simply incorporated in her behavior with only partial
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awcreress, and still others appear to intrude directly from the
past V7ithout any comprehensible connection to the present. To
further complicate the picture, the significant contradictions
and the active confrontation which characterize Hilda's
relationship to the past imply the possibility of resolution,
i.e., the potential for Hilda to achieve entirely new
integrations of past and present. Perhaps most frustrating of
all in terms of the wish to draw neat lines of development, it
is very difficult to sort out evidence of the
•
past from the
context of her present; all of Hilda's recollection is
delivered from the perspective of the present and remains
embedded in her contem.porary situation. This last point proved
very troublesome in much of m.y early work on analyzing Hilda's
life history—which, in turn, suffered from, my tendency to deny
its significance.
In Quoting Hilda's own account of the past as
frequently as J do, it w^ould be difficult entirely to suppress
the context of the present person. Hilda constantly frames
events within her present perspective, communicates her current
emotional reactions, and fuses past and present situations. On
the other hand, it is temipting to stop at the traditional view
of these aspects of recollection as simply components of ^-he
"subiective bias" which a person imposes on the objective
events of their past, i.e., to conceive of past experience as
stored in some way separate from the person, who can retrieve
it, like an im.perfect tape recorder, with varying degrees Oj.
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distortion
. During the initial stages of ray work
with Hilda, I incorporated this misconception in my view of the
project. I tended to picture our collaboration as a sort of
^tcheologic a 1 exploration through the layers of past experience
buried under her present situation. Hilda's ability to recall
sometimes minute details of past scenes and her habit of
reproducing snatches of dialogue in her descriotions tended to
reinforce the illusion of a static, embalmed past.
I saw my role in this archeological view of our
project as a matter of fractioning out the rem.embered past from
its surrounding present perspective and arranging the resulting
samples of Hilda's original experience in a developmental
sequence. I came, through a number of instances like cur above
discussion of the family as a unit, gradually to see this
idea of "fractioning out" as an untenable fiction. When Hilda
observes that there is "no unit," she is synthesizing at least
four generations of family experience, and speaking of family
as a kind of timeless entity. She works around my attempts to
date the observation or relate the experience to a particular
generation because my questions are unanswerable; I try to drav;
artificial distinctions. Although her observation is delivered
from the perspective of late adulthood and addresses—perhaps
for the first time—a current problem in her experience of
familv relatedness, it is by no means entirely new. She drav/s
on a sense of disconnection which pervaded her
childhood—captured for her by her brother James' labelling of
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the family as declasse'—and incorporates views of family and
social interaction which were acquired—e.g. from reading
novels—at some point between early childhood and late
adulthood. To pursue the archeological analogy, it is as if
the culture under study lived on a ground of frost heaves and
sink holes, through which artifacts continually resurfaced,
became modified for present purposes, were lost again, and •
eventually rediscovered. The analogy would be complete if this
reshaping of artifacts were central to present inhabitants'
definition of themselves as a culture, just as Hilda's dialogue
with the family past affects her identity as a social person.
Neither recognition of the significance of Hilda's
present situation as the context of her reconstruction of the
past, nor an appreciation of the degree of active resynthesis
potentially involved in the process negate the imporrance ' of
the past in explaining the present. This understanding of the
interpenetration of past and present does, however, rule out
statements of a direct causal link between early experience and
subsequent functioning. It becomes untenable to say, for
example, that the Mendahls' isolation from their community
caused Hilda's later difficulty in establishing her own network
of social relationships. A more accurate starting point for an
explanation would be that Hilda's acute awareness of her
current isclaticr causes her to focus cn the pattern of
dissociation from community within her early family. T.hrough
this distinction, the relevant questions shift away frorn^ the
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publicly observable events of the past— ill represented by a
single person's account—toward examination of the
relationships which the person privately maintains from the
past and seeks to integrate in the present— the stuff of
intimate recollection. The issue of whether the Mendahls were,
in fact, disconnected from their comm.unity becomes secondary to
the question of why Hilda "holds it acainst them." Her basis
for attributing her difficulties in social inregration to her
early family experience can be taken as real in the sense that
interpersonal relationships have an internal reality. Given
this assumption, her statement that none of her family could be
"on the surface- and still be loyal" becomes an important piece
of evidence, e.g., in what sense might her avoidance of social
involvement be an act of loyalty, and to whom? .
A second lire of support for the explanatory power of
the past comes from, the fact that some experiences are less
integrated within the present context than others. The
contrast between Hilda's reconstruction of her family's failure
at relatedness and her feelings of entrapment are a dramatic
example of this disparity. VJhereas Hilda sees her current
isolation as of a piece of her family's pattern, the feelings
of entrapment can erupt with no apparent connection to
contemporary family situations, even to Hilda
—
"the way I'm
still crazy or something."
Hilda's comm.ent that she "did not accept but was
affected by" her family’s attitude expresses a more subtle
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level of durability of the past in the face of efforts at
resynthesis with the present. The divergence in this case
occurs at different levels of organization; Hilda's current
values and adult perspective on social life may be incompatible
with her basic definition of social situations. Longstanding
behavioral expectations of others or basic habits of social
perception may contradict her present values and undermine
Hilda's ability put her beliefs into action. In other v;ords
,
the statements which a person constructs about livina can be
relatively fluid, changing, for instance, with an altered
social climate or growth in their o\-m intellectual perspective,
whereas a person's vocabulary remains relatively fixed.
Finally, vie can assume that there are general
principles which govern the ways in which past experience
enters into the person's present situation, and circumscribe
the person's ability to restructure the past in accordance with
present circumstances . Virtually every school of psychology,
short of the most dogmatically "here and now" oriented systems
theories, offers some statem.ent on the relationship between
past and present. In the next ohapter, I draw on points from
several schools in order to present a general statement of how
the past functions in the present, laying the conceptual
groundwork for explaining Hilda's four major life problems j.n
terms of her history. Before moving further into abstraction,
however, it is worth filling in the picture of early fam.ily
life, already sketched through the quotes from Hilda, with more
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of the concrete details of her account of the Mendahl
household. Starting with an introduction to the main
j
characters, the remainder of this chapter is devoted to an
outline of the Mendahl family values, practices, and social
^©Istion ships , I conclude the chapter with a brief discussion
of how the Mendahls compare with other families of their class
and time.
The Fabric of the Mendahl Family Life
A little cock rooster of a man
.
Jacob's contact wirh the family v/as measured out in
weekends, and structured in a ritualized pattern of fam.ily
dinners and church going. Hilda's account of her father
centers on descriptions of him presiding over the family as it
lived out the weekend routine. She rarely describes a direct;
interaction with him. The picture of Hilda which comes across
in her account is that of a fascinated, slightly skeptical
daughter watching from a respectful distance. This close
attention to a narrow range of behavior and the lack of details
on personal interaction give Hilda's overall picture of him the
quality of a caricature, a firm-willed Victorian pater laying
down the law of the family.
Hilda: He was small, about 140 I would say, bald, mustached,
goateed, always dressed very neatly, clean shirts and
business suits—a stalwart little guy, stood
straight, spoke loud and clear. He laughed quite
j^-eadily at the children ... he loved [my Sj.Si_er]
Isabel terrif icallv . He had her on his lap most of
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thG liiine v;hen he was home. He was alv/ays polite to
mother
.
—Father was very clean.
—He was very proud he produced all these kids, like
a little rooster, proud of us as results of himself.
—He was a regular little cock rooster in [the Sunday
school classes he taught to a group of women]
. He
enjoyed tearina down all the Christian discussion,
re-evaluating all the people's Christian thoughts. I
could hear him, very loud, intimidating the poor
women. They were always wrong— I thought it was
cruel treatment.
—When father was there, of course, nothing was said
at all [at the dinner table] . The house was always
cleaned beforehand. We all dressed for dinner, then
went to church and Sunday school. Then m.other always
had a terrible headache. Father v;ould say: ail of
us must leave mother alone to sleep this afternoon.
This was peculiar, mother never slept in the
afternoon except after these Saturday nights.
—He chose his people always in ccnversation , very
seldom the females in zhe family ... of course he
was always disappointed, alv/ays wanted boys instead
of girls.
A hard workincr woman.
It is difficult to abstract a clear picture of Emily
Mendahl from the wealth of information Hilda gives on her
experience of her mot.her. Where her picture of father is like
a sharp lined sketch from a remote perspecrive, her images of
her mother are like an im.pressionistic painting viewed too
close, a welter of unmixed and contrasting elements filled with
strong emotional nuance but lacking a well-defined form. Since
early adulthood, Hilda has recognized a need to gain better
perspective on her mother. Her main purpose in v/riting Beauj^,_
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I_ Wonder was "to rectify her image in my mind." She recognized
late in the first summer of our interviews that she had been
accomplishing a similar purpose in our reconstruction of her
history • Hilda contin\ies to use family gatherings as an
opportunity to compare recollections of Emily. The contrast
between Hilda's images and her younger siblings' perceptions of
their mother is the main point of discrepancy which prompted
Hilda to adopt the theory of two families.
Hilda: They see her as a hard working, happy, willing,
loving mother. I see her as a hard working,
distressed, anguished, infuriated woman.
Although it is her emphasis on their mother's
shortcomings and emotional distress which differentiates
Hilda's view from the picture of a competent, loving mother
held by the children of the second fam.ily, her descriptions
generally include aspects of both perspectives. Throughout her
account, Hilda communicates a sense of close participation in
her m.other ' s emotional experience, v^hich ranges—not
infrequently within the space of a single observation--f rcm.
sympathetic recognition to deep frustration over her inability
to cope.
Hilda: Mother had a strong concept of style. She was
certain that it was terribly important to be
stylishly dressed, and she went to great lengths to
have very good dressmakers . . . plan our clothes,
cut our clothes, fit them. We'd go through that in
great detail—much more than most of the children in
Hudson. And she herself was very interested in her
clothing— for the most part we had to have materials
v/hich came from [a wealthy cousin's] house: satins,
and velvets, and laces—things not really in style.
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C • vJ . :
Hilda
:
C. J. :
H jl
I
da
C. J. :
Hilda
:
But mother was creative that way. She was able to
make them into very fine looking clothes—with thedressmakers
.
“—Mother had the old-fashioned way of cleaning in
those days: they swept, covered everything with dust
sheets, covered yourself with dust caps and aprons up
to your ears——and the dust rolled ... and vou never
-got the house clean in those days.
Was she a meticulous housekeeper?
No she was not. She had a method of cleanina which
was supposed to be all right.
VJas that the m.ethod that everybody else used then?
I don't believe so— I don't kr.ov; about other people.
I think mother was so skimpy about how much hot water
she would use and how much muscle she'd put on her
broom ... it just had to do with her equipment and
her decision about how much she was willing to
accomplish.
—She would never accept a social engagement. We had
a life very separate from any of the ccrrmunity, any
of the church women. VJhen mother had her literary
society there, it was all very quiet. Mother had
prepared a paper than she had to read, some of the
other women had papers. It was just like a little
school qroup, each ga-'^e their little literary remark.
And then we had a person in the kitchen who would
prepare these wonderful sandwiches—mother hadn't the
confidence in her cooking, to do a thing like that.
She didn’t have the courage of her convictions as a
social woman.
She never had any group of friends?
None. Well, she was president of the Parent-Teachers
Association . . . considered a very smart woman in
that way, she prepared papers for them, she went into
educational study. And some of these women would
cone to her and give her their problems with their
youngsters. The teachers all had a great deal or
respect for mother. They thought of her as a very
intelligent woman, educationally. She did not have
- personal relations with any of these people. She
never had telephone conversations. She never
attended any of their group meetings, or card
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playing, and teas; all those things that women did inthose days.
--She had a frame and pattern she lived by, and
within and I don't think she coped.
If she was angry, I think she was so v;ell behaved
was well covered. She could be crying,
really, and laughing very loudly. But you felt
mother was weeping. V7e would aggravate mother,
suddenly decide to race around the table, catch each
other by the hair, make one awful shambles of the
dining room
. . . She would say, "children, children,
children , " and we would just go further and further
into and then she would get to laughing so hard you
knew she was really weeping. It was almost more rhan
she could cope with.
This selection of Quotes, although representative of
Hilda's general observations or. her mother's funcrioring in the
household, may give a false impression of Emily's ability to
extend her influence in the family. Hilda mentions at one
point than her parents were each "dictators in their own way."
Most of what Hilda experienced as within her mother's power to
dictate is rather abstract, and bound up in the intricacies cf
their problematic mother-daughter relationship—which I will
turn to in a later chapter. Occasional examples of Emily
exercising an unusual degree of control over details of daily-
life, however, crop up in Hilda's account of the early family'.
As part of her attention to dress, Emily selected a color which
each child was to wear, in Hilda's case until graduation from,
high school. Hilda was assigned red in the v/inter— "she
decided it m.atched my hair: she called m.e a brunette"—and
light blue in the summer. She adds: "Later I was allowed to
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Iav6rd6r, which I never liked ... we had seine leewav in
hats
.
"
Making the grade
.
The theme of "getting up there in the world" enters
repeatedly in Hilda's account of the Mendahl family life. The
family attitude toward intellectual accomplishment, m.cney, and
social involvement, their views on character and self
expression, their practice of religion, response to adversity,
relationships v/ith the extended fam.ily, and definition of
status within the nuclear family were all connected to a pre-
eminent stress on advancing in the world. The em.phasis, as
transmitted to Hilda, was not so much on striving toward a
discrete goal or particular level cf achievem.ent bur, rather,
on the sheer need to ascend—as Hilda puts it, "it v/as
im.portant to be important." By Hilda's charts, this v/as an
ascent o^^er heady terrain, with peaks distant and lofty— "way,
way, wav up there"-—and deep cre'v/’asses always palpably near.
Standing among the siblings was structured in a steep
hierachy similar to that envisioned in the larger social world.
Birth order, gender, and success in school were key
determinants. Hilda's older brother James, v/ho had a lock on
the first tv/o cateaories, excelled in school. He stood cn a
level wholly his own in the sibling hierarchy, the "Bright
Mind" of the family. Both parents, especially Jacob, had great
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expectations for him. Hilda, v;ho shared their high regard for
him, used James as her mentor on a number of matters.
i feel [our stending] had always been a matter of
seniority
. The older ones in the familv were
supposed to be the more intelligent ones because thev
had lived longer—And so if in any way you fell down"
on that
. . . and didn't really make the grade, in
our younger brothers' and sisters' feelings about us,
that was a sorr^'^ remark ... a sorry remark.
You had to be sort of . . . idolized— I idolized
James
.
— 1 give [my family] a lot of credit for believing
that education is more important than almost
anything—no matter if it's done poorly, it's
important
. . . the all important effort.
And I do think it's important to reach a certain spot
in society where you can say that no one can
criticize you because you have reached a hiah enough
level that you can consort with kings, queens,
emperors, politicians
. . . easily . I think that's
an ideal. I believe we all have a right to it, I'm
not saying I think we'll all get there. But I don't
believe in being in a stratified class situation,
[that is], "because you are down here, you don't get
up there." I believe you should always wish way up
t-here— just as James told me I should never become
intimate with anyone unless I admired him much more
than myself.
Money was an important ingredient in the formula for
family ascent; it fueled their progress into a world of
expanding promise.
C.J.: You were aware of your financial status very early?
Hilda: We were m>ade aware of it. Father impressed us with
the idea—we all had different kinds of clothing
[when we moved to Hudson] , this beautiful house— it
was really an elegant spot, you know— tv;o ser'^T'ants
instead of one . . . It didn't last too long, because
the people from whom we were supposedly going to buy
the house decided they weren't going to se].l it.
The sense of promise did, however, last:
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--We were more or less determining our future on thefact that vie would be so well off. Father used to
repeat again and again, "You're never going to haveto work for a living." And many of the family,
Isabel, James, Henry, possibly the little airls, allbelieved that the day would come with time "on theirhands and choices to make.
It was not leisure or freedom from need which the
family valued so highly, but the idea of being v;ell established
in the world. With regard to the future of the male children,
for exam.ple, financial success had a sort of sacrosanctity
.
When World War I came, the family vies strongly against sending
a son, not for moral reasons nor, as Hilda sav; it, for fear of
the physical risk involved, but because it v;ould "interrupt his
progress in the business v/crld."
At a later point in the family history, two of the
female members incorporated delusions about money as central
themes in their psychotic ideation. Hilda's sister Isabel, who
has had recurrent psychoric episodes since early adulthood,
will sometimes return to the idea that she is immensely
wealthy. When Hilda's mother went insane, she dwelt on the
idea that the family was financially ruined (this was prior to
the 1928 market crash, when they did lose their wealth). The
idea was so distressing to her that Jacob once asked Hilda if
she thought it would help for him, to present Emily with a chest
full of currency.
Although Hilda feels that the Mendahls elevated money
to an unrealistic level of abstract significance—what she
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refers to as "the utopian decision in there"— she also holds on
to the sense of promise which was associated with it:
I believe if we'd had the money father expected
... we might have had one very interesting life
among some of the better m.inds who were young people
in that day and age, a more fulfilling expression.
This is where I lost ovit.
Another central element in the family idecloay of
success is something which could he labelled force of
character, i.e., a view which emphasized the power of will,
rationality, and the person as agent of the events of his life.
Hilda never focuses directly on this aspect of her family's
value system. It is, instead, communicated in her personal
idiom, i.e., there is a distinct model of the person in the
world implicit in the expressive but slightly idicsynchratic
figures of speech which she uses ' repeatedly
,
especially in the
context of her familv experience. Living, in this view, is a
job to be done. How you undertake it defines v/ho you are:
when Jacob drew a parallel between Hilda's temperament arc
interests and those of an arristic and insane aunt, "he likened
me to my Aunt Eleanor's esoteric approach." One's level of
achievement is a statement of self: it could be a "sorry
remark" or one might "achieve a more fulfilling expression."
One's performance is continuously measured and the results are
entered in a ledger of interpersonal liquidity: he can be
"given credit for" something, have it "held against" him, "fall
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short in some area, or worst of all, be struck entirely from
the ledger, be deemed "not worth it."
potent
Acts of will and conscious decisions are ascribed a
role in the family's view of the course of one's life.
Events which are customarily conceived of as experiences
undergone are described in terms of willful acts: Hilda speaks
of her family seeing her as "deliberately falling in love" and
her first psychotic break as a form of "deliberate
misbehavior." It seems that the indi^^’idual was held
responsible for whatever setbacks he suffered, as if his life
itself v/ere a vehicle for progress in the world, and keeping it
on a straight course the prerequisite for inclusion in the
family circle.
C . J . : In your family, in general, did adversity tend to
bring you closer together or apart?
Hilda
:
No, I think it separated us. Because when we
suffered hardships of any variety . . . they would
turn their backs on this, you see, as though vou were
not behaving as you should, you weren't lining up to
what was expected of you, having these things occur.
Just as we v/ere always very grade conscious in
school. Unless v;e received a grade of ninety or over
we were not considered . . . worth the family group.
V/e were supposed to get high grades, you see—not
that we particularly cared for school—but that was
expected
.
C.J. : Who expected it?
Hilda
:
Mother and father both . . . expected very high
Grades. In a way, that tension went back through
childhood.
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Rifts in the Fabric
Dissociation from the parents background
.
Hilda felt a sense of close involvement in her
parents’ relationships with their own families of origin. Both
of her fictional works incorporate extensive material from her
parents' background. Fire of Spring is set ir the Minnesota
farming community where her father grew up anr? many of the
characters are based on his relatives. Beauty, I Wonder deals
v/ith a complex mixture of features from the background of both
parents together with her own; a main subplot traces the youth
and com.ing of age of a character modelled closely on Jacob and
the main plot follows the development of the protagonist
through a series of events which fuse aspects of Emily's and
Hilda's own family situation.
Hilda's interest in her parents' fam.ilies of origin
was due in part to the fact that each side represented aspects
of family life wished for in her ov7n , but arose, to a greater
extent, from, the way she was affected by several schism.s v/hich
existed between the Mendahls and their extended family—there
were sides to take.
Jacob's split from his family background was clear
and decisive.
Hilda: Our relatives [on m.y father's side] were farm people,
•hev believed in a Baptist life, a farmer s
expe’-ience. They discussed the crops, drought, the
church, the lives and deaths of the community—They
were 'ery understanding of each other, a close-knit
group
.
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My father was looked on as a renegade—he left the
plsce . He had dared to get out and become educated.
They held this against him, felt he was too big for*
his britches, and that my mother considered herself
a lady from Philadelphia”—they set themselves apart
from us, Gntirely
. They were willing to look at us
and get to know us, but they held guite a disdain for
us, because our values were not the actual values of
country living——they believed that country living
values are the ones that life should be determined
on, arc T was willing to go along to a point. In
fact, I could see [one cousin] as a very beautiful
result of country living—he accomplished life in a
peculiarly beautiful way.
Elsewhere, Hilda quotes this cousin, who stuttered;
— "It's too b-bad
,
that man got too b-big for his
b-b-britches .
"
C.J.: V7as his break from the family as hard as you
portrayed it in [ Beautv, I Wonder ]
?
Hilda; Oh yes, he broke away from all of them— it was still
felt when we returned to Minnesota [on a visit] . He
had taken his future in his own hards and turned
against them as farm people—what they were living
for, striving for. He. paid little or no mind to the
true religion or their devalopm.ent as farmers, as a
family group.
As with the general picture of Hilda's mother, the
strained relations between Emily and her family were more com-
plicated and diffuse. One aspect, which Hilda felt strongly,
/
was not even recognized by Emily. In the first excerpt below,
we are discussing a scene in Beautv , I Wonder in which the
Hilda/Emiily character has her hair cropped short by her mother
.
Hilda; This really happened [to Emily]. Her mother thought
she was going to be too pretty sc she deliberately
had her head cut [Hilda laughs] her hair cut—I’m
saying horrible things. I'm very Freudian today.
I'll have to watch out.
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C.J. :
Hilda
:
C . J . :
Hilda:
Do you think her mother really felt that Emily's hairwas taking her strength away [as in the story]?
She said that— I never met my grandmother, onlythrough my mother's mind— she thought of her as a
saint, although she never worked— a very lackadaisical
southern lady—Mother felt very bitter about [thehaircut]
. It was ore of the things she couldn't
understand about her mother, a real blow—She didn't
realize there was a terrific jealousy in there
—
Although I did immediately, but I'm sure I nev©]^
mentioned it.
Fhose yearnina [on the part of the daughter toward
m.other] were you writing about?
I was imagining [Emily] loving her mother, very
much— I wished I'd had the same terrific love she
claimed she had for her mother.
Emily's family appears to have been rife with
disputed claims, mostly financial. These stemmed from the
dealings between her father, John Hamilton, and his half
brother, V7.T. Grafton— a surname which he adopted because, as a
stepchild, he had been grafted onto the family. The Ham.iltons
owned a small manufacturing concern. W,T. bought out John's
share, changed the company name to his adopted nam.e
,
and made
it a household word, amassing a large fortune in the process.
John, who remained as an employee, was left to pass on a legacy
of resentment.
Hilda; John came out on the short end of the stick. W.T.
had him sell the business and then only gave him
fifteen dollars a week for the rest of his working
days. This curdled in his thinking, continually. He
became a cruel character as a result.
—That was another thing that affected my mother, the
wealth of W.T. Grafton. There was envy there,
tremendous covetousness, "that amount of money in the
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family and we would never get it"—and why should
mother have expected it?
The issue of resentment over division of property
repeated itself in Emily's generation. Hilda remembers a
dispute over the execution of John's will starting immediately
after his death. Emilv felt strongly that her brother Jack was
usurping an unfair proporticn. Jack later committed suicide,
which the Mendahls attributed to his guilt o^^er the division of
the estate.
Hilda: Uncle Jack shot himself on the sam.e date that mother
killed herself, only seven years before. He shot
himself because the money was not divided equally, he
took more than his share of my grandfather's estate.
C.J.: Do you think there was a connection between
—
Hilda: I've always thought sc. I've always thought so.
C.J.: Were they close?
Hilda: Well I think mother felt badly about both her sister
and her brother. I believe she felt they weren't as
sucoessfnl as they should have been, and she might
have held it against herself that rhey weren't.
Each of Hilda's parents took pains to distance
themselves from certain aspects of their spouse's family
background. In Emily's case, it was the religious affiliation
and social standing of Jacob's parents, and in Jacob's case it,
it was the insanity which ran through Emily's line.
The family and insanity .
All of the close relatives whom Hilda knew on her
m.other's side v;ere either markedly eccentric or insane. In
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addition to shooting himself, Emily's brother Frank never held
steady employment and v;as institutionalized at least once. Her
other sibling, Harriet, spent time in and out of mental
hospitals and, during a long stay in the Mendahl household, was
the author of several scary scenes in Hilda's childhood. Hilda
remembers little from her few contacts with Emily's father,
John, but there is at least a strong suggestion of eccentricity
in what she does remember.
Hilda: Mother said, "Now when Grampa Hamilton comes to visit
you [children] are not to comment, any of you, in any
way. Be polite and do not comment." He v/as a very
silent, taciturn gentleman. He sat at tables—always
well dressed, im.peccable—and he put salt and pepper
on everything : he put it in his tea; he put it cn
his cereal; he put it on his bread—we couldn't help
but have our eyes wobble at this.
Familiarity with insanity did litrle to reduce its
horror in the eyes of the Mendahl family. The potential for
insanity, so thoroughly actualized in the Ham.iltons, was felt
as a ne'^’er too distant danger in Hilda's family circle, a
particularly deep crevasse always close at hand. Hilda says,
in describing her exposure to irsanitv in childhocd, "I was
fearful that such a thing could be." In Journal at Sixty she
writes that "my reaction to the abnormal was a concept of
death.
"
Jacob did v;hat he could tc distance himself and the
family from this threat. Farly in Hilda's development, he
condemned what he perceived as r.ascient signs of disturbance by
"[likening] me to my Aunt Harriet's esoteric approach." T arer
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history, wh0n insanity actually appeared in several of
his children, he reacted strongly by, alternately; denying it;
discouraging any mention of it; labelling it as willful
perversity; assaulting it v/ith rational argument; punishing the
offender; blaming their environment; and, when these measures
failed, cutting off the offending member. The consistent
thread in these otherv;i se contradictory responses is the
message that insanity is not of me and mine.
c j •
Hilda :
C . J . :
Hilda
;
Hilda
:
C. J. ;
Hilda
:
Can you sa^^ m.ore about v;hat you mean [when vou write]
"Insanity was a reversal of the family unit', a
naughtiness not to be easily forgiven"?
Any peculiar mental . . . explosion that occurred in
life was a sort cf mental misdemeanor.
In fact, when I had my breakdown in college farher
insisted that I hadn't had one. And when Isabel had
one in college, he was ^’ery unremitting about it.
How do you mean?
Well they put her in a '^’ery difficult spot. She vas
majoring in music at Swathmore. And she dropped out
of school and she was put in a girls' school, a
reform school, unwed mothers— tough . . . people.
They were tough in those days.
VJas she an unwed m.cther?
No, no. She was just a person who had majored in
music.
— [The idea was that] if ycu conform it won't happen;
it's your own lack of discipline that's making it
happen.
Did you accept that view?
Oh no! I thought father v/as ridiculous.^ He had read
Freud and thought he was nonsense. I said "Well
maybe he is nonsense, but on the other hand, there is
such a thing as nervous disorders." Father said "Not
on my side of the family!"
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C.J.: So if you did have a nervous disorder vou weren't his
child?
Hilda. [lauohs] You should have enoug'h of ine in you that it
doesn't have to happen." He'd scold us, seriously
like that— in those days parents were odd balls
anyway. He was actually scared out of his v;it<= about
it.
““If only I had felt it as fear rather than
condemnation
.
Peliqious practice .
The Question of church affiliation, and the
associated issue of subscribing to a particular world-view,
intermittently troubled Hilda up to the time of her second and
major psychotic break—v;hen she resolved it in a paralogical
fashion. At its earliest stage, Hilda's conflict over
belonging to a church was a conflict which she saw in her
family.
The Mendahls were Presbyterians, a choice dictated,
at least in part, by social considerations. Emily was
embarrassed by Jacob's humble origins, and wished to dissociate
their own family from the signs which marked him as humble.
When Jacob's parents came east for a visit, this dissociation
from signs became a turnina away from people. Hilda, a child
of eight or nine at the time, was distressed by the conflict
which ensued betv/een her parents and grandparents. The scene,
v;hich she described below, remains a significant event ^n her
menorv of childhood, a reference point in her reconstruction of
the early family life.
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Hilda
:
Now here's an inkling: father decided that he wasgoing to have his father and mother come from
Minnesota and have a little spell with us.
Because," he said, "I've never had them come here to
see how we live; hov/ the family is." So he paid forthe fare and my grandparents came.
Wei], when mother knevz they were coming from
Minnesota, m.other wept. And father said, "Why are
you doing that, Emily?"
"Well," she said, "You know how funny your miCther
dresses. She wears her hair back in a little bun,
and a silly little hat, and a shawl around her
shoulders .
"
"Why Edith!," father said, "that's mother's wav of
dressing."
"I know , " she said, "but you know your father has
such a funny mustache, and he wears that hat, and
walks w’ith a. cane."
"Well," father said, "that’s my father."
Mother said, "The people of the church won't
understand .
"
So, my father's feelings were hurt b\:t nevertheless
my grandparents came. They attended church with us
and sat in the pew—my grandfather was the mcsr.
social minded person ever. He got to know everyone
there [she laughs]
,
most of the congregation. He had
a great time.
Sc, in a way, it was quite successful, except that
m.other never agreed to grandmother's dress— "how was
she going to explain grandm.cther to the wash lady,"
you know.
I would say, "Grandm.a, I'm sorry about this." And
she would say "Don't let it bother you, Hilda, don't
let it bother you. Your mother thinks she's a lady,
that's all."
So then father and Grair.pa had a terrible religious
argument one night. And m.y grandfatner v;as—he
believed in the Bible, and believed in the old
Baptist religion, and he argued with my father. My
father was furious--at him, because he didn't think
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that iny grandfather had seen the light; he thought he
was ahead of grandpa.
I was ashamed
. . . that this argument had developed.
And, I think, father was also.
— I think it wasn't too long after this that Grampa
and Grandma both passed away, within five days of
each other. They were very devoted.
The clash of family values was not the only
discordant note, for Hilda, in the family's approach to
religion. As Emily's concern suggests, church was the major
point of integration between the family and community. It was
the only consistent opportunity for Hilda to observe her
parents interact with peers. Their interaction—or, more
precisely, Jacob's action toward the congregation—made her
uneasy
.
Hilda remem.bers confronting her father about the way
he intimidated his Sunday School c].ass, "tearing down all the
Christian discussion";
I would say, "I don't know why those ladies like to
be students of yours in Sunday Schcol, you're never
pleasant vrith them, or friendly."
"Why that's friendliness, Hilda. Repartee and
discussion is good fri.en.dship . "
"V7ell," I would say, "to my v/ay of feeling, I feel
sorry for them. I think you try to throttle and
persecute every one cf them."
He said, "Hilda, what is a protestant, what is the
word protestant?"
I said, "protestant? . . . protestant?"
He said, "it's orotest-ant . I'm protesting this
religion"—this v/as his attitude—proud of himself.
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of Jacob's protest:, Emily's social concern,
and the family clash over religion, there is an indication that
they did not take the actual content of religious observation
seriously. Hilda mentions that they brought books with them to
read through the slow parts of the service. Had they taken it
seriously, it would have been difficult to reconcile the near
omnipotent role of will in the family world view with a
basically fatalistic religion. This is a point which Hilda ran
up against:
I asked [mother]
,
"what on earth is predestination?"
"Well," she said, " that means that long before you
were ever here, rhe plan was laid. No matter what
you do it's all been made. You cannot change it."
Now that was a very serious remark to me. I dv;elt
with that, and I didn't like it, and didn't want to
believe it, and yet I wondered if it were sc, that
predestination was a fact— I said to Jim., "this
predestination has got m.e really floored because"—
even when I was very young— "because no natter what
you do, it's already been decided."
"Oh," Jira said, "rot, tommy roti Don ' t believe any
of that stuff." You know, 'this is the v;ay he nailed
m.e . . . to the truth, quite a bit.
Hilda’s problem with the idea of predestination was
not philosophical; she was afraid of the concrete implications
it might have for her life. As she described negotiating this
problem with her mentor, James, you can see both the assertion
of the preeminence of will and the clash of loyalties in
relation to religion being recapitulated between the siblings:
I finally said [to m.other] , "I don't know what to do
about this"—mother said, "what"? "I don't know how
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C . J . :
Hilda
:
C . J . :
Hilda
;
C. J. :
Hilda
tc he good. No matter how I am working at livino andworking and studying, you continually say I'm notgood. I don't understand it." And I said, "Do you
suppose if I join the church T would be good?"
So I joined the church when I was eleven. That meantthat you got up in front of the minister and you
repeated the Apostles' Creed. Which I did.
And when I got back from the ceremony mv brother
<Jcm.es took me in the back yard and he really wailed
me.^ He said, "You are a liar, and you" lied"^
deliberately just to ger in the good graces of mother
and father."
What lie did he react so strongly to?
My beliefs, to say that I believed in Father, Son,
Holy Ghost, and the Resurrection of the Dead
—
sometimes I think that when I went into this insanitv
and all this came, the resurrection of the dead, you
know, I wonder if it went further back--mv
subconscious somehow— the fact that he wailed me so
on that rem.ark.
Did you believe?
Well, I tried to belie'^’’e, everything I was told on
it
—
you know how ycu do this.
—The fact that I dared to do this Apostles' Creed
with my ov/n remark made Jim really dislike me
terribly
.
Jam.es wasn't religious?
He was very scientific. I don't know whether he was
religious or not, I never questioned him—once I
asked him if he believed in God, and he said, "Why
should I believe in God when I am myself?" ... He
was very young, you know.
He seemed to think that he had an actual decision
about everything. He'd say, "How can you prove that
you aren ' t dreaming about me , and hov/ can I prove
that I'm not dreaming about you?" He would tell
m<e— say these things a great deal of the time.
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Being declasse'
.
I have already introduced many of the components of
the Mendahls
' stance toward their social environment, e.g.:
their fierce commitment to "making the grade"; Fmily's concern
with appearances; the family view of a steep social hierarchy;
and the prejudices, as toward the "immigrant group," which have
stuck with Hilda as ego—dystonic habits of perception. Despite
their strong emphasis on social status, and their well
articulated viev/s on what comprised it, the Mendahls were not
well oriented within any social structure. Their value system
failed to cohere into a workable approach to social life. I
would like -briefly to show how this failure was registered by
the children.
Hilda's account of Mendahl family life is like the
Old Testament in that the events in the life of the main
characters are sharply detailed against a mistv background. K
main character will occasionally step outside the family circle
to act on the social environm.ent
,
e.g., her father in church,
or members of the outside will sometimes step briefly into the
household, e.g., her mother's literary group, but the social
context of events in her youth generally remains a distant,
relatively blank screen—and even in the exceptions cited, the
outsiders are more like props for the family action rather than
developed characters.
Assuming that the absence of a picture of coiranunity
or broader social setting in Hilda's reconstruction of her
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family situation reflects something of her original experience,
it follows that she would have had difficulty placing her
family within the social structure; she lacked a solid frame of
reference. In different spots, she mentions her family being
viewed as "grand people," comments that they were not part of
the upper crust" of the town, and describes catching a glimpse
of how the privileged "other half" lived. Resolving this
confusion was important to her because the idea of being
socially established was central to the Mendahls' identity as a
family— it was as if the rules of the game had been firmly
impressed on her but failed to match up with an available
playing board.
The need to have a workable sense of her family's
place in the social order became pressing to Hilda in
adolescence. As she approached entrance into a society in
which, as her family construed it, having a well established
position was crucial, Hilda had to know where she was starting
from. It was at this time that her brother James introduced
her to the idea of the family as declasse', i.e., that their
place was outside the framework. Hilda experienced this as an
insight which enabled her to understand much of the incongruity
in her childhood experience of the family in relation to the
community,
Hilda: Another thing [James! said to me: "You know, you're
never going to get anywhere, even being a
housekeeper, or an excellent family person, because
our family amounts to nothing."
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I said, "What do you mean?"
He said, "We are not of the upper class or the lower
class .
"
"Well, what are we," I said.
He said, "We are declasse',"
"What does that mean?"
"Of no class," he said. "We will never amount to
anything in society, as people."
And, you know, he convinced me of this. I thought
about it, "why that's the truth: mother has no
friends, father has no friends, we only have
childhood friends— it's a fact, we have no situation
in the community."
"In this case," he said, "the only way you can obtain
a personal relationship with your community and the
country is to become an important person."
"How?" I said.
"Be a writer, be a painter ..."
I thought we were important, you see, until he put it
in that situation of imagining that we weren't.
In addition to the problems of fit between family and
social structure, Hilda also perceived something askew in the
symbols of class within the fam:ily. With any fam.ily in the
process of moving along the social scale, it is natural to show
a certain amount of discrepancy in the signs of social status,
to have a better wardrobe, for example, than one's residence
might suggest. The Mendahls, however, tended to take such
discrepancies to the point of, as Hilda puts it, not coping
with a realist's idea of the situation."
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Hilda:
C. J. :
Hilda
:
C . J . ;
Hilda
We were all supposed to be moving into better days.Father was supposed to have gotten into money. Heand mother came hom^e with motor outfits, veils, andgoggles, the whole deal—no car, mind youl That'sthe way they were.
—
-I think the people who worked for mother, the hired
felt that it was all a little bit ridiculous.
Your family?
Yah ... the politeness, and insisting on certain
things being done. Of course, I never heard the
hired girls question mother's authority when she was
disciplining us, which she did in her own way. They
never said, "Oh, don't pay any attention to your
mother" and so on. They were well behaved that wav.
It was something more subtle?
Yes. It was just as if, "Well, what is all this
going to amount to in the end?" It's because she
wanted you to become a person in her status—whatever
that was.
They were poor and lived from hand to mouth. If they
made enough money that day to buy potatoes, that's
what they'd eat . . . We didn't have much better than
that, but still we would always put on a linen table
cloth and set the table, and have the table crumbed
between the main course and dessert—things like
that. A hired girl would bring in the platter of
whatever mother had decided v;e were having. I think
they felt it was all a bit ridiculous
.
Of course, that's the way it was done in those days,
although I felt they v;ere ridiculous too— I thought,
"I'll be darned if I'd go work for somebody—bring in
a platter of corned beef on toast and set it down as
if it v/ere a turkey or something." "Bring on another
platter of beans I
"
Hilda's dinner table scene introduces an area of
discrepancy in the Mendahls' social ambitions which had a
concrete impact on the children; there is an im.plication that
what Hilda at one point refers to as their "semblance of
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property” was being financed, in part, out of the household '
budget
.
Short supplies
.
Memories of the household diet color Hilda's whole
reconstruction of early family life. She always shows a re-
action in describing their limited menu, which ranges, over the
various tellings, from restrained indignation to a bemused
shaking of her head.
Hilda: [Mother] was very skimpy with her food. [My husband]
Richard said, "the trouble with you Men.dahls is that
you were all undernourished. Your mother was a
wonderful woman but she didn't know how to feed a
family.” And he certainly had something there.
For instance, she would give us cream sauces for
potatoes, but it was mostly water and flour and a
little snitch of oleo— she began using oleo long
before oleo was the proper thing. She would buy eggs
in water glass [a preservative solution]. I didn't
know what a fresh egg was.
—Forever there were fried potatoes I Fried in rancid
fat , .
.
pale tomatoes with three slices as skinny
as your little finger, that was a salad . . .
oeculiar food.
As I mentioned in the introduction to this chapter,
food is a concrete example of a whole class of necessities
which Hilda experienced as missing or withheld in her
upbringing. She condenses these areas of short supply within
her eliptical term "being related in factual events." This
relatedness would include, in addition to physical nurture,
exposure to accurate information, developmient of firm ties to a
social reality, and interpersonal qualities of recognition.
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caring, and secure acceptance. In the following passage, Hilda
summarizes her parents' problems in these areas, and brings
this outline of her family situation back to its starting point
in the present day gathering with the surviving members.
C . J.
:
Hilda
:
. J.
Hilda:
C. J. :
Hilda:
You said "withheld expression at home," could you
give me an example of that?
Well, when you're born into a family, and mother and
father have figured out how to spend just so much
money and no more . . . and mother had her day
figured out in hours and minutes, how these are to be
spent in just this way and no other way
. T . I
believe that families should be related in factual
events, in order that the mind of a child develop as
a sort of a sustained factor. How else can a plant
grow, and how else can a child becom.e, you know?
Factual events? VJhat do vou mean bv that?
V7ell how can you become
way nourished
,
you see.
a fact if you aren't in some
from all sides. Because
certain things are necessary to be . . , a human. We
aren't born free and clear, you know, of sustenance.
You need it from so many directions—and meanwhile,
mother, as I say, was frugal and withheld, and ail of
that. Just enough to keep us barely alive, and at
the same time inquisitive, and vrith poor judgment
here and there, and dissatisfied. I feel we were
very dissatisfied—Although I can look back on it and
be with my family—brothers and sisters—over the
usual Thanksgiving dinner—the same darned thing. I
can hardly swallov; it . . . But I go every
Thanksgiving. And we can have an uproariously gay
time, remembering the whole thing. So there's
something that binds us as people—but all of that is
incorrect, though.
All of?
All of that kind of a reaction to the past, the fact
that the past was like that, the fact that v/e get
together over a Thanksgiving meal every year, every
year. And m.eantime Isabel isn't invited, Marion
[aj^Q-ther sister v7ho had a breakdown] isn't invii_ed,
James wouldn't have been invited were he alive you
see?
C
. J . :
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I guess you were left out during—
Hilda: I was left out a long time, yes.
Stepping outside the pale
.
This final rift in the Mendahl social fabric,
outright exclusion of members from the group, did not become
manifest until late in the development of the family. The
precursors, however, were felt early by Hilda in what she
describes as "the tension of making the grade” and the risk of
not being "worth the family group." If "withheld expression"
could be considered the passive dimension of risk to the person
in "becoming a fact" in the family, this is the active
dimension. Hilda alternately labels it as the family turning
"thumlDS down" on the person, "deciding they're a nobody," or
putting them "outside the pale." When it happened to her,
Hilda felt "unsatisfactory as an entity" in the eyes of her
f arfiily
.
All three children of the first fam.ily elicited this
"thumbs down" response as they moved into adulthood. Jim's
case is the most dramatic. Although both parents had idolized
him as the "Bright Mind," and had favored him greatly as a
child, Hilda feels they "never loved him as he was." This
became plain when his development as an adult deviated sharply
from their expectations. Instead of using his ivy league
education to enter the business world, Jim becam.e an artist,
and adopted a bohemian lifestyle and leftist political views.
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Father's reaction to James always upset me. I feltthat Jim had more brilliance than father would admit.When father decided that Jim was not a brilliant
person and thumbs down on him as a man, politically
and intellectually and
. .
.
person-ably, I felt very
sad. After all, father had given of himself so
strenuously to James all of those years, and all
through Yale, and to suddenly decide that James wasjust a nobody, and to, in fact, delegate the same
idea to all the family— I'd start talking about James
at one of these dinner occasions, and they'd say, "Oh
no. Not James
. . . Let's not mention Jam.es." "And
they still do it.
This is very wrong, sorting people out and deciding—
actually I do a certain amount of it m.yself, because,
you see, I objected to my father and he probably had
every right to be the way he was. And I'm not saying
this from Christian goodheartedness, I'm just trying”
to be fair and square about it.
The Family in Context
It is important, in giving the Mendahls a fair and
square assessment, to consider their times. As narrow and
distorted as some of their values m.ay seem by today's
standards, they were in manv respects consistent v/ith the
mainstream of turn of the century Am.erican culture. The
Mendahls' rigid definition of "Mr. America" and their recoil
from "the immigrant group," for example, were part of a
national perception of a society under assault. In the first
decade of Hilda's life, immigration reached an all-time crest,
averaging over a million people per year. By the time she was
ten, nearly an eighth of the population had arrived in this
wave. Whereas earlier immigrants had been largely northern
European, this wave came predominanrly from southern and
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eastern Europe. In addition to the real problems of
assimilation which this more "foreign" group of immigrants
presented, they served as a convenient scapegoat for the
problems of an increasingly complex society, including growing
crime rates, loosening of traditional moral codes, and
political unrest. ITativism and a national obsession v/ith the
need to defend the virtues of "one hundred percent Americanism"
grew in virulence over the first three decades of the century
(see Higham, 1955). There was a widespread impulse to, as
Hilda describes it in her own family, "lawd the brave and the
true and step on everyone else." By the early twenties, one
hundred percent Americans were stepping hard. Major barriers
to immigration were erected and steps were taken to purge
America of the dangerous foreign element v/ithin. In 1920 , a
young J. Edgar Hoover launched his career in the justice
department by coordinating the rcundup of six thousand
politically active aliens for deportation—what Bernstein and
Matusow (1972, p. 137) call "the most massive violation of
civil liberties in American history."
The uneasv mix of secular and Christian beliefs which
troubled Hilda also goes far beyond her immediate family.
Commanger (1950) considers simultaneous adherence to a highly
oprimistic view of man’s ability to shape his life alongside a
basically fatalistic protestantism to be a fundamental paradox
in American thought. Wishy (1968), in his analysis of the
literature on childrearing from the tim.e or the revolution to
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the early twentieth century, The Child and the Republic
, states
the basic conflict in American family life in very similar
terms, i.e., between a pious commitment to Christian values and
"a second and entirely different model and code of behavior
[which] was inevitably set for the child, one that urged him
not to brake his will but to use it to the utmost on the world”
[p. 20]. Wishy traces attempts at reconciling these
conflicting demands as the underlying theme in much of what was
written on childrearing in America. Like Hilda, he also sees
this as a dangerous conflict inadequately addressed:
If Americans combined a fierce will for success and
an impetuous Christian conscience that right prevail,
their nurture writings did not face the possibility
that such conflicting traits were likely tc lead to
personal or national disaster. Instead, they
outlined idealistic reconciliations of will and
conscience.
In its earliest and most harsh form, the model of
childrearing presented by the religious side of the conflict
was the Calvinist doctrine of infant damnation—the idea that
there is no minimum age for going to Kell. Excessive will on
the part of the child was seen, in this model, as evidence of
innate depravity. It was the parents' responsibility to remain
vigilant in suppressing such expressions of will, in order to
channel the child's behavior onto the path of righteousness.
While the specific threat of damnation was slowly dropped from
the literature on childrearing, the stress on parental control
was maintained into the late nineteenth century as part of
general movement toward perfectionism and achievement in the
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secular world. Wishy cites experts who advised fathers to.
exercise absolute authority in the home—as did Jacob at the
Mendahl dinner table™—one going so far as to caution that
"fathers should try to control the child diligently by the age
of four months and were to continue until the child was
twenty-one” [p. 20], Mothers, also, were encouraged to
supervise closely all the details of the child's daily life—as
Emily did in dictating Hilda's choice of clothing through high
school. Even well into the twentieth century, this same
Calvinistic model of parenting can be found, rephrased in
scientific jargon, in the influential advice of the behavior ist
Watson (1928, quoted in Kesson, 1965 pp. 243-244) turned
childrearing expert. He urged parents to "let your behavior
always be objective and kindly firm." He cautioned, at length,
against the "over conditioning of love" and warned that
"coddling is a dangerous experiment j which risks] robbing the
child of its opportunity for conquering the world."
The risks presented to Hilda in the concept of
predestination may have been a relatively undiluted version of
childhood damnation. The Presbyterian church was the most
conservative major Protestant sect in America at the time and,
according to Wishy, only began to revise their doctrine of
innate depravity in 1902. Apart from their choice of church
affiliation, however, the Mendahls expressed very contemporary
values. Their attitude toward churchgoing—suggested in their
books and Jacob's use of Sunday School as ahabit of bringing
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foriim for debate seems a well-developed example of the shift
to regarding spiritual values as subservient to secular goals
which Wishy describes as gaining momentum in the late
nineteenth century; churchgoing became a practice of moral and
intellectual discipline, rather than spiritual. The Mendahl's
tendency to imbue financial success, and money itself, with an
aura of sanctity are further examples of this transition in
values. Wishy cites Horatio Algier's Bound to Rise (1873) as
an early expression of and stimulant tc the increasingly
popular belief that boundless rewards were available in this
world to those with sufficient strength of character and will.
From another side, Andrev; Carnegie's (1903) Gospel of Wealth
preached the idea of an obligation to society which came with
money, and the implicit notion of a natural aristocracy
revealed through the acquisition of wealth.
A numiber of other aspects of Hilda's early family
were part of a broader social pattern. Gordon (1978) describes
the removal of the family from the arena of daily commerce,
frequent absence of the father, dissociation from parental
background, and an insecure preoccupation with distinctions of
class as newly prominent features of upward mobility during the
Mendahls' era. In terms of class distinctions, he observes
that servants acquired a new importance in middle class
families. In addition to their obvious function of symbolizing
wealth, they served as a sort of hired reference group, giving
the employer at least one group in whose eyes he could be on an
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upper level of society. This latter role both prescribed a
newly self-conscious distance between employer and servant and
conferred an implicit power on the servant to disqualify the
employer. Emily's concern——"what will the v;asher woman
think?"—may have been more normal than it would seem at first
glance
.
Finally, Sennett (1970) sees the historical trend
toward isolation of the family from the workplace and the
transition from extended to nuclear families as part of a
widespread pathology in modern life. He feels that there
is a "brutalizing" quality inherent in nuclear family life
which creates an inability tc identify with outsiders. Sennett
(1977) sees the modern "ideology of privacy" as a
rationalization of man's atrophied capacity for participating
in the rich give-and-take of public life, and the consequent
loss of any real community. He concludes that these trends
lead to "retribalization , " i.e., clustering into homogenous
groups of the "right people" who reflect one's own values and
position in society, and a concommittent widespread
"narcissism." Presumably, he would see the Mendahls as in the
avante garde of the movement away from public life and
therefore early sufferers of the malaise he sees sweeping
western civilization.
Pointing out that the Mendahls shared fully in the
values and lived within the social patterns of their time is
not to say that their practices were those of an average
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family. It is hard to assess what the latter would be. The
daily life of ordinary families is seldom recorded. Most
social history follows what was said rather than what was done.
Wishy's (1968) study, for example, does not examine how the
advice on childrearing was ever put into practice. There are,
however, several characteristics of the Mendahls' approach to
family life which can reasonably be taken as unique to the
culture of their family, and which would seem to have presented
the children with an exceptional degree of difficulty in
integrating themselves v/ithin the broader culture.
First, without accepting Sennett's (1970, 1977)
global weltschmertz or his notion of a universal drift towards
narcissism, his terms can be used to characterize a cluster of
qualities which were especially problematic in the Mendahls'
particular nuclear arrangement. Hilda's family was self-
contained with a vengence. Her parents' dissociation from the
extended family was lass a matter of surpassing their origins
than an attempt at severing their connection with dangerous
.roots; they weren't drifting away but fleeing. The barrier
between the family and community was less a wall of privacy
than a gulf of estrangement. There is a tribal quality in what
Hilda conveys of their stance toward the social world. The way
she uses the terms "people" and "person" in. this connection is
suQgestive of hov/, in some American Indian cultures, the term
of human being is limited to designating tribe members. Hilda
speaks of her family failing to "become people" or quotes Jim
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observing that "the family has no situation in the community,
as people." When the family turns "thumbs down on" a member
and excludes him from the horde
,
he loses his status as a
person, becomes "a nobody." The picture Hilda gives of how the
family viewed themselves as a social unit does also have a
narcissistic quality to it. Their grandoise visions were built
on a hollow core and given to sudden deflation. As Hilda
experienced it, you had to be special, "idolized," to be part
of the group, but could be deemed suddenly "not worth it."
Hilda preserves a sense of promise that their natural place was
within a rarified group of "the great minds alive at the time"
alongside memories of the servants viewing her family's social
behavior as ridiculous, a sense that there was something
pathetic in their attempts at establishing themselves. The
choice that Jim posed for Hilda at the end of her childhood—be
great or face being nothing— is the narcissistic dilemma.
Second, Hilda's family was dislocated in the course
of social mobility to an unusual extent, and her parents,
especially Emily, placed exceptional im.portance on the symbols
of being established. Their pursuit of these symbols seems, at
tim.es, ruthless; they made what would appear to be inordinant
sacrifices in order to perser^/e appearances. As Hilda saw it,
Emily was willing to cut the family off from Jacob's parents sc
as not to ieopardize their image at church. There was at least
a de facto decision to place money—whether it was saved or
spent on other things—above ensuring that the children had a
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healthy diet. The Mendahls were, at times, willing even to
sacrifice congruence with reality for the sake of appearance,
e.g,: coming home with driving outfits and no car, setting a
formal table for a subsistence menu, and pressuring children to
agree that they had not experienced a breakdown when they so
clearly had.
The third area which set the Mendahls apart from more
ordinary, less troubled families of the time is the pattern of
relationships within the family. While much of what Hilda
would include under "withheld expression" may have been fully
in keeping with the conventional wisdom on childrearing, there
was some additional quality in the Mendahls' parenting which
made it inordinately difficult for the children of the first
family to enter adult life—something that "stopped them in
their tracks." If Wishy's (1968) well-documented thesis is
right, the children of a great many conscientious middle class
families would have confronted the contradictory secular and
religious models of "goodness" which Hilda ran up against, and
yet—Wishy's comment on "national disaster" notwithstanding
—
these families did not produce an epidemic of schizophrenic
offspring. Even the men who made a practice of delving into
this problem were able to proceed unperturbed in their business
of instructing parents. Why Hilda was hit so hard-— literally
and figuratively— in confronting the issue deserves
explanation. I believe she is correct in sensing a connection
between this problem and her subsequent emotional disturbance.
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that it can b© und©irstood in the context of her
relationships within the family.
To conclude this portion of Hilda's reconstruction of
the past, there was much amiss in her early family; it
presented her with a dangerous immediate social environment
surrounded by an alien and, in places, incomprehensible broader
social world. On the other hand, many of the disturbing
characteristics of the Mendahl family may have been relatively
normal attributes of a turn of the century upwardly mobil
middle class family. Even the m.ost striking aspects of Mendahl
family life—e.g.: the risk of taking a sudden plunge in the
collective esteem; the degree of estrangement from community;
or the desperate edge to their attempts at establishing social
status, with the tendency to lose sight of realistic priorities
in the process—were probably present in other families whose
children did not experience psychotic breakdowns in entering
adulthood. The separate elements of the Mendahl family milieu
cannot, in short, be taken as causing schizophrenia. Taken as
a whole, instead, they represent a general context of high
risk, i.e., the separate factors interconnect in a potentially
synergistic fashion to constitute an overall situation of grave
difficulty for the developing child, Hilda. The family's
estrangement from the community might be considered, for
example, to carry "x" level of difficulty for the child’s
social development. Insecure membership in the family might,
in turn, present "y" level of difficulty. But when both
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situations occur together, the child is left with no secure
arena for developing social relatedness, an overall problem
significantly greater than the sum of "x" difficulty and "y"
difficulty. As I will attempt to show in reconstructing
Hilda's childhood, the nature of the child's primary
relationships within the family—through which all the basic
issues of interpersonal relatedness are first defined— is the
factor which can give this synergism its full pathogenic punch.
Before moving on to Hilda's early relationships, however, it is
worth considering how the past can influence the present in the
first place, which is the topic of the next chapter.
C H A P T E P * III
CONCEPTUAL GROUNDWORK
A Perspective on the Data
These things do I within, in that vast court of my
memory.
. . There I meet with myself.
. . Out of the
same store do I with the past continually combine
fresh and fresh likenesses of things which I have
expereienced
. . . and thence again infer future
actions, events and hopes, and all these again I
reflect on, as present.
St. Augiistine ( Confessions ca. 420)
This chapter is meant to set the stage for a
psychological understanding of Hilda's life. In the first
section I outline a general framework for viewing the data of a
psychological life history. In the second half, I introduce
basic concepts from several theoretical systems which I attempt
later to integrate in my analysis of Hilda's early development.
I have deferred these tasks up to this point in order
first to give a feel for Hilda's background and, particularly,
to show the complex texture of the past in her present. Murray
(1938, pp. 17-18) refers to information of this sort as
"sensuous" data, evidence v/hich communicates "the moving
immediacy of living." He sees the role of the psychclcgist in
a life history as providing the "heartless, denotative.
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referential symbols" which translate a sensuous understanding
into discursive knowledge. As a transition into outlining the
heartless referential symbols” which I see as best suited to a
conceptual formulation of Hilda's life, I would like to
abstract several points from Pascal's (1960) Truth and Design
in Autobiography
,
a critical analysis of the "sensuous"
knowledge that can be communicated in a person's account of
their life.
Pascal seeks to define t-he "structure of truth,” or
the qualities that give the feel of authentic discoverv in
autobiographical writing. The most common impediment to
authenticity, in Pascal's viev;, is for the writer to adept the
pretense of recapturing early events as they were originally
experienced. In that presenting events from the standpoint of
a much younger person tends to disguise the present perspective
of the v/riter, Pascal feels that it creates an inherently false
picture. On the other hand, he sees many autobiographies as
suffering from the opposite problem, reworking the past to make
it fit neatly with the writer's present purposes: "the
retrospective vision here blots out the real relationships."
(Ibid
.
,
p. 82). Works in this mode tend to present an overly
rationalized sequence of events linked in a deterministic chain
to the present. He finds that both problems of conception can
be overcomie
,
however, when the writer concentrates on
recountino his interaction with the world, particularly
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interpersonal interaction.
The ostensible forrr. and intention come to serve a
different and truly autobiographic intention, since
all these objective identities, these other people
become forces within the writer
. . . whom their
impact shapes and who develops in subtle response to
them. (Ibid
, p. 8)
While an autobiographer lacks the perspective to be a
good source on the external facts of his development, or to
deliver unimpeachable self-analysis, he is uniquely qualified
to report on how he experienced and consciously organized his
encounters with the world. Pascal sees this interactional
information, the picture of the person grounded in his
relationships, as the core of truth in autobiography. He feels
that this truth is best approached when the writer drops the
illusion of giving an objective explanation of his development,
frankly acknov/ledges ’’the intimate collusion of past and
present,” and accepts the "realistic level of indeterminancy”
which comes with focusing on interaction. When these steps are
successfully accomplished:
One can . . . assert that autobiography now becomes
an instrument for understanding life ... It seeks
for the law of the individual soul and the law of its
interaction with the outer world [Ibid . , p. 51]
.
It is inspired by a reverence for the self, tender
yet severe, that sees the self not as a property, but
a trust . . . Hence it seeks to trace its historical
identity, in all its particularity (Ibid . , p. 181).
Although Pascal's goal is sensuous knowledge
—
"understanding the feel of a life"—his analysis highlights the
main concerns for a conceptual understanding. The central
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importance which he places on interpersonal encounters fits
with Hilda's reconstruction of her past. In a quote at the end
of the first chapter, she mentions that she sees herself
clearly only in analyzing her reaction to others. Much of her
account of the past is a record of these interactions. Even in
the long period when Hilda was isolated as a mental patient,
her life revolved around a community of imaginary others. A
psychological understanding of her life, in short, hinges on
the ability to conceptualize the central role of interpersonal
relationships in structuring a personality. At the end of this
chapter, I draw together points from, two theories of
interpersonal functioning, Bov/lby's and Boszormenyi-Nag\^ ' s
,
which will be the basis for my theory of Hilda's development.
The value of the evidence in autobiography is not
just that it conveys the impact of others in a person's life,
but also that it shows how he organizes his experience. As
Pascal (1960, p. 1) puts it: "Autobiography offers an
unparalleled insight into the m.ode of consciousness of other
men." It shows how one maintains the sense of a "continuous I"
through his encounters with the world, how he structures an
identity out of his past. Issues of integration and continuity
stand out in Hilda's reconstruction of her history. She has
experienced periods of radical change in her internal
organization—her schizophrenic break and recovery— and
continues to have difficulty in "locating' herself in her
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surroundings. There have been times when she felt that she
"lived unalive” until she could reintegrate the events of her
A psychological theory of her life needs to account for
this process of structuring her expereince, and I draw on
Piaget ' s_ model of cognitive development for this purpose.
Pascal's requirement of conveying the "intimate
collusion between past and present" is well met in Hilda's
reconstruction of her life. V7hile in an autobiography it is
sufficient simply to evoke a "realistic level indeterminancy ,
"
a psychological life history must offer some general conception
of how past and present intermix. In discussing Hilda's
present stance toward early family life, I tried to draw our
the main problems in conceptualizing the relationship between
past and present. Hilda's active process of recollection, for
example, introduces a constant potential for resynthesis. On
the other hand, her sense of control over her links to the past
varies markedly. She consciously maintains some aspects of her
early family life, such as the value on education, v/hereas she
inadvertantly replicates others, such as the family pattern of
isolation from the community. She wants to keep her memories
of the past alive in the present, and yet at times she
experiences her connection to the early family as overwhelming,
like a "suffocating bloodweb" that reaches out from the past.
Most confusing of all, Hilda finds herself reenacting a few
strikingly similar situations of difficulty throughout her
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describes one of these as a '.'dragon" which she
continually reencounters. Most of her life crises occur in the
context of these repeating situations. Understanding this
apparent compulsion to relive the past is key to understanding
Hilda's problems in living.
Psychoanalytic theory offers a comprehensive
explanation of the role of the past in the present. It would
account for many of the confusing aspects of Hilda's
relationship to the past, e.g.: the wide variation in her
conscious control over recollection, the degree of conflict,
the unwanted eruptions of early experience, and, particularly,
'the problem of repetition. A full psychoanalytic explanation,
hovrever', would bring in Freud's metaphychology , The
metapsychclogy would reduce the "intimate collusion" between
Hilda's past and present to a mechancial interplay of memory
traces and energic impulses, thus negating one of the chief
qualities which gives her account of her history the "feel" of
truth. Most other phycholcgical models of memory are sim.ilariy
mechanistic. A number of theorists in adult development are
beginning to define a dialectical perspective on human time
which is more compatible with life history research {see Datan
and Reese, 1977) . It offers an alternative to the concept of
absolute time—appropriate to physical objects—which the
mechanistic models employ. Kvale (1977) contrasts the two
perspectives in a discussion of models of memory, and I use his
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analysis to introduce the dialectical view.
The dialectical perspective on memory
.
Korz^'bski (1921) defined man as the "time-binding"
organism, endowed with a unique ability to incorporate an
experience of the past and anticipation of the future within
the present moment.. Although this quality of "time-binding"
has been recognized for centuries, psychology has had great
difficulty developing a conceptual model which can encompass
it. The problem is reflected in current research. Gergen
(1973) sees a strong a-historical bias throughout social
psychology. Carlson (1973)
,
in his broad survey of personality
research finds that 78% of the studies were limited to a single
session contact and virtually none spanned "significant periods
of time."
Kvale (1977) attributes the a-historical bias in
psvchology to the two traditionally dominant models of memory.
-
In order to suggest a relationship between the activity of the
researcher and his conceptual fram.ework, he labels them the
"assemblv-line model" and the "beaucratic model." In the
former, memory is conceived as a single repository which stores
atomistic traces of experience. The model seeks to derive the
few basic laws by which traces are fixed in their container.
The concept of memory in Freud's metapsycholpgy is a three
dimensional variation on this model—the psychic energy which
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attaches to a trace of experierce determines how deeply it is
stored in memory.
The "assembly- line" model has begun to lose its
preeminent position and is being replaced by the "beaucratic"
or information processing model of memory. Instead of a single
repository of memory traces, theories in this mode picture a
mental storage apparatus composed of numerous boxes, systems,
or departments, each with a specialized function. Formal lines
of communication organize the various units within an overall
hierarchy of control functions— the computer. Peterfreund
(1971) and Bowlby (1981) have each proposed a revision of the
psychoanalytic model of memory along these information
processing lines.
Although computer inspired theories offer a
realistically complex model of remembering and allow for
qualitative differences in memory functions, they share v/hat
Kvale sees as the basic problems in the assembly-line model.
Bouh set up an artificial dichotomy between an internal world
of mental storage facilities and an external world of manifest
b0havior. Memory is reified as a collection or permanently
fixed traces of the outer world and seen as existing in
isolation from the active rememberer. It is hard to tell the
degree of metaphor intended in descriptions of the phychic
apparatus. Bowlby (1981), for example, speaks of psychic
subsystems which become "aware" of each other, "interpret
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reports from other subsystems, "sever communications," or even
engage in "self-perception."
Kvale sees dialectical analysis as a way of
the false distinctions imposed mechanistic models of
memory. He. abandons the idea of a hard line between the
rememberer and his memories, and with it the notion that past
experience must be located, like a physical object, in some
internal space. Instead, Kvale views recollection as process
of simultaneously structuring and being structured by the past:
"Dialectics concieves of remembering as a relation of a subject
to a world, the subject affecting and being affected by this
interaction" ( 1977
,
p. 180, Kvale's emphasis). A person's past
and present are, in other words, interrelated aspects of his
total situation. Fast experience shapes his understanding of
the present and changes in his present circumstances can give
events of the past new meaning. This fluid relationship
between past and present thus creates a constant potential for
resynthesis
.
Meacham gives a more radical statem.ent of the
dialectical perspective in his "transactional" definition of
remembering: "Both memories and the individual rememberer are
changeable events, derived from a more basic process of
transaction , communication, or exchange. Not only are the
memiories constructed, but the indivudal in turn depends upon
the memories" (1977, p.277, Meacham's emphasis). Transaction,
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as Meacham uses it, is a term for the dialectical state of
interdependence, wherein the separate aspects of a total
situation mutually define and exclude each other—
—just as
ground defines figure and figure excludes ground in a
perceptual gestalt. At an interpersonal level, the
relationship between buyer and seller or master and slave are
examples of transactional dependence; each party is defined in
relation to its counterpart, neither "exists” without the
other.
Meacham puts remembering in terms of interpersonal
exchange in order to stress the social nature of memory. He
regards the person's social context as a constituent aspect of
his relationship to his personal history— a third party in the
transaction between past and present. Just as the meaning of a
person's past experience and present situation are mutually
defined, his synthesis of past and present shapes and is shaped
by his social context.
The relationship between the individual, the
memories, and the social context is one of reciprocal
causality .. .The memories, as products of the
transaction, act upon the individual and the nature
of the individual's motor actions, cognitions, and
personality .. .whenever a new rem.embering ability is
presented, the relationship of the individual to the
social context is changed, and the potential for
further change in the individual exists [Meacham,
1977, p. 278].
The dialectical perspective is a very general
framework for viewinc psychological phenomena, something both
more and less than, a specific theory. A number of theOj.ies
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incorporate dialectical concepts. Both Kvale and Meacham cite
Bsrtlett's (1932) contexual model of memory as an example of an
implicitly dialectical theory.
Bartlett (1932) saw the idea of literal reproduction
of past experience as speculative, a theoretical possibility
with limited significance. He focused, instead, on memory as
an active search for meanina, an attempt to draw on past
experience in order to master the requirem.ents of functioning
in a changing biological and social environment. He referred
to this process as "meaning retroaction," whereby the indi\nidal
constructs "schemas," or cognitive maps of his life situation,
which integrate aspects of his past with his perception of the
present and anticipation of the future. As the context of
remembering changes, an individual may need periodically to
reorganize his schemas, giving elements of the past new
meaning. Following a religious conversion, for example, the
individual tends to reinterpret much of his past as leading up
to the event—and it is interesting to note that the opening
quote on Augustine's view on memory as a creative process or
constructing "fresh and fresh likenesses" was taken from his
account conversion.
Within the psychoanalytic tradition, Schachtel (1947)
extends the concept of repression in a similar direction. In
his analysis of the universal phenomenon of childhood amnesia,
he sees a basic antagonism between reviving the intense
sensory/perceptual experiences of early childhood and
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maintaining active participation in the adult world.
Socialization, and especially the development of linguistic
abilities, inevitably replaces the concrete modes of childhood
experience with the conventional categories or "schemata" of
adult experience. These adult schemata are not "suitable
vehicles" for the unique and intense qualities typical of
childhccd experience. Through his evolving participation in
the world, a new relationship—functional, but robbed of much
of its richness— is created between the individual and his
history: "The capacity to see and feel v/hat is there gives way
to the tendency to see and feel what one expects to see and
feel, which, in turn, is what one is expected to see and feel
because everybody else does" (Ibid
,
p.9)
.
In addition to developing the concept of "schema"
into its fullest form, Piaget elaborates an entire theory of
development based implicitly on a dialectical perspective. It
is his version of schematization which I use to conceptualize
"the intimate collusion between past and present" in Hilda's
life.
The chief advantage of employing the concept of
schem.a
,
in particular, and the dialectical perspective, in
general, is that it frees me from the impossible task of
separating a true "signal" of Hilda's past from the surrounding
"noise" of her present situation—each becomes significant in
relation to the other. More than simply marking Hilda's
reconstruction as an authentic autobiographical effort. the
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numerous examples of collusion between past and present can be
seen as meaningful phychological data, evidence of a
personality developing through time. It provides a basis for
viewing Hilda in light of her childhood, without, at the same
time, having to see the mature person as essentially childish.
There are some aspects of Hilda's integration of past
and present which do not appear to fit the model of an active
transaction. In some of the situations which seem most
strongly connected to her past, Hilda's sense of agency is verv
limited. She experiences the "m.essage" of the past as a
command— "suffocated in the family atmosphere"—and feels
forced to flee the reminders of the past. In other instances,
such as her repeating triangular relationships, Hilda finds
herself reliving the past with an unwanted degree of
precision—as if the past were a fixed template which
constrained the present person from changing. These
situations seem to fit better with a mechanistic model of
memory traces charged with energy—the metapsychology—and the
challenge is to translate Freud's insights on the subterranean
life of the past in the present into terms consistent with a
dialectical perspective.
Components of a Model
In the remainder of this chapter I outline the basic
concepts from Piaget, Bowlby, and Boszurmenyi-Nagy v/hich I use
to analyze Hilda's development. A reader familiar with these
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theorists may wish to skip ahead to the next chapter, Hilda's
childhood, where I begin my integration of their concepts.
The two Freuds
.
In constructing his metapsychology, Freud followd the
dictates of his intellectual superego—the Helmoltz school,
which sought to reduce biology to the principles of Newtonian
physics. Because he saw psychoanalysis's claim to science as
resting on its underlying model of mechanistic explanation, he
paid close attention to clarifying its basic principles. His
clinical theory, on the other hand, developed more or less
inadvertently out of a combination of factors: Freud's genius
as a clinical observer and the fact that his research focused
on historical reconstruction in the context of a prolonged,
intimate encounter between patient and analyst. The concepts
which emerged from this situation were based frequently on
principles of meaning, purpose, and adaptive striving. Because
these principles ran deeply counter to the dictates of his
intellectual superego, Freud had reason not to examine the
underlying perspective in his clinical theory. Rather than
spell out an alternate model, he worked to maintain his
clinical concepts, like a complex suspension of oil in water,
within his mechanistic model of explanation. There are a
number of different ways to define the underlying framework of
the non-mechistic side of psychoanalysis (Loevinger, 1969); one
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is to regard the clinical theory as based on a dialectical
perspective
The dialectical perspective is represented most
ii^ the concept of ego which emerged from Freud's
clinical work. Although in the metapsychology ego has a very
minor status— "We like to think of ego as powerless against the
id" (Freud, 1926, p.l8) —Freud gave it a major adaptive role in
his clinical theory: the ongoing synthesis of the deeplv
conflicting forces of unstructured libido and unyielding
external reality. The ego's power to synthesize diametrically
opposed forces is reflected in two of it's major
accomplishments: sublimation and symptom formation. In the
former, the demands of society and the anti-social impulses of
id are converted into constructive activity. Although neurotic
symptoms have an opposite effect, from the standpoint of
adaption, they arise from a similarly creative synthesis of
opposing forces.
The symptom comes into being as a. . .cleverly chosen
ambiguity with two completely contradictory
significations. [Freud, 1920, p. 315]
[Neurotic symptoms] achieve satisfaction by means of
. . .
a reversion to earlier phases in the [psychic]
organization. [The Neurotic] looks back on his
life-story seeking some such period of satisfaction
. . .
even if he must go back to the time when he was
a suckling infant to find it according to his
recollection or his imagination of it under later
influences. In some way the s^Tnptom reproduces that
early infantile way of satisfaction, disguised
though it is. . . and mingled with elements drawn
from the experiences leading up to the outbreak of
illness [ibid. p. 319]
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The creative process of reintegrating past and
present which Freud saw in symptciu formation is very close to
S^^'tle'tt s idea of "meaning retroaction," the difference being
^®lstive weight they assign to past and present experience.
Freud gradually defined his therapy as an attempt to reverse
the predominance of past experience. He cam.e to rely on the
pstient to bring up memories v/hich could then be reintegrated
within the structure of his mature ego— a redefinition of his
therapy which Freud (1914) saw as the "true beginning" of
psychoanalysis. In his later writings he began to speak of
"constructions" in analytic therapy (Ekstein and Rangell,
1959 ), implying that the analyst and patient were not simply
uncovering buried facts, but creating new meanings which alter
the patient's relationship to his past.
In relying on the patient to direct the course of
therapy, Freud positioned himself to add a greatly expanded
m.eaning to his early concept of transference. He discovered
that intrapsychic structure can shape interpersonal
relationship—an interconnection v^hich Loevinger (1966)
considers one of the two basic principles in psychoanalysis.
Freud (1914) began to speak of the patient as imposing a
"template," "imago," or "prototype" from early relationships
onto his current relationship with the therapist. He refocused
therapy on the transference relationship, adopting the view
that altering the patient's ways of relating to the therapist
would lead to a change in his ways of relating to the world:
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The person who has become normal and free from the
influence of repressed instinctive tendencies in his
relationship to the physician remains so in his own
life when the physician has again been removed from
it (1920, p. 386)
.
In focusing on the transference, Freud also extended
the meaning of resistance from a purely intrapsychic
concept—the process of blocking from awareness memory traces
v;hich are associated with dangerous libidinal impulses—to
become an interpersonal process— the use of the therapeutic
relationship as a defense against self-recognition, a way for
the patient to thwart the therapist's efforts at effecting
change. Freud further narrowed the focus of the therapist onto
interpretation of the transference resistance; "Experience
shows, . . that when the patient's free associations fail the
obstacle can. be removed every tine by an assurance that he is
now possessed by a thought which concerns the person of the
physician" (1912, p. 314).
Further experience showed, however, that the obstacle
could not always be removed, that is, in concentrating on the
transference Freud came to see a new and far less tractable
dimension of resistance. He found that, rather than
reintegrate the past through reflection, some patients seemed
determined to reconstruct it in action. Interpretation seem.ed
only to abet such cases, as if they chose to confirm the
interpretation by living it out all the more clearly. Freud
came to see this "compulsion to repeat" as part of a deadly
force of inertia in psychological life which ran counter to
the
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adaptive striving for rcsynthesis of past and present through
recollection
.
We soon perceive that the transference is itself only
a bit of repetition.
, . We must be prepared to find,
therefore, that the patient abandons himself to the
compulsion to repeat, which is now replacing the
impulse to rememJDer
,
and not only in his relation to
the analyst but in all other matters occupying and
interesting him at the time (1914, p. 370).
The discovery of compulsive repetition was disturbing
on both fronts of psychoanalysis. In term.s of the clinical
theory, it represented a severe limitation on the power of
insight—and Freud (1923) eventually concluded that there was a
large group of neurotics whose "need to suffer” put them beyond
the reach of analytic therapy. In terms of the metapsychology,
compulsive repetition appeared to be a "deamonic fate" them.e
which violated one of the central tenets of the model, the
Pleasure Principle:
Patients repeat all of these unwanted situations and
painful emotions and revive them with the greatest
ingenuity. . . They contrive once more to feel
themselves scorned. . . they discover appropriate
objects for their jealousy. . . None of these things
can have produced pleasure in the past. . . but no
lesson has been learnt from the old experience of
these activities having led. . . only to unpleasure
[1920, p. 15]
Freud (1920) resolved this mystery—or at least
rephrased it in terms compatible with the metapsychology in
his last major revision of the instinct theory. Beyond the
p]_0asure Principle. Fe elevated the Nirvana principle to the
central position in his mechanistic model:
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The pleasure principle, then, is a tendency operating
service of
. . . the most universal endeavor of all
living substance—namely to return to the quiescence
of the inorganic world (Ibid p. 58)
.
As Yankelovich and Barrett (1970) point out, the
death instinct—the return to quiescence—was implicit in the
Nirvana Principle from the start. In spelling it out, Freud
was simply reaffirming his basis in Newtonian thermodynamics.
In presenting the death instinct, Freud toyed with
the idea of revising his instinct theory in an entirely
different direction. In addition to the self-destructive
repetition shown by his patients, Freud looked briefly at
several other forms of repetitions behavior; the tendency to
"relive" a traumatic experience, reoccurrent nightmares, and
the tendency of children to repeat unpleasant experiences in
play. It was in the latter context that Freud offered an
alternative to the idea of a death instinct: an "instinct for
mastery .
"
He observed that his eighteen-month-old grandson
constantly repeated a game in v/hich he made objects disappear
and return. He would toss a small toy connected to a string
over the curtained edge of his crib, uttering a drawn out
approximation of "gone." He would then pull it back in,
greeting it with a joyful "there!" Freud also noted that,
although "greatly attached to his mother," the infant did not
show the degree of distress at her departure which would be
expected at his age. He suggested that the infant might
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somehow be making himself "master of the situation" through
symbolic re-enactmient of his mother's departure in play;
At the outset he was in a passive situation—he was
overpowered by the experience [of his mother's
disappearance] ; but, by repeating it, unpleasurable
though it was, as a game, he took on an active part.
These efforts might be put down to an instinct for
mastery was in itself pleasurable or not. [1920, p.
10, original emphasis]
The adaptive shift of position which Freud observed
in his grandson's play could never fully reduce to a mechanical
interplay of energies. Viewing the ability to restructure his
relationship to the world as a basic property of the child
would have required a radical revision of the metapsychology.
The role of mastery was far too substantial to hand over to the
"impotent" ego of the metapsychology, the "submissive salve" of
the id.
Although Loevinger (1966) feels that, more than
simply marking a road not taken, Freud was presenting a second
basic principle of psychoanalysis in his observations on his
grandson's play, Freud (1920, p. 8) had a far less sanguine
view of the idea of mastery: "We are left in doubt as to
whether the impulse to work over in the mind some overpowering
experience so as to make oneself master of it can find
expression as a primary event." Reasoning that it would be a
contradiction of the Nirvana principle if the goal of life were
a state of things which had never yet been attained, he
concluded that the idea of mastery must be considered a
"benevolent illusion;"
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Seen in this light, the theoretical importance of theinstincts of self-preservation and mastery greatly
^inii^^ishes
. They are component instincts whose
function it is to assure that the organism shall
follow its own path to death.
.
. (ibid
, pp. 32 - 33 )
This passage captures the tragic limitation in
Freud's work, that the man who devoted his intellectual life to
revealing the biological context of human nature should
ultimately entrap himself in such a distorted picture of
organic development. In his loyal adherence to the principles
of an inorganic science, Freud abandoned the opportunity to
articulate a set of basic principles appropriate for his
clinical theory— in particular, he turned av/ay from
clarification of the adaptive process of structuring and being
structured by the world which he relied on in his daily
clinical work.
Both sides of Freud, especially in the form which
they ultimately took in confronting the problem of repetition
,
are relevant to Hilda's life. If all the forces which led to
pathology in Hilda's life became suddenly clear, how she was
able to recover from the depths of schizophrenia—and at a time
when treatment consisted of being locked day and night in a few
rooms full of other regressed psychotics—would remain a
mystery. Some basic principle of mastery is definitely in
order. On the other hand, in shifting to a model which
emphasizes integration and adaption, there is a risk of losing
the insights of Freud's dark view of psychological life. This
issue is far from academic in Hilda's case. Starting in
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childhood, she has had several long periods of active
flirtation with suicide. The split between Hilda's conscious
intention and the destructive impact of her actions has
sometimes reached dramatic proportions, as when she nearly
drowned her daughter. Her repetition of painful situations has
often had self-destructive consequences. An adequate model
include a construct which has the explanatorv power
of the death instinct without its biological mystecism. I
address this two-sided problem by attempting to integrate an
implicity dialectical theory of development—Piaget's—with an
explicitly dialectical theory of interpersonal
relationship—Boszormenyi-Nagy
' s
.
Integration in the physical world .
Piaget and Freud seem to chart two different worlds
of psychology. Freud lets issues of mastery and active
adaption recede in order to concentrate on conflicting drives,
irrational motivation, and the deeply emotional aspects of
life. Piaget, as if in a reversal of figure and ground,
focuses on rational organization and adaptive integration of
experience to the point of ignoring any conflict, emotion, or
motivation which does not relate directly to an overall
striving for cognitive mastery. Both systems, however, share
certain basic similarities: each is based on a model of
clinical observation in which the investigator attempts to
understand events from the perspective of the subject; the
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intent in both cases is to place human behavior in a biological
context; and^ most important, both see the interna"'
structuring—albeit along very different lines—of past
experience as a key feature of development. A further
similarity is that Piaget's system approaches Freud's in
complexity. My purpose here is simply to draw out several
basic concepts in Piaget's theory which offer a different
perspective on the problems of repetition, transference, and
mastery
.
The most fundamental difference between Piaget and
Freud is in their concept of biology. In Piaget's view,
progressive organization, rather than tension reduction, is the
essential process in organic life. Instead of arising out of
conflict, psychological life is an extension of biological
adaption
:
The creation of intelligent structures is related to
the elaboration of forms which characterize life as a
whole [1936, p. 371]
.
At a certain level life organization and mental
organization only constitute, in effect, one and the
same thing [Ibid , p. 46].
Although Piaget speaks of mechanisms and equilibrium,
his implicit model of organic adaption is dialectical, not
mechanistic. Life is a process of change, not a return to
stasis. Even at its most primitive level, psychological
functioning always builds on, incorporates, and, above all,
contains the potential to transmute prior forms of adaptedness:
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The sequential manifestations of a reflex such as
sucking are not comparable to the periodic starting
of
^
motor used intermittently
,
but constitute anhistorical development so that each episode depends
on preceding episodes and conditions that follow in a
truly organic evolution [Ibid
.
,
p. 46].
The person relates to his world through schem.as, a
concept which Piaget uses so broadly that concise definition is
(difficult. Roughly, a schema is an internally organized
structure of mental or physical actions (Beard, 1969) . A
schema determines the way in which the person perceives and
acts toward some aspect of his environment. Organization
exists between, as well as within, schemas. The totality of a
person’s schemas grounds him in the world—the basis for
Piaget's (1936, p. 43) seemingly mystical statement that "the
universe is embodied in the activity of the subject." In that
a schema is always constructed from the person's past
experience, it likewise grounds him. in his own history: "a
schema embodies the past and so always consists in an active
organization of the experience lived" [Ibid .
,
p. 381] —a view
close to Bartlett's (1932) concept of "meaning retroaction" and
consistent with the dialectical notion of the person actively
resynthesizing past and present.
Schemas develop through assimilation and
accommodation, the two basic processes of change which
characterize mental life. Assimilation, a primary conceptual
link between Piaget's psychology and biology, occurs whenever
the person incorporates an experience of the environment into a
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schBina,. Just as it is inpossibl© to dstsnnin© th©
©xact point wher© inanimat© matt©r b©com©s living matt©r wh©n
an organism ingests physical substances like air or water,
assimilation significantly blurs the line between person and
environment: "The existence of an organized totality which is
preserved while assimilating the external world raises, in
effect, the whole problem of life itself" (Piaget 1936, p. 46).
Assimilation represents a constant interpenetration of person
and environment. In contrast to the rigidly fixed external
reality of Freud's model, the concepts of assimilation and
schema mark Piaget's view of reality as transactional.
Internal and external reality are relaticnally defined,
mutually dependent entities.
[An] object only exists ... in its relations with
the subject and, if the mind alv/ays advances more
toward the conquest of things, this is because it
organizes experience more and more actively, instead
of mimicking ... a ready-made reality. The object
is not a "knovjn quantity" but the result of a
construction [Ibid , p. 375].
The external world is not, of course, infinitely
maleable; there are natural limits on assimilation. Unfamiliar
situations, novel stimuli, and unanticipated consequences all
tend to shake up, or in Piaget's term, lead to
"disequilibration" of an existing schema. When the person
.modifies a schema so as to improve its fit with reality, he
engages in accommodation. This process is comparable to
assimilation in that the person "accommodates" a broader range
of experience, but differs in that he does so from an entirely
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nev7 perspective. Because schemata are interrelated,
modification of a central schema can lead to a radical
® the entire organization. Major accommodations
of this sort are a basic feature of normal development,
characterizing the transition from one stage to the next. The
development of symbolic thought, for example:
. . . is much more than a matter of formulating or
following up work already started; it is necessary
from the start to reconstruct everything on a new
plane. Perception and overt responses by themselves
will continue to function in the same way, except fcr
being charged with new meanings and integrated into
new systems. [1950, quoted in Kessen, 1965, p. 276]
Piaget compares these internal Copernican revolutions
to the abrupt restructuring of perception described in Gestalt
theory, but draws an important distinction. In contrast to the
recrystalization that occurs in a Gestalt shift, accommodation
can result in "a kind of thawing out of [existing] structures"
[1936, p. 288]. That is, every shift in perspective tends to
loosen the connection between a schema and the specific
situation in which it was constructed , The person's action
becomes less stimulus or situation bound, and more like a
portable tool which can be employed in a variety of unfamiliar
situations. Piaget [Ibid . , p. 288] refers to this result of
accommodation as the "mobility" of schemata: "mobility . . .
animates and coordinates configurations that were hitherto more
or less rigid despite their progressive articulation [through
assimilation] ."
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As a more flexible and integrated structure becomes
consolidated, assimilation recontinues on a higher level of
generality. All psychological development is, in this sense,
the progressive balancing of assimilation and accommodation.
Piaget calls this state of balance "mobil equilibrium."—
a
simultaneous achievement of stability (assimilating more of the
environment) and change (accoiranodating more fully to reality)
.
In order to illustrate these concepts, and introduce
an additional principle, objectification, it is helpful to
follow the course of change in a simple schema.
Psychological life starts with certain innate
reflexes, e.g., sucking, grasping, and visual scanning. The
infant assimilates the environmient in an initially stable
fashion: objects which enter his visual field are seen and
things which touch his hand or mouth are grasped or sucked.
When, in the course of repeating these reflexes, the infant
happens to grasp objects seen or suck objects grasped, a
destabilization occurs: the once distinct line between the
class of visible objects and the class of suckable objects
begins to blur. As the stable link between object and action
loosens, "graspability" and "visibility" come to be experienced
as properties of the object. The infant begins to
differentiate things in his environment from his own reflexive
functioning; he begins to invest them with a measure of
independent existence—the beginnings of what Piaget calls
"objectification" and "object permanence":
I
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When an object can be siiruiltaneouslv grasped and
sucked or grasped, looked at and sucked, it becomes
external to the subject quite differently than if it
could only be grasped. In the latter case
. . . the
subject only attempts to grasp through the need to
[Through objectification] the object acquires
an ensemble of meanings and consequently a
consistency [1936, p. 121].
This first step toward objectification is a major
accommodation, opening the way for the infant to reorganize his
rudimentary schemas into a more finely adapted and coordinated
sequence of actions. The infant then attempts to assimilate as
much of the environment as possible through his new schema,
that is, he tries to grasp everything he can see and stick it
into his mouth. This tendency toward over inclusion, a
universal characteristic of newly established schemata, propels
the infant toward further objectification and nevf levels of
accommodation. As the infant explores his v/orld through
seeing-grasping-sucking he experiences the limits of his new
schema: the wide range of suitability-for-sucking in objects
and the fact that some things simply cannot be grasped or fit
into his mouth. He may also discover that his own
schematically determined actions can affect the environment in
unexpected ways, that he can cause a rattle, for example, to
make noise en route to his mouth. These experiences
destabilize the new seeing-grasping-sucking schema, introducing
a new disequilibrium in the infant's relationship to the
environment. Piaget sees a natural tendency to repeat and
exaggerate these destabilizing experiences, to escalate
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assimilation in the area of disequilibrium—as if every schema
contained the seeds of its own destruction:
Each distortion, when carried to an extreme, involves
the re-em.ergence of the relations previously ignored.
Each relation established favours the possibility of
a reversal (quote in Kessen, 1965, p. 287].
New levels of coordination and mobility evolve out of
these distortions. The infant learns, for example, that two
hands can raise a heav^^ object to the mouth or that grasping
can be employed to rattle an object as well as to suck it.
These discoveries enhance objectification. The infant begins
to apprehend general laws of the environment, like gravity, and
unique properties of objects, like the noise a rattle makes.
Objects become increasingly anchored in the external world.
This process of "decentralization” accompanies every step of
the person's progress toward "mobil equilibrium”: "in
proportion as the action becomes complicated through
coordination of schemata, the universe becomes objectified ard
is detached from the self” [Piaget, 1936, p. 211] —the
dialectical contradiction of his statement that the "universe
is embodied in the action of the subject.”
I use a sensory-motor schema to illustrate Piaget's
basic concepts because it highlights the unconscious aspect of
schematization. Although Piaget accounts for the development
of logical thought—V7ith numbing complexity—the basic
processes of assimilation and accommodation, mobility and
objectification, remain at the heart of every advance in
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cognitive functioning. The schemas of rational thought simply
crown a massive pyramid of sensory-perceptual and intuitive
schemas, the great bulk of which rem.ains well outside the
person s conscious awareness. It is as if each person
unconsciously reconstructs the laws of physics, and re-
capitulates the Ptolemaic and Copernican revolutions, as an
inner framework for logical thought.
This view is a significant alternative to Freud’s
model of a dynamic unconscious. Both Freud and Piaget see the
unconscious integration of early experience as a potent force
in adult functioning, but Piaget’s system does not require a
separate language of physical energies. Like Freud, he sees a
terrific, inertia in psychological life, but only in the
abstract sense of inertia which applies to stable biological
adaption or the functioning of an implicit v/orld view.
The solutions which Piaget’s system offers to the
problems of mastery, repetition, and transference may already
be apparent. The striving for mastery, of course, becomes a
fundamental aspect of life, not a derivative of any particular
instinct or conflict. Repetition becomes part of a universal
process of adaption, seeking equilibrium through
disequilibrium. Piaget's view of repetition accounts for the
need for a period of "working through" which Freud observed in
his patients but never fully rationalized in theoretical terms.
It also makes the tendency of some patients to exaggerate
maladaptive patterns which have been pointed out to them seem
I
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far less perverse, no longer requiring the diabolical
intervention of a death instinct to account for it. These
patients can be seen as striving for mobility through an
increasingly rigid repetition of the dysfunctional pattern.
Just as Piaget's model anchors the loose concept of
"working through," it provides a theoretical context for the
images which Freud uses to describe transference in his
clinical writings. Freud's "prototype ," imago , " "template," and
"cliche" all translate directly into Piaget's "schema."
Despite the potential for translating Freud's
clinical concepts into Piaget's model, and the greater clarity
offered by the latter, Piaget has had only minor impact in
clinical psychology. One strong reason for this lack of impact
is the fact that concepts like schema, assimilation, and
objectification seem so remote from the emotional experience of
everyday life. The psychodynamic model of the person as a
vehicle of conflicting- drives, defenses, and compulsions seems
to fit the world of emotions—especially in its disordered
aspects—far better than Piaget's emphasis on cognitive
organization. The gap, in fact, seems huge.
One approach toward bridging it to abandon the
traditional habit of viewing thought and emotion as separate
categories. This is a stance which Bowlby (1969) advocates,
i Just as Piaget sees cognition as one aspect of a physiological
I
process of adaption, Bowlby links emotional experience with
! both. Drawing on Danger's (1967) philosophical attack on the
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Cartesian split betv;een mind and body, he argues that feelings
are one "phase" of a physiological process, an integral part of
the process rather than a separate product or causal agent. He
cites Langer's analogy between emotions and the redness of
heated iron to illustrate this point: "When iron is heated to
a critical degree it becomes red; yet its redness is not an
entity which must have gone somewhere else v/hen it is no longer
in the iron" [ 1969
,
p. 10 8] .
Like Piaget, Bowlby sees the person's cognitive
organization of the environment as an extension of organic
adaption. Emotional experience is one mode of registering this
process of integration with the environment: "the very process
of categorizing a person or object or situation as one fit to
elicit one or another class of -behaviour is itself experienced
em.otionally" [ Ibid
. , p. 113].
Madison (1969)
,
in company with a number of other
psvchologist s , also argues for the need to see cognition and
emotion as related aspects of a single process. He refers to
this process as "reintegration," which he defines as "the
tendency of past experience to enter into the present so as to
restore a former state of affairs." [Ibid . , p. 236]. He
argues that any perception can be placed along a broad
continuum ranging from purely "stimulus-constrained, e.g.,
"objective" perception of a well defined figure viewed under
bright light and at reading distance, to, at the other extreme,
"hallucinatory reintegration," i.e.. "extremely convincing
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imagery strongly determined by past learnings but experienced
by the subject as a perception." [Ibid
.
,
p. 239]. Most
perception falls within the midrange of "reintegrative fill-
in": "in which the general framework of the percept is
®^itiulus determined but details are supplied reintegratively
^it]^out the subject's being aware of such past influence."
This process of reintegrative fill-in is generally accompanied
by a motivational and/or emotional component. The person-
experiences himself as "seized" by the em.otion. Therefore,
although thought and feelings are both components of a single
process, the cognitive aspect of emotion is poorly reflected in
awareness.
Madison introduces the concept of "reintegrative
resonation" to account for the motivational and emotional
aspects of the linkage between past and present. He feels that
the person organizes significant past experience into
"resonating systems," a term which he defines through analogy
with a sound chamber:
An incoming stimulus . . . can be conceived as . . .
a whisper entering a cavern full of echo chambers.
Some chambers are shaped just right for a wave of [a]
particular amplitude and their resonating effect
strongly amplifies the incoming sound . . . What
enters as a whisper comes out as a roar [1969, p.
244] .
There is a good example of reintegrative resonation
in the preceding chapter where Hilda was discussing her
family's stance tov/ard "other classes of people." She
mentioned that she did not accept, but was affected by their
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snobbish attitude, and went on to describe how isolated she is
in her present neighborhood. With the intention of softening
her self-indictment, I pointed out that her neighbors are
mostly ”GE people”—a corporation known for its policy of
encouraging a sense of tight-knit community among its
employees. Hilda responded: ''They're only GEers 1 "—as if my
mild excuse had resounded in an echo chamber to come out as a
harsh accusation.
Another area in which Piaget's system can be brought
closer to the world in which Freud works is in the concept of
motivation. The source of motivation in Piaget's model is
remote and monolithic: the force toward organization found in
all organic life. Other theorists posit a similar basic
motivation
,
eaually monolithic but phrased on a more human
scale. The striving for "self-actualization" described by
Goldstein (1938)
,
Maslow (1954)
,
and Rogers (1959) is an
example. Lecky ' s (1945) concept of an overall striving for
"self-consistency" and Kelly's (1955) theory of personality as
a system of "constructs" directed toward prediction of events
in the environment are built on a similarly monolithic motive.
Epstein (1973) improves on these monolithic conceptions of a
basic organizing principle by incorporating the need to
assimilate and organize the data of experience as one of three
basic motive systems, the other two being the need to m.aintain
a favorable level of self esteem and maximization of the
balance of pleasure over pain. The advantage of such a
151
pl^^^llstic thsory of inotivation is that it ©nablas Epstain
1981) to account for conflict batwaan, as wall as within,
systems, say, for example, when an effective assessment of
t63lity might be damaging to self esteem——an alternate approach
to explaining the occurrence of repression and dissociation.
Epstein, in other words, offers a model of motivation which
connects the cognitive emphasis on mastery and organization
' with the psychodynamic emphasis on conflict.
White (1960, 1963) presents a forceful argument for a
revision of the psychoanalytic model of motivation along
similar lines, that is, to include an innate striving for
"effectance" alongside the traditional drives of sex and
aggression. He argues that this addition would introduce a
modern principle of biological adaption to psychoanalytic
theory and integrate the concepts of psychic structure and
energy:
Effectance . , . refers to the active tendency to put
forth effort to influence the environm.ent ... [It
is] conceived to be just as basic as the instincts
. , . This conception of independent ego energies
tends to reduce the sharp metaphorical distinction
between energy and structure. If we conceive of
structure as competence, we are giving it the dynamic
character of patterns of readiness for future action
[1963, pp. 185-186].
White notes that his revision of psychoanalytic
motivation eliminates the need for a cumbersom.e principle of
neutralization. He, in fact, separates the development of
"competence" from the process of cathexis altogether:
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The [individual's representation of an] objective
stable world is thus best conceived of as a
construction based on action
. . . There is no need
that cathexis plays any necessary part at
all in knowledge of reality [ibid
.
,
p. 188].
As White points out, this reconceptualization of ego
development brings ego psychology close to Piaget's model of
cognitive development. White stops short of actual synthesis
t^3.t he maintains the psychoanalytic notion of energies“—or
,
more accurately, White moves the separate worlds of Piaget and
Freud inside the psyche. He posits the coexistence of a
potentially conflict-free sphere of ego functioning powered by
energies which seek structure ( competence ) and an inherently
conflictual sphere of sexual and aggressive drives which push
toward discharge. White sees affectional ties as falling into
the latter sphere of energy, and reserves the concept of
cathexis "for describing a loving interest in objects." This
sphere is also responsible for psychological development taking
an abnormal course; its energies can "obstruct" or "flood"
growing ego structures, diverting their adaptive energies from
developing competence to erecting defensive structures, such as
repression and denial, which distort reality. White, in short,
accepts a confusing psychic world of dual energies—and
sacrifices the chance for a full integration of Freud's and
Piaget's concepts of structure— so that he can maintain a focus
on abnormal developm.ent and continue to place it in an
interpersonal context.
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The confusing system of energies which White accepts
points to a problem in adapting Piaget's model to Freud's
^li^ical theory which no amount of tinkering with philosophical
assumptions can solve: it is missing an important dimension of
psychological life. Peterfreund (1971, p. 377) puts his finger
on this missing dimension: "Piaget has been interested in how
we organize the world vis-a-vis inanim.ate objects.
Psychoanalysis has been interested in how we organize the world
primarily vis-a-vis animate objects." This gap is especially
apparent in clinical work; people with serious problems in
living are often quite successful in relating to things,
whereas their relationships with people are almost invariably
disturbed. Piaget illuminates the gyroscopic nature of
development—that, as our focus expands outward to incorporate
more of the environment, we become increasingly stable through
mobility—but neglects the fact that we at the same time
develop as satellites of other moving bodies. Our lives
revolve around other people, a situation which shapes our
perspective at least as forcefully as the need to accommodate
to the physical world. A full psychological account of a life
must focus on this interpersonal dimension.
To summarize this section, Piaget's view of the
underlying process of development as a progressive structuring
of relationships is a valuable alternative to Freud's
metapsychology, avoiding several of the main problems which
stem from attempting to reduce organic growth to a process of
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tension reduction. It fits with the dialectical perspective
implicit in Freud's clinical theory and offers specific terms,
such as assimilation, accommodation, and objectification, for
conceptualizing changing modes of relationship. The impression
of over—empha s i s on rationality in Piaoet's system can be
reduced somewhat by regarding thought and feeling as related
aspects of a general process of registering and integrating
experience
.
Piaget's model does, on the other hand, de-emphasize
internal conflict, a problem which can be approached by
treating the need to integrate oneself in the physical world as
one of two basic sources of motivation. White's term for this
motive, "effectance , " has the advantages of referring directly
to som.ething that can be experienced—feelings of
competence—and insofar as White separates effectance from
psychoanalytic energies, he offers a link between the concepts
of structure in Freud's and Piaget's systems. I will be using
White's term, abstracted entirely from the notion of energies,
to refer to this motive system in Hilda's life.
Leaving psychic energies behind, however, highlights
the need for an alternative conception of how other people act
as a force in one's life. In order to fill this gap, I draw on
two major contributions to an understanding of the
interpersonal dimension of psychological life: Bowlby's (1969,
1973) theory of an instinctive need for attachment and
Boszormenyi-Nagy's (1965, 1973) theory of invisible loyalties.
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Because my integration of these two theories will be a prime
focus in understanding Hilda's life, elaborated throughout the
remainder of her history, I will at this point give simply a
bare outline of the main concepts, and what I see as the common
ground in Bowlby's and Boszormenyi-Nagy
' s models.
Attachment to the interpersonal world
.
The person may engage v;ith others as objects to
dominate or instruments to use or because he depends
on them for some particular purpose. But
fundamentally he depends on them, as they on him,
simply because they are other than him. It may not
be in the best of taste to use the word love, which
just now seems to belong largely to certain fields of
applied zoologr^: but some word is needed to point to
that quality of the person's essentially human
engagement with others.
Paul Lafitte (1957, p. 51)
Most of the leading theories on the origins of
attachment, prior to Bowlby (1958), are encompassed by the
first sentence in the above quote from Lafitte. The
development of a bond between the infant and its caretaker is
traditionally seen as deriving from some other m.cre basic
process, primarily the satisfaction of physiological needs and
especiallv the need for food. This is the view in social
learning theory (Dollard and Miller, 1950) as well as the
standard position in psychoanalysis: "The reason why the
infant in arms wants to perceive the presence of its mother is
only because it already knows by experience that she satisfies
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all its needs without delay" (Freud, 1926, p. 137). Theories
in this mold are based largely on principles drawn from other
areas of observation, in psychoanalysis, for example, on
retrospective inference from adult functioning. The most
prominent revision of this view, the object relations theorv of
attachment mentioned in the introductory chapter, was advanced
by clinicians who, in contrast, had considerable first-hand
experience with children. Significantly, their view of
attachment as the product of a primary "object seeking" drive
comes very close to Bowlby's theory. Bowlby, however, takes
two major additional steps: (1) he attempts to base his theory
entirely on direct observation of human infants and immature
animals in relation to their mothering figures; and (2) he
views attachment as a basic, "instinctive" need, an inborn
propensity not reducible to any more primitive drive, process,
or source of motivation.
Attachment may have escaped direct attention because,
like oxygen, it is so much a part of life that its importance
becomes clear only in its absence. Bowlby's focus on
attachment, in any case, arose out of his work with children
who had been separated from their parents. He discovered that
children undergo a predictable and potentially catastrophic
pattern of responses when separated from their primary
attachment figures (Bowlby, 1953) . He was unable to account
for this observation within the psychoanalytic energy model and
turned, instead, to ethology.
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Bowlby found a close parallel between the mounting
evidence on the damaging impact of institutionalization on
human infants and studies of maternal deprivation in non-human
primates (e.g,, Harlow, 1961, 1962) . Both show that, even
adequate physical care, an infant deprived of its mother
enters a state of general crisis; prolonged deprivation leads
to a loss of the "will to live”
—
possibly even death—and
serious maladjustment in later functioning. Ethological
studies also provided Bowlby with strong counter evidence to
the theory that attachment results from physical needs being
met: infant monkeys cling to a -non-nutritive surrogate which
resembles an adult monkey in preference to one that feeds them,
puppies attach more strongly to an investigator who takes time
out to beat them than to one merely delivering routine care,
and frightened monkeys will cling to a surrogate even when the
object itself instigates the fear, e.g., by delivering a shock
or a loud blast.
In the first two of his three volume work on
attachment and separation, Bowlby (1969, 1973) marshalls a rich
body of evidence from primate studies, cross cultural and
naturalistic studies of early human development to support his
thesis of a universal, inborn tendency to form strong
affectional bonds. The main points, abstracted from a summary
in the opening of his third volume (Bowlby, 1980, pp. 39-41)
include
:
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(1) Bowlby defines the goal of attachment behavior as
maintaining proximity to a specific figure:
[It] is conceived as any form of behaviour that
results in a person attaining or retaining proximity
to some other differentiated and preferred
individual
.
(2) This goal has an important biological function:
Attachment behaviour has become a characteristic of
many species during the course of their evolution
because it contributes to the individual's survival
by keeping him in touch v;ith his caregiver (s) .
(3) Strong feelings are associated with attachment,
to the extent that the psychology of emotions is largely a
psychology of affectior.al bonds:
Many of the most intense emotions arise during the
formation, the maintenance, the disruption and the
renewal of attachment relationships. The formation
of a bond is described as falling in love,
maintaining a bond as loving someone . . . Threat of
loss arouses anxiety and actual loss gives rise to
sorrow; v/hile each of these situations is likely to
arouse anger. The unchallenged maintenance of a bond
is experienced as a source of security and the
renewal of a bond as a source of joy.
(4) Although most obvious in early childhood, the
need for attachment remains a potent factor in adulthood:
During the course of healthy development attachment
behaviour leads to the development of affectional
bonds . . . The forms of behaviour and the bonds to
which they lead remain active throughout the life
cycle
.
On the way in which an individual ' s attachm.ent
behaviour becomes organized within his personality
turns the pattern of affectional bonds he makes
during his life.
Most of Bowlby ' s evidence is amassed in support of
the first three points above, the functional and emotional
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s icrr. i ficance of attachment in early life. Bovrlby's orcanizing
concept for this stage is the "behavioural, system," a term
ethology
. A behavioral system is an interrelated
set of propensities for assessing the environment and acting so
as to achieve a predictable outcome or "set-goal," such as
niaintaining proximity to an attachment figure. The system is
"activated" by the individual's appraisal of changes in his
internal or external environment, and "terminated" by his
appraisal of achieving the set-goal.
Up to this point, Bowlby's conception of the internal
structure which m.ediates between organism and environment is
very similar to the reflexive and action oriented schemata
described by Piaget. Bowlby's model of primitive organization
is slightly more mechanistic than Piaget's, lacking, for
instance any equivalent to Piaget's "accommodation," but has the
important advantages of: (1) drawing an explicit link between
cognition and emotion, i.e., by regarding feelings as an aspect
of appraisal; and (2) shifting the focus of integration to the
interpersonal sphere with the addition of a distinctly social
dimension of basic motivation.
It is in making the huge leap from infancy to
adulthood—the fourth point in the outline above—that Bowlby
diverges from Piaget. In his first two volumes, Bowlby (1969,
1973) gives relatively little attention to the development of
higher level organization or the individual's overall
integration of his discrete systems of attachment behavior. In
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his second volume (1973, pp. 203-210) he suggests that an
individual's attachment behavior becomes increasingly mediated
by "forecasts" based on his "working models" of self and other,
that is, on an appraisal of:
(a) Whether or not the attachment figure is judged to
be the sort of person who in general responds to
calls for support and protection and (b) whether or
not the self is judged to be the sort of person
towards whom anyone, and the attachment figure in
ps^^ticular
,
is likely to respond in a helpful way.
[Ibid
.
,
p. 204 ]
.
The concept of a working model is compatible with the
Piagetian notion of schemata so long as it is regarded as an
abstract construction of social reality, a mode of relating to
a changeable social world. If, on the other hand, a model is
seen as the literal representation of a fixed reality, such as
a computer could be programmed to produce from a body of pre-
defined data, it means something entirely different. Bov;lby
(1980)
,
unfortunately, takes this latter route in the final
volum.e of his work on attachment;
Once cognition and action have been automated, they
are not readily accessible to conscious processing
and so are difficult to change. . . [But]
provided these representational models and
programmes are well adapted [to reality] , the fact
that they are drawn on automatically and without
awareness is a great advantage [Ibid . , p. 55].
Bov/lby shifts fully into an information processing
model in order to trace the roots of adult psychopathology to
early childhood attachments, the focus of his third volume.
The model is well suited to this purpose; maladapted programs
and distorted representational m.odels account for the tenacious
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r©pGtition of dysfunctional and s©l f“limiting b©havior without
requiring a concept of psychic energy or a death instinct.
This reified picture of cognitive organization, however,
irreconcilably separates Bov/lby's system from Piaget's.
Development becomes largely a process of quantitative change, a
cumulative assimilation of data through the continuous
enlargement of the person's svstems of processing. Although
modification of the processing systems and reintegration of
data can occur, there is no equivalent to the major qualitative
changes in the person's relationship to the environment which
Piaget conceptualizes in terms of accommodation, mobility, and
objectification. Bov/lby stops at an interactive perspective
rather than the fully transactional view that Piaget employs.
To labor the satellite analogy, it is as if Bowlby places the
bodies in the correct relationship but limits himself to a two
dimensional perspective, allowing only for linear movement.
This is where Boszormenyi-Nagy ' s theory becom.es
important. Starting from a point similar to Bowlby 's central
assertion of a need for attachment, he introduces an essential
dimension of reciprocity and interdependence to the concept of
relationship, adding a new level of mobility to Bowlby 's model.
The problems in integrating Boszormenyi-Nagy '
s
concepts with any of the preceding models are great. Unlike
the other theorists, his primary unit of analysis is the
interpersonal system, rather than intrapsychic organization.
He also bases his concepts on explicit philosophical
162
3.ss\iinptions to an ©xt©nt that is Qsn©]rally unacc©ptabl© in
acad©mic psychology— invoking ontological n©©ds or ©thical and
obligational motivations which s©©m ali©n to psychology. On
the other hand, Nagy's dialectical perspective can be seen as
an extension of the same principles of contexual determination
and change which are implicit in Piaget and Freud, as well as
in a number of other more traditional models of psychic
functioning. .In contrast to most other systems theorists, Nagy
maintains a strong emphasis on history. He preserves a focus
on durable patterns of individual behavior and recognizes the
importance of an individual's organization of his experience as
a partial determination of interpersonal events. Nagy, in
fact, sees his systems theory as supplementing, rather than
supplanting, intrapsychic theory. By placing interpersonal
relationship in the context of an abstract transaction, Nagy
adds a new dimension of meaning to many cf the substantive
concepts of psychoanalytic and object-relations theory— in the
same way that Piagetian psychology redefines information
processing as an abstract construction.
The dialectical concept of transaction is the heart
of Boszormenyi-Nagy ' s (1965, 1973) view of social relations.
Social behavior is always defined by its context, never fully
separable from the overall organization or "system" of actions
in which it occurs. Interpersonal relations are organized on
the lines of a negotiation, in which the position of one party
defines and excludes the position of the other:
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Each real, or anticipated, transaction creates or
contributes to a syir.bolic delineation of both
entities: the one
. . . who acts (subject) and the
one who
. . , [is] acted upon (object)
. The
structure of any transaction implies a figure—ground—
like polarity of relating, and each transaction
redefines personality boundaries. [1965, pp. 35-36].
,The conventional terms and categories of intrapsychic
psychology take a new meaning in light to this emphasis on
transaction. The concept of ego, for example, always implies
an alter ego. Neither can be understood fully in isolation
from the other. Both are interpendent aspects of an integrated
system: "the other ego may ... be considered a constitutive
agent rather than a mere segment of an indifferent social
reality” [Ibid
.
,
p. 35], This view does not negate the fact of
internal organization or the experience of personal continuity,
but it regards these phenomena as dependent upon a context:
The experience of Selfhood depends on the existence
and intactness of a boundary
,
formed through the
polar division of the person’s relational agents into
two symbolic regions: a proximal region of Self-
referent and a distal region of Not-Self-reverent
agents. Agents of the proximal region are all
experienced as constituents of either a singular or
plural Selfhood (I or we)
,
whereas agents of the
distal region make up the spectrum of Others [Ibid .
,
p. 42, original emphasis].
The idea of a transaction at the core of personality,
in other words, extends the meaning of Freud’s (1923, p. 36)
definition of the ego as a ’’precipitate of abandoned object-
cathexes” and adds significance to his (Ibid . , p. 48) comment
that ”to the ego, living means the same as being loved.” It
also introduces an interpersonal equivalent to Piaget’s concept
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of objectification": every refinement in one's understandinc
of his significant others results in a further differentiation
and integration of self. The establishment of object
permanence and a stable sense of self are, for example,
mutually entailing processes.
The primary assumption in Boszormenyi-Nagy
' s theory
is the existential concept of ontic dependence—the idea of an
inherent interdependence betv/een self and other. Nagy's
analysis of ontic relatedness, or the person's existential need
for others, is on a different plane from Bowlby's examination
of functional relatedness, or the person's biological and
instinctive need for others. The two perspectives are not,
however, mutually exclusive; each has aspects which enhance the
other. Regarding Bowlby's "primary need for attachment" as an
alternate perspective on ontic dependence, for example, links
Nagy's psychology with the life sciences and provides a solid
foundation of empirical evidence for the idea of an inherent
interdependence between people. Nagy suggests the possibility
of such a linkage in his concept of the "relational need
template," a synthesis of physiological needs and early inter-
personal experience which results in an enduring affinity for a
set of complementary others:
Need templates . . . are largely unconscious
amalgamations betv/een inherited, phylogenetic
patterns and past learning (imprinting) from
formative encounters with significant Others [ Ibid .
,
p. 52] .
165
Boszormenyi-Nagy
' s concept of complementarity
—
f i^u^s^gsround—like polarity of relating”—
—in turn enriches
Bowlby's basic definition of attachment behavior. There are
two components to Bowlby's definition: proximity maintenance
and specificity. Bowlby concentrates mainly on the former, and
his concept of the behavioral system offers a good account of
the mechanics of remaining related in physical space. Although
Bowlby (1980) posits a basic principle of complementarity in
attachment, he devotes little attention to it—specificity
seems to be part of his definition of attachment behavior
mainly because it is such a strong empirical observation.
Nagy's emphasis on the importance of self-other demarcations
makes it clear why the preferred figure would be as essential
to attachment behavior as the aspect of physical proximity.
More than most systems theorists, Nagy is concerned
with describing how the individual internally structures his
experience—or, to put it in transactional terms, how he
unconsciously carries his relational context into new
encounters. The "need template" is one of several terms which
he uses to identify this level of motivational structure. He
also speaks of: " introjection of familial transactional
networks" (1962) ; "intrapsychic relational configurations" or
the "internalized structure of self-other situations" at the
core of personality (1965); and the "affective programatic
structuring" which occurs in early relationships and contains
the "blueprints of the person's future actions" (1973). None
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of these terms are convenient for describing clinical
phenomena—they are all too abstract and awkward for regular
use. Given Nagy's deeply contexual perspective, however, an
alternative term has to meet a number of conflicting
requirements: it must be something v/hich can be subjectively
experienced as well as objectively observed; it needs to
encompass aspects of unconscious motivation, affective
experience, and perceptual structuring; and it should imply an
aspect of intrapsychic integration and self delineation at the
same time that it refers to interpersonal organization and
group definition. Nagy (1973) develops the concept of
"invisible loyalties" to meet this need for a synthetic
concept.
Loyalty, as Nagy (1973) uses it, is a multi-
dimensional term—and he makes no promise of being able to
define it fully or operationalize it at this point. At the
level of interpersonal system, loyalties refer to the set of
expectations, injunctions, myths, and values which define group
membership. Nagy describes loyalty bonds as: "the deeper
relational structuring of families and other social groups
. . .
the sustaining principles of membership . . . and the
invisible but strong fibers that hold together complex pieces
of relationship behavior . . . the substance of group survival
[Ibid., pp. 38-41]. Loyalty commitments define the individual
as well as the group, that is, at the level of individual
behavior:
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Loyalty
. . . encompass identification with thegroup, genuine object relatedness with other members,trust, reliability, dutiful commitment, and staunchdevotion , . . Internalization of expectations andinjunctions in the loyal individual provide
structural psychological forces which can coerce theindividual just as much as external enforcement
within the group [Ibid
.
,
p. 42].
Loyalties can be conscious or unconscious and vary
broadly in the degree to which they are maintained through
coercive or cooperative devices. Taken as a whole, they make
up what Nagy calls the "obligational system of motivation"
which regulates the homeostasis of group functioning. Within
the individual, obligation behavior is regulated on the
positive side by feelings of love, trust, self-esteem, and a
sense of belonging; on the negative side, by guilt, shame, and
fear of exclusion.
Nagy makes heavy use of the metaphor of "accounting"
in referring to how the individual experiences his position
within a particular obligational system: "each person
maintains a bookkeeping of his perception of the balances of
past, present, and future give-and-take" [1973, p. 39]. A
person's accounting of loyalty commitments is, in other words,
his historic record of the impact of his significant self-other
encounters. Carrying a positive balance means experiencing a
sense of indebtedness and holding expectations of cooperation.
Carrying a negative balance means harboring resentment and an
expectation of coersive and exploitive encounters. In this
sense, the accounts that a person carries forward from his
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sttachments have the same potent affective and
motivational influence on future relationships that
psychoanalytic theory attributes to internalized object
relations. As Nagy puts it, "the accounting of acts of loyalty
is the key determinant of relationship structures and
ultimately individual behavior" [Ibid
.
,
p. 25].
Summary
I started this chapter with an outline of Pascal's
(1960) analysis of the qualities in autobiography which have
the "feel" of true evidence of a personality; a focus on
interpersonal relationships, examples of how the writer
organizes his experience and maintains a sense of personal
continuity, and a general acceptance of the "intimate
collusion" between past and present. I noted that these
qualities are well represented in Hilda's reconstruction of her
history, and that they fit with my broad theoretical goal—the
integration of intrapsychic and interpersonal concepts. I also
discussed the difficulty that psychology has in conceptualizing
how a person incorporates the past in the present and compared
two broad paradigms: the mechanistic model and the dialectical
perspective. I then outlined the components of the model which
I will be using in analyzing Hilda's development. As a first
step toward integrating these concepts, I will look briefly at
how they add to a theoretical understanding of the points which
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Pascal identifies as central to communicating the "feel” of a
life.
1) The complex relationship between past and present.
The mechanistic model, which conceptualizes the past
as a permanently fixed aspect of the present, has the
advantages of accounting for conflict and being able to
portray the person's history as a strong determinant of his
present functioning. In particular, Freud's concept of the
dynamic unconscious~that traces of past experience link with
instinctual impulses to act as a constant force in the
present—offers an account of the potent influence of the past
which any alternative theory has to attempt to match. Freud's
metapsychology, however, exemplifies the problems inherent to a
mechanistic model: the reification of experence and an
inability to encompass the qualitative changes of organic
development—Freud reduces growth to a round about process of
tension reduction.
The dialectical perspective is well suited to
conceptualizing qualitative change and the active nature of a
person's reintegration of past and present. Piaget's view of
the person as assimilating the present through structures
derived from past experience is a step toward an alternate
account of the determinative force of the past. The tendency
to de-emphasize conflict in Piaget's system can be corrected by
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adding an instinctive "need for attachment" (Bowlby) alongside
his monolithic striving for organization or mastery.
Nagy's interpersonal theory incorporates the
advantages of a dialectical perspective while m.oving still
closer to the explanatory power of the mechanistic. His
emphasis on the role of others as constituents of self implies
that some degree of repetition would be inherent in all
relationships. His concept of a "relational need template"
also implies a degree of dynamic tension between past and
present. "Loyalty accounting" subsumes both concepts and, in a
sense, re-defines id as the sum of the person's relational
needs which are unmet in his present situation.
2) The internal organization of experience and continuity over
time.
Freud's clinical theory opens all the central issues
in this problem: the emphasis on ego integration which leads
to a principle of mastery, his insight into the fact that even
maladaptive behavior shows active organization and creative
synthesis, and his discovery of the interconnection between
intrapsychic organization and interpersonal relations.
Piaget shifts the analysis of organization into a
more appropriate biological frame of reference. He redefines
psychic structure as a mode of relating to, or schiematizing,
the environment and adds a number of important concepts for
describing dialectical change in relation to the physical
world.
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Nagy applies the same transactional perspective in
relation to the interpersonal world, bringing the role of
interpersonal relationship in intrapsychic organization into
sharp focus. His emphasis on the importance of others as a
constituent of self brings phenomena that Freud explained
through the death instict back into the realm of integrative
and adaptive striving.
3) The role of others as a force in one's life—Pascal's idea
of the self as "not a property but a trust."
Bowlby's work on attachment provides an empirical
basis for Nagy's philosophical assumption of "ontic dependence"
between self and other. In addition to placing interpersonal
relations at the center of psychological life, Nagy opens the
way for an integration of intrapsychic and interpersonal
concepts. His concept of an "internal configuration of
self-and-other , " for example, captures the insight of object
relations theory without reference to psychic energies or
things that are not things— factors which negate an
interpersonal focus.
Nagy's theory has an historical dimension but it is
not specifically developmental. The fact that he and Piaget
both work from a dialectical perspective suggests the potential
for cross fertilization: Nagy could add the central dimension
of interpersonal relations to Piaget's framework and Piaget
could place Nagy's concepts within a developmental context,
adding a language for describing change—e.g., assimilation and
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accomodation. A comprehensive developmental theory might
emerge from the synthesis.
As I mentioned above, I begin in the next chapter to
integrate the concepts which I have outlined here. I separate
this integration from my presentation of the theoretical
background in order to start with a brief look at Hilda's
memories of early childhood—and to remind the reader that this
is still her story.
CHAPTER IV
CHILDHOOD
Early Childhood
Hilda's first years
.
The dialectical perspective on memory as an ongoing
transaction between past and present applies most strongly to
recollections of early childhood. Like most people, Hilda
remembers only a few isolated scenes from her first years of
life. What she does remember falls into three overlapping
groups: images which evoke a strong feeling-tone; events which
punctuate long passages of family life, such as deaths, births,
and moves; and experiences which Hilda has reconstructed—and
perhaps entirely reshaped— in conversation with other family
members. Schachtel's (1947) analysis of childhood amnesia
—
that the schemata of adult experience inevitably blot cut the
memories of childhood—offers a good explanation for the
extremely eliptical quality of Hilda's early memories. Adult
schemata provide an unsuitable vehicle for early impressions of
the world and serve to refashion those experiences of childhood
which do get carried forward.
Once again, recognizing the dialectical nature of
memory means abandoning the idea of a literal reconstruction of
childhood: it is impossible to put the events Hilda
describes into an exact developmental sequence, the perspective
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she communicates is not necessarily that of a young child, and
her understanding of relationships, in particular, may be more
the product of adult reinterpretation than a reflection of
childhood experience. Given these qualifications, however,
Hilda's recollections of early childhood can be taken as
evidence of her psychological development in at least two
senses. First, Hilda's account of childhood scenes often
communicates an overall feeling tone or emotional gestalt which
can reasonably be attributed to the original experience,
particularly when these feelings remain relatively unanalyzed
and disconnected from adult experience. Second, there are
several life issues or themes, such as physical illness, which
appear very early in Hilda's story. Although Hilda's under-
standing of an issue may have changed markedly over time, the
fact it occurs prominently in her early memories suggests that
it had significant meaning to her at the time— it shows that
the issue itself has been a durable feature of her psychologi-
cal life.
Hilda's knowledge of her infancy is supplied mainly
by her mother.
Hilda: [Mother told me] "We almost didn't bring you back
several times, Hilda—You were a very sick child. We
were unable to get food that you could digest. We
finally found something vou could eat: oatmeal
[still a staple of her diet]. We had just gotten you
well when you had something happen which could be
called an appendicitis; you ate some grapes and were
prostrated with pain. Then we almost got you well
again, and you came down with a whooping cough. You
were so violently ill that you forgot how to walk.
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Hilda's own memories of early childhood also center
on illness and pain. Perhaps her earliest memory, which she
dates to the first or second year of her life when the Mendahls
still lived in Minnesota, is a distinct recollection of "sit-
ting on a curb
,
vomiting into the curb .
"
During Jacob's early career in the steel industry,
the Mendahls were relocated several times. Hilda remembers
these years (roughly age three to six) as a period of "almost
constant discomfort." One particularly vivid image from early
in this period involves both pain and pleasure:
I rem.ember falling down stairs and cutting my head
open and mother holding me—and I thought, "Oh this
is wonderful, being held by mother"— Bleeding into
her lovely, clean, white shirtwaist.
"
Births and deaths stand out in Hilda's recollection
of early childhood. V7hen Hilda was three, both events came in
rapid succession in the case of her sister Eleanor. During
Emily's lying-in Hilda recalls "having to eat potatoes I didn't
want to . . . some kind of servant there. I didn't want to be
in her presence, not being allowed to see mother and all."
Eleanor, "a bleeder," lived only a few weeks.
C. J. : You were aware of Eleanor's death?
Hilda: Oh yes ... I can remember going with the casket to
the cemetery, in a little cab—Now I may have invent-
ed this memory of Eleanor's corpse, but I saw the
casket for certain, because I remember sitting in the
cab with father and the casket was sort of across my
lap and James' and father's.
C.J.: Do you remember what feelings you had?
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That It was a rainy day
. . , and that there was thisdead infant in the box, and that father said she
never would have survived anyway, vou know, "Betterthat she died"—that sort of thing".
How did you feel, can you remember?
Hilda: Oh ... I think I was feeling for my mother, because
I can remember, somehow, a distant weeping thing
happening in the house——although I don't know if l
actually remember seeing mother weeping about it.
An epidemic of diptheria almost claimed Hilda's
second sister, Isabel, and a subsequent outbreak of smallpox
did claim a servant, "taken away in a sheet on one of those
•pest wagons'—all of this seemed like so much illness."
Births and deaths were accompanied by Hilda's Aunt
Jen, Jacob's family's self-styled nurse— "always there to bring
them in and see them out." Aunt Jen was an austere presence in
Hilda's eyes: "a major domo, figuring the whole thing out,
sending us this way and that."
The second intermittent member of the early family
circle, Hilda's psychotic Aunt Eleanor, left an even stronger
impression: "I was always being frightened by Aunt Eleanor, in
the halls of that house, frightened of being whipped by her."
Hilda remembers sharing the fear of Eleanor with her older
brother James, and how his fear served to intensify hers:
"When Jcimes was frightened, I thought, that's the end—there's
really something to be frightened about!"
At age five, Hilda was sent to kindergarten—
a
progressive movement in education at the turn of the century
(Wishy, 1968). She recalls this initial foray into the outside
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world as a distressing experience, "because Isabel and I were
taken away from the home
. .
.
[to a place with] cold spots and
funny little women, and these funny, vacant rooms." She cried
a great deal and remembers a teacher telling her "every tear is
a pearl."
Hilda's kindergarten career ended early in May of
1906. Her teachers had clothed the children in paper costumes
and had them dance around a maypole. It rained. Hilda
contracted a cold, followed by an ear infection. Her ear
remained absessed through the rest of her sixth year— "pain,
pain, pain."
The psychological tasks of early childhood .
Any theory of the phenomenology of early childhood
faces a major obstacle: the inaccessibility of infantile
experience to adult modes of understanding creates the need for
a high degree of empathic projection on the part of a theorist.
One theorist's empathc projection is another's wild
speculation. Debates, which would seem arcane to an outsider,
rage back and forth within the various schools of thought on
such issues as the nature of early identification, the
existence of primary narcissism, and the order of precedence
between differentiation of self and integration with others.
Many of these issues are unresolvable; by the time the child
can verbally communicate his experience, his "inner world" is
no longer in the universe of infancy. On the other hand, there
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is growing consensus among clinical observers around the main
points which I attempted to develop in the preceding chapter:
(1) that the development of interpersonal relationships is a
central feature of early life; (2) the need to organize and
integrate experience is egually fundamental; and (3) that these
two processes of integration in the physical and social world
are interconnected.
Integration in the social world
.
Two types of inheritance converge at birth: the
child enters the world with a set of built-in physiological
needs and reflexes and he immediately occupies a niche in the
family which has been extensively prestructured by the needs,
expectations, and projections of the other members,
particularly the mother who has had the direct experience of
pregnancy and can anticipate being the primary caretaker. As
Borzormenyi-Nagy might put it, the infant's "need template"
exists from the start in relation to a matching social context.
The degree of complementarity between these two structures has
life and death significance to the newborn. As Bowlby (1969)
argues, a n\imber of the infant's most basic reflexes are geared
toward ensuring a complementary bond with the mother: sucking,
clinging, crying, smiling, and visual tracking—all of which
are normally shown within the first several months of life. In
accordance with Piaget's model of development, the infant
gradually coordinates these reflexes into a schema of the
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mother. This initial mother-schema is, -of course, primarily
sensorimotor. It is a pattern of tactile and kinesthetic
actions through which the infant assimilates the mother.
Mahler (1965) refers to this period in life (at about six
months) when reflexes become coordinated into a specific
pattern of attachment as psychological "hatching"—the infant
remains "centered" on his own fleeting sensations but, like
breaking out of a shell, begins to direct his attention outward
to absorb a major portion of his environment, his mother. Nagy
(1965) suggests that the infant's experience of this event may
be comparable to an animal's sense of territory, that is, a
primal sense of situation' or an experience of being "at home"
in the world. Erikson (1950) refers to the positive outcome of
the infant's first steps toward mutuality as the development of
"basic trust," a deep, "almost somatic conviction" that the
infant's behavior has meaning and continuity in the social
world. Erikson sees this development as the basis for all
future psychosocial growth, leading "toward a final integration
of the individual life cycle with some wider belongingness"
(Ibid
.
,
p. 249) .
Returning to Piaget's more prosaic terms, the
mother-schema which an infant establishes at this stage serves
as a prototype which the child uses to assimilate, or relate
himself to, other people. Vestiges of this first interpersonal
schema remain a component of all future physically intimate
relationships, for example, in the hugging, kissing, and
meaningful eye contact between levers.
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Psychodynamic theories of development often focus on
the infant's experience of an imaginary omnipotence. Rheingold
(1969) takes the unusual approach of analyzing the actual power
that an infant has over his parents. She points out that the
infant directs parental behavior through his expressions of
pleasure and displeasure. The overall effect of the parents'
efforts at "habit training" (e.g., feeding and sleeping
schedules) are, in Rheingold' s analysis, far less significant
than the infant's socialization of the parents. In addition to
shaping parental behavior, the infant has a strong emotional
impact on his caretakers; he becomes a central figure in their
emotional life, especially for the mother. Benedek (1956)
coined the term "emotional symbiosis" to describe this aspect
of mutuality in the attachment between mother and child. The
term has become popular in recent psychoanalytic theory.
Mahler (1968, 1975), for example, uses the concept of a
mandatory stage of symbiotic attachment as the centerpiece of
her theory of early development.
Psychoanalytically oriented theories generally
account for the mother's bond to the infant in terms of
projective identification; the infant reawakens the mother's
needs in relation to her early objects. Satisfaction of his
needs becomes satisfaction of her own. Bowlby (1969) suggests
an alternate explanation: that innate behavioral systems of
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caregiving within the mother are activated by the infant's
attachment seeking behavior. Boszormenyi-Nagy (1965) sees the
infant's power over the mother as a basic aspect of ontic
dependence: the mother's existence as a mother depends on the
child receiving her care. Each theory, in other words, employs
^ model of explanation, but all three are based on an
observation of deep mutuality in the attachment between mother
and child. Each also sees the infant as having a significant
hand in regulating the relationship.
There is reason to believe that the mutuality between
Hilda and her mother -went awry at this early stage, and that
Hilda's difficulties with relationships may stem from a
disturbance of her initial "symbiotic" bond. Based on what
Hilda knows of her infancy, she was a very difficult child to
mother. A sick child tends to disqualify the efforts of a
caregiver, she may continue to show distress no matter what the
mother does. Even worse, Hilda's illness was digestive. The
normal avenue of nurturant contact between mother and child was
disrupted. Emily—who "lived within a narrow frame" and
"lacked the courage of her convictions as a social woman"—may
have been unable to cope with the level of frustration and
disconfirmation that the infant Hilda subjected her to. Hilda
would have escalated her attempts at regulating the
relationship, making nurturant contact all the more difficult
for Emily and setting a negative feedback loop into effect.
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Approached from Hilda's perspective, the
complementarity of physiological needs and environmental
response, which Nagy sees as providing the infant with a basic
grounding in the world, would have been uncertain. Or, to use
E^i^son s language, Hilda's nascent sense of continuity with
her social world would have been prone to disruption; she would
not have been in the position to experience her inner states as
consistently meaningful to the outside world. Her digestive
troubles interfered with her ability to develop a sense of
"basic trust." Somatic, psychological, and interpersonal
disturbance were all one at this point in Hilda's life.
In saying that Hilda's chronic difficulties with
people stem from a disruption in her earliest attachment, I do
not mean to imply that she suffered an irreversible trauma.
The processes leading to healthy development are naturally
resilient. Given different family circumstances, Hilda and
Emily might have corrected their false start as soon as Hilda's
digestive problems cleared up. But Hilda has already mentioned
a number of events which would have made Emily physically or
emotionally unavailable, e.g., the stress of frequent moves,
three more births during Hilda's first four years, Eleanor's
death, Isabel's near death, and the reasonable possibility that
Emily suffered periods of depression after any of the latter.
This continuing stress on the mother-child relationship created
the conditions for what Bowlby (1969) calls "anxious
attachment," the major problem in Hilda's development.
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The social role of anxiety
.
Ernest Jones maintains that "anxiety is the Alfa and
Omega of psychiatry ... on the way in which any individual
deals with the primordial anxiety of infancy more depends than
on anything else in development" (quoted in Guntrip, 1971, p.
130) . Perhaps because it is such a pervasive factor in early
development, psychology has had trouble defining the basic
nature of anxiety. Freud's progress in defining a theory of
anxiety, for example, spanned the better part of his career.
At the start (1895)
,
he saw it as simply the experience of
undischarged energy, the unpleasure of tension welling up
inside the person. Freud gradually redefined anxiety as the
signal of an impending threat of unpleasure, rather than the
unpleasure itself. In his final work (1926) on anxiety, he
focused on the infant's experience of separation from its
mother as the prototype of all later anxiety. Although, at the
level of the metapsychology, Freud still explained primordial-
anxiety in terms of a disturbance of the infant's internal
economy—reducing the infant's need for its mother to the need
for external regulation of its homeostasis—what he describes
is an interpersonal phenomenon:
Only a few instances of the expression of anxiety in
infancy are intelligible to us . . . being left
alone, being in the dark, and finding a strange
person in place of the one in whom the child has
confidence. [These] are all reducible to a single
situation, that of feeling the loss of the loved
person [1926, pp. 75-76].
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Even at a later stage of development, when anxiety
can become entirely a matter of communication between internal
agencies, it remains, in the final version of Freud's theory,
basically interpersonal:
The formula "separation, exclusion from the horde"
applies only to that more lately developed portion of
the superego which was patterned after social models,
not the nucleus thereof which corresponds to the
introjected parental authority. Expressed in more
general terms, it is the anger
. . . of the superego,
•the loss of- its love, which the ego apprehends as a
danger and to which it responds with the signal of
anxiety. [Ibid
.
,
p. 79].
Bowlby (1973) arrives at a very similar account of
basic anxiety through his functional analysis of attachment
behavior. He reasons that, given the high survival value of
sticking together, it is natural for attachment behavior to be
regulated by strong negative as well as positive emotions:
"Anxiety is a primary response not reducible to other terms and
due simply to the rupture of a child's attachment to his
mother" (Ibid
.
,
p. 376), A number of other situations also
excite alarm in young children, e.g. , sudden changes in
stimulation, looming objects, excessive novelty, strangers, and
darkness, but in each case the response is greatly magnified by
the absence of an attachment figure.
In addition to being a primary source of distress,
separation is also a predisposing condition for further intense
fear. In both cases, the infant's anxiety motivates him to
attempt to re-establish contact with his mother— in Bowlby 's
terms, it activates his behavioral systems of attachment
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seeking. As the child matures, the necessity of physical
proximity falls away; his feelings of security and anxiety come
to be based more on his appraisal of his mother's whereabouts
and the conditions of her availability. While the child's
definition of attachment becomes increasingly symbolic, anxiety
acts as a strong motivator for him to remain related to the
fi^u^ss in his environment. In this sense, anxiety
serves to maintain homeostasis between, rather than within,
people: "the regulatory systems that maintain a steady
relationship between an individual and his environment can be
regarded as an 'outer-ring' of life maintaining systems
complementary to the 'inner-ring' of systems that maintain
physiological homeostasis" (Bowlby, 1973, p. 150).
The regulation of anxiety between mother and child
can go askew, leading to what Bowlby calls "anxious
attachment." When the availability of an attachment figure is
uncertain, fear is easily aroused in the child and he tends to
show extreme forms of attachment seeking, e.g., constant crying
or panicked clinging. If, for any number of reasons— such as
the mother's inability to cope with the child's heightened
attachment seeking—the uncertainty becomes chronic, anxiety
remains a pervasive element of the relationship.
Bowlby 's (1960) main research is with mothers and
children who have been separated by hospitalization. Even a
brief separation tends to disorganize the child, leading, for
instance, to unfocused protest or aimless searching. Once
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reunited with the mother
,
the child tends to regress in terms
of attachment behavior, e.g., relying more strongly on
physical proximity than he had prior to the separation. Under
conditions of prolonged separation, some children show a
general regression, losing sensori-motor or language skills
which they had accuired earlier. Separation does not
necessarily have to be physical; Bowlby (1973) examines a
number of other conditions which promote anxious attachment,
e.g.: threats of abandonment, emotional unavailability or
abnormal fearfulness on the part of the mother, and
hypersensitivity to arousal in the infant.
Hilda's recurrent illnesses fit this model of
preconditions for anxious attachment. Physical distress
heightens an infant's need for the comfort of its mother. This
need may have been impossible for Emily to satisfy, both in
terms of the constant attention Hilda would have demanded and
because her distress m.ay have, at times, been beyond comfort.
The experience of caring for Hilda would have been alternately
frustrating and anxiety provoking. It would be natural for
Emily to become inconsistent in her caregiving, swinging
between strenuous efforts at comforting Hilda and periods of
withdrawal. Hilda's attempts at regulating the relationship
might have caused further disequilibrium—the negative feedback
loop mentioned above. The fact that Hilda mentions losing the
ability to walk following her bout with whooping cough suggests
that the variability in their attachment may have reached
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extreme proportions, having the developmental impact of a
prolonged separation.
Anxious attachment tends to develop into ambivalent
attachment. Separation frequently arouses anger as well as
anxiety. Bowlby (1973) draws on a large body of evidence to
show that this connection between anger and anxiety holds true
in a variety of situations where humans are parted, as well as
in instances of separation between non-human primates. He
concludes that, like anxiety, anger serves the adaptive
function of maintaining the steady state of an attachment: ”it
may assist in overcoming such obstacles as there may be to
reunion [and] it may discourage the loved person .from going
away again" ( Ibid .
,
p. 247)
.
Just as anxiety can become dysfunctional. in
regulating an attachment, anger can also distort the
relationship. In a chronically anxious attachment, another
vicious cycle tends to arise: as the uncertainty of the
relationship escalates, each partner becomes increasingly
Likely to experience intense anger in relation to the other,
viewed from the perspective of the child, yearning, anxiety,
and anger all come to focus on the same person. This
ambivalence, I believe, took hold early in Hilda's relationship
to her mother. It is the root of the antagonism which Hilda
describes as plaguing her later development: "I had such a
resentment for mother all my growing years ... if I couldn't
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have seen her belatedly as a good human being, l would have
slain her—let alone that she slew herself."
Differentiation and integration
.
the need for attachment were the sole source of
motivation in infancy, integration would occur along the lines
of the amoeba. In order to give an accurately complex account
of personality development, it is necessary to balance the
centrifugal force of attachment with an equally basic,
centripebal motive for autonomy. This is where White's theory
of a set of minute motives toward "competence" fits.
Since White (1960) first published his theory of
competence, evidence has accumulated in support of his idea of
an inborn tendency to explore and master the environment.
McCall and Kagan (1967) find that infants, within the first
several months of life, show a preference for complex stimuli.
A moderate degree of novelty is intrinsicly rewarding:
"stimuli that are optionally discrepant from established
schemas are [most] likely to attract and maintain attention"
(quoted in Mussen, et al . , 1969, p. 164). Loevinger discusses
the same phenomenon in terms of developmental "pacers," objects
or tasks which lie just beyond the infant's established ability
to deal with complexity. Pacers remain a significant stimulus
to growth throughout the life-cycle: "As the person maintains
contact with and thus masters a pacer, his own level of
complexity grows and he is ready for a new, more complex pacer
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(1969, p. 118)—Piaget’ s principle of seeking equilibrium
through disequilibrium.
The second fundamental motive, the need for mastery
over the environment, is in at least one important sense
ambithetical to the need for attachment: it draws the infant
I
away from its mother. The same stimuli which, under slightly
circumstances, arouse anxiety and attachment seeking
I can also lead the infant to separate and explore the
I
environment. Progress towards effectance and mastery
;
inevitably violates the boundaries, or disrupts the steady
state, of a secure attachment.
The development of competence and interpersonal
,
relatedness are not, however, independent, competing processes.
Each builds on and transmutes the other in the manner of a
^ dialectical progression.
i
At the behavioral level, the child's exploration of
I
the environment and his attachment behavior have an
1
I
interdependent, as well as an antagonistic, relationship. In a
I
study of fifty infants placed in a novel environment, Ainsworth
and Bell (1968) observe a balance between exploratory behavior
I
and proximity-seeking. When the mother is present, the balance
I shifts significantly in the direction of exploration.
i
Conversely, when she is absent, exploration tends to cease and
I
j
is replaced by proximity-seeking. In a more detailed clinical
analysis of a smaller sample of infants and mothers, Mahler
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(1975) finds the same relationship. She observes that the
mother acts as a "beacon for the child, a secure base from
which his investigation radiates outward." Mahler also
describes several patterns of behavior which children use to
mediate between attachment and separation: "checking back," in
which the child re-establishes visual contact with the mother;
"emotional refueling," interrupting exploration with interludes
of physical contact; and "shadowing and darting," whereby the
child alternates between maintaining constant visual contact
and making sudden forays away from the mother—as if playing
with the dynamics of the mother-and-child homeostasis. Mahler
points out that all of these patterns of behavior enhance the
specificity of the child's attachment; they provide practice,
initially, in discriminating mother from environment, and
later, in differentiating mother from others. At the same
time, they serve to expand the radius of secure exploration,
bringing more of the world into the circumference of mother-
child proximity.
The connection between attachment and mastery of the
physical world is likewise strong in the most significant
symbolic task of early development: establishing a viable
sense of self. In reaching this milestone, the child draws
deeply on progress from both spheres of functioning and
achieves a new level of synthesis between the polarities of
separateness and relatedness. As Jacobson puts it, the child
becomes
:
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a differentiated but organized entity which is
separate and distinct from [the] environment, an
entity which has continuity and direction
. . . and
the capacity to remain the same in the midst of
change [1964, p. 23]
.
This development is, in a sense, the beginning of
personality. Stierlin (1969) refers to it as "the dawn of
knowing individuation" and Mahler (1975) describes it as
"psychological birth."
The infant's growing competence in the environment
lays the ground work for this transition into selfhood.
Exploration, supported by a secure base of attachment, leads to
objectification. Recall that there are tv/o aspects to Piaget's
view of objectification, the first major accommodation of early
childhood: the "decentering” or separation of self from the
object, and the increased mobility and coordination of the
infant's schema of the object. The child is able to perceive
the unique qualities of the object and, for the first time,
relate to it as something apart from himself. It becomes
"real” to him:
The infant gives the impression ... of really
exploring the object's potentialities ... of really
subordinating his actions to an object seen as a
thing apart, something "out there" [Flavell, 1963, p.
114] .
Object permanence opens the way for person
permanence. The interconnection between these two developments
is neatly illustrated by a footnote which Freud adds to the
anecdote on his grandson's attempt to master the situation of
being left alone:
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One day the child's mother had been away for* severalhours and on her return was met with the words, "Babygone! ... During this long period of solitude the
child had found a method of making himself disanoear.
He had discovered his reflection in a full-length
• • • by crouching down he could make his
mirror-image "gone." [1920, p. 9, f.n.]
The boy's game obviously requires a certain level of
ob j ecti fication—
—in order to see himself, he has to have a
"decentered" schema of the mirror. But he is using this
competence with objects to master an interpersonal situation,
the temporary loss of his mother. Prior to this stage of
development, the infant experiences the mother as real only
insofar as he can assimilate her through his sensori-perceptual
schemas. Self-schema and mother-schema are one and the same, a
"dual unity" as Mahler calls it. When she leaves him, he loses
the secure sense of being which attaches to his mother schema
—
the precursor of a sense of self. Freud's grandson is
discovering a self separate from his mother-schema. This
differentiation introduces a new level of relatedness. He can
begin to perceive a continuity in his mother which, like the
toy on its string or his own image in the mirror, remains
durable despite temporary absence. His attachment becomes
mobile. The relationship between self and mother can now
extend out in space and time, far beyond his immediate
proximity and sensory perceptions. Once decentered from his
own actions, self, mother, and the connection between the two
all begin to take on a more permanent reality. As Freud
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correctly perceived, the child, in turn, makes a major advance
in mastering the anxiety of separation.
This dialectical transition to a newly abstract level
^®ishedness through differentiation represents the child's
first step in developing the emotional capacity to be alone.
Success at this stage results in what Winnicott calls "ego-
, relatedness "
:
The capacity to be alone is a paradox; it is the
experience of being alone while someone else is
reliably present. Here is implied a rather special
type of relationship, that between the infant or
small child who is alone, and the mother who is, in
fact, reliably present , . . Ego-relatedness refers
to the relationship between two people, one of whom
at any rate is alone; perhaps both are alone yet the
presence of each is important to the other [1965, p.
129] .
The first steps toward differentiation and ego-
relatedness can be considered a sudden revolution in the
child's mode of integrating himself in the world. The
elaboration of these companion processes, however, remains an
ongoing task, extending throughout the life cycle. Even the
first stage of this developmental process, the negativism of
the "terrible twos," seems interminable to most parents. The
child, following the universal tendency to over assimilate
through a new schema, applies his new construction of self-as-
different-from-other with a vengence. Everything becomes
negatible. A battle of wills ensues between parent and child.
The child attempts constantly to expand the boundaries of his
negatively defined self, forcing the parent to affirm the
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limits of other. The child's development of competence and
consolidation of his differentiated sense of relatedness remain
closely linked in this new transaction:
One of Piaget's firmest beliefs, repeated over and
over again in scores of publications is that thoughtbecomes aware of itself , , . and in general able to
adhere to logical-social norms of noncontradiction,
coherence, etc.
. . . only from repeated
interpersonal interactions in which the child is
actually forced again and again to take cognizance of
the role of the other. It is social interaction
which gives the ultimate coup de grace to [coqnitivel
egocentrism [Flavell, 1963, pp. 156-157].
Accommodation must be mutual in order for this stage
to have a successful outcome—the parent must offer defeat with
honor. The child who vigorously opposes his mother counts on
her continued support to the same degree that the infant who
engages in "shadowing and darting" relies on the mother's
action—rather than his own anxiety—to re-establish the
homeostasis of their attachment. Failure at the earlier stage
of exploration, e.g., injury in the environment or a fearful
response from the mother, forces the infant to accommodate more
on the basis of anxiety. He might, for example, adapt by
clinging and learning to rely increasingly on covert forms of
exploration, such as visual scanning. Defeat at this later
stage of differentiation has a similar effect. If the child
experiences his differentiation as endangering his basic
grounding in the interpersonal world, accommodation will,
again, be strongly influenced by anxiety. The opportunity to
experience himself as at once whole and part of a larger
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totality recedes. He comes to see significant aspects of
himself as inimical to participation in the social world; shame
and anxiety become part of his structuring of self. Through
the covert processes of fantasy and dissociation, he may learn
to retreat behind what Winnicott (1965) calls a "false self on
a conformity basis."
There is a good deal of evidence in Hilda's history
that she and her mother were unsuccessful in negotiating this
stage of parent-child opposition. Hilda mentions that Emily
used to tell her that "The first words I uttered were 'I don't
want to.'" Conflict around the issue of being "satisfactory as
a person" was a central theme of her childhood. As Hilda
stepped out into the world, she suffered acute crises of shame
and social anxiety. Experiences of depersonalization and fears
of "being seen" have remained a painful feature of Hilda's
adult functioning. The process of dissociation is implicated
in all of these disturbances. To complete the framework for
understanding Hilda's early development, a brief outline of
this alternative to integration is in order.
Dissociation .
VJhen a person employs dissociation, he excludes
unacceptable aspects of himself from his conscious awareness;
he comes to regard them as "not-me" (Sullivan, 1953). In
transactional terms, dissociation is a mode of relating to self
Dissociation is motivated by the need toas a non-self object.
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remain grounded in the social world. it requires the ability
to imagine the perspective of one's reference group turned back
on oneself. The aspects of self which, if seen, might put one
"beyond the pale" of the group are those most likely to be
dissociated. They are often connected with the experience of
shame
:
Shame supposes that one is completely exposed and
conscious of being looked at ... He who is ashamed
would like to force the world not to look at him, not
to notice his exposure. He would like to destrov the
eyes of the world. Instead he must wish for his own
invisibility [Erikson, 1950, pp. 252-253].
Dissociation achieves this wish for invisibility; the person
does not "see" the source of shame as part of himself.
Dissociation is part of normal development. Some
dissociations, those attaching, for example, to the products of
bodily functions, are shared throughout the culture.
Dissociation becomes problematic when the person experiences
many of his own wishes, impulses, and emotions as unacceptable
in a vital relationship and, therefore, seeks to dissociate
major, constituent aspects of himself.
Breger (1974, pp. 210-219) draws an important link
between the use of fantasy and dissociation: "The essence of
pretense is that one actively does something and, at the same
time actively denies doing it." Dissociative fantasy is like a
pretense maintained toward oneself:
V7hen the child moves into the world of fantasy as a
way to resolve conflict, he is pretending in two
v/ays. Outwardly, he pretends to feel other than he
does—he ceases to be angry, demanding, or selfish.
197
Inwardly, he pretends things are other than thev
creates fantasies in which his anger can be
expressed or his demands gratified [Ibid
.
, p. 213],
Breger also focuses on the deeply passive nature of
dissociation. The child becomes passive in relation to the
parents by accepting their will as his, becoming the object in
relation to their subjectivity. He withdraws into a private
sphere, intentionally cut-off from active participation in
public give-and-take. He also adopts a passive position in
regard to his own feelings and actions, experiencing them as
things which happen to him—moving toward the passive end of
what Stierlin (1969) calls the dimension of "doing vs.
undergoing."
If the parents are persistently unable to support the
child's individuation or have an overriding need for him to be
a particular way, his dissociative solution can stabilize: he
erects a false, public self split-off from a private world of
shameful feelings and gratifying fantasies. This solution has
two seriously negative implications for future development.
First, as Breger points out, the child who relates to the world
extensively through fantasy can assimilate without
accommodating; instead of promoting active mastery, ongoing
experience tends to reinforce his passive solution. Second,
and more relevant to Hilda's life, the act of relating through
a false self tends to divorce the person from the corrective
influence of engaging with others. He always knows, at some
level, that his transaction is based on a false currency. His
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sense of false self insidiously disqualifies v/hatever security
others might offer. Doubt—which Erikson calls "the brother of
shame" comes to pervade his interpersonal experience. These
negative developments begin to appear prominently in Hilda's
recollections of mid-childhood.
Mid-Childhood
The family's move to Hudson stands out as a bright
spot in Hilda's memory. In contrast to the dark, industrial
atmosphere which she associates with the homes of her earliest
years, Hudson seemed full of "growth, skies, hills, woods—all
this beautiful out of doors." Hilda regards her family's
arrival in Hudson as a potential turning point in her life; she
describes it at several points in her journal^ and had an
hallucinatory vision of it during her psychosis.’ It was a
moment of expanding promise for Hilda and the family: they
were settling into their first permanent home, Jacob was
becoming established in the business world, and a secure
position in society seemed close at hand.
Several sources of satisfaction did materialize for
Hilda during her years in Hudson: she discovered books, an art
teacher introduced her to painting, she and her brother James
became close, and she formed a lasting friendship with another
airl in the community. But, for the most part, her life took a
dark course through childhood. She became absorbed in fears of
periodic depressions, thoughts ofdarkness and "bogies.
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suicide, conflict with her siblings, and, above all, a
painfully antagonistic relationship with her mother. Home
became a trap:
It was really a form of discouragement. Many times
in my life I've thought, "What's the use. I don't
try hard enough, I'm not that bright, I'm not that
fullfledged a person.” A lot of my childhood I was
terribly, terribly bored at home— if only I had
gotten away—the same food, the same bed, same
fights, same talk
. . .
—This sounds like such a sad story— "fun on the
farm."
Darkness and strange creatures
.
The most common sources of fear in infancy—darkness
and strangeness—remained potent for Hilda throughout her
youth. They became a fixture of her private world:
Hilda: I had a terrible fear of the dark—even when I grew
to be a much older person. I could go up the
stairway and make a sound and all these horrible
creatures would come out, you know, from the dark. I
called them bogies.
C.J.: Were they something you would actually see?
Hilda: Yes, I'd see them.
C.J.: What would they look like?
Hilda: Oh, they were something like these fluxing creatures.
Either black or with these horrible faces coming
toward me. I'd have to rush from them— something
like that av/ful woman I had encouraged to chase me,
down town
.
The woman that Hilda refers to was a deranged bag
lady who wandered around Hudson. She was one of several aber-
rant characters who struck Hilda's imagination.
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Hilda: There was also an awful bov/ Danny Natchis. He was
the wrong kind of a birth, you know, a great big
9^3^ussome man-sized thing. He made a terrible noise
. . . Every time I saw him I thought, ”Oh my god.
I'll die if I have to see that thing again."
And I'd say to mother, "Why don't they put Danny
Natchis someplace like we did Aunt Eleanor?"
Aunt Eleanor was, of course, the earliest and most
immediate member of this group of scary figures: "When I was
very little she would get us in the corner and frighten us
j
terribly. She had a very frightening way about her—and she
I
was frightened herself."
: Hilda gives an occasional hint of feeling, in
i
I
addition to terror and fascination, a sense of fellowship with
the abnormal people in her childhood. In dancing school, for
I instance, she often chose a very withdrawn boy as her partner.
i
I
]
Hilda believes that she was the first to discover that his
problem was deafness, and brought it to the attention of the
i
1 adults.
I
I
The suggestion of an identification with abnormality
\
is strong in the case of Aunt Eleanor. Emily's sister was the
I
' only adult in the early household who had strong interests in
’ art and religion, two of Hilda's main interests. She remembers
' her father more than once noting the connection:
j
If father didn't like my remark or look he would
i
liken it to Aunt Eleanor's 'esoteric approach'— she
I was very interested in religions. Very often I would
,
come out with something suggestive of spirituality.
I
He would say, "Just like Eleanor"—as if that were a
I verv sad thing. I would ask, "What's wrong with
being like Aunt Eleanor?" and he would respond,
' "Well, she went insane"—maybe he gave me the idea.
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This is not to say that Hilda consciously modeled
herself after Aunt Eleanor— she resisted the idea at the time,
and still feels her father's comparison unfair. Hilda may have
a connection with Aunt Eleanor, but shared her family's
sense of horror with regard to her insanity. in reflecting on
her childhood terrors and fascination with abnormality Hilda
comments:
Hilda: These are things that I consider bad maladjustments.
C.J.: Back then, as a child, did you see yourself that way?
Hilda: No, no, I just felt life had awful things in it.
Hilda as the bad child .
To recall points from Chapter 2, two of the main
features in Hilda's experience of the family atmosphere were a
shortage of supplies and failure to cohere as an integrated
unit. Within the subsystem of Hilda and her siblings, these
qualities have their counterpart in memories of an unequal
distribution of parental affection, dual standards of justice,
jealousy and resentment between siblings, and children out of
control
.
Hilda felt the family resources overtaxed at a simple
auantitative level—the additions were too frequent:
I think I held [my mother's fecundity] in disdain.
James called me aside once and said, "Now this has
got to stop. Mother and father are doing this all
the time and having children all the time! Something
has got to be done!" [Hilda laughs] I thought it
was awfully bad too.
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Hilda also remembers the children being out of
control at the level of group action. She and her siblings
would get caught up in frenetic teasing and rough housing as if
infected by some outside force—being "full of the very
dickens." Emily's protests— "children, children, children"
—
would seem to push them "further and further into it." Hilda
describes experiencing "the dickens" in herself as a "kind of
motherhood thing"
:
I liked to tease [my younger siblings]
,
a great deal.
It was kind of a motherhood thing in me, thinking
they were cute, fun to annoy, and so on. I was very
fond of [the youngest boy] Harry. Harry would chase
me out of the third story window on the slate roof
around the house, lickety-cut, v/ith just this gutter
. to control me from falling down three stories . . .
The neighbors would call mother and say, "Harry is
chasing Hilda around the gutters on the third floor
again." And mother would say [with resignation] "I
know it, I know it."
Hilda feels that what control Emily did exert was
very unevenly distributed, that she was subjected to an
entirely different standard of discipline than the other child-
ren.
Hilda: My brother, both of my brothers punished me too
—
punishment seemed part of life in those days, and on
and on until I began living alone.
C.J.: James would punish you?
Hilda: Very often, yes. At the table, I would look at him
in sort of a penetrating way. He would make a remark
and I would try to make some cute rejoinder. He
would say, "If you don't stop looking at me and
speakina when I speak, I'm going to come around and
punish you. I'm going to give you a very mean fist
right in the middle of the back." So I would go
ahead and do it again and he would walk slowly around
203
the table and give me a terrible bang right in theback.
How would your parents react?
I think mother would say something like, "Hilda, you
shouldn't be such a tease. You're always teasing"--
It was called teasing when I did it
. . . when they
did it it was called "discipline." The m.ales disci-
plined the females.
Could you do it, I mean what if you "disciplined" a
younger child?
I would get a spanking at the end of the week [when
father came home]
. When I disciplined Isabel it was
called "teasing."
Did you resent it.
I did.
While Hilda may have felt that her parents' standards
were grossly unfair, she still questions whether she was really
bad. Following the pattern of the "two families," her younger
siblings respond: "Hilda, you know you were a very naughty
child," and Isabel tells her, "Of course you weren't." As a
child, Hilda was especially hurt when her father subscribed to
what she now sees as the perspective of the "second family."
C.J.: Would you go to your father—as a young girl—with
problems?
Hilda: Well the problem was always that I had been bad that
week, and had to have a spanking from him, every
Sunday. And that was it. No explanation at all ,
from him or myself ... Of course I could always
think back to sometime when I had been teasing the
heck out of Isabel or something. But she would begin
it, she knew she could get me angry. I'd scratch or
pull her hair, then she'd go screeching to mother,
then I'd be reported to father, you see? Isabel
knows that to this day.
C. J.
:
Hilda
:
C . J. :
Hilda
c . cr . :
Hilda:
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Could you ever turn to either parent to talk overproblems?
Hilda: Not really, the reason being that either you were inthe right or you're wrong—all the time, you see
And I don't think the thing really balanced; I think
I was in the wrong more than I was ever in the
right—This is my feeling
, today even. And I don't
know how this occurred, except that I was really a
tease ... I would bring on these situations through
my teasing.
Parental affection was, in Hilda's eyes, equally
misapportioned
. She remembers feeling intense jealousy in
relation to both parents. Everything the other children
received highlighted what she was missing. She was
particularly jealous of her father's affection for Isabel, who
was "always" sitting on his lap:
My father used to say, "Hilda, you have a very
unpleasant expression."
He had a picture of us that he'd show m.e. Isabel had
a "charming little girl look" and I had a gloomy
expression. Perhaps he called this out in me,
though. Maybe if father and mother were— I thought
the two of them were awfully stern creatures—Maybe I
was gripping myself together— I felt their
disapproval a great deal of the time.
Hilda remembers accusing her parents of not loving
her. They explained that Isabel had "double the love" because
little Eleanor had died (Isabel was immediately before Eleanor
in the birth order)
.
Her mother's "withheld expression" hurt Hilda most
deeply
:
We were not demonstrative. Mother used to say
[imperiously], "No demonstration is necessary." But
meanwhile I was terribly jealous of the fact that she
would demonstrate with Isabel and Harry and James
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and even with father, she would demonstrate a goodbye
and hello kiss.
Childhood depression
.
From late childhood until early adolescence, Hilda
experienced periodic depression, which would come on "like
having a dream., and then it would be suddenly over." For
several years, Hilda also entertained ideas of suicide during
her black spells:
Father used to have muriatic [hydrochloric] acid
around the house. He thought it aided his digestion.
I would try a little now and then—Once I took enough
to have my stomach feel as if it were rusting inside.
I also wanted to throw myself on the railroad tracks
. . . I would lie in bed at night and hear the train,
and wish either to get on and go, or to be standing
in the middle of the tracks.
Hilda's train-death fantasy ceased when Johnnie
Polaski, their housekeeper Mary's retarded son, did actually
get run over by a train. Hilda feared that her thoughts of
suicide had somehov/ been communicated to Johnnie, perhaps
through her mother's conversations with Mary, and resolved to
put such dangerous thoughts aside.
Hilda does not recollect the experience of depression
itself with any detail. She describes it simply as global
"discouragement," a deep sense of being "not worth it," or
feelings of being "trapped at home."
She has several theories on the origin of her
depressions. She speculates that, given the regularity of
onset and the fact that she had a constant headache
for a year
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prior to menarche, they might have been in some way a precursor
of menstruation. Hilda suggests that this connection might
have been the hidden wisdom in her mother's customary advice:
"Just wait awhile and maybe you will stop wanting to kill
yourself .
"
Most often, she connects her depressions directly to
her relationship with her parents, especially Emily. in the
63fcerpt, Hilda gives an excellent example of two
central qualities of dissociation: (a) the experience of one's
own emotions as alien——she describes her feelings in the
passive voice, as something undergone; and (b) the link between
disowned emotion and the disruption of a vital interpersonal
relationship--her anger is like an internal subversive force
which works to sabotage her relationship with Emily.
Hilda: These things were usually triggered by a remark of
some kind from mother. Feelings would be hurt, anger
aroused—I've told you my anger has betrayed me many
times into very unhappy outcomes.
Hilda draws this connection between anger at her
mother and depression at several other points in our inter-
views. In the next excerpt, she describes an instance where
communicating these feelings actually led to physical isolation
through the intervention of a third party, her father:
Hilda: I think I decided I hated my mother. And my father
came home one weekend and said, "I understand you
told your mother you hated her? You go up to the
spare room and you stay in that room until I tell you
to come out."
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C . J . s
So I had to go up in that spare room and stay there,
I don't know how many hours
. . . These moments of
isolation are peculiar in my memory
. . .
You remember it well?
Hilda; Yes I do. I stood at the door, at the crack of that
door, and I can remember seeing that paint, and
smelling the matting in the room, and the whole—the
flux of sunshine in there—the whole thing. And
thinking; "I wonder if he means this?"
I can't remember when he let me out, but I remember
standing up to him: "Now do you think you
accomplished anything with that?"
C . J . ; What caused you to hate your mother?
Hilda; I can't remember why I decided ... I think I had a
lot of hatred for my mother. But it was bound up in
jealousy, you see, and anger and all of that. I was
really jealous of her attention to others in- the'
family—And it seemed to m.e that no matter how hard I
tried to do the various things she asked me to do
—
even though I would be lax in getting at it at the
very moment of the remark . . .
I never could really satisfy her, I think that was
the point. I felt, "Gee I never will . . . be a
satisfactory person as far as she is concerned."
C. J. ; Did you know what you'd have to do to satisfy her?
Hilda
:
Well, I suppose I should have stepped on it and
worked happily, singing- at the top of my voice,
asking her if there wasn't one more thing I could do
besides all the other little duties she'd imposed
upon us— I call it "imposed," you know, but that's
the way it felt.
Hilda and Emily .
In Chapter 2 I commented on the difficulty of
abstracting a clear picture of Emily from Hilda's rich account
of the early family. It is even more difficult to organize
Hilda's reconstruction of their relationship. In addition to
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the sheer volume of material—most of Hilda's descriptions of
events in her youth refer back to her mother at some point
—
there is Hilda's own problem in organizing her experience of
relationship. She mentions once that her daughter Ruth
is "at least ten people to me," an estimate that can apply to
Emily as well— I have tried to narrow them down to three
overlapping aspects.
Hilda has also put a good deal of work into sorting
out her relationship with Emily. The impossibility of
separating the childhood memories from the adult rememberer is
especially apparent in this area of her life. In fact, some
aspects of her early relationship with Emily only become clear
in light of Hilda's much later experience—seeing Ruth as ten
people might be an example. I include several of these latter
day connections to Emily with Hilda's descriptions of their
early relationship.
To continue with a theme introduced in the last
excerpt, much of Hilda's account of her childhood experience of
Emily describes a servant/master relationship. The theme of
oppressive servitude is strong in Hilda's adult life. She
writes, in Journal at Sixty , of observing the servants in the
Mendahl household closely, and wondering:
Wherever did these women wash their bodies (certainly
not in the family bathroom) . And wherever did they
eliminate. Did mother force them to sponge bathe
secretly in the iron tubs of the dark laundry? And
must they use that poor toilet seat ... near the
coal bin?
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.. . Hilda, herself, worked as a servant three times;
twice for outsiders and once, following her first
hospitalization, "in my father's house." In each case she felt
alienated and exploited. As she puts it, she resented "working
for somebody else's result."
Her feelings of oppression were extreme in the case
of her return to the family after hospitalization. In
describing this period she stops herself to interject; "This
is like a Dickens novel, poor little creature," [she laughs].
"It's unbelievable."
It was only late in the second summer of our
interviews that Hilda and I recognized this aspect of being a
servant in relation to her mother. Hilda had been describing
how her mother had cared for her during several illnesses of
mid-childhood, hew surprised she was at Emily's kindness:
Hilda: I didn't exactly knov/ what to make of it, I think I
demeaned myself in mother's— in my own mind about how
m.other felt about me—always.
And if she had been good, say, to one of the
servants, if a servant had been ill, and she was good
to the servant I would think, "Why are you doing
that?" She was—sometimes when I had a terrible
earache, she'd talk over the phone, "V7ell Hilda has
had this earache for so many days."
And I'd think, "She really doesn't like that." It
surprised me.
C.J.: What could she like about it?
Hilda: [Laughs] I don't know. But this was my reaction in
my mind.
When she paid attention to the servants that
surprised you too?
C . J . :
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Hilda
:
C.J.
:
Hilda
C.J. :
Hilda:
C.J. :
Hilda:
C.J. :
Hilda
C. J. :
Hilda
:
I
I
I
VJhen .she was kindly to them and understanding, yesthat surprised me. ^
And you felt the same way about yourself?
Yes, much. I think I really did liken myself tothem, a great deal. I felt very badly for the
servants, very badly.
. . . maybe I decided I wasn't worth liking.
She must have done things to make you feel that wav?
I don't know.
Where would a little girl get that.
I don't know, but where would a grown person have it
all of her life, in the same way, the same feeling?
Where does it come from?
I think someone has to give it to you.
I don't . . . know. I can't remember anybody that
put me there and said, "There, that's all you are."
There must have been some reason you were surprised
when she did show you some affection when vou were
ill.
I was always surprised when she was kindly toward me.
It's just like when you have a cruel boss— it might
have been a form of discipline in her voice
—
you know
when you have a boss on a job, and he suddenly turns
around and says 'You did a good job that time.'
You're so surprised that he even considers you did
any kind of a job. It was something like that.
I think that mother and father were both dictators in
their own way, no matter if she were gentle or harsh,
I can't remember. I know later, after my death
[sic], I'd hear her voice as plain as could be, and
recognizing it, and there was nothing about it that
was dictatorial or reprimanding, but it could have
been that I took it that way [as a child]
.
So I was surprised whenever they'd say, "Well done
thou good and faithful servant," in any respect at
all.
I
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In this view of their affectional bond as bondage,
Hilda emphasizes one aspect of her experience of the
relationship, her feelings of uncertain worth in the eyes of
her mother. She often focuses on this dimension of their
relationship. Hilda speaks of: yearning for the "terrific
love that mother claimed she had with her mother" ; "never being
the person I could have been to. her" ; and being hesitant to
share things with Emily because she feared her offerinos would
be deemed "not worth it." Hilda's need for recognition and
affection from Emily was clearly a central dynamic of their
relationship, but it was by no means a simple matter of
presence or absence. Recognition had its own very real dangers
to Hilda:
My mother was a clever woman
. . . She could make
remarks which would really cut you—she could see
you, you'd be behaving in a certain way, and she
could see you, and she vrould make a remark. Somehow
it was the fact that she could see what I was doing,
I suppose, that I was in some way thinking I was
.getting this over well—whatever it was I was
thinking or saying—and her criticism was usually
very acute, very apt, but it would throw me into an
av/ful despondency—Now my sisters say I'm exactly the
same kind of person, that no one in the family is as
likely to do that as often and as happily and as
carefreely as I will—that I can put my finger on
certain things about them, mention it, hurt their
feelings, and go right along in the midst of my
speech—and I don't even know that I've done it . . .
There's something in us that doesn't want to be
found.
— I have a vague remembrance of relating things about
my friends—many things I would decide, sort of
insights. I would give to [mother] . She was very
patient, but every now and then she could disagree so
totally that it wiped the slate clean— it would take
away my own concept.
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Having her "slate wiped clean" or being "seen" by her
mother were two components of a deadly antagonism that Hilda
experienced in their relationship: "my mother could have
fought me any day of her life," Again, this is a perception
which Hilda develops in looking back through her years of adult
experience. In the context of describing a triangular
relationship which Hilda entered into during early adulthood,
she mentions that she felt "stym.ied" by the other woman, "she
made me feel that I had to fight for who I was being," Hilda
recognizes this perception of someone else "standing in the way
of my freedom" as part of a life-long pattern:
It seems that I have always- put myself in that
position, dram.atically
,
in my life—there must be a
clear expression of love or value, or permission for
myself to be enjoyed by someone else, or to enjoy
someone else. And I always say, "If that were not
there I could ..." Quite often it's a woman. My
mother-in-law seemed to do that with me, and even my
mother
—
you know it might have gone back originally
to my mother.
In Hilda's experience of the antagonism with her
mother, anger took on frightening proportions. Hilda is highly
sensitive to interpersonal conflict in general. She often
describes hurt feelings in terms of physical damage. For
example, she describes her husband as "coming back with these
god-awful remarks that had a personal thrust— if it were
combat, it was really murder—as if he enjoyed mentally
murdering the opponent." Hilda uses this imagery of deadly
struggle in describing the impact of her conflict with Emily.
Earlier in the chapter, I Quoted her statement that, if Emily
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hd.d not coininittEd suicidS/ "I roally would ha.v© slain h©r
myself .
"
C. J. : Slain her?
Hilda: Because I had deliberately done this in my
relationship with her as a youngster; not being
understanding enough, not giving her credit for who
she was or what she was enduring. When you are cruel
to anyone—and I was, I guess, cruel to her, and~I
guess she was to me, in her own peculiar way, you
kill yourself and your people and your relationships,
in that way. Cruelty is a thing which destroys,
totally.
Hilda has experienced a similarly destructive cruelty
in other recurring antagonistic relationships in her life,
especially in relation to women who have actual power over her.
Some of these people can strike Hilda as so incomprehensibly
cruel that she has been tempted to view them as
possessed— "that would be an easy way of coping with it, just
call them 'possessed'." Coming under the influence of such
inexplicable cruelty has, in fact, been a sort of demonic fate
theme in Hilda's adult life. The most extreme example of this
relationship occurred in the later years of Hilda's
hospitalization. She was placed in a ward supervised by a
woman whom Hilda saw as virtually enslaving her, subjecting her
to constant mental and physical abuse and forbidding any
contact with the staff doctors which could have led to her
release. In the following passage, Hilda is responding to my
comment that her writings on this period portray the woman as
so irrationally cruel that it is hard to believe in her as a
real character:
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Indeed, I have met some awful people in my day. Argh
. . . Most of it, in my thinking, is women who would
contrive in any way to be in a position, socially or
politically—they would use themselves, and what they
had of personality, to hurt, to trammel—this is
mostly mental, let me tell you. I saw it in the
hospital, nurses, people who had seniority over you
. . . there was almost no end to which they'd go to
try to destroy you in some way, disturb you and
destroy you, and others too—and delight in doing it.
There are strong overtones of sadism in Hilda's
account of these antagonistic relationships; she almost always
describes the other person as taking pleasure in their hurtful
action. A co-worker at the mental hospital once told Hilda,
"you leave yourself wide open to this kind of thing," and
accused her of being a masochist. There is truth in this
observation. Hilda's chief mode of resistance in these
enormously threatening antagonisms is to absorb abuse more
successfully than her counterpart can dole it out, resisting
domination through submission. Just as the others "use
themselves to trammel," Hilda uses herself as a vast buffer
zone, offering a "wide open" territory to absorb their advance.
She gives a clear statement of this Russian tactic of defense
in relation to the abusive v/ard supervisor.
C.J.: Weren't you ever tempted to rebel?
Hilda: Never, throughout the whole of my hospitalization
She used to say, "If you'd only fight back, Hilda,
then I could put you on a worse ward." "Hal," I'd
think, "I'm clever not to fight back, and I will
remain so if I die in the attempt."
Hilda never explicitly labels any of her oppressors,
including Emily, as sadistic. She does, however, outline the
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of a masochistic dafcnsive position in har
descriptions of their mother-daughter antagonism. Her idea of
the best approach to dealing with the excessive demands which
Emily "imposed" upon her— "I should have stepped on it and
worked happily, singing at the top of my voice"— is a statement
of the false self solution. It would involve separating her
private feelings from her public face, withdrawing behind the
boundary of an outwardly -cheerful
,
compliant self, accepting
defeat, but leaving the conqueror with nothing real to subsist
on. Hilda's counter attack from this defensive position is
likewise self-destructive. In her strongest statement on their
mother-daughter antagonism, Hilda's "cruel" actions toward
Emily— "not being understanding enough, not giving her credit
for who she was"—entail v/ithholding from Emily the same
recognition and affection which Hilda is so acutely aware of
needing. Hilda, in effect, dissociates herself from the
positive aspects of her affective bond with Emily, resorting to
a scorched earth policy toward her own most vital
feelings— "You kill yourself and your people and your
relationships, in that way."
The fact that Hilda can articulate the essential
features of this defensive position does not mean that she was
consciously aware of employing it in her daily interactions
with Emily, nor that she often adopted it in a pure form. More
likely, her usual mode of relating to Emily would have been a
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more complex compromise between active resistance and
compliance, achieved without Hilda’s conscious awareness.
Hilda:
. . . At home, when I was a child, and I was asked to
r I just had a feeling of rebellion every time—
—
mother said the first word I said was "I don't want
to" And I think that almost every request that was
ever made of me, I would remark in my mind, "I don't
want to," and later relent and want to. As if one
were a dual creature ... I won't want to and then I
have to, an the time
. . . It's a habit of behavior,
compulsiveness—they called it compulsiveness in my
insistence on work as a hospital attendant.
It feels that way to you, like a compulsion.
Hilda: Yes it does, it does.
Another approach to regulating the balance of their
relationship is for Hilda to become like Emily. Frustrated in
her attempt to become one-and-different
,
she may fall back on
being one-and-the-same
. There is considerable evidence that
Hilda also employs this mode of adapting to the dangerous
antagonism between mother and daughter. She wrote her second
book. Beauty, I Wonder
,
shortly after Emily's death. Hilda's
intent was "to rectify" her image of her mother, "to see her
. . .
belatedly as a good
,
interesting human." She
accomplished this by fusing events and relationships from both
of their lives into the character of a single protagonist:
This clarifies her for me, for some reason. Even
though it is all mixed up in characters— first it's
myself, then it's herself—nevertheless, I can
remember her when I read it ... I was so afraid I
might forget her, because I had such an antagonism
for her all my growing years.
Hilda has already mentioned that family members today
see her as "exactly the same kind of person" with respect to
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making cutting remarks "so often and so carefreely." In an
earlier quote, she describes teasing—the childhood
equivalent—as "a kind of a motherhood thing in me.” In
contrast to the solution of adopting a false self, this mode of
adapting to the mother-daughter conflict through identification
puts Hilda in an active position. Incorporating Emily's "safe"
ways of expressing anger enables Hilda to move from a posture
of pure undergoing to one mixed with doing. It provides her
with a means of asserting herself in relation to Emily.
C.J.: As a child, were you particularly rebellious?
Hilda: Well, I would instigate
. . . trouble. I knew how to
tease Isabel or Harry or Jim until they reacted. I
was rebellious in that way.
In addition to the obvious function of balancing her
relational accounts on the less dangerous heads of her
siblings—oppression flows downward—Hilda's skill at teasing
serves to redress the original inbalance in the mother-daughter
relationship. Hilda's siblings become inadvertent allies, a
force that she can turn against Emily— "children, children,
children . " Like the solution of adopting a false self, this
strategy of self defense based on identification dissociates
Hilda from her own anger—first, by allowing her to disown it
as play and, second, by diffusing responsibility across the
sibling group——but it does so in far less destructive ways.
Her aggression takes place in the public world of interpersonal
action, rather than in the potentially more dangerous private
world of fantasy, emotional bonds, and self delineation.
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Paradoxically, Hilda's identification with Emily in
this area of disowned aggression enhances differentiation in
several ways. First, Hilda's gain in interpersonal competence
brings her new power to regulate the relationship. Hilda's new
ability to have any active effect on Emily reopens the
possibility of becoming one-and-different . Second, the process
of identification itself involves a "decentering" of attention.
In order to model herself on her mother, Hilda must focus not
just on how Emily makes her feel but also on what she actually
does to affect Hilda. This shift in focus advances Hilda's
"objectification" of Emily and enables her to acquire a newly
mobile way of relating—teasing—which she can apply in other
situations. Third, the specific skill which Hilda acquires
from Emily— "seeing" people,, honing in on their emotional
vulnerabilities— further enhances her opportunities for
objectification. As she exercises and refines this skill,
Hilda would become increasingly aware of at least one facet of
the other person's unique properties.
On the other hand, this last benefit carries a
substantial cost for Hilda: becoming more sensitive to the
vulnerability of others would heighten Hilda's appreciation of
the dangers of the interpersonal world in general. In relation
to her mother, in particular, becoming increasingly fluent in
Emily's ways of penetrating another person
'
s, defenses
"cutting" them with remarks that have a "personal
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thrust”—might bring the danger of having her true self "seen"
all the closer, thus reinforcing Hilda's need for a false self.
The dangers of "seeing" and being "seen" remain
potent to Hilda in her adult life. In her Journal at Sixty she
writes: "How fearful it would be if our souls like rivers
. . . could flow into the open, revealed actually, and
combining. What horror 1"
C.J.: Can you say more about what you mean here [in your
Journal]
?
Hilda: Well, I v^as very conscious of my loneliness at this
time. But I thought, "Much better this way than
. . .
if we were being revealed and combining and
understanding and seeing— like a Dante's Inferno,
everybody all writhing in a heap of tragedy and death
and fear and horror .
"
In her closest current relationships, Hilda also re-
mains sensitive to the risk of being the object of the other's
disowned anger:
C.J.: Do you worry much these days?
Hilda: I have moments of being awfully angry. Then I trace
it back to something that was said . . . Suddenly
something is said that feels as if it's a vital blow,
that that person's remark affects me in that way.
And then I can think "Well, now you're taking that
rather seriously," later on.
Immediately, I can be very angry, have the anger be
active— [my daughter] Ruth says, "My, you're feisty!"
And I'd say "Ruth, I don't think—Ruth, do you know
me at all? Why do you deliberately say a thing like
that to me?"
And later on she'll say "Now Hilda, you saw that in
an entirely different way than I intended it to be
said" --sometimes she "teases , " you know, but that
isn't teasing, that isn't a teasing moment—of course
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I don't feel I do it, but Ruth says there are times
I'ni so difficult I'm as bad as she is, [Hilda laughs]
or worse.
As Ruth suggests, Hilda continues to incorporate
seeing/ teasing in her predominant ways of relating to the
family. Although Hilda would never be intentionally sadistic,
and is sensitive to the pain of others, she has also incorpor-
ated some of the feelings of pleasure which she attributes to
the hurtful counterpart in her antagonisms.
I remember that I was very easily hurt. On the other
hand, mother told me that I knew how to tease people
and that I was hurting them. I said I didn't intend
to, and I think I didn't—Except that I like to
excite people and see them cringe when I point out
certain facts about them,, as people .
And my s.isters said, "Hilda, you don't realize how
you can understand people. And you can come out with
a remark that's very hurtful."
I said, "Really?"
"Oh, yes!," they said. "You'll nab onto some little
thing about us, that no one else would think of."
I said, "Well perhaps I'm too analytical."
"That you are!" they said.
"Well I like analyzing people, I enjoy that . . .
unless you can figure out why people say and do what
they do . . . how are you going to latch onto the
way things go?"
Hilda's identification with Emily's ways of seeing/
hurting introduces a third major aspect of their mother
daughter relationship: along side of her experience of
oppressive servitude and deadly antagonism, Hilda felt a deep
sense of participation in her mother's emotional experience.
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Although she fought Emily more strenuously than any of her other
siblings^ Hilda may also have been the closest to her in the
sense of emphatic recognition. Again, this is not a view of
their relationship which comes immediately to Hilda:
We were almost like sisters in a way. I did not take
her advice readily, but I would talk along with her
—
much more than I realized until afterwards, until
now, talking to you.
The picture of Hilda "talking along" with her mother
emerges more from between than in the lines of her descriptions
of early family life. For example, Hilda can give a detailed
accounting of Emily's household budget and how it was
apportioned. She also gives occasional examples of taking the
role of an older sister toward Emily, e.g., Hilda describes
introducing improvements in the household diet, like salads,
which she obser\?’ed in a friend's home or urging her mother to
shampoo more often and to abandon a fashionable hairstyle
because "you just don't have the manual dexterity for it."
In addition to following Emily's activities, Hilda
was a close observer of her mother's inner state. She saw the
"veiled anger" and distress behind her mother's public
behavior
:
If she was angry . . . she was so well behaved that
it was well covered. She could be crying, really
. . .
and laughing very loudly. But you felt mother
was weeping.
Hilda's perception of Emily's hidden distress is the
main point which differentiates her perspective from that of
the "second family":
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They see mother as a hard working, happy, willing,
loving mother. I see her as a hardworking,
distressed, anguished, infuriated woman.
Despite Hilda's frustration with her mother's
shortcomings in coping with daily life, she was also acutely
sensitive to Emily's vulnerability in the eyes of the world.
She uses the phrase "cold mockery," or "world of cold mockery"
several times in her first two books. In response to my
request for elaboration, Hilda connects the image to Emily:
It's what I mean when I say I don't really get into
people . . . Instead, they're just sort of saying:
"Oh well, you—that's just you saying that. That has
nothing to do with the real situation. Why don't you
cope with the really important characteristics of
living .
"
Probably it's a form of realizing that my mother was
similar because she didn't cope with the realist's
idea either.
Hilda's sympathetic concern over Emily's treatment
at the hands of others focused most strongly on her father:
I'd feel very sad when her feelings were hurt, when
things weren't going as they should—Father almost
was gruff with her, I'd feel badly for her— I did
have feelings for her.
Hilda, Emily, and Jacob
I think I never found in father the person I hoped I
might, a companion, someone who would understand me.
I used to think if we would see more of him, he would
know us and we would know him. Somehow this never
happened.
I don't think I was ever able to accept other
people's attachments for each other. I think when I
see any attachment ... I have a serious jealousy—or
something
.
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There is a causal relationship between Hilda's above
two statements. That is, Jacob's sparse and ritualized weekend
contact with the family made it difficult for Hilda to get to
know her father, but the real barrier arose from the fact that
Jacob and Emily's relationship was painfully unacceptable to
Hilda. It was impossible for Hilda, in turn, to separate her
parents' relationship from her own intricate and troubled
relationship with Emily.
Looking first at the problems which Hilda perceived
within her parents' relationship, she identifies the main
shortcoming as a lack of "emotional interplay".
There was no emotional interplay. When I began
reading about love in poetry and literature
,
I would
say to mother, "You and father don't know a thing
about that !
"
They were so hidden, gave so little of themselves,
otherwise we could have been more understanding
. . .
In those days it was not "polite."
She saw the lack as occurring on both sides; neither
partner gave the other the necessary credit and support.
Almost entirely, mother didn't appreciate father for
the person he was, as a mind, a hard working person
getting up there in the business world, through his
own error and attempt ... He would always talk
about money and stocks., Mother couldn't believe any
of it, it meant nothing to her.
Hilda's picture of Jacob's shortcomings in offering
Emily emotional support is more mixed. On the one hand, "He
admired her, he used to say, 'Your mother is a beautiful little
person.'" He was also "a good skate" about her lapses in
housekeeping, overlooking "whatever he found in the corners.
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On the other hand, Hilda feels Emily got "very little credit
from father" for all the hard work she did. In terms of
support, however, Jacob was unambiguously deficient:
I don't know how he ever expected her to get by on
what little he gave her.
P®thaps I got used to the idea of copinc without a
male protector. If there had been a loving
relationship between my parents, it might have been
different
.
The one area in which Hilda did see an active
interplay between her parents, their sexual relationship, was
most disturbing to her. Recall from the second chapter that,
as part of the weekend ritual, Emily always retired with a
headache after the family dinner. "This was peculiar because
mother never slept in the afternoon except after these Sunday
nights." At some point in mid-childhood, Hilda solved this
mystery by observing her parents in bed through a crack in
their door. She came away with a picture of sex as a brutal,
destructive act, particularly in terms of its impact cn Emily.
I just hated him having intercourse with her ... I
despised that . . . thought that was dreadful.
— I think intercourse queered mother, it floored her.
She invariably had those violent headaches.
— I objected to them having intercourse— it was an
unfeeling gesture on my father's part, for his
satisfaction and nobody else's.
— I believed that it was probably one of the most
sorrowful points about marriage, the fact that that
was expected of one.
—Probably father felt the same way, that it was her
"obligation"—things were based on rather peculiar
fundamental practices in those days: going to bed
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once a week, giving birth to a child every vear ortwo—what did it amount to, as a relationship?
Hilda saw the long range impact of sex on Emily,
pregnancy and childbearing, as its most insidiously destructive
aspect.
I compare myself to mother, and she suffered more in
^slstionship with father and childbearing than Idid in mine. Even though I was not well adjusted to
marriage, I think mother was less adjusted.
— I think all insanity, most insanity—Margaret
Sanger would have said, "Well Hilda, I told you"—had
she lived to see me go insane through my problems of
intimacy, marriage, love, and childbirth—The doctors
said, when I was first brought to the hospital, "How
many times was this woman pregnant ... No wonder
she is insane !
"
I don't know if this is physically true or not . . .
[but] I was concerned that I had never told you this
part of my insanity; that I was not a clever woman in
that way, in controlling pregnancies—nor was mother.
Her anguished perception of Jacob imposing himself on
Emily's body represents only one side of the feelings which her
parents' sexual bond aroused in Hilda. Earlier, Hilda
mentioned being jealous of the fact that her mother "even
demonstrated a goodbye and hello kiss to father." Her parents'
intercourse was a far more thorough demonstration—Emily giving
her body to Jacob. Hilda qualifies her statement on being
unable to accept other people's attachments, quoted at the head
of this section, by adding that:
My attachment for my own. friend Teressa is so secure
that no matter what she did or what I did, we feel
this way; we're as close as two people who grew up
almost flesh to flesh, although our lives were so
different.
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Hilda lacked any secure "flesh to flesh" contact v/ith
her mother; the only times she remembers having it are when she
was ill— "Oh this is wonderful, being held by mother, bleeding
into her
. . . shirtwaist." Jacob had it on a regular basis
—
flesh to flesh contact was, in fact, the only source of an
emotional bond between her parents which Hilda could see. She
had cause to be deeply jealous of her father.
In addition to being an overwhelming competitor,
Jacob also had the potential to be a significant alternative to
Hilda's attachment with Emily. He could have represented an
escape from the weekly conflict with her mother and siblings,
someone who could balance the injustices she felt so acutely,
an important person who might recognize and support her as
"good." Instead, Jacob acted as the arm of Emily's justice
"with no explanation at all, from him or myself." Emily, in
Hilda's eyes, had an unassailable hold over Jacob
—
perhaps
again through the bond in flesh to flesh contact. Hilda was
blocked from forming a separate alliance. Even in the lesser
sphere of competition with Isabel for their father's affection,
Emily, as the prime contributor to Hilda's "continually gloomy
expression," handicapped Hilda, giving Isabel, with her
"charming little girl look," a permanent inside track.
Hilda has found herself caught up in a painful
triangular relationship a number of times in her life. Intense
jealousy, sometimes complex and two sided, is always a factor.
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In the final hour of our first suiraner of interviewing, Hilda
sums up her experience of this situation.
Hilda: I think I was courting that jealousy— I always did,in any connection. I had a very possessive feeling
even about [my husband] Richard. I was courting thejealousy I felt for his connection with his parents.
C.J.: You sought out the situation?
Hilda
:
Almost as if I were battling it as a dragon. First
we kill that dragon then we get to you.
It seemed like I had to slay that jealousy in order
to get to see him. And yet I courted it. Just as I
used to court those darned bogies— "Come on! Here I
am. Come on, get me and I'll get you— if I dare."
. . . In fact, that's what I was told about my
relationships with people by [my friend] Ellen..
"Well you make it happen!," she'd say— and probably
it's true. She said, "You're very clever, you bring
things out in people no one else will."
. . . I think I know I'm doing it, in a way. But
it's also— it's just like if I want a relationship
I'll bring something out [in the other person], but I
don't think I do it much anymore—Maybe I'm not the
person who could anymore . Maybe that '
s
the thing I
miss in [my] Unitarian group. Maybe if I could do
that—bring out the things I want to do battle with
—
I'd be satisfied.
C.J.: It seems that it would certainly make your life
easier not to have to do that.
Hilda: I know. Bad taste! It's in poor taste.
Understanding Hilda's Childhood
Because Hilda's adult relationships are often
strikingly isomorphic with her childhood attachments, a
psychological understanding of her life turns, to a large
extent, on the interpretation of her childhood experience. The
repetition of early dilemmas— "the dragon"— in her later
relationships highlights the importance of one's internal
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structuring of experience. At the same time, Hilda's child-
hood is also important, from a theoretical standpoint, because
it was the period of her most full participation in a family
system. The abortive outcome of her own efforts at
establishing a family, and the carefully measured social life
—
the "frugal experience"—of her later years, make Hilda's early
family, in effect, the one ongoing system in her life. If the
idea of integrating concepts of intrapsychic development and
systems theory were not already in circulation, it would have
to be invented for Hilda's life. The fact that an integration
is called for does not, however, make the task any the less
complicated. In order to avoid bogging down in this
undertaking, I will attempt to simplify—perhaps oversimplify
—
it to a bare outline: first suggesting how a systems
perspective might fit with Hilda's experience; then, through
Boszormenyi-Nagy ' s reinterpretation of super-ego theory,
looking at her membership in her first three person system;
and, finally, adding the concept of loyalty to the basic
framework presented in the first part of the chapter in order
to discuss Hilda's first signs of maladaption.
The general system .
Scapegoating—an analogy to the Yom Kippur ritual in
which the sins of the tribe are symbolically placed on the head
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of a goat which is then sent into the wilderness—may be the
most widely used concept in systems theory. The Mendahls, who
responded to "any adversity" in the family by locating it
within a single member and turning "thumbs down" on him, appear
to have relied extensively on scapegoating. Hilda gives a
clear description of being in the position of a scapegoat— "it
didn't balance, I was always in the wrong." Another basic
systems concept, "reflexive triangulation"— "a reactive process
wherein no two people deal with each other" (Bowen, 1972) —also
fits well with Hilda's account. The alliance between Emily and
Jacob which resulted in Hilda's punishment was a fixed part of
the ritual of Jacob's weekends with the family. Hilda's
unresolved conflict with Emily brought her parents together,
giving her one of the few opportunities to see them acting in •
unison
.
Both of these processes are explained through the
principle of group homeostasis (Baker, 1974) , that is, the
system supports the cohesive functioning of the whole at the
expense of one of its members. There is good evidence that
such a dynamic exists. For example, Minnchin (1974) shows that
physiological measures of stress drop in parents who are
engaged in triangling a child, while they rise in the child.
It appears that Hilda's parents relied heavily on the
children to support their cohesive functioning; Emily became
overtly psychotic when the youngest child reached adolescence,
and the need to care for her brought most of the children back
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into the home. This systems level of analysis clarifies
Hilda s experience of her family, but it precludes an
understanding of how she, as an individual member, actively
the experience. Hilda's scapegoat behavior becomes
comprehensible when she is regarded as a component of her
family system, but it is hard to see what motivates her as a
separate person to remain bound in such a costly transaction.
This is a point where Nagy's concept of loyalties becomes most
helpful
.
Loyalties in the oedipal situation
.
Many consider the oedipal situation Freud's greatest
discovery. Loevinger (1969)
,
Guntrip (1971)
,
and Nagy (1973)
all see it is the point at which psychoanalysis becomes an
interpersonal theory—Freud's discovery of the principle of
external relationships becoming internal relationships.
Freud's explanation of the oedipal situation, however, did not
transcend his metapsychology: the child, out of fear of
retaliation (castration) from the father, divests his libidinal
energy from the mother and his aggressive energy from his
father, and reinvests both onto internal object representations
of his parents, which become his ego-ideal and superego. A
number of critics have found serious flaws in these mechanics:
(1) The child is an artificially closed system in
this formulation. The parents are interchangeable
units, relevant only as the object of the child's
drives. Bloch (1978) points out that Freud
significantly omits the first part of the Oedipal
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myth, that his parents intended to kill the child bvabandoning him on a hillside.
(2) The emphasis on castration leaves femaledevelopment as Freud acknowledged
—mysterious; andthe formula focuses too strongly on paternal
authority, while ignoring maternal authority
(Dinnerstein, 1977).
(3) The dimension of power is over represented in
Freud's explanation at the expense of other
considerations such as justice or esteem (Naov.
1973).
(4) The process of identification is too narrowly
confined to the oedipal period (Breger, 1974)
,
and
Freud attributes everything which follows from
resolution of the oedipal conflict—e.g., conscience,
sublimation, and mature ego functioning——to negative
actions—e.g., renounciation
,
repression, and
reaction formation. He does not provide terms to
describe the affirmative aspect of these developm.ents
(Schafer, 1976) .
Although Nagy (1974) is not directly concerned with
development, and only occasionally mentions the oedipal
situation, his theory of loyalties is, in essence, a systems
approach to superego theory. Nagy shifts the analysis of
internalized self-other relationships from the psychoanalytic
framework of power to a basis in reciprocal justice and
obligation— a shift which substantially addresses all four of
the above criticisms of Freud's theory of oedipal relations;
Monothetical power accounting represents a much more
superficial aspect of social structuring than the
accounting of obligations. An irresponsible
loosening of the hierarchy of loyalties is more
detrimental to the survival of societies than is
seemingly excess authority [Ibid . , p. 27]
.
Beyond the subjective antithesis between I and you,
each close relationship has a bookkeeping of merits
as a synthetic, quasiquantitative, quasiobjective
system characteristic ... We use the term merit to
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describe the balance between intrinsically exploitive
versus mutually enhancing aspects of any relationship
... Dynamic psychology has neglected to account for
the justice and injustice in the human world of close
relationships [Ibid
.
,
p. 34].
Justice is an historically formed ledger, recording
the balance of mutuality of give and take [Ibid., p.
66 ] .
Nagy's term "ledger of merit" is, in other words, a
metaphor for the motivational properties of a loyalty bond. He
uses it to describe the way in which the structuring of a
loyalty contains a prescription for relational behavior. To
somewhat over-simplify Nagy's view, loyalty derives its
motivational force from two basic sources: (1) the fundamental
interdependence between self and other as transactionally
defined entities— "ontic dependence"—which, in the case of the
child is also an existential dependence in terms of physical
needs and (2) what Nagy assumes to be a universal principal of
balance or homeostasis within any multipersonal system, with a
relationally defined state of "equitable reciprocity as its
ideal goal" [1974, p. 67].
Nagy preserves an intrapsychic dimension of loyalty
motivation in extending the psychoanalytic meaning of
internalization. Nagy (1965) sees the "object" of internali-
zation as a "relational pattern" or "self-other configuration."
Whereas Freud emphasized the defensive role of the internalized
object, which serves as an aid to the ego's efforts at impulse
control, Nagy considers it also an "active agent," representing
the needs of the internalized other. This view follows from
233
Nagy's assumption that the other in a close relationship
becomes a constituent of self; the other's needs become
self-needs. These internalized needs of other enter
into the individual's accounting of merit in a relationship.
Accounts from an early relationship can be carried forward into
the "bookkeeping" of a current relationship, as if "converting"
them into a foreign currency:
It is through the bookkeeping of merits that the
unity between internal (psychological) and external
(interpersonal) relational events can be restored
. . . seemingly interpersonal interactions can be
exploited to settle issues with the internal agents.
For all practical (dynamic) purposes the internalized
other is an active participant of the bookkeeping
system [1974, p. 172].
If the person carries a great sense of indebtedness
from his early relationships his ongoing accounting will be
generous. If he carries a legacy of exploitation he will tend
to seek retributive justice. This is the meaning of a
statement which Nagy repeats in a number of ways: "VJe regard
the internalization of object relationships as one of the key
indicators of the justice of one's human world." [1974, p.
25] .
Nagy's emphasis on justice may appear to imply a high
level of ethical, and thus cognitive, development. Apart from
a passing reference to Piaget's observation that a strong sense
of reciprocity develops early in childhood, Nagy does little to
dispel this impression—his primary concern is with adult
functioning. Much of the early negotiation between mother
and
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child, however, can be described as a developing loyalty bond.
In order to set that stage for the conflict of loyalties which
occurs in the oedipal situation, I will take a brief glance at
the development of identification in early attachment.
In the first part of this chapter I focused on the
deeply mutual regulation which occurs from the onset of the
mother-child relationship, at first defining the boundaries
solely in terms of sensory contact and physical proximity and
later, with the child's acquisition of object permanence,
extending them much further into space and time. Because, in
the case of the mother, the object -is a sentient presence, the
child's "objectification" of her opens the possibility of
taking her perspective. He learns not just that she sees him,
but how she sees him. In particular, he learns that his action
can invoke a strong emotional reaction in her. One of
Sullivan's major contributions is in pointing out that this
learning starts at a very early, preconceptual stage:
Empathy is the term that we use to refer to the
peculiar emotional linkage that subtends the
relationship of the infant with other significant
people . . . Long before there are signs of any
understanding of emotional expression, there is
evidence of this emotional contagion or communication
[1953, p. 17]
.
Because the child's dependence on his bond with the
mother is total at this stage of life, her needs in the
relationship become, through empathic communication, his deeply
felt needs. Identification, in other words, is an ongoing
process which starts with the earliest give-and-take between
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mother and child rather than the sudden event depicted in the
traditional view of the oedipal situation.
Projective identification, the ability to take the
Perspective of an other
,
remains a potent factor in regulating
interpersonal relationships throughout the life cycle.
Hornstein (1976)
,
in an insightful review of the literature on
altruism and aggression, identifies the capacity for empathv as
the key variable in determining whether people behave
cooperatively or aggressively across a wide range of
experimental situations. He argues that empathic identifica-
tion creates a "we-group," within which altruism naturally
flourishes, as distinct from a "them-group, ” who are unlikely
to elicit cooperation and, if sufficiently distant from the us-
group, may even become the brunt of unthinkable cruelty.
The capacity for empathy [is] the necessary
prerequisite for developing an effective cooperative
social organization. It is the capacity that allows
human beings to experience the bonds of ^ and the
barriers of they ; and it is this capacity that
regulates the occurrence of altruism and aggression
[1976, p. 59]
.
The child's cognitive development during the pre-
oedipal years (1 1/2-4) greatly enhances his ability to in-
ternalize the conditions for maintaining the bond of "us.”
With the advent of what Piaget calls "imitative accommodation,"
the child becomes able to act out the role of the mother toward
himself, priasing and scolding himself for his own actions.
More significantly, symbolic representation—the capacity to
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imagine actions rather than simply to perform them—enters the
picture
:
With the beginning of representative thought and
especially with the growth of imitative thought,
intelligence becomes capable of invoking absent
.
objects, and consequently of being applied to
invisible realities on the past and partly even in
the future
. . . Imitative thought thus provides a
map of reality [Piaget, 1950, quoted in Kesson, 1965,
p. 294] .
The child is now able to map the symbolic boundaries
of the mother-child relationship. He constructs an imitative
working model of the give-and-take in their bond. He comes to
anticipate which actions might flood the relationship with
anger and anxiety, those which could place him "beyond the
pale," and those which preserve the mutually satisfying
continuity of good child and loving mother. The child's
internal structure of the bond takes on the same motivational
force of the patterns of emotional expression earlier in the
relationship, while no longer requiring the actual presence of
the mother. This internal structure is, I believe, exactly
what Nagy means in the term invisible loyalty.
Viewing conscience as the outgrowth of a loyalty bond
preserves Freud's insight into the role of identification and
internalization of an emotionally significant relationship, but
alters the psychoanalytic m.odel in two important ways: first,
by dating the first major internalization of social standards
to the pre-oedipal era; and second, by shifting the emphasis
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from paternal to maternal authority—a point which Dinnerstein
expresses eloquently:
The first ''you," in addition to its other vital
functions, is the original well spring of pooled,
stored, communicable experience upon which each child
draws for its fundamental orientation to communally
tested and communally created human reality, for its
fundamental leap into civilization [1977, pp. 172-
173].
The oedipal triangle is the first major test of the
child's bond of loyalty to his mother. It represents his first
opportunity to branch out from his original dyad and establish
a broader "us" in the adult world, as well as his first real
temptation to be disloyal—the first crisis of conscience.
Power in this triangle' is complexly lopsided. On the
one hand, the father has, from the child's perspective, awescm.e
power in the world; he functions outside the family, exercises
authority within it, and, especially, exerts a strong influence
over the mother. On the other hand, the mother has awesome
power over the child. She is associated with the child's
deepest experiences of shame and anxiety. She still has an
eery power to see his most private aspects of self; his
awareness and her's are still, from his point of view, highly
permeable—as Dinnerstein [1977, p. 168] puts it," In
confronting her the child faces an old, devastatingly
knowledgeable witness."
Unless the father is unusually remote or tyrannical,
he holds a strong attraction for children of both sexes. In
contrast to the mother, he is a refreshingly separate authority
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figure, a more clearly defined model for identification and a
safer person to differentiate from:
His presence is apt to be relatively peripheral until
after we have started ... to recognize that a
creature can have multiple aspects, shifting moods
and still be a permanent, unitary individual. For
this reason he is perceived from the very beginning
... as a more human being than the mother, more
like an adult version of oneself, less engulfing,
less nebulously overwhelming [Dinnerstein
, 1977, p
175].
Lacan (1968) speaks of -the father as representing
"The Law." This is another aspect of his attraction which
would have been especially important to Hilda: the father
holds the promise of recourse to a more rational, objective
standard of relational merit and obligations. He represents
the justice of the adult world and, with the comforting limits
on his knowledge of one's past humiliations and private sources
of shame, a fresh start for the child. This is one reason why
Jacob's inflexible stance of subscribing to Emily's view of
justice endures so as a source of pain and disappointment for
Hilda.
As Freud first saw, the child's ability to renounce,
or break away from, the mother is mandatory for a successful
outcome of the oedipal situation. Being a distinctly separate
person, the father cannot be assimilated within the child's
existing structure of self and other . A new attachment to the
father requires a major accommodation of self, which, in turn,
calls for a new level of differentiation from the mother. If
there is a sufficiently loving relationship between the
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parents, the child may base his accommodation on the esteemed
aspects of the same sex parent. A boy will form an imitative
identification with the esteemed and powerful aspects of his
• With a girl, the accommodation is somewhat more
subtle: in order to draw closer to the father, she must base
identification on the esteemed and powerful aspects of her
mother as seen from his newly recognized perspective. In both
cases, the child's accommodation serves to restore the original
loyalty with the mother on a new level of merit—another
instance of integration through differentiation.
Hilda's chance of a successful resolution of the
oedipal situation was severely limited on two fronts. First,
Hilda saw very little "emotional interplay" between her
parents. Their union, instead, was hurtful, especially to
Hilda. In an impoverished economy of merit, competition and
feelings of jealousy tend to be maximized; new alignments of
relational bonds become power plays. Put another way, any new
coalition in a reactive triangle, such as Hilda experienced
with her parents, is an alliance against the third party, an
act of betrayal (Bowen, 1972)
.
The second major factor which crippled Hilda in the
oedipal situation is closely related to the first: there was
minimal latitude for differentation in Hilda's relationship
with her mother. Emily— a woman who restricted each child to
two colors of clothing into their adolescence—appears to have
had very limited tolerance for differentiation. Hilda was
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acutely aware of Emily's authority as a "devastating witness."
She experienced her mother as ruthless in the exercise of her
power to "see" into Hilda, someone prepared to "take away my
own concepts," "wipe the slate clean." Nagy (1965) holds that
^ loyS’l'ty bond maintained on such a coercive basis comes to
play the role of a "counter-autonomous superego"; any attempt
establishing a new relationship—
—and even the process of
maturation itself—comes to be seen as an act of deep dis-
loyalty .
If Hilda's loyalty to Emily had been based solely on
coercion, she might have been able eventually to differentiate
from her mother, formidable as she was. Oppression, however,
was only one aspect of Hilda's experience of their relation-
ship. She was also closely attuned to Emily's suffering.
Hilda identified what others missed: "a hard working,
distressed, anguished, infuriated woman." Her well developed
capacity for empathy made the sanction against pushing away
from Emily doubly binding; the altruistic motivation inherent
in identifying as "us" merged with Hilda's fears of evoking
aggression in moving toward "them." It is in describing this
sort of complex mixture of interpersonal motives that Nagy's
concept of loyalty accounting—or, specifically, "double
accounting"—adds an important new dimension to superego
theory
:
Exploitive parents can simultaneously appear
martyrlike, suffering, and unhappy. The resulting
ambiguity through its subtle, and unresolvable
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indebtedness may set up an ethical injunction against
any revenge on the parents [1973, p. 173],
Hilda's adult repetition of triangular relationships
can be seen as an attempt to balance the accounts carried
forward from her oedipal situation. But, due to the
unresolvable conflict in her loyal attachment to Emily, what
Nagy (1973) calls "relational stagnation" occurred. Hilda
structured her adult heterosexual relationships along
relatively fixed lines, in effect assimilating them into the
pattern of her oedipal situation. Accommodation was blocked
from two directions: her ongoing loyalty to Emily continued to
make differentiation treason; and the heavy imposition of past
accounts on her relationships obscured the current
transaction—as Hilda puts it, her need to fight the "dragon"
kept her from "seeing" her mate. This unresolvable conflict
set the stage for Hilda's attempt to achieve a meta-solution
through insanity.
Signs of distress .
Hilda's adaption had clearly begun to go awry by mid-
childhood. To review the main points in my discussion of her
early childhood, her problems stemmed from a disturbance of the
mother-child bond. Due to her illnesses and Emily's circum-
stances, Hilda's first attachment may have been highly anxious.
Chronic anger and an unusual vulnerability to feelings of shame
would have been natural outgrowths of her anxious attachment,
factors predisposing her to overemploy dissociation as a
mode
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of coping with emotional distress. Added to an understanding
of Hilda's loyalties, this framework makes her first symptoms
of emotional disturbance reasonably comprehensible.
is interesting to note that there is a rough
parallel between the stages of response to prolonged separation
whic Bowlby (1960) first identified—anxious protest,
despondency, and detachment—and the pattern of Hilda's
childhood disturbance. The difference, of course, is that
Hilda was dealing with a highly abstract form of separation.
But the similarity highlights the role of anxious attachment in
the problems that run through her childhood.
Looking first at her absorption with "bogies,"
psychoanalytic theory traditionally explains such experiences
in terms of projection, i.e., the child defends himself from
his own unacceptable and dangerous impulses by experiencing
them as emanating from the environment. Bloch (1978) inter-
estingly reverses this interpretation: the child, in response
to a universal fear of infanticide, defends himself from
perceiving the aggressive impulses in his parents by
misattributing the danger to the outside environment. My
interpretation of Hilda's experience of bogies falls between
these two positions. Because Hilda's illnesses made nurturance
a deeply frustrating experience for both parties, anger was a
pervasive quality within the mother-child relationship. V7hen
Hilda located the danger outside the relationship, she was
defending the integrity of her bond with Emily—an act of
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loyalty. Her projections served the adaptive purpose of
motivating her to draw closer to Emily, while temporarily
f^®®ing the relationship of its antagonistic guality.
At the same time, the chronically high level of
anxiety in the mother-child bond would retard Hilda's progress
in mastering the dangers normally perceived in the environment,
e.g., novelty and strangeness. The normal anxiety provoking
situations of early childhood, such as being. alone in the dark,
would have kept many of their, to use Madison's (1969) term,
"resonating" properties. Hilda's hallucinations are an example
of "reintegrative fill-in," a case of pure assimilation into an
dissociated schema under conditions of high arousal.'
Hilda's fascination with bogie-like people is
somewhat more complex. On the one hand, it served the obvious
function of recapturing the ground of earlier rebuffs, i.e.,
re-exploring the fearful aspects of her environment, probably
in the supportive company of others. But there is also a
suggestion of identification in her stance toward aberrant
people. This may represent movement toward what Erikson calls
a "negative identity." Hilda felt far removed from the
encapsulated "us" of her family. Her need "to be someone" may
have moved her to explore a group which was distinctly "them."
Hilda's thoughts of suicide also fit with this interpretation.
Hilda, who was shown that Isabel had "double the love" by
virtue of her proximity to the short-lived Eleanor, may have
adopted "the conviction that to be sick or dead is a better
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assurance of being 'recognized' than to be healthy and about”
[Erikson, 1959, p. 141],
Depression, perhaps because it is more than one
disorder, is not well understood. Two interconnected factors,
however, are widely observed: the experience of loss and low
steem , The breakup of a relationship, loss of employment
social status
,
and the death of a loved one all freguently
precipitate depression. What these forms of loss all have in
common is that they serve to loosen the person's grounding in
the interpersonal world. The adult expression of grief in
these situations is closely analogous to the despondency which
Bowlby (1960) observes in children suffering prolonged
separation. He maintains that grief has the adaptive function
of promoting attachment—that it is a physiological call for
help. Hilda's call for help does seem to have involved her
whole body—e.g. , her constant headaches—and she had a history
of attachment in pain which would add meaning to this
communication. The loss that Hilda was dealing with falls
between the physical abandonment of early childhood and the
more abstract forms of damage to self-esteem seen in adulthood.
Self-esteem, an intuitively obvious concept, is
difficult to grasp in theoretical terms. It inhabits a
nebulous border zone between intrapsychic and interpersonal
.events. White clearly identifies the dual nature of self-
esteem:
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There can be no doubt that self-esteem is
tremendously affected by the income of esteem that isreceived from others
. , . It is a mistake,
nevertheless, to suppose that self-esteem is wholelv
a matter of esteem income—that no coin can ever be^
minted within [White and Watt, 1973, pp. 142-143],
The problem is how to understand the individual's ac-
tive contribution to self-esteem, how he mints his own
currency. As Epstein (1981) points out, the child's internali-
zation of his parents' values plays a major role. But the
child has an important hand in regulating the flow even in his
formative interactions with his parents:
Children cannot be fooled by empty praise
. . . They
may have to accept artificial bolstering of their
self-esteem in lieu of something better, but their
ego identity gains real strength only from whole-
hearted and consistent recognition of real
accomplishment [Erikson, 1950, p. 208].
It seems that the child's development of competence
in the physical world and attachment in the interpersonal must
converge in order for him to have an integrated, "real" basis
of self-esteem. Without examining how this convergence would
occur in normal circumstances, it is clear that it did not in
Hilda's case. The heart of the problem was Hilda's need to
accommodate to her mother through a false self. From Hilda's
perspective, her accomplishments were always dictated from
outside—acts of submission not personal mastery. She felt
compelled to meet her obligations to Emily in the counterfeit
notes of compliance and was repaid in a foreign currency of
merit belonging to someone not quite herself. Because her
"true self" remained quarantined from the transaction, Hilda
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was blocked from acquiring any reserve of merit sufficient to
protect her from exposure to the devastating shame of early
childhood. So long as her income of esteem was in a foreign
currency y doubt accompanied it; Hilda was constantly vulnerable
to a sudden devaluation—a significant factor in her eventual
breakdown.
As to the last stage in Bowlby's (1960) sequence of
responses to separation, Hilda's adoption of a false self in
one sense avoided detachment. Her false self was a compromise
between turning away from and outright submission to Emily, a
compromise which was preserved in the constantly repeated
ritual of first- ignoring and then complying with Emily's
demands—becoming Emily's loyal opposition. Again, the divorce
between the public expression and her private experience
significantly undermined Hilda's ability to benefit from her
loyalty to Emily. Her feelings of being an abandoned child
were on a separate plane from her daily engagement with Emily;
the ongoing attachment was between Emily and someone not quite
Hilda. Her primary grounding in the interpersonal world was
therefore also vulnerable to exposure and abrupt collapse. As
the events of the next chapter show, such a collapse did
finally occur.
CHAPTER V
BECOMING AM ADULT
This chapter of Hilda's history covers a great deal
of material. Starting with her early search for alternatives
to the troubled bond with Emily, it moves through her first
steps toward sexual intimacy, an initial breakdown, marriage,
early motherhood, becoming a writer, and entrance into a
complex triangular relationship, to end as her adjustment takes
3 rapidly downward slide toward schizophrenia. Events are in
the saddle during this twenty-year period of Hilda's life (from
about age ten into her early thirties)
.
When Hilda and I first sat down to reconstruct her
history, she focused on the later portion of this period, from
her marriage onward. I experienced this first day of
interviewing as a numbing overload of information. In my first
presentation of Hilda's history I believe I replicated this
effect for the reader, devoting over one hundred and seventy
pages—with minimal analysis on my part— to cover what is
condensed here into the second half of a single chapter. I
still try to include the most salient details of this eventful
stage of Hilda's life, while focusing on those which exemplify
the aspects of dissociation and integration in her efforts at
meeting the tests of loyalty in an expanding sphere of
attachments
.
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Alternative Attachments
James and Teressa
.
Hilda and her brother James were close throughout her
late childhood and adolescence. He was her first successful
attachment at least partially outside the dangerous arena of
her relationship with Emily. James was her mentor, and
although he occasionally "disciplined” Hilda or "nailed her to
the truth," he was by and large a supportive mentor. She
shared her childhood fears with him, and it was James who
helped her to understand that she was not responsible for the
death of Johnie Skibiski, the servant's son who was killed by a
train. He was also allied with Hilda in viewing the frequent
additions to the family as "a very serious problem," and James
gave Hilda her eventual understanding of the family's isolation
as a function of being declasse'. He was also the one to give
her the final encouragement to be "somebody," a writer or a
painter
.
James could understand Hilda, see her private
thoughts and feelings, without presenting her with the enormous
risks that being "seen" by Emily carried. For example, James
used to take advantage of the fact that Hilda frequently spoke
in her sleep; he was able to interrogate her in her sleep so
that she would divulge her secrets, such as where she hid his
stamp collection. Hilda remembers being perturbed, but not
devastated, by this violation of her boundaries. James, in
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other words, could take away particular secrets but not, as
Emily could, Hilda's very "concepts." As an opponent, he was
on an altogether more manageable level.
In one sense, Hilda's attachment to her older brother
was a healthy partial resolution of her oedipal dilemma
—
accomplished in the lesser world of her sibling system. James
was the "bright mind" of the family, "worshipped" by both
parents. In her fond attachment to James, Hilda converted a
formidable rival for Emily's affection into a cohort. She
remained loyal to Emily in mirroring her esteem for James and,
because both parents were unified in their high regard for
James, she did not risk taking a side against either— in fact,
it was a way to join their side of the triangle in relation to
James. By aligning herself with James, Hilda also opened the
possibility of receiving whatever affection might deflect off
of him
—
just as the child who identifies with the primary
parent's loved partner positions himself to be loved more fully
by the primary parent. Hilda was very active in making herself
"us" with James; she took his advice, incorporated his views,
spirited off his possessions, and became, for a few years in
mid-childhood, a "tomboy."
The adaptive aspect of her attachment to James
becomes apparent in comparing the relational configuration with
her bond to Emily. The apparently small step from her master/
servant relationship with Emily to her master/ student relation-
ship with James opened a whole new vista of mutual exchange and
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growth. Although the student owes homage to the master, it is
the homage of a potential peer. Unlike the servant, the
student's steps toward equality, and even differentiation, do
but fulfill the relationship. Accepting James'
influence, in comparison to Emily's, was for Hilda like moving
from a totalitarian state to an authoritarian system.
The second fond attachment from her childhood which
has had lifelong importance to Hilda was with a girl in her
neighborhood, Teressa. Their first meeting stands out as a
bright moment in Hilda's memory of childhood:
I was taking a walk in Hudson and I was very lonely.
I saw this child swinging in a lilac bush—a very
romantic setting. In those days everyone wore
rompers when they were little, [but] here she was an
eight year old child in rompers, pink . , .
And that was exciting to me because I had never seen
a pair of pink rompers. She had pink hair ribbon and
curls and enormous—She spoke to me first, I was so
delighted. Behind her I could see the studio window
and I wondered what that great big window was
—
"Mother's an artist, she paints there."
Hilda and Teressa petitioned Teressa 's mother to
allow them to become friends. After interviewing Mrs. Mendahl,
she ascented. Over "long, long walks," painting and reading
together, and mutual assistance with homework, the girls became
a solid "we." They established what Hilda calls "a pact
against reality," each opposing those seen to transgress
against the other, and joining against a common threat:
adolescence, boys, and the ineluctable "physiology of marriage
and birth."
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I felt her mother was so domineering she didn't allowher to be the full fledged person she might havebeen. But she couldn't stop her from reading
. .
I had a feeling of her being a very poetic person
with insights she had accomplished alone and would
.share with me, a lot of it , , , and we were
competetive in drawing. She did better than I,
invariably.
—We also used to study the dead. In those days you
could, just go into the houses with the dead— I don't
know how many young people do that but we did ... I
had an idea the images of the dead Christ and the
dead were very similar. I loved looking at them.
—We would kiss each other, I didn't know what it
meant except as a sign of affection
. . . she always
smelled wonderful. The nearer I got the more excited
I would get, as if Teressa were some wonderful
glowing thing.
It seems that at least some of Teressa 's glow was a
reflection of her home and mother. Teressa 's household,
excelled in several of the areas in which Hilda's fell short:
there was an atmosphere of opulence; meals were well prepared
and ample— "chocolate cakes and fresh foods and spinach, oh, it
was wonderful"; and the family was securely positioned in "high
society." More important, Teressa had a mother whom Hilda
respected as an artist and woman of the world. Although Hilda
disapproved of her overprotective attitude toward Teressa—her
"Baby Bawena"—she recognized an expansive love missing in her
relationship with Emily: "I could see a lot of that, so
called, 'real love' between mother and daughter—Teressa 's
mother loved her immensely. I was jealous."
Hilda's attachment with Teressa was a boon to her
development in several respects. For one thing, Teressa
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brought Hilda out into the world. In providing secure compan-
ionship, she greatly facilitated Hilda's exploration of the
environment, widening the range of possibilities to include
places that would be far too anxiety provoking to venture into
alone. By introducing Hilda to another family system, she
created a bridge for Hilda to cross from the insular "us" of
the Mendahl household toward the rem.ote "them" of the commun-
ity. She gave Hilda a new perspective both on the Mendahl
household and on the social world at large—which must have
looked very different from the vantage point of Teressa's
family.
Teressa, even more than James, introduced a new level
of freedom for Hilda to disagree. In competing with Teressa,
even if she ,lost, Hilda was entertaining the possibility of
prevailing—as opposed to reaffirming her inferior position.
Hilda was forced to recognize Teressa's views, but in a newly
discriminating and differentiated fashion—not as a law which
she was forced either to accept or risk stepping "outside the
pale." If her attachment to James was an advance from
totalitarianism to an authoritarian system, with Teressa, Hilda
established a pact of democratic give-and-take.
One of Sullivan's major contributions to psychoanaly-
tic clinical theory is his insight into the significance of a
same-sex "chum" for preadolescent development. In describing
the "chum" relationship, Sullivan focuses on the same three
relational qualities which Bowlby sees as defining an
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attachment—
—specificity
,
mutual regulation of proximity, and
the development of a strong affectional bond—but he views them
as rising to a new plane of action: proximity evolves into
"intimacy," regulation becomes a more complex "collaboration,"
and the affectional bond between chums is, for Sullivan, the
advent of "love."
This new interest in the preadolescent era is not as
general as . . . the need of similar people was in
the juvenile era. Instead, it is a specific new type
of interest in a particular member of the same sex
who becomes a chum
. . . This change represents the
beginning of something very like full-blown,
psychiatrically defined love
. . . The other fellow
takes on a perfectly novel relationship with the
person concerned: he becomes of practically equal
importance in all fields of value
. .
.
[The] child
begins to develop a real sensitivity to what matters
to another person ...
Thus the developmental epoch of preadolescence is
marked by the coming of the integrating tendencies
which, when they are completely developed, we call
love, [that is] the manifestation of the need for
interpersonal intimacy . . . Intimacy is that type of
situation involving tv/o people which permits
validation of all components of personal worth and
requires a type of relationship which I call
collaboration . . . clearly formulated adjustments of
one's behavior to the expressed needs of the other
person in pursuit of increasingly identical—that is,
more and more nearly mutual—satisfactions . . . and
security operations [1953, pp. 245-246, Sullivan's
emphasis]
.
The qualities which Sullivan describes as heralded in
by the chum relationship are what Boszormenyi-Nagy calls
dialogue, the mature stage of relating. Nagy's dialogue is the
interpersonal equivalent of Piaget's concept of accommodation.
an implicit compact for reciprocal modification of self and
other. Just as accommodation introduces new levels of mobility
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and coordination, a dialogic relationship is characterized by a
higher order of differentiation and interdependence. For the
person who first enters a relational dialogue, the
interpersonal world becomes at once a more secure home and a
less rigidly predictable place—two developments which Hilda
needed desperately.
[Dialogue] amounts primarily to helping the Other to
be delineated as a subject opposite to oneself as an
object to the Other's needs
. . . The trust, i.e.,
the anticipated reciprocation on the part of the
Other, removes the emotional flavor of being used or
taken advantage of. The atmosphere of trust changes
the economy of "giving emotionally" [1965, pp. 56-57,
Boszormenyi-Nagy ' s emphasis].
As the "dialogue of needs" becomes established, it
becomes one of the greatest sources of relational
security and trust. [And it is a new form of trust]
. . .
The structure of dialogue is not based on a
constant complementation of needs. Instead, it is a
contract for the free exchange of both partners ' non-
complementary need assertions, based on their
reliance on the overall mutuality of each other's
object availability [Ibid .
,
p. 77]
.
In making his point that the major experiences which
shape personality do not all occur in early childhood, Sullivan
may focus too narrowly on the single chum relationship. For
one thing, the kind of discriminating sensitivity to the
specific needs of the partner and the high level reciprocity
—
particularly as elaborated in Nagy's concept of dialogue—which
Sullivan attributes to the years of the chum relationship
(around eight and one half to twelve) require the full freedom
from egocentric thought which only becomes available in
adolescence.
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® data base was also skewed in a direction
which might accentuate the importance of a chum. He worked
primarily with schizophrenics, who tended to have a history of
early family relationships which were exceptionally bleak and
coercive. In these circumstances, the chum relationship would
take on an aura of salvation. But if Sullivan'
s
model is unbalanced, it is slanted in the same direction in
which Hilda's early life was askew. The consolidation of her
"pact" with Teressa gave Hilda a new experience of mutuallv
regulated security in a relationship which—because Hilda is a
"time—binding animal"—could never be entirely cancelled by
anything which she experienced before or afterwards. It may
well have had the impact which Sullivan (1956, p. 313) observed
in the lives of some of his patients: "if the person has
experienced the need for, and novel returns from, intimacy with
another person, a chum . . . then the eventuality of schizo-
phrenic disaster will not bring so swift a regressive
divestment of the later acquisitions of personality."
Hilda, herself, recognizes the existence of Teressa
in her life as an enduring alternative to the most problematic
aspects of her family relationships. The context of the
following excerpt is a discussion of how Hilda can still
experience the "atmosphere of marriage, of parenthood" among
her present day relatives as dangerous and "painful." I have
already presented parts of the same discussion: her
vulnerability to "suffocation in the atmosphere" and her
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"serious problem with jealousy.” In differentiating her
relationship with Teressa from these dangers, Hilda describes
the gualities of secure object availability and the freedom to
be "one-and-different" which Boszormenyi-Nagy sees as the core
of a dialogic relationship.
Hilda
:
I thought I would enjoy it much more than I did,
getting into my former environments, you know, with
my sisters and my children. And it is true that
. . . when I was with them I would sort of be them,
see them, you know, and be them because of what they
were.
C . J . : Would that be anything like the "rivers flowing to-
gether?"
Hilda: In a way, but not exactly because we weren't really
exchanging to that extent. I wouldn't exchange, I
would sort of ^ there, be in this environment— I was
always sort of withheld in my remarks ... I don't
think they know me at all—Ruth thinks she knows me
better than I know myself, I can feel that. And yet
I think I know them fairly well . . .
I had an idea I was reading them correctly. I would
think: "Now this situation isn't the way it is,
this atmosphere of marriage, of parenthood—and it
would be painful because I really wouldn't want it.
C. J. : What would be painful? What was the pain?
Hilda
:
I don't think I was ever able to accept other
people's attachments for each other.
C. J. : So that when you get reinvolved with your family, it
would be the other attachments that
—
Hilda: I think whenever I see any attachment, I have a
serious jealousy, or something. Now my attachment
for my own friend Teressa is so secure that no matter
what she did, or what I did, we feel this way—We're
as close as a couple of people who grew up almost
flesh to flesh—although our lives were so different.
No matter how many times she goes to Europe and comes
back, we always feel that. We're so close that we
can in no possible way feel any jealousy a± aJ^.
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The alternatives of fantasy
.
Fantasy, like so many other psychological processes,
is in itself neither healthy nor pathological. On the one
hand, fantasy is the tool which enables a child to transcend
the here and now, that is, to step back from the problem at
hand and envision solutions which have never before existed.
On the other hand, it is a seductive mode of problem solving
which can lead to, as Erikson (1950, pp. 217-218) puts it, "an
increasing tendency on the child's part to take life
experiences into a solitary corner and to rectify them in
fantasy, and only in fantasy."' Breger (1974, pp. 211-219) adds
that this latter use of fantasy runs counter to the process of
accommodation in the real world, and thus fuels any tendencies
toward a dissociative adjustment.
Hilda appears to have relied heavily on literature as
a source of satisfaction in her childhood. She spent so much
of her time "off somewhere with a book" that the Mendahls
"limited" her to "six books a week." Although she and I never
discussed her recollections of childhood reading in any detail,
the two titles which she mentions have such similar themes—and
parallels with events in her own life—that it is worth
speculating on what they meant to her.
Mark Twain ' s " Recollections of Joan of Arc
"
(published anonymously as a serial in Harpers , 1895) was
Hilda's favorite story:
interested in Joan of Arc. I read theI was very
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book over many times, Mark Twain's version. When she
heard voices and became a leader, I simply adored
her. I would weep over it ... a marvelous
miraculous happening. I wanted to be her.
Joan of Arc, according to the legend, was a peasant
girl who came of age at the time when France was divided
between the houses of Valois and Burgundy. The Burgundians, in
alliance with British invaders, repeatedly tyrannized her home
province. The legitimate Valois king was too hesitant to
commit his forces in defense of the realm. Joan, under divine
instructions, cropped her hair, dressed as a man, and led the
populace in an ultimately successful resistance. In the
process, she was captured, tried as a heretic, and burnt at the
stake. Twain's version idealizes the legend into a sort of
Cinderella story. His Joan is a wise, iron willed, chaste, and
bold child prodigy who, once touched by divine revelation,
leads a charmed existence. She is the only person able to calm
an ax-wielding mad man, for example. In the end she sacrifices
herself in order to bring justice to France by reconciling the
houses of Burgundy and Valois (Rakman, 1971).
Twain's story would have offered Hilda a model of
transcsndent solution to several of the problems which carried
forward from her oedipal situation. Warner (1981) points out
that Joan is unique among idealized female figures in that she
performs no traditional feminine role, such as being a mother,
queen, great beauty, or courtesan. She is also a heroine
uniquely suited to the requirements of Hilda's oedipal drama.
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Like Hilda, Joan grew up in a land dangerously divided and
lacking in justice. Her king, being too disengaged to impose
his legitimate authority
,
left the land open to whatever
depredations the collusive Burgundians wished to commit. With
the aid of a higher Father, she takes matters into her own
hands, stirring her king to action by force of her example.
Fantastic solutions still have to conform with the
main strictures of the child's reality— a point which Erikson
stresses—and Joan's androgeny was also a transcendent solution
to this aspect of Hilda's oedipal dilemma. Joan, on the verge
of becoming a woman, adopts the dress and actions of a man, in
effect, stopping time and preserving her chastity forever.
Joan consummates this manuever in martyrdom, an act which
brings the rulers of her land together and unites her with her
heavenly Father— a perfect solution to Hilda's unresolvable
conflict between remaining loyal to Emily and seeking Jacob.
The Scarlet Letter
,
the other story which captured
Hilda's imagination, served as a model of the darker outcome
which Hilda anticipated in moving into the heterosexual world.
Hilda: This situation always attracted me in stories
—
The
Scarlet Letter. I could never figure out why women
who really became wholehearted females , you know,
passionate women, why they were destroyed . That
always made me— I wondered about it. And it was a
. . .
tease to me. I thought: "well it would be fun
to be ^ passionate woman and be destroyed"— I really
think that occurred to me, quite often.
C.J,: There was something even in the destruction that was
attractive to you?
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Hilda: Yes. Which is what I, what happened to me up here[years later ]
,
it was as near as I could come to
being a passionate woman and being destroyed. It
happened
.
Hawthorne's heroine, Hester Prynne, is a good deal
more complex than Twain's Joan of Arc, but there are basic
similarities in the outlines of the two stories. Hester,
trapped by an unsatisfying marriage and constricting society,
also attempts to transcend her situation. Her lover, like
Joan's king, is an ineffectual man. Hester's refusal to betray
him is what occasions the harshest persecution from the
community: being branded with the scarlet letter. At first
humiliated, Hester gradually comes to see her adultry as a
noble cause, the assertion of her free v/ill in the face of an
unjust and oppressive society. She becomes possessed with a
sense of mission, and her scarlet letter takes on an
hallucinatory brilliance. At the same time, Hester, as Wishy
(1968, p. 8) puts it, "rejects womanliness and reconciliation
with her fate and instead serves a destructive, abstract, and
masculine rationality." Although Hester eventually comes to
terms with her womanliness and re-enters the community, it is
the first part of the story which stands out for Hilda.
The fact that the themes of transcendence and
destruction are much more complicated in The Scarlet Letter
suggests that Hilda's fascination with the story developed at a
later stage—when, for example, her denial of "the physiology
of marriage" was breaking down—but Hester can be seen as an
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extension of Joan into a more real world. Both heroines invite
destruction by: (a) remaining loyal to their inner
convictions, and (b) reaching out into the male world. For
Joan the convictions are first transmitted from the outside;
she has armour, and remains pure in defeat. Hester's desires
for sexual intimacy and self expression come from within; she
has only a cap in which to hide her long hair, and her defeat
is mixed with issues of guilt.
Neither does battle with a discrete female villain.
Both, instead, are in the clutches of a treacherous or harshly
punitive community. For Joan it is a battle of action and
absolute justice. Hester faces a more purely social and lonely
form of persecution.
Finally, both characters embrace their own
destruction. Joan's reasons are clear: it brings her closer
to God. Hester's—and Hilda's—are less so. It may be that
The Scarlet Letter allowed Hilda to envision a situation in
which her need for a male attachment was simultaneously
satisfied and punished—the standard psychoanalytic
interpretation. On the other hand, Hester's destruction may
still have been an extension of Joan's, that is, Hilda might
still have entertained fantasies of a male savior in her
personal use of Hawthorne's story. Both interpretations could
be true. In either case, her preoccupation with these themes
was an attempt to solve relational problems in isolation. As
she became better at finding imaginary satisfactions and
262
consoXi.dd.'tsd hGir pictu]r© of a b©n©vol©nt inal© prasanc© waiting
to ambraca bar, Hilda would hav© lass raason to fac© th©
dangars and frustrations of saaking raal hatarosaxual intimacy.
At th© sam© tima, Hilda's projaction of harsalf into
thas© storias would hav© baan th© mantal acting out of social
rolas so common in praadolascant fantasy (Bragar, 1974)
.
Lookad at in this light, Hilda's fascination with th© thama of
a "scarlat woman" was an attampt to find a group with whom sha
balongad. Sha was abla to idantify harsalf in Hastar Prynna,
to axparianc© a sansa of fallowship. But mantal practic© of a
rola, ©spacially such a nagativ© ona, can ba dangarous: it
craatas a potantial for tha rola to b© raalizad in action— "it
happenad.
"
Raliqious saarch .
Hilda: This is not somathing you spaak of oftan. Thara's
something too important about it, as any intimate
disclosure is.
Psychologists tend to trod heavily in analyzing a
person's religious experience; they often attempt to take away,
rather than add meanings. The search for a sense of belonging
to a church, and discovery of Christ, which occupied much of
Hilda's preadolescent attention was more than one thing. My
effort is not to reduce it to a single dimension, but to
clarify one significant aspect: Hilda's use of religious
imagery as a way to integrate herself in the interpersonal
world.
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Wishy (1968, p. 10) regards Hester Prynne's struggle
as a metaphor for two deeply conflicting aspects of American
life: "the claims of the free individual
. . . and the
contrary demands of an inherited, inflexible code of Christian
character and republican social faith." Adding Hilda's
strivings for growth and sexual intimacy to the "claims of the
free individual," and substituting her binding loyalties to
Emily and the family for "social faith," Hilda's search for
Christ can be seen as an attempt to resolve a verv similar
conflict. If Hester Prynne offered a negative resolution, the
model of moving beyond the pale, attachment to Christ offered a
positive solution: the possibility of achieving simultaneous
expression and validation of her inner self through an act of
transcendent conformity.
In accordance with Hilda's dual goals in pursuing
Christianity—expression of her needs and recognition of her
worth—there were two sides to her preadolescent religious
experience. The first concerned the outer display of religious
faith. As shown in chapter two, Hilda's earliest personal
involvement with the church was an attempt to remake herself in
Emily's eyes, to escape from being "a continually unpleasant
person in the home,/' and to transform herself into someone
suddenly good.
Recall that Hilda was very disturbed by Emily's
interpretation of predestination— "long before you were ever
here the plan was laid; no matter what you do it's all been
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made"—and asked her to offer a solution from the church as
well
:
No matter how I am working at living and working and
studying, you continually say I'm not good ... Do
you suppose if I joined the church
. . .?
"Well," mother said, "Do you want to be a Christian?"
"No, I don't understand that at all, but I want to be
good .
"
Hilda's confirmation in her family's church was, to
use Boszormenyi-Nagy
' s metaphor, an attempt to "convert" her
accounts with Emily onto a new plane of merit. It was the
beginning of an exploration of a number of churches, which
included at least two other instances of Hilda publicly
accepting salvation. Although she initiated her search in hope
of achieving a more satisfactory attachment to Emily, even from
the start Hilda ran into conflict with other family loyalties
—
James "nailed her to the truth" and labelled her conversion a
lie "to get in the good graces of mother and father." Isabel,
who was witness to Hilda's second conversion, "thought it was
peculiar, not at all in keeping with our life. [That] I was
being over-emotional, deliberately misbehaving." Jacob likened
the intensity of Hilda's interest in the whole matter to "Aunt
Eleanor's esoteric approach."
The conflict in Hilda's religious search was internal
as well as external. As her involvement became more emotional,
she turned the same harsh standards of honesty onto herself.
She moved in and out of seeing other people's religious
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expression as real, and entertained constant doubt about the
"truth" of her own feelings.
I enjoyed choir a lot
. . . And I enjoyed the
enthusiasm of tabernacle singing, although I felt
9'^il'ty about it. There was something exciting about
it, the fact that it stimulated the conqregation so.
I worked myself up into thinking it was a kind of a
beat, which could control everyone.
Guilty?
It wasn't truthful ... I felt you shouldn't use
religion in this way, it wasn't finished enough, full
out—and it wasn't really savage enough either. When
I saw the blacks go through their exhortations, and
sing and be baptized, that was very real. I could
sense that it was true, their Bible reading and their
droning and their prayers . . . but when white people
deliberately threw themselves into a frenzy ... It
didn't seem honest— I could sense Catholics being
very honest in their rituals and singing, and I
enjoyed their sound, awfully, and the smell of their
meeting house. I didn't see how they accomplished
it. I couldn't understand how they could do that,
read those Latin words, and those prayers, respond to
the altar and all that. But I thought it was real.
— I tried to imagine how they attained Christ in this
set up. You could see it happen; even if it was
deliberate, they were prostrated with emotion.
— [My conversion was] an attempt, a deliberate—
a
deceit in a way ... I think it was a deceit even
[the second time]. I don't believe I actually—you
know how you can make yourself faint or suffer if you
decide to? I think I allowed myself a hysterical
reaction to it ... I sort of wanted it to be like
that. I had a self-despise about it.
There was also a very private side to Hilda's relig-
ious search, a wish for a direct, personal relationship with
Christ.
I wanted to love Christ as much as those people loved
Christ, but as my concept of him not theirs.
Hilda;
C . J. ;
Hilda
;
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—When I decided to become a Christian, because I
''^3,nted to be ’good,” I began having tentacles out to
this idea, feeling for the idea of Christ, trying to
him as the Godhead he apparently was to
other people.
didn't let anyone realize that I was bringing up
this vision of Christ, this was my own.
When Hilda was thirteen, she spent a summer with
Jacob's relatives in Minnesota. Two main events occurred in
this visit: She attended and was "saved” at a revival meeting;
and she developed her first crush on an older cousin, Phillip.
Both events served to stimulate her efforts at "bringing up the
vision of Christ." '
In reconstructing this period with Hilda, I devoted a
lot of attention to determining how exactly she "envisioned"
Christ—to questioning what m.ode of perception her tentacles
represented. I met with little success, or at least
contradictory results. Sometimes Hilda seemed to describe a
direct visual perception, at other times she was clear in
stating that what she experienced was mental imagery, or
fantasized contact with Christ. The following description of
"seeing" Christ contains both sides.
Hilda: I really did conjure up Christ in my thinking. I
conjured Him, I saw Him in the body. His flesh, every
night [that summer] ... I could almost see him up
here [waves in front of forehead]
.
C.J.: Almost? Was it like an hallucination, you were
really seeing something?
It was not like a miracle, a miraculous vision of
Christ, not like a dream with Christ appearing. No,
I decided I really wanted to see Christ and I could
see Him.
Hilda
:
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I could see His sorrow, and thought, 'Now how didChrist suffer when he was crucified?' and it seemedto me when I thought this I could see Him suffer
. .
.
[I used to v/onder] "how could they say thatbecause Christ was crucified, murdered, that He is
repaying the debt which we created, died for our
sins. How could this be true?" I did my best to
realize this and I just about did.
But I worked to do it, it was a deliberate attempt
. . . I was trying to realize Him, as a wonderful
Godhead
. . . Once I could see it, and feel it, and
conjure it and imagine it, with the singing and the
exhaustion of the audience, I really believed it
because I wanted to, I think.
C.J.: What did he look like?
Hilda: Oh, larger than life, and beautiful, as the paintings
and sculpture of him are ... In the flesh, white
fleshed, and you would see him with——his eyes were
opened, he wasn't dead.
C.J.: What was his posture?
Hilda: Sorrow and a sort of beseeching, and sometimes I
would see him with his arms out, and so on.
I gradually recognized that Hilda had no interest in
distinguishing between a vivid mental representation of Christ
and a visual perception. To draw too fine a line might take
away from the fact that, through whatever mode she
experienced it, her contact with Christ was real to her. It
was a contact which she deeply needed at the time.
Hilda: I had a great desire for love. I wanted to love
Christ and him to love roe and to love Phillip and
Phillip to love me.
C.J. : They were connected.
Hilda: Yes, very closely.
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It might seem paradoxical that these two interests
should be interconnected for Hilda, that her pursuit of an
other worldly relationship should intensify in the same moment
that she experiences a newly heightened interest in the world
of real people. But, given the requirements of Hilda's binding
loyalty to Emily, one interest balanced the other. Out of her
oedipal situation, Hilda had grown to experience her desire to
be united with a man as a dangerous foreign influence
—
part of
the "dragon" which lurked in all of her future heterosexual
relationships. To actualize her desire would be a form of
betrayal so deep as 'to stretch the imagination. It would
endanger her vital grounding in the interpersonal world. In
order to preserve these ties, Hilda needed to redirect her
desire toward a relationship which required an equal stretch of
the imagination in the opposite direction, that is, only by
fantasizing a relationship on an incomprehensible level of
merit could Hilda balance the ruinous debt which she was
incurring in her desire for Phillip. The search which had
started as a conscious effort to please her mother—and was so
public that James saw it immediately—had by now become deeply
private and unconsciously motivated, but remained embedded in
Hilda's relationship with Emily.
On the Verge of Sexual Intimacy
Diana Beale and the Presbyterian girls .
Hilda's first involvement with a cohesive peer group
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occurred with what she calls "the Presbyterian girls," a clique
of young women whom she met through her church. The group
centered around Diana Beale and her lover, Rachel. One
i^^ication of the lasting significance of her involvement with
the Presbyterian girls is that Hilda keeps a photo album of
them in her small collection of memorabilia. Two large studio
portraits of Diana——an attractive woman with an imposing,
military bearing—and Rachel occupy facing pages, -and a half
dozen smaller portraits of stylishly dressed women fill out the
remainder.
Things get sort of . . . ah . . . complicated.
Complicated, you see, because a lot of it had to do
with the fact that I was falling for these women.
Diana—and there was a Justine D'Ascoin who was a
contralto who sang for us in church. She trained me
in voice and she was a marvelous singer. And she was
great, beautiful, woman, you know. And I would be
able to feast my mind and eyes on these women. I
more or less felt that was not the way it should be,
and yet I was enjoying it, plenty . They're very
attractive to me, those two women— [musingly] I don't
know that I can remember any more.
Hilda does not speak easily about her relationship
with these women, partly for fear of being misunderstood, and
partly because she does not fully understand it herself. Her
memories of Diana Beale, in particular, intermix feelings of
sexual attraction, awe, concern, friendship, danger, and loss
of control.
C.J.: That's one thing I haven't been clear on, how sexual
was your attraction to Diana Beale?
Hilda: Yah . . . well, she is a very handsome woman. She
had a beautiful voice. She drove her uncle |s car
—
he was a doctor. And I am sure she was addicted to
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some drug. Because so much of the time she seemed to
be in a peculiar frame of consciousness. I was so
sure she was under the influence of drugs
. . .
Sometimes I would go down to her uncle's office after
choir practice—he lived downtown in lower Hudson, a
poor section of town—and I would think that her car
was down there and I would have kind of an ESP sense
of the fact that she would be there in his office.
It was a very dark hallway
. . . and I would climb
this dark hall, stairway, and stand outside of his
apartment, which was a poor, poor spot. I would
listen at the door, listen and listen and hear her
groaning and groaning, and then his voice and then
groaning and groaning. And sometimes I would stand
there, it would seem to me about an hour, and I would
think, 'well she's in no condition to drive her car.'
And then she would come out of his apartment and she
would be half conscious, as if she were drunk. And
she would say, "well, little brother"— she called me
"little brother" and I called her "big brother"— "can
you steer if I determine the amount of gas?" And I
would steer her all the way up town . . . then walk
home, which was about another mile or two. And this
went on often.
C.J.: Were you frightened, by the . . . ah
—
Hilda
:
Well I thought [lowers her voice] I thought he was
abusing her. I could picture him sexually abusing
her—and I think probably he did have some kind of a
. . .
ugh ... of a feeling of terribly deep love
for her, as a woman and he a man. But he was—he
looked like the kind of person that you would
picture—who was the person who controlled Trilby? I
thought of Trilby and—don't you know? Trilby was
that great, beautiful woman who was controlled
through hypnosis ... He was a Jewish person, with a
long mean face . . .
But I would see her to her own home . . . she had her
own rooms and own bath. And she would say, "Little
brother, can you come up and read poetry to me or
stay with me a while?"
knd she would be lying on the bed—beautiful, white
pulsing flesh, it seemed— it always seemed to me I
could just imagine it, this pulsing . Because she was
so beautiful, had such a lovely fragrance—well now^^
that fragrance might have been the addiction, but she
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did smoke
,
too, and I hadn't known many women whodid, and she had a lovely fragrance of tobacco, too.
I would say, "Are you in pain?” and I would kneelbeside her. I would touch her.
And she would say, "Well, may I kiss you?”
And I said, "You don't want to kiss me.”
"Yes I do," she said, "I'll pretend you're Rachel."
And she would give me this great big beautiful, full,
lovely
,
lip— soft lovely, beautiful kiss . . .
I would think, "Oh, Rachel, aren't you lucky? To
have that mouth kiss as much—kiss you as much as you
want .
"
That's as much as it amounted to.
Hilda communicates the impact of her experience of
Diana in the way she recounts her story. Between the brackets
of "Yah ..." and "That's as much as it amounted to," her
voice rises and falls abruptly; she becomes momentarily
exultant in describing her attraction to Diana, and hushed and
abstracted' in musing over the sinister connection between Diana
and her uncle. The picture of the "little brother" Hilda
straining to control the steering wheel, while an intoxicated
"big brother" Diana "determines the gas," comes across clearly.
Ranking it after her crush on Phillip, Hilda refers
to her infatuation with Diana Beale as "my second powerful
sexual experience." It was the first to involve mutual
engagement and physical contact. The question of why Hilda
chose a woman as the object of her first active infatuation can
be approached through a number of lines. Hilda opens several:
Ill
C.J.: Did you ever have any period of
—
you were considered
rebellious, but those aren't really actively
rebellious things, not doing something
—
Hilda: Any really outstanding rebellion you mean?
Well I think I was very rebellious when I fell in
love with this Diana Beale . . . deliberately falling
in love with a woman . .
.
[But my parents] took it
as part of becoming an adult—they were wrong there.
I think I could have gone on enjoying that kind of
personable relationship, that is, admiring and
adoring and loving and watching and thinking
—
you
see, a woman doesn't think exactly as a man— I know
this. -When two women love one another they can see
each other better than when a man and a woman love
one another . . .
I really think that men have different kinds of
minds. I admire them more, always have. But on the
other hand it is easier to understand and love and be
close to a woman.
In addition to experiencing her attraction to a woman
as rebellious, Hilda remembers considering it as evidence of "a
serious maladjustment" at the time. This combination of
rebellion and morbid self image is the hallmark of Erikson's
(1959, p. 141) "negative identity": "an identity perversely
based on all those identifications and roles which . . . had
been presented to the individual as most undesirable and
dangerous, and yet also as most real." Hilda's flirtation with
lesbianism was, on one level, a natural extension of being a
^ continually bad person in the home." The fact that she made
1 little effort to hide her sexual attraction to Diana, and
seems
i
I
instead to have gone out of her way to confront her parents
1
with it, supports this interpretation. In contrast to what
! became a very private infatuation with her images of Christ,
1
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Hilda presented her relationship with Diana as part of her
public self. She used it as a way to maintain her continuity
in the family, to remain real at home while she was actualizing
a life in the outside world.
Hilda's comments on women being more comprehensible,
more accessible as love objects, introduces a second line of
explanation. She had been bitterly disappointed by Jacob, who,
on any number of critical occasions, had taken Emily's side
against her. Moreover, the picture which she had developed of
her parents sexual relationship— "for his pleasure and nobody
else's"—was most unattractive. These reasons for turning away
from men may have had an additional message to Jacob similar to
what Freud (1920, p. 217) reads in the homosexuality of a young
female patient: "Since you have betrayed me, you have to put
up with my betraying you."
Another line of explanation begins with the
recognition that Hilda's sexual choice was a move in relation
to Emily as well as Jacob. Freud (1920, pp. 214-216) offers
two additional interpretations of his patient's homosexuality
which have clear relevance to Hilda and Emily: "retiring in
favor of the mother," i.e., avoiding rivalry with her by
renouncing men; and "a yearning from the beginning for a kinder
mother" which can lead to a "search for a substitute to v/hom
she could become passionately attached."
Each of these interpretations can be understood as an
aspect of the loyalty bonds which Hilda solidified in her
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oedipal situation. In other words, the particular negative
identity which Hilda was experimenting with was a vehicle for
expressing anger at her parents, a strategy for seeking
alternate sources of satisfaction, and above all, a way to
remain true to Emily in relation to Jacob.
To put Hilda's adolescent sexual strivings in the
context of her relational needs is not a way to deny her
burgeoning sexuality. What this perspective does deny is the
idea that the sexual yearnings which become so strong in this
stage are in some way separate from the adolescent person,
forces which come from somewhere outside of Hilda and drove her
to act in certain ways. Viewing Hilda's sexual urges in the
context of her family relationships, in fact, helps to clarify,
rather than obscure, the specific pleasures which she found in
Diana Beale.
All of the pleasures which Hilda describes enjoying
in the "kind of relationship" which she had with Diana Beale
—
"admiring and adoring and loving and watching and thinking"
—
are the pleasures of a passive participant, an observer. The
first thing which Hilda describes when I ask her how sexual her
attraction was is her observational position: standing outside
the door listening to Diana and her uncle—a striking
repetition of the childhood scene at the door of her parents
bedroom. In order to understand the pleasurable aspect of
to consider two factors: thethis scene, it is necessary
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iinpact of dissociation and th© ssxual quality of Hilda and
Emily ' s relationship
.
Because a person who relies heavily on dissociation
tends to experience their own most dangerous impulses as "not-
me," the world becomes, as Hilda puts it, "full of awful
things." One tends also to see others as engaging in deeply
illicit satisfaction of one's own dissociated urges. As noted
in the last chapter, there was a pervasive quality of
sado-masochism in Emily and Hilda's relationship. Sadism and
masochism are not specific instincts or sex drives, but ways of
relating, modes of integrating sexuality into a relationship.
They were a significant aspect of the self-other configuration
which Hilda knew as intimacy. The important point here is that
they were an aspect particularly prone to dissociation. Hilda
and Emily both had a strong investment in viewing Emily's
hurtful use of intimacy as inadvertent—Hilda attributes
sadistic pleasure to the antagonistic other only in her later
relationships with women in authority. Although Hilda can now
recognize she sometim.es finds similar pleasure in exploiting
intimate knowledge— "it's exciting to see people cringe"—at
the time, she needed to picture a third party experiencing deep
sexual pleasure in abusing, dominating, and enslaving the
object of her love.
The scene which Hilda envisioned between Diana and
her uncle differs from the original scene behind her parents'
276
door in two important respects. First, in contrast to the
situation with Jacob, Hilda's fantasies were not constrained by
any loyalty to Diana's uncle. He was a stranger, not part of
Hilda's "us"—and his "them-ness" was accentuated by his "long
mean Jewish face." Hilda's fantasies o-f sexual abuse and
exploitive bondage could take on a more full-blown expression
to encompass the intensified yearnings of an adolescent.
Second, Hilda moved toward a more active participation in this
repetition of her parents' bedroom scene. The "ESP sense"
which led Hilda to wait outside Diana's uncle's office was a
rescue fantasy of the sort which Freud (1920) notes as comm.on
in early heterosexual as well as homosexual infatuations.
Hilda was stepping in to deliver her love from the abusive
impulses which took on such strength when she pictured them as
part of the uncle's "deep love."
There is a second, more tender side to the feelings
of love which Hilda attached to Diana. Hilda's description of
her experience of actual closeness with Diana—the fragrances,
pulsing flesh, and the "lip—soft lovely beautiful kiss -—are by
far her most rhapsodic descriptions of physical attraction.
The only near approximation is the wonderful "glowing thing"
which she experienced in Teressa. The fact that these
passionate feelings focus on women can also be connected with
Hilda's early relationship with Emily, but the connection
requires a somewhat more speculative leap. Schactel (1948)
points out that odors are often the most strongly evocative
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aspect of a long forgotten scene. He explains this observation
reasoning that an infant's sensual experience of the world
is heavily olfactory
. Oral satisfactions and experiencing the
mother as a source of light (Mahler, 1975) are also
characteristic pleasures of infancy.
Guntrip (1971, p. 152) defines the private self which
remains after a public "false self" is established as: "the
regressed ego, a part of the infantile libidinal ego . .
.
put
into cold storage with a secret hope of rebirth." He refers to
the "tiny naked baby" in one of his patient's dreams as the
perfect image of this dissociated "secret self." In relational
terms, this "inner self" can be regarded as an infantile mode
of attachment or "need template" which has been split off from,
and therefore not transmuted by, ongoing participation in the
world. The possibility of intimacy v/ith a woman may have
revitalized Hilda's hopes of finding a matching context for her
true self—an interpretation which would account for the
intensity, and the particular qualities of emotion which her
female love objects aroused in her.
Approaching heterosexual intimacy .
Hilda's transition from women to men is an event
passed over in our reconstruction of her history. The picture
which emerges from the interviews is that one moment she was
engrossed in "feasting her eyes and mind" on women then,
following a brief interlude of awkv/ard dating, was suddenly
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engaged to be married. It is as if she had followed a course
which had been determined with little question of choice on her
part. She is only remotely in touch with being attracted to
Richard, her eventual husband, and the few instances in which
she recalls these feelings are extreme situations: at his
deathbed and during a reunion of Teressa, Richard, and Hilda
after years of separation. In the latter case, the feelings
were triggered by Teressa embracing Richard and saying, "You
always were such a handsome person.”
C, J. : You still felt possessive of Richard, back then, a
few years ago?
Hilda: Well, you see, here is what would happen with
Richard, in certain situations: I could see
ourselves as these high school kids
,
you see.
Because Teressa, Richard, and I all went to high
school at the same time, went with the same group.
So it kind of went, kind of resulted again; it was
sort of reborn, that sort of a . . . high school
frenzy , . , of . . . . whatever it was that first
excited me with Richard.
What does stand out in Hilda's memory of this period
is her interaction with her parents. She has strong feelings
about how they "coped with the problem of dating" and
sexuality. Almost all of her descriptions show an unresolved
mixture of feelings: she expresses anger over her parents'
failure to guide her in this stage and criticizes their nar-
row views
,
while at the same showing a sympathetic appreciation
for their position and expressing some of the same views her-
self.
C.J.: It sounds . . . between the lines, like you had a
sense that [your mother] could be embarrassing.
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Hilda: Well she was embarrassing in that she didn't agree
that there was such a thing as ... a relationship
between the sexes that was important—and she didn't
expect it to happen, excepting in a very conventional
way: meet a boy, kiss a boy, be engaged, get
married, and the father and the mother approve of the
arrangement, and so forth. That was it. That was
all it amounted to
. . .
As far as dating was concerned, one didn't start
dating until way along in those days
. . . high-
school. Now—and there '
s
where we fell short—where
mother fell short, in bringing us up.
C.J.: How do you mean?
Hilda: Well she never encouraged dating, and she never
arranged that we would have a social life with boys,
in our home—and she had five girls, you know. And
she never arranged that the boys would meet girls.
For instance, when James and that one girl, ah . . .
Eileen O' Donovan, out of Massachusetts, that he
wanted to marry—a lovely little girl—because she is
a Catholic: ' thumbs down '
,
you know. And that's the
thing that broke Jim's spirit, as far as a happy
relationship with the female is concerned . . . And
that '
s
where mother and father fell very short . . .
But I ... I don't think it was necessarily their
fault . I believe that they didn't understand the
importance of life in that—from that angle.
Father was working at it a little bit, you know,
reading Freud and thinking that was a nasty,
perverted, ah . . . thing.
Mother, meanwhile, thought that all of the sexual
life was really the motherhood of it, I guess. That
was as much as her energy could cope with . . . there
was so much expected of people in those days, in one
day's stand.
Although Hilda feels strongly that her parents, par-
ticularly Emily, let her down in this area, it is not immed-
iately clear what she needed from them. The points which she
identifies in the preceding excerpt— sex education and
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3.TT 3.n<j i.n<j contact in th© hoin©—
—ar© th© v©ry things which Hilda
describes as objectionable in the following passage.
C.J.
:
A while ago, you were talking about your mother and
her attitudes about dating. Did your mother and you
6ver talk about sex, did she ever explain——
Hilda: No, she never explained anything to me about sex
until after I became engaged
. . . And anyway, her
way of explaining it was, you know [somber voice]
,
"I
have to tell you, Hilda, that there is one responsi-
bility the wife has for"
—
I said, "Listen, mother, please don't say another
wordl I know what you're going to say and I don't
want to hear it!"
"Well!" she said—and she was really quite taken
aback, you know, she turned red as fire . . .
"I know," I said— I knew what she was going to say.
But I said , . , Augh, "why are you telling me this?
I should think you would allow me to find this out
some other way!"—This was my feeling, that she
shouldn't have told me.
C.J, : She shouldn't have?
Hilda: No. Because she didn't know anything about it her-
self; and I could see it. i^nd I said, "I hope," now
I said, "I hope that this— if this is the case, if
this is 'woman's duty,' as you call it, that it
happens no more than once a year." Because I had
that already straight in my mind . . .
C . J. : So it seemed something very unpleasant?
Hilda
:
Totally. Painful, difficult—very bad.
And I agreed that it probably was, from her— in fact
my own experience was not too good up to that point
you know. And I believed that it was probably one of
the most sorrowful points about marriage, the fact
that that was expected of one.
But I did believe, then, that I cared enough for
Richard, that in spite of that I would go along with
the idea of marriage.
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now when Richard and I dated, he came all the wavfrom Mount Marion, which is eight miles out of
Hudson. He'd come in by bicycle
. . . And mother
would sit with us, darning socks, in the living room,
while he and I had a bit a reparte' until ten
o'clock. Then she'd say, 'Now Richard, it's bed
time. You must go and Hilda has to go to bed'—That
was my dating with Richard. Mind you!
C.J.: And that was at your mother's insistence?
Hilda: Mmgh? Yes. That was mother's way of coping with the
problem of . . . having a date.
Hilda, in short, experienced Emily as at once too
disengaged— "that's where she fell short"—and overly intrusive
in this stage of her development— "I should think you would
allow me to find this out some other way." This contradiction
resolves itself when you consider that what Hilda needed in
this transition was not really specific advice or matchmaking
but permission to step away from the family, Emily's blessing
for Hilda to move forward with a man. I arrived at this under-
standing through a roundabout process. One of Hilda's most
vivid memories from this period concerns the dress she chose
for high school graduation—the first time she was allowed to
deviate from the color scheme which Emily chose for each child.
I was initially struck by the elaborate attention which Hilda
devoted to describing her dress, but puzzled by its
significance. Much later, I realized that this choice of dress
was Hilda's first opportunity to shape her own boundary in the
concrete domain of physical appearance. Like a bird which
changes it plummage at sexual maturity, she would need some
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assurance that she was still recognized by the flock. Hilda
never received such assurance.
When I asked Hilda what breaking away from her
niother s uniform meant between Emily and herself
^
she addressed
the question at first on a concrete level, going into detail on
Emily's exacting standards in dress, particularly with respect
to modesty.
C.J.: Was that the style then, or was that part. of your
mother?
Hilda: I think my mother decided that . . . there should be
no sign of a figure. You should be something, either
corsetted or contained ... Of course many women
were in that hang up about the effect of their body.
Their bodies had to be in total control so that they
never walked, you know, feeling yourself swing at the
hip—that was totally wrong, because you were trying
to be attractive to the opposite sex. Mother was
very much in that nature: never do anything to be
attractive to the opposite sex.
C.J.: That must have made it very hard when you were a
teenager, when that's really on your mind.
Hilda: Well, I don't think that it was on my mind. I don't
think I had allowed it to enter. I don't think it
had developed. In fact, I think that was one of the
downfalls of my marriage. I had no idea that females
could be so attractive— I had never developed it in
myself . . . Mother really queered us in that way
. . .
[one of my sisters] is still in that awful bind
of behavior. Some people hold it forever.
On the verge of leaving for college, Hilda became en-
gaged to Richard. Hilda's childhood "pact" with Teressa, al-
r0ad.y stained by her infatuation with Diana Beale and the
Presbyterian girls, was at this point fully broken:
And when I told her about Richard she said,
he is so handsome—and then I've lost you!"
"Oh, but
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sure Teressa had already broken from my
loyalty— "the only one and one relationship"
—and
Carlo [her husband to be] was probably in the picture
already.
—It broke us, broke us apart—totally. I mean our
childhood was over then.
College and an Initial Breakdown
Like her dating and engagement to Richard, Hilda
presents her college experience as something which happened to
her. James chose the university, Berkely, "because he decided
it was cheap and wanted me to go to a radical school." Jacob
chose Hilda's specialization, dietetics, for reasons never
entirely clear to her.
Hilda does not describe having strong feelings—one
way or the other—about moving so far away from home, but she
begins the following account of her college experience in
response to my question on whether or not Jacob came through in
times of crisis.
Hilda: Well, I don't think we very often presented him with
our crises . . . When I asked him if I might go to
college out in California because Jim decided that
was a good school to go to, he said, "All right"—but
he wanted to decide what courses I would take. He
decided I was to be a dietician—which heaven forbid,
I didn't care to be—but inasmuch as he was willing
to pay my way, I said, "okay. I'll take the courses."
He said, "You know, you love to cook. You can be a
dietician."
C.J.: Why did he pick dietician when you didn't want to do
it?
Hilda: You've got me ... I guess he thought I was smart
enough to cope with the science—and matter of fact,
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I did pass all the science courses—But you know youhave nothing but science
, all of the 'ologies that
there are, almost. And you never see a cookbook
. . . until you've been there five or six years
I'm just as glad I didn't.
I filled up all of my terms with—all the
. . .
English I could, you know, and poetry—and decided I
liked writing
. . . That's what I really wanted, the
^ost. I don't really know what I would have become,
had I become anything ... I wasn't serious about
it, I guess.
Hilda is oddly self-deprecating in her last
comment— "had I become anything." Actually, she had success in
several careers: she was published twice and supported her
family for a period with her writing; she taught at and had a
hand in running a, progressive school; and she rose to a
position of responsibility, and was certified as an L.P.N.
through her hospital work. Even in college, one of her
professors recognized her potential as a writer and encouraged
her to take her work seriously. Rather than an objective
assessment, her comment reflects two factors which shape
Hilda's sense of her own competence in the world: the all-or-
none definition of "making the grade" which Hilda acquired from
her family—and the role of dietician would seem to fall short
of the requirements for being a "Somebody" in the first
place— ; and Hilda's feeling that, like Emily, she has never
learned "to cope with the realist's idea of the situation,"
that is, that there is some standard of legitimate participa-
tion in the world which she and her mother never mastered.
Hilda's college career, which was aborted by a "very serious
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tailspin of a nervous breakdown," confirmed both sides of this
negative view of her competence.
The main event in her breakdown was an attack of un-
controlled screaming, identical to a later experience which she
underwent -shortly after her mother's death.
In college when it happened, it lasted about, oh
. . .
over an hour. That was when I was initiated
[to a sorority], the first time I screamed. And then
the next day I went to the library [mumbles] ... I
was telling a very close friend of mine about the
initiation, and I suddenly had this smothering
sensation again—they always started with that
horrible smothering sensation. And I threw myself
back—right there in the library, you know, in the
university and I began to scream
,
you know, then .
And I was carried out, and, ah . . . screamed and
screamed—and my eyes were shut during this; I
wouldn't be able to open my eyes.
C.J.: Do you remember what you thought about, what would be
going through your mind?
Hilda: Just that I wanted to— I wanted to empty everything I
had in me. I just wanted to close my eyes and scream
. . .
until all of me was gone . . . And I almost
felt as if that were happening.
C.J.: As if?
Hilda: As if all of me, my personality, my self , were gone
—
were forgotten.
The initiation which brought on her screaming was a
hazing ritual in which the members of the sorority paraded
Hilda, clad in a bathing suit, past the men's fraternity
houses. Hilda experienced the men's attention as intensely
humiliating. What Hilda felt she was being initiated into,
however, was equally disturbing. Hilda, with the help of the
doctor who attended her through this period, traced her break-
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down to her fears of being pulled into the "very full lesbian
expression" which she perceived in her sorority house.
Then when I was in college, of course, there were a
great many girls, it just was taken as a matter of
course . . . that you found a mate, slept with a
mate, and went ahead having, really, a sexual ex-
perience with a mate in college—which I did not do.
I was dead set against it then. And I guess that I
told her—the doctor— I told the doctor this was a
problem for me, about having had an experience with
Diana—a mental, emotional experience with Diana
—
And I was terribly afraid that these women in college
were going to insist . In fact, I woke up once or
twice with some of them more or less attacking me,
you know, and "God! I can't do this and study," you
know. And I was engaged to Richard anyway.
And that's when [Dr. Robin] said to me, "How much
have you had to do with men? You should really begin
having relations with men, in some way"—And I
thought that was a very peculiar diagnosis. But
still I should have
—
probably she was very right, you
see. She was ahead of herself, in that day.
And I said, "How do you go about that?"—because I
could see no way of going about that— it didn't come
to my mind how to go about it, you see.
The doctor who attended Hilda, Anne Robin, took her
into her own home for several weeks, where she offered Hilda a
treatment of silence and solitaire.
Hilda: Dr. Anne Robin . . . allowed me not to speak for the
entire visit . . . she would order me about setting
the table and gave a ... a job of learning to play
solitaire ... I was to occupy myself in this
continually, which I did—Everything she told me to
do I did. It was almost as though I had been hypno-
tized by her. And so
—
C.J.: Was that helpful?
Hilda: Well I can't say, one way or the other . . .
Finally, after two or three weeks, she said, "Now
today you can get in your college clothes and walk
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campus, and then go to the class that vou
would be attending at this hour.”
And I knew that it would take about a half hour walk
over to Berkely, to the University, and the class was
chemistry » And it was an enormous room, with
thousands in it. And I remembered my seat—
I
myself in this way
,
that I had found my
seat, thought of my seat. But, when I saw these
thousands of students, I began screaming again. But
instead of fainting or falling
,
I ran to the
infirmary and beat on the door—or the windows, they
were shut at the moment—and said that I had to come
in I was having a nervous breakdown. And I was put
to bed there.
Hilda recovered quickly from this third incident to
finish out the remainder of her term at Berkely and return
home
.
Understanding Hilda's crisis
.
Hilda's emotional "tailspin” fits the classic pattern
of a homosexual panic. But the standard psychoanalytic inter-
pretation—that Hilda was defending herself against her own
impulses by projecting them onto, and then fleeing from, the
objects of her desire—sheds light on only one aspect of
Hilda's crisis, leaving others, such as her feelings of intense
shame, the "horrible smothering sensation," and her anxiety in
the classroom, obscure. These latter aspects of her college
crisis all become comprehensible when put in the context of
Hilda's broader relational needs at this stage.
Bios (1979) regards adolescence as the "second indi-
viduation stage" in development. Erikson (1959) , who refers to
adolescence as the stage of "identity versus identity
288
diffusion/' points out that successful passage through this
stage requires a renegotiation of oedipal conflicts. Hilda, it
may be recalled, entered her oedipal situation before she and
Emily had- achieved a successful resolution to her first stage
of individuation, and, in particular, the negativism entailed
in this stage. The normal pushing away and coming together
which occurs in this period remained, for Hilda, abnormally
fraught with separation anxiety and the risks of shame.
Hilda's flirtation with homosexuality, in addition to being a
way to forestall a renegotiation of her oedipal situation, was
a recapitulation of her first stage of negativism. Because her
call for a counter response from her parents fell on deaf ears,
Hilda took matters into her own hands, turning abruptly from
her experiment with a negative* identity into a premia ture
commitment to heterosexual intimacy—accepting engagem.ent with
Richard, as she puts it, on the basis of "a few dates and a
goodbye kiss."
College presented a second opportunity for
individuation. Assuming that Hilda had a hand in choosing
Berkely, she attempted to take maximum advantage of this
opportunity, separating herself from her family by the width of
a continent. Although Hilda does not recall her feelings about
the move itself, it is reasonable to assume that they were
highly ambivalent. On the one hand, she was for the first time
escaping the continual "sameness" of home and, on the other
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hand, sh© was ©ntsiring an altogsthsr n©w lev©l of ©xposure to
separation anxiety and the attendant risks of shame.
Once at college, Hilda sought membership in a
sorority, following what Erikson (1959, p. 154) calls "a
universal trend [in adolescence] tov/ard some form of uniformity
through which incomplete self-certainty can hide, for a time,
in group certainty.” The ritual shaming which is frequently a
requirement. for admission into such group certainty was over-
whelming to Hilda. It actualized her worst fears of being ex-
posed in the world—an experience which Erikson compares to
that of a naked child standing in the judgmental gaze of much
larger adults. Being paraded semi-naked past the fraternity
houses was an experience of excruciating self-consciousness for
Hilda. Perceiving her most private aspects of self as cast
suddenly in a hostile spotlight, she attempted to eliminate
self-consciousness—to force her eyes shut and scream "until
all of me was gone."
A "horrible smothering sensation," rather the fear of
attack, is what stands out in Hilda's memory of anxieties of
this period. In order to understand this sensation, it is
helpful to look back at two similar experiences which Hilda
describes; "suffocation in the family atmosphere," and her
recurrent dream of being engulfed by a "libido thing. Her
feelings of suffocation in the family center on the experience
of a rigidly static self-other complementarity, the feeling
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that her own existence is defined by her state of relationship
to the family:
When I was with them I would sort of ^ them, seethem , . . and be them because of what they were
. . . I wouldn't exchange, I would sort of ^ there,be in this environment.
Hilda's dreams of her "libido thing" also describe a
state of self being forced into a matching context of Other,
but at a more sensual, viceral level of experience. In addi-
tion, it sounds very close to her recollection of waking up
with her dorm mates "more or less attacking" her:
I was trying to remember the terrific sexual dream I
had [recently] . You know, this libido thing ... I
would sometimes wake up with it when I was insane.
With this creature on top of me, I called it my
libido
.
It v;as really attacking me sexually, and I was
attacking it sexually . . . this libido situation
C.J.: Is it a pleasant dream?
Hilda: Enjoyment? I don't know, it just has to do with a
real sexual expression.
C.J.: Is it frightening?
Hilda: I wouldn't say it was—it's not the best and not the
worst, but sexual, totally.
C.J.: You describe it as an attack going on.
Hilda: Yah, that happens ... I alv/ays think of a relation-
ship—in life or your imagination or whatever—that
it's your ego seeking an alter-ego, you see——this I
firmly believe. This [libido] was an alter-ego
that's searching for me, as much as I was searching
for it.
Does the figure ever remind you of anybody in parti-
cular?
C. J.
:
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No, it's kind of a peculiar membraneous thing, sort
of gelatinous. But it has a suffocating quality to
It, and it has a definite fragrance
. . . I think ofit as death and funerals and things like that, thatkind of a fragrance of a corpse ...
And sometimes I have a shot that goes right up the
center of my body, that kind of a sexy thing that
women, I suppose, get when they are excited sexually
• • •
It sounds like a very consuming dream.
Well sometimes I think, "Well boy now, was that
satisfactory?"—I'll say when I wake up [laughs],
"Would you sell your birthright for that?" I'd say
to myself, "No, I don't think so."
College, and especially sorority life, presented
Hilda with an opportunity to find a matching context for the
self which she had never been able to express at home. Her
relationship with Diana Beale had made her recently aware of
the strongly sensual aspect of her search for an "alter-ego";
she was newly sensitive to the sexual nature of the unmet
relational needs which she held as part of her private self.
To say that she projected these needs onto her dorm mates is
accurate, but covers only part of the picture. As Freud (1922,
p. 236) points out, people do not "project into the sky."
They, instead, "displace to the unconscious minds of others the
attention which they have withdrawn from their own." Hilda's
heightened awareness of her own needs for attachment and
intimacy made her acutely aware of the search for "mates" which
was going on all around her— it led her to focus on the
centripedal force between people, but as if under a microscope.
Whether or not Hilda was accurate in perceiving a homosexual
Hilda:
C . i7 . :
Hilda
:
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undercurrent in the attraction between her dorm mates is ir-
relevant to the main point, which is that Hilda was unable to
experience herself as an active party in the search for
intimacy. To do so would have been to sacrifice her "birth
right," that is, had Hilda expressed the relational needs which
she kept so carefully hidden within her family, she would have
violated the binding loyalties which grounded her in the inter-
personal world and acted as a "counter-autonomous superego."
Because it would be dangerous to acknowledge her own yearning
for intimacy, Hilda was forced to experience interpersonal
attraction as pursuit—as if she were a stationary piece of
iron with magnets moving toward it from all directions. While
the relationships differed markedly from those of her family,
Hilda's experience of being coercively defined by her
environment, and the accompanying sensation of suffocation,
were the same.
The role of counter-autonom.ous anxiety is clear in
Hilda's third incident of screaming. VJhen she entered the
chemistry classroom, she was struck by the "thousands" of
students. She was also surprised at finding her own seat, that
"the thought of my seat" could even enter her mind. Rather
than giving her comfort, recognition that she had a place in
such a vast world of strangers appears to be what triggered her
anxiety reaction. Her schema of self could not accommodate the
experience of being at home among strangers. As Hilda defined
her loyalties within the family, there was no freedom to be
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one-and-different~to be part of ''them'' would mean sacrificing
her identity as one of "us." Hilda's sudden recognition of her
place in the context of the classroom thus aroused the anxiety
of separation. Hilda responded by attempting "to empty"
herself of the offending awareness.
Hilda's third anxiety attack differed from the pre-
ceding two in that she had a bridge between the isolation of
autonomy and the security of enmeshment in the person of Dr.
Robin. "Instead of fainting or falling" she was able to take
action and run for the infirmary. Although her advice about
men had mystified Hilda, Dr. Robin had been able to provide
exactly what Hilda needed to control her anxiety at the time;
a maternal authority figure who could limit her self-
expression— "allow me not to talk"—and impose the rigid
structure for Hilda to relate, "as if hypnotized," through a
false self on a conformity basis.
Finally, viewed at the level of the family system,
Hilda's nascent autonomy and success as a student threatened to
disqualify her from the role of scapegoat. Hilda's loyal
return to the role, through her breakdown, was met with an
immediate gesture of reinduction. Rather than seeing her as
distressed or in need of help, Hilda remembers her father as
quick to define her breakdown as a form of misbehavior, a
mental misdemeanor which reinforced her debt to the family.
My father was totally uninterested in it. He said it
was a deliberate attempt at calling attention to
myself, and he refused to pay the [requested
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charitable contribution]—Well he sent twenty— fivedollars, I think, to Dr. Anne Robin.
A moritorium in the family
.
Hilda returned home to spend one of the happiest six
months of her life. She enrolled in Columbia Teachers College
and moved into an apartment in Greenwich Village with James and
their father. Hilda was responsible for preparing meals and
managing the household budget, a task with which James both
aided and hindered her:
He used to say, "Now you have to learn to live, no
matter what situation you find yourself in—I'm going
to bring you to New York, and show you how you can
buy furniture, furnish a flat, cook, on a very little
bit of money, and find the most beautiful and
interesting things in New York." And he said, "I'll
show you how that can be done—and you can do it
anywhere in the world if you decide to."
And so, when we went to New York, sure enough, father
gave me fifteen dollars a week to run the apartment
we lived in. And Jim would say, "we don't need that
much. I'll take seven and a half, and you may have
seven and a half. I need seven and a half for
spending money" . . . so on seven and a half dollars,
I fed the three of us.
Hilda was pleased with the opportunity to enter
partially into James' world, and she dates much of the advice
and outlook which she adopted from him to this period. Their
apartment became a meeting place for a circle of "advanced
thinkers," including several literary figures and social advo-
cates prominent at the time. Hilda fondly remembers evenings
of dancing, drinking tea from a samovar, and passing time among
exciting company.
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She and Richard maintained a regular correspondence
which they had started while Hilda was at Berkely. He would
make the long trip from his college in upstate New York to
spend occasional weekends with her. Jacob often subsidized his
fare
.
The high point in this respite from Hilda's gradually
mounting crises of adulthood occurred when she engineered an
elopement between Teressa and her lover Carlo
—
perhaps the only
instance of Hilda becoming triangled into a relationship with a
happy conclusion.
Because Carlo, as an artist and an Italian, was
unacceptable to Teressa 's family, they had been carrying on a
secret affair. Hilda, initially shocked, felt compelled to act
in their behalf. She approached Emily:
And mother said, "Now calm down. I'll show you how
we'll cope with this."
She said, "I'll have him over here," and she invited
Carlo for the weekend, to our home. Because she felt
she would investigate Carlo herself.
She "blurted out the fact" to Teressa 's father at an
inopportune moment:
So he was furious at both of us. And he took Teressa
under his wing, had her in the apartment in New York
City, and did not even allow her any social life at
all.
And Hilda became directly involved:
By the time I got to New York, I decided I would have
to find out what was going on, because Carlo was
visiting me ... and he said, "I'm going to either
kill [Teresa's father] or kill myself—I'm an
Italian, you know, this can't go onl She's my
sweetheart and I must have her .
"
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And I was frightened— I believed him.
Hilda and Carlo went to Teressa's home, where Hilda
convinced her aunts to allow her out for a moment,
Hilda: And we got into a cab and rode all over New York
City. And he tried to make her promise she would
marry him, and she would say, "Yes! No! Yes, no, no
If
• • •
C.J. : And you were
—
Hilda: I was there
—
yes— "And like I say, you love him and
he loves you—Now what does that mean? That means
you should be married."
So finally she agreed, and he took us to an Italian
restaurant, way down in the village. And we had a
wonderful meal and he bought red roses for both of
us, and he said, "Now we must get married tonight!"
So we went to the editor of The Mentor
,
Guy Jones
. . . Guy answered the door—he's a very charming
person, he liked my writing—that's why he's
charming!—So he opened the door and said, "What's
this Carlo?"
Carlo said, "I'm getting married?"
Guy said "To which one?" [laughs] — I was very pleased
that he said that—although I wouldn't have wanted
marriage—but I had a very soft spot in my heart for
him.
Hilda, Teressa, and Carlo spent the night with their friend and
arranged a wedding the following day.
And when I finally came back to the apartment, Jim
was there. He said, "Where have you been?"
I said, "Why?"
He said, "Father's been telephoning the police and
Teressa's father's been telephoning the police—we
want to know where you've been!"
"Oh," I said, "I eloped with Teressa."
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Marriage.
I will say that I lost my memories of Richard, and
all of that, when I went insane. That part of mv
life I lost—was lost.
But you regained it?
Some of it I began to regain, yah. But if I try to
remember Richard, it's a very difficult thing. I
sometimes can remember him in [our sons] Carroll or
Harry, or sometimes those photographs I have of him
. . .
make me remember him . . .a little.
I told you, told you at the last time— looking at him
while he was dying, I could remember him.
But the memory isn't exactly intimate . It isn't even
as intimate as my relationship, say, with Teressa,
and with my sisters, and with my mother— it's
disconnected. It's as though I were intruding on his
life.
What do you mean by "disconnected?"
Now and then I could try to remember my life with
Richard and I could remember some of it, and then my
mind would let it go. You know, it wouldn't go
consecutively on in my thinking, as much of my
memories do go right consecutively on, from one to
the other
—
you know this.
Erikson (1959, p. 134) observes that "often only an
attempt to engage in ... sexual intimacy fully reveals the
latent weakness of identity." Sullivan (1956, p. 152) speaks
of a malevolent transformation that the person may undergo in
attempting intimacy, "the profound discouragement in the
pursuit of affection that culminates in schizophrenic break."
Although Hilda's schizophrenic break did not occur until she
was in her early thirties, the mother of four, and had been
separated from Richard for several years, I believe that this
connection between intimacy and schizophrenia holds true
in her
Hilda:
C. J. :
Hilda:
C . J. :
Hilda
:
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life. One reason for the prolonged latency is that Hilda's
was a great resource. At times of crisis, she was able
to turn to an imaginative reconstruction of problematic events
in her life——a creative skill which significantly eased her
passage through these years. Also, the engagement between
Richard and Hilda was persistently tentative; their marriage
always had an "as if" quality. Neither partner acccm.plished
what Erikson calls the "efficient repudiation," the differen-
tiation of self from family, which is a prerequisite for
engaging in a fully intimate relationship.
Both families resisted the idea of Hilda and
Richard's marriage. James was the most supportive:
Hilda: Jim felt that Richard was an unusual person. He
agreed that Richard was worth it, worth a try as a
friend and a companion—although he didn't think that
marriage [itself] was worth it . . .
C.J.: Did he actively oppose your marrying Richard?
Hilda: VTell I think everyone in the family did—Richard's
family, my family, all opposed it. And my father,
and Richard's father, wanted it to be a . . . form of
ei^ression, a "trial marriage" is what they called
it.
Emily's response was the most problematic for Hilda:
When I told her—mother—that I was going to get
married, she said, "Then you can get a job and get
money for your announcements and wedding dress.
Because you have no dowry.
C.J.: She didn't think of it as a good marriage?
Hilda: She didn't think of it as a marriage at all, I don't
believe. And yet she wanted me not to give up on
working at it.
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i^ioth©r v/as roina.ntically inclinsd toward
Richard, but she was not connected with Richard's
family
. . .
I know he felt the same toward her. Even after herdeath he would say, "you had the most beautiful
little mother ..."
You know when you see two people standing together,
the way they look at each other. She would look up
at him and I would think, "For God's sake, mother 1"
And he would look down at her with a kind of
Lochinvar look, and I'd think, "Richard, for pete's
sake .
"
C.J.: How did you feel about it?
Hilda: I felt ashamed for her— I didn't for Richard because
I just thought he was a great big son of . . . his
father—His father couldn't help but go for any woman
who showed any sign of a soft eyed look. And mother
was really giving him a soft eyed look.
The picture that Hilda gives of married life
contains numerous scenes of intense and engulfing emotional
involvement, drawn against a background of isolation and loneli-
ness. Other people, particularly her mother and mother-in-law,
enter constantly into the marriage, sometimes dictating their
entire life style. Hilda, caught, as she puts it, "in the
throes of production and reproduction," becomes vulnerable even
to feelings of loss of control over her own body. Richard's
actions often have a very painful impact on Hilda, but he never
emerges as a "full determinant" in her life: "He never really
came into my life nor I in his."
Hilda gives a clear description in her Journal at
Sixty of her sense of isolation in marriage:
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And being married was, in memory, a concept of being
alone, for she sensed now her continuous, air-hung,draft blown self "married,” forever waiting for its
^^te to return; from work, from sleep, from its
silence in eating or reading ... [She] waited for
some frail accompaniment, which so seldom occurred.
The other, overly enmeshed, side of Hilda's marital
experience began when the couple moved to Richard's parents'
farm immediately after their wedding. Hilda felt that her
life, under the controlling hand of Mr. and Mrs. Kroner, became
unending servitude. She also describes this aspect of their
marriage in her journal:
Life was disposed and arranged by his parents.
Daylight, darkness, morning, noon and night, were
followed -according to their placem.ent of continual
effort. To them, loving and breathing and doing went
a certain way. The sound of churning, fire-stoking,
water-slopping from pump to pail, feet stomping the
snow off in the shed, the hungry cries of many
creatures, cat, chick, cow and hog, all were material
phenomena to time the next effort. The clean, hot
odor of fire and food and the sudsed soft-soap,
washed dishes and clothing, the cold stomp of wet
soles from constant water, when sound subjected all
to effort and hours were filled with it.
At the same time that Hilda was coming to see her
marriage as a form of indenture to the Kroner family, she was
also discovering that she had, to some extent, "invented" the
Richard of her love. Intimacy with the real person presented
problems far more severe than she had anticipated, especially
in the area of establishing a sex life.
C.j. : The first time we talked about [your youth] you
referred to yourself as "sexually repressed" . . .
what did you mean by that?
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Hilda j Wall, I don't baliav© I had a nonnal ralationship
with anyone, that is, I never had a protector in the
male—and most women expect to be married, don't
they? They expect to have someone with them every
night, right?
C.J.: I suppose, yuh.
Hilda: And this never happened to me, you see; I never had
such a thing.
And, therefore, I think
—
[my daughter] Ruth believes
this, and I think she's right: sex has to be learned
, . . that it isn '
t
a magic happening, exactly, that
it is a desirous development, and you can accomplish
it like dancing, or good food, good singing, good
culture of any type— it can be accomplished . . . And
that was something which I never accomplished.
— I really loved Richard, but it was entirely mental,
I'm sure, my love for Richard— I loved to watch him
and look at him, see and be near him, and sleeping
with him, and so forth. But as far as the sexual
life was concerned, I knew nothing about what sexual
life was with Richard. He was not the type of
person— in fact, I can't understand how anyone ever
understood him in that way.
The most important aspect of her sexual life with
Richard was, to use the phrase which she applies to Emily, "the
motherhood of it." From the start, Hilda's experience of
bearing a child was surrounded by conflict. In each instance
she felt an undercurrent of deadly opposition from the maternal
authority figures in her life. Most of the grave shortcomings
which Hilda perceived in Richard as her "protector in the male
center on the issue of pregnancy. The overall impact of her
pregnancies was so traumatic for Hilda that at several points
in our interviews she suggests that there must be a connection
with her eventual insanity
.
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Hilda s first pregnancy came in the early months of
her marriage.
C . J. : Do you remember your reaction to finding out you were
pregnant?
Hilda
:
Yes, I was quite happy.
Of course, by then another self seemed to have been
developed. And anyhow, I believe that the minute you
are pregnant your motherhood is immediately
developed
.
C.J. : How do you mean "another self”?
Hilda Well, a person who—a mother. I lost my own selfish
person and I was now a mother, the minute I knew I
was pregnant.
I don't know when I told Richard ... He probably
paid it no attention because [I can't remember him]
making any kind of a to do about it.
I went down to Hudson to tell my mother and she was
very happy about it—unbelievably because they had
decided I shouldn't have children and hoped I
wouldn't. But you know her motherhood, her
grandmotherhood
,
whatever, was developed at that
moment also.
C . J. :
—Finally Mrs. Kroner began to suspect something and
questioned me. She questioned Richard and she
questioned Richard's sister and [concluded], "I think
Hilda's pregnant and we are not going to have this!"
VJhat was her objection?
Hilda: She had absolutely decided we were not going to have
children. Absolutely.
C.J. : Why?
Hilda: I . . . don't know. She hadn't wanted her own
children. She didn't believe in putting people in
the world, procreation.
So she was awfully hard to get along with and
although I had worked awfully hard for Mrs. Kroner
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previously
,
new she gave me jobs that were outland-
ish: lugging, pushing and pulling jobs.
You thought that she was trying to abort the baby?
I know that she was. And so I began losing the child
you see. I had a night of cramps, just like it was
labor, and I told Richard about it and he said, "well
you better stay in bed the next morning." Naturally
he told his mother about me having probably a miscar-
riage and she said, "good, have her get up and get to
work." I had to get up and work.
Richard wouldn't intervene?
No. He was a very undeveloped male, you knew. So I
got up and worked. Then I began suffering so, and
having a hemorrhage and I was afraid. So I told her,
I told Richard that I was going to go to Hudson. I
got into Hudson and my mother put me into bed and she
took care of me. She was furious but I lost the
little fetus. I felt so sad about that I wept all
day. This is the way it was every time I got
pregnant.
Following Hilda's first miscarriage, Jacob pushed for
Hilda and Richard to separate. Because Hilda wished to remain
with Richard, he settled on relocating them from the Kroners
'
farm. Jacob found a job for Richard in one of his company's
plants in New Jersey and the couple moved to an apartment in
Newark. Hilda soon became pregnant again.
I hated to tell Richard because his mother had raised
such a furor about the first pregnancy. I was fear-
ful he would let her know . . .
When I did tell him, Richard told me, "Now you've
really taken me by surprise! Not only do I have to
support you, but a child ... you're going to lose
this one too."
So he made me walk all night with it—two or three
nights—all around Newark. But I didn't lose it and
I'm glad. He's my oldest boy, Carroll, the pride of
my life and a marvelous person.
C . J .
:
Hilda:
C. J. :
Hilda
:
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Inasmuch as I didn't los6 the baby, Richard came home
and said, "I'll fix you, I've quit the job. Now we
have no money .
"
Hilda got a job as a substitute teacher and was able
to work daily until she became visibly pregnant. Near the time
of her delivery, she made arrangements with a doctor to attend
her in a home birth. When she went into labor she attempted to
remain silent because the landlord did not allow children in
his apartment. The doctor was summoned, but she feels that
Richard blocked his passage on the stairway. She still cannot
understand what his motivation would be:
. .
.
perhaps a deep seated fear of anyone giving
birth. He might not have believed the fact that I
was going to give birth. Another thing, he could
have just suddenly decided, "No you're not going to
have that much help. If you want to give birth go
ahead and do it without any help." We never really
discussed it.
The delivery was successful and Richard, now re-
conciled to having a child, found employment. For the next
several years the new family moved between apartments in the
Newark area and temporary residence in the country near their
parents. Because Richard changed jobs frequently, Hilda never
had a sense of financial security. Richard began to be
increasingly absent from the home, especially when he became a
well driller during the latter stage of this period. Hilda
felt isolated and desparately lonely. Her brother James
stepped into the void, offering her company and
counsel— "decide whether you want to be a 'good wife' for the
rest of your life or to be Somebody "“~3nd spending long
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stretches of time as a member of the household. James arranged
Hilda's first professional contacts with publishers. He also
connected her with a doctor who performed several abortions
for her, a traumatic experience in each case——"When you become
pregnant your motherhood develops fast, when you lose it [the
feelings are] still there."
The tensions of this period came to a head while
Hilda was carrying her second son, Harry. Unsure of Richard's
support, Hilda had chosen not to have a second child. Richard,
in contrast to past instances, insisted that Hilda bring this
pregnancy to full term—a stance which Hilda sees as motivated
by his wish to entrap her in the marriage.
Harry's birth was traumatic for Hilda. About six
weeks beforehand, Richard's arm became seriously infected from
a drilling accident. Hilda rushed him to her parents' home
where the family doctor treated him.
Dr. Bannister said [to mother] , "feed him, just feed
him continuously." Richard was a great eater, he
didn't mind in the least. He ate all the stew,
crying, weeping, and moaning. And I said, "Oh my
God, if he loses his arm ..." And suddenly I went
into labor.
Mother said, "Just contain yourself, because I have
to take care of Richard."
So I tried to contain myself, but I had quite a false
labor ... I usually did have a false labor, every
time.
When Richard recovered sufficiently to move, he went
to his family's home, taking their son Carroll with him. Hilda
stayed on, awaiting Harry's birth. When the time finally came:
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I thought, now this time I'm going to shriek my
lungs out" ... So I did, I raised the roof ... I
fully enjoyed shrieking. I could have torn down the
house with my yelling.
C . J. : Was that shrieking in any way similar to vour scream-
ing [in college]?
Hilda: That ' s what I wonder
. . .
Because Harry was a breech birth. Dr. Bannister had
Richard and Emily assist him in forcing the delivery— "it was
like a mountain bearing down on my abdomen, a terrible
feeling." Emily's role was to administer the anesthetic,
choloform, on a handkerchief. From Hilda's perspective, she
overdid it, almost fatally. As Emily held the cloth over
Hilda's face, she felt herself suffocating and struggled on the
verge of passing out. Dr. Bannister intervened, later
commenting: "we almost lost her there mother—he called my
mother ' mother ' . "
C. J. : Why do you think your mother did that— I know I've
asked you before?
Hilda
:
I think she lost— I feel that my mother was a little
peculiar about whether she was jealous of me having a
child by Richard. She was jealous of the fact that
we were husband and wife, you know.
C. J.
:
She just couldn't accept it?
Hilda
:
I really believe it.
C . J . : And that would be enough for her to—do you think she
was aware of what she was doing, with the cholorform?
Hilda: I don't know. But my sister Isabel, who went off her
rocker quite a bit after college, was also jealous of
the fact that I was married to Richard . . .
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Mother said to the doctor, "I think it would be aood
for Isabel to watch this birth because I think she
has the makings of a good nurse in her."
Dr. Bannister said, "Why mother, that is not a good
idea at all."
I was glad the doctor said that ... it might have
been the worst thing in the world for Isabel,
actually.
Hilda now felt like a guest at home, "and a guest was
a hard thing for mother," so she left as soon as she could
travel with the baby. Arriving home late at night, she found
that Richard and her younger brother had turned the house into
a shambles: "in bed with their shoes on, mud all over the
blankets, mud in the carpets, dirty dishes everywhere." She
threw herself into cleaning in anticipation of Mrs. Kroner's
arrival with Carroll the next day.
I had the house in perfect shape . . . Mrs. Kroner
came in with Carroll and she sat right down with him
by the stove.
And I said, "Don't you want something to eat?"
She said, "No, I'm not going to let go of this boy"
. . .
She did not want to relinquish Carroll. She
said, "You have the other one, I'm going to keep this
boy."
Why I was . . . angry, and ready to fight furiously.
My feelings were terribly hurt. And I said, "You
can't say a thing like that, Mrs. Kroner, that's my
child" . . .
I had a kind of a dread. I knew then somehow that
the Kroners would take Carroll over into their
lives—“Which really has happened. He has really
become a Kroner ... I really had this idea that I
wanted him devoted to me and not to the Kroners . . .
[Several years later] Carroll and Harry would both
come back, after a week or two with the Kroners, fat.
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awfully fat and dressed in all kinds of funny
outfits. I liked Harry's hair to be curled and I let
it get long and shaggy with a big bang—he looked
beautiful. They would come back with crew cuts . . .
stockings over their legs and shoes that laced up,
when I had them running barefoot all the time.
What it meant for Hilda to become a mother
.
The most striking feature of Hilda's account of
pregnancy and childbirth is the intense opposition which she
experienced. Whether or not Emily's heavy handedness with the
choloform had murderous intent, or Mrs. Kroner's chores were
meant purposefully to overload Hilda, her psychic reality was
peopled with maternal authorities ready to use deadly force in
blocking Hilda from motherhood. The suggestions of cedipal
conflict are obvious in these perceptions, and consistent with
Hilda's strong sense of competition with Emily over Richard.
There is also a more subtle level, however, to Hilda's perpe-
tuation of her oedipal situation. She remained steadfastly
loyal to the definitions of legitimacy within her first oedipal
triangle. She accepted the view of her relationship with
Richard as "trial marriage," and it became more so with time
—
as Hilda puts it, "I was never my real self in our marriage."
She was subject to false labors, as if her pregnancy were an
assumed role, not an organic process. Most distressingly, she
felt that her offspring could be expropriated, as if the rights
of motherhood were never fully hers. Given these definitions
of her situation, pregnancy becomes visible evidence of Hilda s
trespass—comparable to Hester's sin in The Scarlet Letter
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She projected her feelings of condemnation onto everyone around
her.
The deadlines of the opposition which Hilda
experienced becomes understandable in light of her positive
feelings in pregnancy: "Another self seemed to have been
developed ... I lost my own selfish person and was now a
mother." In a rigidly complementary relationship, such as
Emily and Hilda's, a good self always requires a matching
context, of bad other. Hilda had an acute intuitive awareness
of Emily's global need to relate to a bad child. There was no
dialogue, no room for give-and-take, in their relationship. In
explaining Emily's behavior during the trauma of Harry's birth,
Hilda states that:
As ,a rule, mother never took account of any other
person's feelings, seeing the overall effect
—
you
have to think of the ultimate good, not the
individual target.
As the customary target, Hilda had a deep sense of
her negative role in preserving the "ultimate good." Individ-
ual change, in this context, would be perceived as destructive.
The specific changes which Hilda was envisioning—becoming a
fully adult woman, taking on the goodness of motherhood—would
have been perceived as directly destructive to Emily's position
in their relationship— "You kill yourself and your people . . .
in that way .
"
As in her college experience, change was being forced
upon Hilda, although in this case from within. The child which
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Hilda bore may have represented the deeply private combination
of goodness and badness which she knew as her inner self. This
last aspect of the meaning of pregnancy would account for her
abandoned shrieking in labor and the dramatic struggle against
suffocation in giving birth.
Hilda's Writing
For- the next several year-s after Harry's birth,
Richard and Hilda maintained their residence in the country.
Richard was absent for large portions of this time, leaving
Hilda in the company of her two infant sons. Hilda, now in her
mid-twenties, used this solitude to begin to exploit her talent
as a writer.
Writing served several important purposes for Hilda:
it was a way to re-enter the exciting world which she had
experienced in her interlude with her father and brother in
Greenwich Village; it provided the basis for an identity
outside the deeply conflictual sphere of motherhood; and, above
all, it was a means of attempting mastery over the troubling
issues of her life. Hilda became more than normally engaged in
this latter aspect of the creative process. She attempted to
live into the events which she was constructing, to incorpor-
ate them into her daily reality. For example, she says of her
first book, Fir'e of Spring : "As I wrote it, I became so
involved, seeing Christ, hearing Christ, it was almost as if I
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had. It was very real to me
. . I had a great desire to see
Him.
"
It is this degree of personal involvement in her
fictional works that makes them valuable as evidence of her
psychological past. Her books do not. provide new information
on her life, but they highlight several of the issues most dis-
turbing to her at the time and, especially, show the outcomes
which she wished to achieve.
In Fire of Spring
,
Hilda reconstructs the events of
her summer with Jacob's relatives, including her first crush,
but as she puts it, "takes them further." The main issue which
she addresses in the book is the passage into sexual intimacy.
It is framed by the relationship of the main character to her
mother. The book starts with their separation and ends with
their reunion.
One of the advantages of a fantasy solution is that
it enables one to split off the problematic aspects of a situa-
tion and deal with each separately. There are two young girls
who confront the problems of sexual intimacy in Fire of Spring .
Alma, the main character, becomes enraptured with her visions
of Christ—and in this sense represents an extension of the
Joan of Arc theme in Hilda's earlier fantasy life—but turns,
by the end of the story, to a platonic and uplifting affair
with her cousin Phillip. Lizzie, the central figure of a sub-
plot, becomes pregnant through an illicit affair, has the scorn
and abuse of the community heaped upon her , and is forced to
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wander around the countryside dressed in black—representing,
of course, the scarlet letter theme.
Hilda divides maternal authority in Fire of Spring
into three parts, Alma's mother is globally understanding and
beneficient. Aunt Jen, the mother of the household, encourages
Alma's religious involvement and attempts to use Alma to
advance her own standing in the community. Aunt Jen also
spearheads the persecution of Lizzie. Phillip's wife, Alma's
potential rival, is developed as a character so narcissisti-
cally involved that she fails to notice what is occurring with
her husband.
Both Lizzie and Alma deal with experiences of intense
shame. For Lizzie, the shame is imposed from without, as in a
scene where the preacher at a revival meeting orchestrates her
public confession.
The leader was sweating at the collar and, with tears
streaming down his face, was pleading for Lizzie's
soul ... He threatened hell fire and eternal dam-
nation. Then he changed his method again and
beckoned for soft singing ... He knew that he
might, through this wretched pretended sympathy,
break down the strongest will.
He was afraid of the blood in the faces of the
people. He was not anxious for murder. And so he
changed the wind . . . The choir on the platform
fairly melted with its sadness . . . "Come, come lay
your sins on Jesus." "Why not now?" "Jesus is
tenderly calling to-day." "Though your sins be as
scarlet, they shall be as white as snow."
Lizzie's head drooped lower and lower . . . she
thought. Oh, will my baby grow to hate me too. Will
he think I'm a sinner too?
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. . . She felt a sudden rush of nausea caused by the
child within her
. . . she cried wimperly, "Momma,
momma!" to the woman on her left.
And before she knew it, she had been helped out into
the aisle and up to the platform with her mother on
one hand and with her father on the other supporting
her. She felt dreadfully ill and she kept saying,
"Oh! Momma! Momma!" (pp. 157-159).
Alma's shame is a far more private experience. In
the following passage Hilda describes Alma's reaction to her
first kiss and uses imagery strikingly close to Erikson's pro-
totype of shame as the experience of a naked child painfully
aware of being observed.
How little she felt and how frightened! But she did
not want them all to know that she was afraid and so
she whispered the words, "What are you doing?"
"Come on." The boy's mouth was so near to hers that
she swallowed his warm breath which his words made.
"It's fun to be naughty, little angel-
face, ain't you found that out yet?" Without waiting
for her to reply, he placed his lips upon hers and
kissed her as she had never imagined kissing could be
done. She felt utterly naked again and she believed
that she was unclean, never again to be cleansed
. . . She saw his eyes enjoying the wickedness of his
lips
.
[She resolved] she would not be dragged down into
that pit of hopeless darkness . . . she would not cry
either. "Let's see. Just let's see," she whispered
savagely to the stars. "Let's figure this out." And
just as she nearly caught the truth and was going to
see it clear and perfect before her, that kiss would
come back to her again, flinging her into the pit of
vileness and disgust.
Alma's fascination with Christ starts as a form of
romantic love:
He was as majestic as a Prince . . . smiling gravely
at her from beneath his ruby crown, his flesh as hard
as pale ivory against the yet sterner glow of gems
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. . . Are you then to be my little Queen? he
questioned with those curved lips as red as the gems.She longed to have him kiss her, to be enfolded
within his arms, to be comforted by him.
As the story progresses, it becomes increasingly a
bondage in suffering; Alma adopts an anti~life orientation:
She understood now, she decided, the black garbed
nuns who walked into the glaring beauty of the world
with their faces mutely blind to all about them,
their black mitted hands clasped before them, their
eyes downcast and their cheeks colorless.
Alma begins gradually to rebel against the burden of her
attachment to Christ:
But what have you done, Alma, inquired her curious
common sense, that interfering friend, what have you
possibly done to make Jesus die? Be still 1 her heart
answered . . . Hasn't it been proven to you enough
that you've done something? You can't know
everything at once!
Her budding love for cousin Phillip reinforces Alma's
resistance to Christ. Phillip's recognition of her attractive-
ness awakens feelings of self-appreciation and an acceptance of
her own impulses. Alma's new self-awareness directly conflicts
with her attachment to Christ, who causes her to feel shame for
her body. The conflict comes to a head when Alma realizes that
Christ is connected to the persecution of Lizzie. She con-
fronts him with Lizzie's suffering:
"But she wronged me, child," he went on with a
melancholy voice" . . . You have wronged me, too, and
once promised me, you are proving faithless."
"Look!" he said, and before her he thrust his long
pale hands. She saw the raw wounds at the center of
his palms. "Listen!" he cried with his face nobly
bearing the pain and she could see two drops splash
down upon the sheet which covered her body . . . She
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wanted to tell him that she had begun to find truths
in her heart. She wanted to say, I know about babies
now, Christ. But even as she thought of the sentence
she felt shame mount her breast and clothe her in
burning blushes ...
"Kiss me, little wife," he said, transfigured now
into the jewel crowned prince.
"I don't want to, thank you, if you please," she said
fretfully, turning away from him and holding it
against him that she experienced that miserable
unaccountable shame.
"You are faithless then. You do not love me!" he
accused her,
"Sweet lord! ... I can't help loving you when you
are hurt," And then she felt his lips upon hers,
cool, steady, then growing warmer and warmer until
she felt her mouth scorched and at the same time she
was aware of her gown open at the neck exposing her
small rounded breasts ... Oh! It wasn't fair to
make her feel so horrid and shameful . . .
And when, after a long breathless silence during
which time she longed for another kiss
,
at the same
time feeling repulsed by the desire, she knew that he
had gone.
Heavens! how detestable to feel this way! It made
everything smutty and undesirable.
Alma ultimately arrives at a "miraculous vision of
understanding": "deciding to make an act wicked it is made
Christ was gone now not to return. She saw in this
moment of clear understanding that he had been of
[the community's] manufacture . . . No one, thought
Alma, knows what poor Christ was really like. And
for her part, she was willing to forget him for a
while, his ill-conceived shadow had caused her so
much unnecessary misery.
Sh0 turns from her visions of Christ to embrace Phillip.
Could she have analyzed the sudden rebirth of her
heart's life after her decision against Christ, Alma
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would have heard it beat out its gratitude in this
way: I was blinded in Christ, but I am open-eyed
with Phillip for my love.
[With Christ] I could see nothing else, surrounding
him was sorrow and evil, mockery and tears 1 . . . But
with Phillip to love, I see life about him. Rather
than look into his eyes I see through them, with my
sight added to him.
She had forgotten Jesus and her recent initiation
into morbid pleasure. She was, in truth, too normal
and wholesome to endure the nurturing which warped
minds would have forced upon her.
The bent stem of her life which might so easily have
been twisted and broken stood upright again . . . She
was growing up.
The story concludes with Alma and her sister returning home to
their mother, who recognizes and approves of their new
maturity. The final sentence of the book reads:
And mamma would murmur looking at her two daughters
and kissing them each on the foreheads, "How you have
grown .
"
In discussing the theme of Lizzie in Fire of Spring ,
I asked Hilda why the comjnunity reacted so harshly to her
illegitimate pregnancy. Her response was: "You see these
people were sort of . . . ambivalent. They wanted to be
Christians and yet they could be that cruel to a person who was
in their midst." She, in other words, meant to portray a group
which maintains its cohesion in merit by scapegoating a member.
While Lizzie is the external image of a scapegoat, Alma gives
the internal picture.. Alma's feelings toward Christ are analo-
gous to the ambivalent and binding loyalties which Boszormenyi-
Nagv describes in cases where the parent is both martyred and
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exploitive. Alma grows to hate Christ for immersing her in
shame and yet she feels devoted to him and responsible for his
suffering—— I can't help loving you when you are hurt."
Hilda's creative process in Fire of Spring is a good
example of what Kris (1955) calls "regression in service of the
ego." On the one hand, Hilda reverts to her childhood mode of
solving problems through fantasy at a time when her adult life
has come to a standstill. She re-engages in a fantasized union
with a perfect other—and it is this regressive aspect of
writing, rather than the insights, that Hilda remembers most
I
I
strongly, that is, how real Christ became to her. On the other
I hand, Hilda's insights are substantial in Fire of Spring . She
steps back from her ongoing crises of adulthood and, through
I
j
the character of Alma, confronts her own "counter-autonomous
j
superego." She explores the emotional ties of the scapegoat,
and achieves intellectual mastery over the feelings of deep
j
sham.e which accompany her steps into womanhood. Hilda
I recognizes, through Alma, that rather than being a reflection
I
I
of absolute goodness or badness, her feelings are a product of
I
I
the relationships which she maintains. Alma turns away from a
relationship which would suppress the "truths in her heart" and
I
I
,
define her desires as evil, and seeks, instead, a heterosexual
j
intimacy which would support her growth. She puts aside the
' self-limiting gratifications of a fantasy work in favor of
j
I
engaging with real people.
j
1
I
(
(
318
Coming to Altamont
Hilda followed the course which she outlined for
Alma
.
From the early days of their marriage in New Jersey,
Hilda had entertained doubts about Richard's faithfulness. She
once confronted him and she acknowledged that he was seeing
another woman.
I got very upset then and I said, "I don't know why
you have to have someone else as a lover."
Richard said, "Because you aren't satisfactory."
In her distress, Hilda turned to her one friend in the area,
Alice
.
She said, "Well tut, tut. It's a common thing for
men to want women and women to want men
,
why can '
t
you understand it?
"Oh Alice," I said, "I really wish it were you, if I
knew it was you I could take it—then I found out
later that it was she, just like that, that time I
really went off my rocker.
Hilda was able to mute the impact of Richard's con-
fession by keeping her picture of her rival abstract. She
imagined a large red-headed woman, just the opposite of Alice,
a petite woman with black hair.
In the isolation of her days in the country, Hilda's
jealousy grew:
A searching vine intruded on the rock of her faith, a
questing serpent seeking her heart's core [Journal at
Sixty ]
.
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Jealousy, however, seemed far from Hilda's mind at
the time of her completion of Fire of Spring
. Despite resis-
tance from Richard, and his lack of financial support, she had
managed to save enough to meet the expenses of submitting it
for publication. Her manuscript was accepted in its first
draft. Hilda was elated. A whirlwind of meetings with her
publisher, social introductions, and photography sessions fol-
lowed. She was suddenly recognized as a writer— "I couldn't
believe it was happening."
She was staying with Alice, who now lived in the
city. It was at this point that Alice told Hilda that she had
been having an affair with Richard for years—a confession
which Hilda feels was motivated by envy of her sudden success.
Hilda flew into a fit of despair. She cried all that
night and left New York abruptly the next day. On the train
home she ran into an acquaintance, Claire, v;ho was familiar
with Richard and Alice. Claire offered Hilda cold comfort:
"Well," she said, "the sooner you grow up, the better
for you girl."
Claire kept trying to be the adult : admonishing me
and teaching me, and telling me—and I felt: "if I
can just escape this woman. I'll go out on the plat-
form and throw myself off the platform [into a
train] ."
I did get to the platform two or three times. She
came after me— I guess she more or less accepted that
I was really in a frame of mind.
Hilda describes meeting with similar responses when
she turned alternately to her mother and Mrs. Kroner—so
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similar, in fact, that she comments as an aside to her account
interactions, 'this sounds like one of those fair
stories, with everything repeating over and over." She
remembers Emily's response as especially unsympathetic; "I
don't want to hear a word of it. I'm not going to have a
divorce in my family."
Although Richard and Hilda were not legally divorced
until some twenty years later, she resolved never to sleep with
him again, nor accept any further support from him.
Claire owned a country home in Altamont, a nearby
community long popular as a retreat for artists from New York.
She had offered to take Hilda in as a housekeeper. Hilda, now
without a home for her children, accepted.
Hilda's move to Altamont is a dividing point in her
life. In leaving Richard, she actively severed a tie with her
family— a new experience of differentiation for her.
I had sized Richard up in my own mind concerning his
worth, as a father ... a mate, when I found out
that he had a mistress, someone he loved other than
me
.
And that cut me off from Richard, at that point, and
I expected them to feel similarly ... I resented
the loyalty my family [maintained] for him.
Hilda m.ade Altamont her emotional home for the rest
of her life. Soon after arriving, she entered into a menage '
a
trois with two artists who shared the property with Claire,
Phillip and Susan. In doing so, Hilda feels that she
permanently discredited herself within the Mendahl family
,
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becoming a "fallen woman"— "I murdered my place in American
society." On the other hand, Hilda felt a new level of freedom
to be herself in the relationships which she established in her
days at Altamont, an experience which she describes
coming back to her when she returned, years later, to make the
property her final home:
I was looking out at the brook and realizing this
whole place [again] : Phillip, and the sense of
freedom and understanding, and whatever he had—
I
don't know if it was love. There was som.e terrific
drive he had as an artist. It seemed to permeate the
whole atmosphere. Also Susan had a terrific drive as
a person and an artist.
I felt when- I [first] stood at the window that I
could actually become myself on this property,
somehow, that I had not been myself through all my
years of marriage. It was when I had just decided
that I was going to really get rid of my marriage
that I had this feeling of terrible love for this
property.
The early stage of Hilda's triangular relationship
with Phillip and Susan was surprisingly free of conflict. It
began almost as a reenactment of the happy ending which Hilda
wrote into Fire of Spring .
As Phillip leaned against the refrigerator, he said,
"My wife and I have never had a sexual life—you know
I think you would make a very beautiful nude. I
would like to do a painting of you."
I said, "My goodness, all of this at once, and here
I'm only a servant, you know."
"No," he said, "Don't think that way. I just think
that you need someone to show you what it really is
to love you. And I can show you this."
He said it in such a way that I wasn't shocked, I
didn't blame myself—It's just as if . . .an angel,
or God or someone stood there saying this to me.
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Like Alma's rival in Fire of Spring
,
Susan was, at first, a
remote competitor.
In the fall [before I arrived] Susan had an eighteen
month old boy. When the fall floods came, Susan was
sitting in the living room absorbed in her painting
and paid no attention to what was happening to her
little son. He fell into the brook
. . . and
drowned
.
So she was suffering from deep grief and terrible
blame, as though it had been her fault.. . . She had
become very difficult as a person, very soured.
Susan was away consulting a "religious woman who was
training her not to believe in death" when Hilda and Phillip
first became lovers. On her return, Phillip called a meeting
between the three of them.
He said to Susan: "I have decided that Hilda is
going to be my nude model and my sweetheart. But
first we want to ask you if it is agreeable to you.
She agreed to it, that we'd be lovers, because he and
she couldn't enjoy sex together.
She said to me, "Better you than to have him going
off here and there bringing in someone else"—and
especially I'd begun doing the housework . . . and
she hated housework.
Hilda moved into Susan and Phillip's side of the
house and for the next six years maintained a communal life-
style with them. The only source of friction which Hilda
remembers from the beginning of their relationship was the
distribution of work. As the relationship progressed, the di-
vision of labor and financial arrangements grew more complex.
Oh Phillip's initiative, they began taking in children for
the
The property evolved into a sort of artist's retreatsummer
.
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and progressive school. Hilda's roles eventually included:
looking after a cottage with six children, in addition to her
sons; teaching classes; and preparing the meals, often for
large numbers of people.
Several photographs that Hilda has saved from this
period give the impression of a diverse group of people in a
sstting of rustic conviviality
. One of Hilda shows a very at-
tractive, long-haired, sun—tanned young wom.an dressed in a
coarse frock—she could easily pass for a flower child of her
grandchildren's generation.
Losing Emily
Not long after Hilda moved to Altamont, her mother
became overtly psychotic. Her break seemed sudden at the time,
but in retrospect Hilda recognizes a num.ber of signs of in-
cipient deterioration: Emily's meals became more than usually
spartan, serving a dinner of three types of beans, for example;
in applying the chloroform at Harry's birth, her face had "a
very insane expression"; when Hilda was breaking away from
Richard, Emily became irrationally insistent that the couple
sleep in the same room. But when she did finally become
psychotic, the change was clear:
Hilda: She was the wildest beast— I never saw as insane a
creature in my life at the asylum—She was wild. She
would even begin to gnaw food, she'd eat the garbage,
all of it.
C.J.: What was it like for you, to see your own mother
—
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Hilda
C.J.
Hilda:
0^' ... I got to thinking it was funny, because
every now and then if you paid no attention to her
she'd put on a skit. '
She'd say, "well now I'm going to commit suicide."
And she'd put some boxes around and try to hang
herself from the chandelier, or something. She would
make a little Shakespearian remark, she would orate
.
I would think that was the funniest thing ever—but
sometimes I would wake up and she would be over me
with a knife.
Just you? Or your other sisters too, that she'd do
' this to?
I don't know, I never compared notes.
Two other symptoms stand out in Hilda's recollection
of her mother's insanity. Emily would recite a litany of her
children's shortcomings and failures, e.g., "Jim's no good, he
. . ., Isabel's a failure, she . . .," etc. Hilda would be
omitted when she was present— "you're a success, you've written
a book"—but suspects she was included once she was gone.
Emily was also obsessed with the idea that the family had lost
all its money.
The family at first attempted to minimize Emily's
symptoms, and then turned to a search for a panacea. Jacob
contemplated presenting his wife with a chestful of hundred
dollar bills. He entertained several theories of a
physiological dysfunction, and arranged a thyroidectomy.
Eventually, they moved closer to New York so that Jacob could
be home in the evening. The task of supervising Emily fell to
Isabel. Marion, the next oldest daughter at home, became the
"mother" of the family.
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In the third year of Emily's insanity, Jacob came for
a weekend in Altamont. At breakfast on the morning of his
visit they were interrupted by a telegram:
It was a telegram saying that mother had died.
And father acted staggered on the stairs. I thought,
"Is he showing off?" Little did I
. realize that poor
father really was taken aback by the news.
Emily had taken advantage of a few unsupervised hours
to make methodical preparations' for gassing herself. • Hilda
does not entirely understand the connection, but Emily's
suicide was on the same date that her brother had killed
himself some years earlier.
The family, who knew few of the neighbors in their
new community, had a simple funeral. All of the children—now
adults—spent the night before the service in the attic,
talking until morning. The next day the minister, a stranger,
delivered a long eulogy. As the family grew restless, he
threatened to continue until he saw "at least one tear in this
place." Hilda thought:
God, it behooves me to make a tear, somehow. So I
looked at the coffin and could just barely see
mother's nose. I thought, "mother was the only one
in the family that had a beautiful little nose."
That caused a few tears . . . and so the minister
brought it to an end.
Hilda's substitute for mourning .
Emily's insanity and death occurred at a most inop-
portune moment in Hilda's life. Hilda had just begun to
differentiate in earnest. Together with the rest of the
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family
,
she experienced her move to Altamont as a real
separation in a way that her ’’trial marriage" to Richard had
never been. It provided her with her first base of intimate
relationships which did not start in and compulsively return to
the family home. Under other circumstances, Hilda's concurrent
success as a writer and loving relationship with Phillip might
have changed the all important economy of her relationship with
her mother. Merit which she accumulated outside of her
relationship with Emily might have strengthened Hilda's
position as an active subject within it. Even if their
subsequent realignment fell short of the ideal of a full
reintegration based on mutual give-and-take, Hilda might have
established, at least, a clear picture of when Emily's needs
differed from her own. Her mother's insanity, instead,
eliminated the opportunity for intimacy. Emily lost the
capacity for an adult negotiation of the roles of subject and
object. She became alternately a pure subject, obsessively
scapegoating the children and expressing hostility toward Hilda
in ways which precluded a realistic assessment of
responsibility, or an unknowing object, a "wild creature" that
had to be watched and cared for. Put in slightly different
terms, at the very moment that Hilda was attempting to
integrate her private self within the social world, Emily's
insanity turned the public sphere into a farce.
Hilda's divorce from feelings of grief is striking
even her father's reaction to Emily's death seemed unreal to
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her. Part of the problem was, of course, that by the time of
Emily s death the full person had long since departed through
insanity. But even in our current discussion of Emily's in-
ssnity
,
feelings other than shock and amusement remain inacces-
sible to Hilda.
The only expression of grief which Hilda recalls from
the time of her mother's death was a prolonged screaming
incident—similar to her "tailspin” in college—which she
experienced on returning to Altamont— "I wanted to get out of
my body." Becoming aware of her emotional reaction to the loss
of Emily was an overwhelming experience for Hilda, the ex-
perience of being flooded by anxiety. It is as if she were a
child at the stage of shadowing and darting who turns to
discover that the mother has disappeared. Hilda lacked the
early experience of reliable continuity in the interpersonal
world—Winnicott's "ego relatedness"—which enables one to
confront permanent separation from a loved one.
Hilda, in short, was cut off from the normal process
of mourning in two central respects. First, full recognition
of the loss of her mother, and thus grief, was too anxiety pro-
voking for Hilda. Second, because Hilda's recent efforts at
differentiation had been thoroughly clouded by Emily's insan-
ity, her image of her mother remained embedded in the feelings
of intense anger and shame which Hilda had experienced as a
child in their relationship. She was unable to engage in the
process of gradually reincorporating the deceased as a symbolic
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presence in one's life which normally brings mourning to an
end. Hilda was forced, instead, to turn to the solutions of
dissociation and magical identification offered in fantasy.
She threw herself into writing a second book.
The product. Beauty
,
I Wonder
,
is a reconstruction of
the events of Hilda and Emily's lives fused into the character
of a single protagonist. She takes her protagonist through
some of the best and worst experiences from each of their
childhoods, gives her Emily and Jacob's early marriage, and
concludes by placing her in Hilda's triangular relationship
with Phillip and Susan— in a sense, dealing with the crisis of
her separation from Emily by rewriting history to show that one
or the other of them had never existed, merging them into an
eternal oneness.
Hilda's account of writing Beauty, I Wonder gives a
clear picture of the problems which she was addressing at the
time and suggests how her creative process substituted for
mourning.
Hilda: The story is of my mother, but I am all bound up in
it too . . .
C.J.: Some of the things you describe, say the "burning
bush", it's never clear to me whether it's an actual,
visual
—
Hilda: Yes I saw a bush when I decided to write . . . [there
was] a sort of halo thing about it, a brilliant halo
to it, tremulous, as if you could touch it, feel it .
C . J .
:
You have it as really a central piece of Emily's
character, she repeatedly refers back to it.
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Hilda: When I first started writing this book, it was seeing
this thing that really started me . . . all of a
sudden this whole book began coming to me.
C.J.: What made you think of bringing that into your
mother?
Hilda: I was very desirous at the time to write about my
mother so I decided that this was the person who was
seeing it.
— I wanted to have [mother] in my mind, you know.
This book clarifies her for me, for some reason.
Even though it is all mixed up in characters, first
it is myself, then it is herself . . . Nevertheless,
I can remember her when I read it, and I really did
it with that in mind.
I was so afraid I might forget her. I had such an
antagonism, all my growing years— if I couldn't see
her belatedly as a good
,
interesting human, I really
would have slain her myself, let alone the fact that
she slew herself.
CHAPTER VI
SCHIZOPHRENIA
This life appears unbearable. Another unattainable.
One is no longer ashamed of wanting to die; one asks
to be moved from the old cell which one hates to a
new one which one will in time come to hate. In this
there is also a residue of belief that during the
move the master will chance to come along the
corridor look at the prisoner and say, "This man is
not to be locked up again. He is to come with me."
Kafka (as quoted in Hilda's Journal at Sixty)
Downward Spiral
It is difficult, and perhaps a mistake, to draw a
sharp line where Hilda's psychotic experience begins. To be
able to hang the onset of her schizophrenia on the peg of a
single precipitating event—and the three years between Emily's
death and Hilda's hospitalization present several good candi-
dates—would simplify the narrative, but distort the picture of
a gradual loss of control over her life which culminated in
Hilda's schizophrenic break. Hilda begins her written account
of her psychotic experience—which I excerpt extensively in
this chapter—with the events immediately preceding her hospi-
talization. She omits the antecedents to her break, in part,
because of the difficulty of determining where her break
actually occurred, that is, exactly when she lost touch with
reality. As she puts it, "I can't be certain except that I
reinterpreted things a lot——I created my own atmosphere . . .
almost courting a form of insanity, deliberately wishing for a
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maturity which would allow me to be that much of a passionate
soul .
"
At the beginning of this period of adaptive struggle
Hilda experienced herself as having an active hand in creating
her atmosphere? she sought out heightened perceptions, such as
vision of the "burning bush,” and used them to support her
functioning as a writer. By the end she experienced herself as
totally controlled by her atmosphere? her heightened percep-
tions seriously interfered with functioning and virtually
precluded communication. There were three major turning points
in this transition, not exactly causal factors, but events
which determined the timing of Hilda's loss of control over
what was, to start with, an untenable life situation.
The malevolent transformation of her triangle .
Hilda needed another woman in order to experience a
fully emotional involvement— intimate love—with a man. It was
only when Hilda knew of Alice's involvement that her relation-
ship with Richard became passionate, and at the same time
unbearable
.
Phillip's wife, Susan, never really fits together as
a whole person in Hilda's descriptions of their interaction.
In Hilda's account of the early days of their triangle, she is
strangely remote and placid in her acceptance of the situation.
At some point in their six years together Susan became Hilda's
enemy
,
and the relationship took on dangerous hostile and
competitive overtones.
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I always thought that she was someone I had to vie
against, I had to say, "Well now Susan, you are more
of 3 person than I am, and I'm going to prove that
I'm as good as you"— so on and so forth.
Susan was always a person who stymied me. She was
a danger to me , . . She made me feel I had to fight
for who I was being. And probably I've always put
myself in that position, unconsciously ... I always
accuse the other person— I accused Susan of standing
in my way, of freedom here ... I won't give myself
a clear expression of love or value, or permission
for myself to be enjoyed by someone else.
There are no lines of transition in Hilda's recon-
struction of their triangle between the Susan of the early
days—who "accepted it more than anyone, even more than Phillip
really"—and the dangerous antagonist in the later days of the
relationship. Two events, however, seem to mark the beginning
of the bad days: Emily's death, and the birth of Phillip and
Hilda's daughter, Ruth. Both events occurred in the third year
of Hilda's relationship with Phillip and Susan. Although Hilda
does not relate either directly to the change in the climate of
the relationship, she is clear in locating the troubles in the
last three years of their time together. She came to exper-
ience the relationship as increasingly coercive and entrapping.
The division of work and money, always an irritant, became a
major issue. Hilda was given an allowance for each child she
housed in her cottage and required to pay rent for herself and
her own children, as well as paying for produce from the farm.
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She felt deeply exploited— "I couldn't understand why I had to
work so hard, continually harder, but nothing came of it."
It was the change which she perceived in the emotion-
al economy of the triangle which made Hilda's sense of
financial exploitation so oppressive. She began to feel
negated as a person:
It finally bore in on me very badly . . . Phillip was
beginning to show that he was fond of Susan—But it
was true. Susan was more intelligent than I. She
was a Cornell graduate, I had not graduated from
college . . . You see in my family, whoever was tops
got all the credit. And I felt, you see, that they
were much ahead of me, as artists and as people.
—This is something I don't understand about the
menage a' trois : one person in the group of three is
always discredited, the other two are not discredited
... I was the one who was always given the real,
critical "thumbs down" reaction—by everyone.
In an attempt to escape "the work and the burden of
not knowing if Phillip really loved me," Hilda became romantic-
ally involved with her publisher—who was also married to a
woman whom Hilda respected. It was in "playing with" this
possibility of escape that Hilda felt her relationship with
Susan and Phillip close in upon her as a trap. Both partners
urged her to stay. Phillip acted: "He took me by the hair of
the head and slung me on the floor and said, 'now you want a
child. I'll give you a child.' And he forced me."
Hilda became pregnant with her fourth child, Peter.
In addition to ensuring her physical dependence on their
arrangement, Hilda felt that this incident confirmed the
grossly uneven distribution of all the positive aspects of
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heterosexual intimacy in their three-way relationship, Hilda
now saw Susan as having exclusive claim to Phillip's respect
loving interest, and herself as in danger of becoming
simply a degraded sexual object.
Phillip had an old-fashioned attitude about us in his
own mind. Just as men criticize the women they will
take off base—go out and take a woman— I think
Phillip did that to some extent in his relationship
with me, even though I wouldn't admit it. Just at
the last, when I came back from having been with [my
publisher] —the way he threw me on the floor and
nearly knocked my brains out, made me know that he
really didn't have the respect for me that I had
hoped he would.
The collapse of her identity as a writer
.
Hilda's second book. Beauty
,
I Wonder was more am-
bitious, in both a literary and a psychological sense, than her
first. She drew on material directly related to her current
life situation and, although she gave the book a coherent plot
line, she was experimenting with a more eliptical "stream of
consciousness” style, alternating between the perspectives of
several of the characters in her narrative—a progressive idea
for the time. The book met with success on both fronts: it
enabled Hilda to feel that she had "clarified” the image of her
mother; and, like Fire of Spring , it was immediately accepted
for publication. At the same time, however, it marked the
beginning of Hilda's rapid loss of grounding in her sense of
herself as a writer.
On the level of public recognition, Hilda's affair
v^ith her publisher, which began at this time, to some extent
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disqualified publication as a measure of merit. Because her
publisher had influence in the literary world, Hilda's sense of
uncertainty carried over to reviews as well. Being more
esoteric than her first book, it made considerably less money
for Hilda; her doubts over literary recognition were not offset
by commercial success.
On the level of Hilda's private experience of
writing. Beauty, I Wonder represents a loss of her sense of
control over her own creative process. She describes the in-
spiration as entering her from some external source, "all of a
sudden this whole book began coming to me." She mentions that
she "felt in some way singled out to write" when she undertook
the work, and looked for signs like the "burning brush" to
direct her through it. She was surprised by the "vocabulary"
she used, and still wonders where some of her words came from.
Even if the book had met with an unmixed positive reception,
the credit, at this private level of experience, would never
have been entirely Hilda's— she lacked the sense of active
manipulation necessary to cement feelings of competence.
Both trends reached a peak in Hilda's third book,
Ishtar
,
a loose narrative based on themes of fertility in
Persian myths and the biblical story of Esther. In sharp
contrast to her two prior books , this work bore no apparent
connection to her life. Although she felt a strong need to
write about womanhood and fertility, she still finds her
interest mysterious. Whereas in Beauty , I Wonder Hilda had ex-
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perienced herself as reaching out to make contact with the
ideas which inspired her writing, the very content of Ishtar
just seemed to flow into her:
That whole book seemed to me a mystique of a myth.
In fact, it came out so readily and entirely that I
do not know that I did much thinking about it.
Hilda had come to experience herself as dissociated
from her own creative process.
Publishers expressed weak interest in Ishtar and
Hilda angrily withdrew it from consideration. She began to
lose this aspect of her identity— "thinking much less of my-
self as a writer"—and the enterprise no longer seemed like a
viable route of escape from her worsening interpersonal situa-
tion.
Motherhood becomes untenable .
Unlike Hilda's first two deliveries, giving birth to
Ruth, her daughter by Phillip, went easily for her. She did
not experience intense conflict in the situation surrounding
her birth, she had no false labor, and the delivery itself was
relatively painless.
In carrying her last child, Peter, the traumatic
pattern of Hilda's pregnancies reasserted itself with a ven-
gence. Legitimacy became once again a major issue. She felt
compelled to make the outside world believe that Richard was
the father of her child: "Lying like that was very tough for
me . , , I could try to lie, but mostly I acted the lie.
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Looking back on this time in her Journal at Sixty
. Hilda de-
scribes what she was attempting to guard against with her
pretense
:
She feared disgrace terribly, expecting this mark of
the devil to show in anyone of her blood, who in turn
would disgrace her. Trembling at the imagined exper-
ience of her daughter, her brother, her son
. . . the
anguish and anxiety, suffering on the cross of her
own disgrace
. , . She saw in the mirror of these
other minds a different image of herself which she
could not always hold dear ... an ugly thing she
really shunned and contrived against.
Hilda's false labor in Peter's case was especially
pronounced:
It was peculiar. I thought I was having him born and
called the doctor in. I was going through these
peculiar contortions, and screaming as if I were in
labor—and now if you ask me, "were you in labor,
were you in pain?", it seems to me that I wasn't. It
seems to me that I was trying to get Peter born . . .
And so when I finally did go into labor and they
called the doctor, he said, "Oh, I don't believe it,
she is just putting on an act."
At some point around the time of Peter's birth—and
Hilda's memory of the order of events in this period is con-
fused—she met a young couple, Joe and Rose, and found herself
suddenly enmeshed in yet another triangle:
I disliked her immediately and I liked Joe immediate-
ly. I could see that he was a sensitive, wonderful
person ... a very beautiful male, sexually . . .
Something like that other affair with [cousin]
Phillip and his wife. I could not understand why
these very sensitive, lovely people would be with
these great big hedonish women.
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Rose happened to be nearby when Hilda went into actu-
al labor with Peter, She ended up playing a central role in
Hilda's final crossing of the threshold into insanity.
I was alone in that room with Peter about to pop out,
and I called, "Rose, Rose, Rose." She came into the
room, and Rose knew nothing about helping a woman
have a child. She bore down on my shoulders and my
throat. I was thrashing around and being held down
at the shoulders and it was awful, an awful birth
agony
. . . Rose choked me almost.
—She was over me, bearing dov;n on me while I was
giving birth to Peter. She frightened me badly.
Nothing I could say would have her let up . . . And
she was so delighted at helping give birth [whispers]
it was awful, an awful moment.
—The first sensation that I liken to the incubus was
when Rose was helping me deliver Peter. She became
larger and larger and awfully peculiar— like a bogie.
Confronted with her newborn, Hilda found herself sud-
denly at a loss as a mother. She was unable to remember how to
perform simple acts of care, and feared that whatever she did
might destroy her child.
I would look at Peter and think, "I can't give him a
bath, I'm not able to do it, I don't know how."
Phillip would come in and say, "Isn't it time to feed
him?"
I would say, "I can't feed him ... I can't give him
a bath."— I would be afraid of dropping him.
Hilda latched onto the idea that Rose's husband Joe
would "save" her. She became obsessed with a wish to be near
him. Phillip, hoping that a change of scene might bring her
around, arranged for Joe and Rose to take her for a visit.
Hilda's reconstruction of the trip has the "fairy tale quality
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of a repeating line—in this case, "Hilda, I'm married to
Rose" which she noted in her account of leaving Richard.
I had suddenly gotten a feeling about Joe. I
thought, "He is beautiful, just like Jesus. I love
him that much."
— I just kept thinking that he was so much like Jesus
that he could save me ... "If only he would tell me
he loved me"
. . . "You have to kiss me now, you have
to kiss me now. I'm lost, we're lost"
. . . "Joe, I
want to go away with you."
He said, "Hilda, Hilda, I'm married to Rose, you know
that"—But he was very kind and tender through it
all.
—Joe realized that I was going off my rocker and he
said, "I think Rose and I will take Hilda up to this
spot in the Catskills where Jewish people gather
. . . All’ that ride with Joe the landscape spread out
and we sped through soundless areas, very rapidly. I
could see Joe and I felt him, very close to me, as if
he and [my publisher] were sort of interchangeable in
my thinking.
When we got up to this place. Rose became this great
big incubus—of course I had Peter with me, and I
forgot to feed Peter, I didn't know whether I had him
on a safe spot. And I kept wanting to get back to
Joe. And there was always Rose there, interfering.
— [That night] I was lying down on the bed, with
Peter beside me, and feeling a little jealous . . .
So in the middle of the night I went into the room
where Joe and Rose were sleeping and asked Joe to
come back with me.
He said No Hilda, I'm married to Rose. You forgot
and left Peter.
The next morning he said we should go back to the
farm. Rose had wrapped herself in a blanket. She
looked just like my idea of a bogie— I thought, "this
is terrible, I'm afraid of her."
—I thought perhaps I was going to be murdered then
and there. I decided, "No, this wasn't going to
happen, I was going to murder instead."
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It was a very peculiar trip back in the car. It
seemed that instead of being on land, I was goingthrough the air ... It was something like a dreamdeath, going through the world so rapidly that I
couldn't see any of the land. I had Peter in my arms
and Joe beside me. I kept thinking, "If Joe doesn't
tell me now that he loves me, the end is coming."
When we got back, he explained to me how we landed on
the fara, how suddenly there was ever earth again—
I
was going insane so fast. I had that peculiar
feeling of som.ething bearing down on me that night,
it was just like Rose, that incubus, that enormous
thing bearing down on me and suffocating me.
When I escaped from that incubus and went over to
Phillip and Susan's house and told Phillip I was
going to murder Susan, Joe was still there. And I
had a feeling [even after being hospitalized! that
Joe was going to save me. Of course Joe did not save
me.
The next morning Hilda took her daughter Ruth to the
brook where Susan's son had drowned. She is not clear on the
exact sequence of events
,
but she attempted two drownings
:
clutching a stone to her chest, she threw herself in the water;
and, with the thought of "baptizing" her daughter, she held
Ruth under water. She was stopped by Phillip and hospitalized
shortly thereafter.
Understanding the precursors of Hilda's insanity .
Hilda's entrance into the triangular relationship
with Phillip and Susan was the central event in setting the
stage for her schizophrenic break. It was the first experience
of heterosexual intimacy which was fully real to her. The
three—party relationship is what she knew as sexual attachment.
It fit her schema of intimacy, in the sense of schema as a
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structure of thought and action with strong motivational and
affective properties.
in any major adaption, Hilda was attempting to
balance strong conservative and progressive trends--to strike
an equilibrium between the processes of assimilation and
accommodation— in her triangular relationship. On the one hand,
she was attempting to accommodate her relational needs within
the structure of an adult heterosexual attachment, to love a
man and make him love her. In doing so, Hilda was taking the,
for her, radical step of exposing her "true self" in an
interpersonal transaction; she was experimenting with
expressing the powerfully ambivalent mixture of anger and love
which she had for so long dissociated from her actual
engagement with significant others. On the conservative side,
Hilda was protecting herself from too radical a change by
assimilating her new relationships into the pattern of her
oedipal situation. So long as she remained an interloper,
rather than a partner, in a marriage, she: maintained the
security of experiencing herself as structured by a familiar
environment; remained loyal to the definitions of relationship
in her oedipal situation; and could, at least partially,
disoualify the dangerous progress which she was making toward
differentiation.
The woman in Hilda's triangles—Susan, Rose, or her
publisher's wife—was always the central figure. Hilda related
to her also- in progressive and conservative ways. Because
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Hilda's efforts at resolving her original oedipal conflict had
foundered on her binding attachment to Emily, she continued to
reguire another woman as part of the context of heterosexual
intimacy—or, to use Freud's (1920) term, as a "condition of
love. In order to move toward a man, Hilda had to push away
from a woman. As a substitute for Emily, Susan opened new pos-
sibilities of growth for Hilda: she was on a far more equal
footing with Hilda than, say, Richard's mother had been; being
unprotected by the loyalties which bound Hilda to Emily, she
was a fair target for aggressive competition. Because Hilda
could experience her anger toward Susan in a less dissociated
way, she was able to take an active role in "vying against
her." This last point has a conservative aspect as well, that
is, Susan presented Hilda with the opportunity to displace
anger from her relationship with Emily, to seek revenge in
effigy, without betraying her primary loyalty to Emily.
Although Hilda focuses most strongly on her need to
resist Susan in their triangle— "she made me feel I had to
fight for who I was being"—there is an implicit wish for
closeness in many of her descriptions of their relationship.
Susan's recognition was very important to Hilda— "I'm going to
prove that I'm as good as you." The fact that she could
prevent Hilda from "giving myself a clear expression of love or
value" suggests that Susan held the key to these qualities.
The strong affective needs and sensual urges that Hilda became
aware of in her infatuation with other women must have been
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operative, at least on an unconscious level, in relation to
Susan. Sharing a love object can be an unconscious way to seek
closeness and it is this aspect of their triangle which
remains most alive for Hilda in late adulthood:
My association with [my favorite] walk has to do with
Phillip and Susan. I always wondered what she
thought of when she went over in there. I was sort
of stealing her walk.. I thought, "Well she's
thinking of Phillip"
. . . And I still like to go in .
through there to think, "Now if I think hard enough I
will know what she was thinking, what part of Phillip
she knew that I didn't know."
Hilda's wish for intimacy with Susan may have been
her deepest goal in the triangular relationship, but it was in
direct conflict with her other important goals of heterosexual
intimacy and self expression. The model of an interpersonal
triangle which Hilda carried from her oedipal situation re-
quired a scapegoat— "one person in the group of three is always
discredited." As Hilda experienced it in relation to Emily,
the goodness of one party recuired a complementary badness in
the other. Even worse, the complementarity was rigidly fixed:
to draw closer to the other women would mean becoming entrapped
in the position of bad self; to push strongly away, and to
assert one's goodness, would be experienced as a deeply
destructive act. Without redefining the terms of intimacy—the
meaning of self in relation to significant others—this dilemma
was irresolvable.
There are several reasons why Hilda's dilemma may
have taken on deadly overtones around the time of Emily's
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death. Developmental victories cannot be won by default.
Hilda's loss of her original antagonist could have served only
to confirm her worst fears of the dangers of differentiation.
Because she was at the same time losing her primary attachment
figure, her unconscious need for closeness with a substitute
would also have been intensified. Both sides of her dilemma in
the triangular relationship would, in other words, have been
magnified.
Hilda's work at ''clarifying'' the image of her mother
in Beauty, I Wonder suggests just how serious the dilemma would
have been at this point. In order to see her mother "belatedly
as good," she had to dissociate all of her dangerous
emotions—her feelings of intense anger over the exploitation
and cruelty which she experienced in their live relationship
—
from the image of her dead mother. This was not, to use
Boszormenyi-Nagy ' s metaphor, a rebalancing of accounts, but the
transfer of liabilities. It is as if Hilda had freed all the
badness from her relationship with Emily only to have it
re-enter her ongoing triangle and lodge either on herself or
the other woman. Hilda's imaginative solution of writing her
separateness out of their mutual history—there was no room for
both to occupy a position of goodness in a world "filled with
awful things"—was unavailable in reality. Because she could
not affect a similar merger with Susan, Hilda was left deeply
uncertain of her viability as a separate entity—the doubt
which she carried into her schizophrenic break.
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The role of Ruth's birth in Hilda's progression
toward insanity is unclear. Paradoxically, this first child
out of wedlock was the only one which did not raise iin—
mediate issues of legitimacy for Hilda. It may be that Hilda
felt sufficiently secure in Phillip's love to experience
herself as temporarily owning the goodness of motherhood—her
imaginitive fusion of the images of Emily and herself at the
time may also have supported her
. sense of motherhood. The fact
of having a child in the triangular relationship, however,
would still have been problematic for Hilda. Becoming the
actual mother in the unit would have aroused Hilda's fears of
destroying or cutting herself off from Susan. At the same
time, raising a child in a communal situation would seem, un-
avoidably, to invite feelings of competition—a highly danger-
ous competition, in light of Hilda's fragile sense of herself
as a mother.
By the time of Peter's birth, Hilda's dilemma had
taken on fatal proportions. She had re-established the full
complementarity between herself and Emily in her relationship
with Susan, assimilating all of the surplus badness in the
system into herself and projecting all merit onto Susan. The
complementarity had become totally rigid. Because they could
not both be viably good people, any assertion of merit or in-
dependence on Hilda's part would be either murderous or suici-
dal. Whatever Phillip's feelings for Hilda were at this point,
his love was now unavailable to her. She experienced his
346
desire, and the act of impregnating her, as collusion in her
entrapment she saw him as forcing her to live out a deadly
lie. She reverted to dissociating herself from the organic
process of pregnancy and, once Peter was born, "forgot" even
the most basic aspects of her by now well practiced role as
mother.
Hilda was overwhelm.ed by the enormity of her crime in
attempting motherhood again. She could not accept the
murderous implications of the act as part of herself. She
needed, instead, to project them onto an outside party. Rose.
Being unencumbered by any knowledge of or loyalty to the real
person, Hilda was able to im’-est Rose with the entirety of her
own fantasized evil; Rose became a grotesque monster.
Hilda, at the same time, kept alive the wish to
escape her suffocating trap. She turned to Pose's husband for
the justice—the release from her badness and affirmation on a
higher plane of goodness—which Jacob had originally denied
her. Because Joe had to provide a level of merit commensurate
with Hilda's sense of transgression, he became Jesus. Joe re-
mained steadfast in his loyalty to Rose, and their transcendent
escape never got far off the ground.
Having attempted escape, Hilda panicked upon her
return to earth and re-immersion in the triangular
relationship. She became obsessed with the need to murder
Susan and made a gesture toward suicide. She also came close
to drowning Ruth in her impulsive "baptism"—an act in which
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Hilda was attempting simultaneously to: cleanse Ruth of "the
mark of the devil," break the chain of mother-daughter
suffering, and destroy the evidence of her own transgression.
Hilda was now relating to her most significant others primarily
on a symbolic level, abandoning accommodation and assimilating
them into the schemas of her early childhood. Her
schizophrenic break had begun in earnest.
Psychosis
The course of onset
.
Hilda spent the next year and a half in Boxborough
State Hospital, immersed in a world of her own creation.
During a long period of remission, she was released into her
father's custody and eventually moved from home to work as a
live-in housekeeper. She suffered a relapse and was returned
to Boxborough. Although she recovered her functioning fairly
quickly, Hilda remained on a back ward for the next seven
years. Fifteen years later, while working at Boxborough as a
resident staff member, Hilda wrote her account of the years as
a patient. I use passages from her manuscript to carry the
narrative through the remainder of this chapter.
Hilda's main purpose in writing her account is to
give a faithful picture of her psychotic experience. She does,
however, make a few significant omissions. For example, she
never mentions Peter, who died several months after Hilda was
hospitalized, and refers to Ruth as her youngest child. She
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also changes occasional minor details for aesthetic effect,
giving events a slightly more upbeat or idealized tone than her
corresponding descriptions in our interviews. For the most
part, however, the two pictures are closely parallel. I in-
clude occasional excerpts from the interviews, bracketted as a
separate paragraph, where Hilda adds an important elaboration
to her written account.
Her account.
Hilda's account starts on the evening of her return
from the trip with Joe. She writes in the third person:
It was as if Hilda stood centered in a dream. The
thick but transparent walls of this wove stickily
about her a room's depth . . . clinging to her as the
mass of egg matter surrounds the uncracked chick.
She could hear her speech and hear the speech of the
others she had known yesterday . . . but to reach
them, to make them hear through this mass of en-
casing jell of dream was impossible.
Earlier this evening she had awakened in a nightmare
of darkness. The black room engulfed her, and
drowning in this thick pressure of warm black she
arose to make her way through its heaviness to the
door and down the stairs . . . into the living room
of the Big House where Phillip and Susan and the
others were, sitting around the table in the false
light of the red-shaded electric bulb.
"I have come to murder Susan," Hilda said, fully
intending to do just this.
Thev lifted their heads and looked at her slowly, and
Phillip said, "Never mind, Hilda, I'll do it for
you." He picked Susan up in his arms and carried her
out through the kitchen screen door to drown her in
the brook . . .
—The next morning was very bright . . . The morning
light was intense. Each sensation was keen. The
water from the opposite faucets was very hot and very
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cold. The air from the open door struck strong as
wind, but there was no wind.
Susan's ghost looked very clean and very clear, but
smaller than Susan herself had been; and Hilda,
knowing that this must not be, that Susan could not
be, that she must be murdered and done with, grasped
at the red sash which held Susan's white dress, and
charting toward Susan plucked at her, crying, "You
must not be, even as a ghost."
—How had she again returned to her room?
The atmosphere of it appeared surcharged with an
almost liquid black, and she had rushed to the small
screened window for light.
She could see the sun glaring red through the black
haze of air and space. It was as if some giant
fungus had been puffed, exploded and now left its
billions of smoky spores filling the world.
Hilda groped through this weight and threw open the
screen, leaning far out over the sill. She screamed
toward the main road and woods. She screamed as
though these words were pent-up vomit which must now
be emitted.
Her throat and mouth were filled with them and they
issued once her lips were parted. She screamed
against Phillip and Susan, against the hours she had
spent working for them and the rent and milk bills
she had paid. She screamed against the price the
corner country store had charged her for bacon and
oranges.
--Her youngest was squatted near the brook. Hilda's
dress must have been blue, for as she gathered up the
full skirt and bent and carried her child to the
water, sinking the body below it, she noticed the
blue deepening water stain on her skirt. Breathless,
she was whispering, "You must be baptized."
Her child's cry brought Phillip and at the same time
there was the confusion of a car's motor sounding in
the drive.
Phillip set the child on its feet and wrung its curls
dry with his fingers. "Ma was only fooling" he con-
soled; and the little one promptly commenced sucking
its fingertips for comfort, as was its wont.
I
\
1
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Holding Hilda by the arm, Phillip spoke. She could
hear him through this depth of tumblinc, thronging
noise, water pouring over the stones. "There are
some doctors here. They want to see you."
—Now she lay on a bed in a small ward
. . . The
drone of a thousand bees, blurred forms on the beds
around her and one smiling, lowered face above, an
attendant in blue.
"Hello, Hilda. What did you do? Why are you here,
Hilda?"
Unknown! Suddenly fury rose again. Hilda screamed.
"I murdered! I am murdered! Look at the blood in my
hair!" And she lifted her head shaking her long hair
about her.
She was drowning in the sound of her own shrieks, the
black smoked atmosphere and the odor of blood.
Strong hands held her arms, carried her. She was
blind and struggling. She was half thrown to a bare
floor in a dark, cubicled room. The key turned in
the lock. "Alone, until you can behave!"
—Awakening in a silenced room. A locked cubicle, a
floor, a blanket. Daylight, time dissolved. Hilda's
body felt light and free, naked within the blanket.
"Who am I?" she whispered.
"You are our little girl, our Hilda." she heard her
mother and her father say. And staring out of the
window she saw them all descending from the street-
car steps to the sidewalk, at the bottom of the hill
of the street on which they were going to live . . .
How well remembered, each shadowed, varnished, wooded
room! "Where we shall live forever, away from
Pittsburgh ' s smoke .
"
Yes! "I know who I am, I am little Hilda." she
thought happily.
Terrific happiness, th6 elusive stuff one never
experiences, but imagines, reads of in poetry, and
glimpses at in rare moments, hears in snatches of
music; this was hers now— forever.
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--As consciousness or unconsciousness assailed Hildathe impressions were one dissolving into the other
'
. . . It was one long awful moment without beginnina
or end, ^
She found herself ''here." "Here" was the cubicle andthe light dim and perfumed and dusting, brushing,
sounding, like a molten moth's wing. She danced.
Hilda danced to her blanket as though it was a
personality, as though it were her own tired self.
"Lie there" she said to it as she placed it on the
bare boards of the bed. "You are tired and cold and
wet
.
"
As she danced she thought, she conjured; atmosphere
of sound warmth, peace. Conjuring thus she felt
impowered. She felt the blanket breathe as she
folded it in her arms. And within its cornucopia of
wool she felt a hundred little souls, birthed,
breathing, their little bodies winged and filled with
warm blooded breath like beating, throbbing doves.
Like a conjuror she flowered wide the folds of the
blanket and she heard, felt them fly forth. "You
have given, borne these souls" she told herself.
[I thought I was escaping my body at this time . . .
some mythical, religious idea of transubstantiation
.
It was a wonderful feeling ... I did a lot of birth
giving ... In this stage of the game, I began to
talk about all the pregnancies I'd had, and think of
each and every child I had not given birth to—and
they would come to me as little souls with names.]
—In the corner of the room she saw reflected the
gleam of light from a pool on the floor, dim but
penetrating. She brought it to her lips . . . but it
was urine. Barely at all, she wondered if it were
hers. She washed her cheeks, forehead and hair in it
. . , She had been alone so many hours now it seemed
like a friend to her. She bent over and kissed the
wet spot on the floor.
—The vision of street-lamp, tree, walk and hedge,
swirling, slimily, retreating and returning, like the
pattern of an enorm.ous serpent's back and belly as it
slowly coiled and uncoiled; retreating and returning.
352
Horrified, Hilda wanted nothing more than to be freed
of this sight. Terrified but fascinated, she coulddo no more than cling to the sill and stare andlisten and smell
. . .
Thus she watched and saw the ground heave wide slowly
and graves yarn with the earth trough binding, and
the ghosts of murdered Susan and her mother, dead now
three years, swang crazily toward her and away from
her; their little faces mocking, tragic.
—The heat of the room encased her. There was a pro-
longed silence. She knew the world would end, and
she would be left alone, sealed in this yellow-
painted, sweet-odored room.
She heard and felt the long, enormous, muffled roar
of the world as it exploded, dissolved. She knew
that its vapors, cancerous, sweet-decaying and liqui-
fying, were rolling wild, and dissolving into the*
eternity of distance. That none lived and man . . .
left naked, alone, to fly or cringe, hating, hoping
for re-embodiment.
Hilda's m.outh unsealed. "Father!” she screamed.
[I couldn't see out because the windows had a sort of
film over them . . . but I felt that if the window
was ever opened, that the whole world would have been
gone . . . But I did talk to God and we decided that
we would do a thing called—be elevated, transcend
this world . . . and chose who would be born and who
would not be . . . And I did call for my own father,
I had God and my father sort of confused in there. I
also still hoped that Joe might save me and I was
calling for him too.]
—It was as she stirred in the water, almost asleep,
that she heard the Voice whispering. He spoke from
above, from within one wall. "Listen to me, Hilda.
No one else can hear. I am your Mind. I have left
you but you are there and I am here. Do not be
frightened. Call for me when you want me."
Her mouth was sealed again, but rapid as the
clocking, printing of a typewriter, the keys of her
thinking tapped words. "Am I here? Is this Heaven?
Can You hear Me?"
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"I can hear you" laughed the Voice. "This may beHeaven. You are either dead or insane, I have notdecided which. But do not be afraid"
Hilda lay immersed in the tub of water for a longtime. Her brain continued to tick out sentences like
^ ^yp^yj^iter
,
word after word heard clearly by her,
answering the Voice which claimed to be her Mind.
"Are You God?" "I am Mind."
[I had a great deal of faith in this voice. I think
it was the first time I began believing in God
. .
I don't think that before I ever believed in God as
an entity you could cope with—
—Mother had always said
intelligence is God. I have believed in God
sver since this time——it was so actually true, and
went on for so long, that I really think I was
talking to God, still. Maybe it's only my super-ego,
the super-ego does funny things, I'm aware of that^]
“—And she felt a clean blanket holding her, warming
her. She lay naked and as she thought, dead, within
its shadowed folds, dissolving into the shadows
herself, liquifying into the shadow, to become only a
shadow.
The light blazed, diffused through the opaque paint
of window panes, and as Hilda awoke, for the first
time having slept, the Voice spoke to her.
"Christ gave up His body that man should be reborn"
the Voice said. "Die now, Hilda, a thousand deaths
in the semblance of Christ and each death v/ill re-
create .
"
This game Hilda commenced. She lay on the blanket
straight, and imagined her life gone, her soul freed.
She arose in the shadow, invisible without the form
of herself, stretched on the bed; and she and God
talked and conjured, and she saw fresh, new-born
images of the recreated . . .
This game of conjuring occupied her for many hours.
She lay on the blanket, "Died," arose in the spirit,
leaving the corpse of herself.
At times her soul entered her body again and she
arose, young as a child herself, strutting, dancing,
singing in a brassy but melodious strong voice:
"I died to save the World again in Heaven Oh! Joy!
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To give and save and love, and love.
When' e'er I hear Your voice I give and suffer
For I am dead and You alive above!
Oh! Love, Oh! Shame! Oh! Die! and Oh! Repentance!"
The course of the acute stage
.
After spending her first weeks at Boxborough mostly
in isolation, Hilda was placed on a ward for acutely psychotic
women. Her private world of voices and souls continued to be
the main focus of her attention for the next year or so, but it
became an increasingly differentiated world. In addition to
the Voice of Mind, Hilda came to identify her auditory halluci-
nations with a number of the significant people in her life.
She could also experience, at will, a clear vision of her own
"soul." She protected and nurtured this soul through increas-
ingly elaborate rituals of dying and rebirth. Apart from an
occasional vision of the attendants as "angels" or "my child-
ren," Hilda was at first aware of others only insofar as they
physically impinged upon her.
As her awareness of her public world gradually
returned, she began to make her rituals more covert and
secretive. She also directed attention toward resisting the
ministrations of the staff, especially in the area of food "in
those early days I was attempting to be free of all substance,
anything that had to do with substance." Wet packs a frequent
occurrance in the early stages of Hilda's hospitalization—gave
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her the reassuring sense of having something solid to- resist.
She also came to experience the fixed routine of ward life as
supportive of her inner structure. By the end of her first
year in Boxborough the outside world still seemed remote and
unreal to Hilda, but she was beginning to have moments of sharp
longing to return.
The following is a small sample of her reconstruction
of the events of this acute stage. I present the excerpts in
the order in which they appear in her account. In the first
passage, she describes the moment of discovering her "soul,"
and places it in the context of her first recognition of her
social surroundings.
"You are here" said the Voice, "You must stay here."
"Are these the living-dead?" she would ask.
"No, they are the Mad" answered the Voice. "Watch
them. Do not become filthy and unkempt, as they are
"Where are their souls?" Hilda asked, "Oh! God! Tell
me, where are their souls?"
"They have lost their souls," God answered her.
"Where is my soul?"
"Watch it, guard it" answered the Voice, "Close your
eyes. Look at your third eye."
So it was that she was taught by the Voice to shut
her eyes, to look at her third eye. Central, within
her forehead, she could see it and as she waited,
concentrating, she saw her soul, a living figure of
herself, younger than her thirty-two years, its
countenance serene, its behavior wise but guileless.
She believed that if she did not find it each little
while, cherish it, watch it, it would flee, leaving
her as naked and mad as the others.
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"I'll never eat again," she told them in a happv
voice. "The food is poison. The milk is poison,'
too, but I'll drink that for you. Don't you know
that I die again and again, just as Jesus died, so
that you may be born again, and live?"
—The water rushed at her full force and was a shock,
but in a few seconds its violence seemed good, as if
an inner tortured self could fight it.
—She had the continual awareness of a trapped wild
thing. She believed that at any moment she would be
grasped, her arms twisted, her hair reining her head
forward or backward. She watched and waited,
whispering mutely to the image which was clear and
shining within her "third eye."
Hilda sunk her head down within the neck of her
dress, closed her eyes and waited until she could see
the image of her soul, flockering, moving. "Stay
with me. Soul." she told it, "Don't leave, don't be
frightened. I shan't let these creatures harm you."
—As' she had conjured, danced, and died into her
blanket weeks earlier, she now performed the same
rite secretly, unravelling her shirt . . . winding
the thread into a ball . . .
Hiding within the folds of her dress, whispering to
her soul . . . she ravelled and whispered feverishly,
believing that as she did so she wove her very own
body into the thread . . .
Thus she "died," and waited mutely until she heard
the Voice speaking clearer than any sound, commanding
that she "live" again.
She handed the wound ball to the Attendant.
"There! See there!" they laughed together. "She's
unravelled a whole shirt again. Trying to make the
State poor. Hey, Hilda? Sometimes she makes Holy
Chains with Crosses at the ends. She always gives
the whole mess up each night."
[Previously I don't think I would have called it a
rite, but at this point I had an idea that it was
some magical strength ... I believed my connection
with God was making me someone important.]
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““She existed in her own immediate experience of
Voices, and the conversations that her brain
^oj^trived continually, answering them. She became
extremely careful about her cleanliness
. . .
She became cautious about touching furniture or sills
or floors and performed hand“washing rites over and
over again throughout the day . . .
Space, time, existence, seemed to be here and here
alone, within these large bare, linoleum floored
rooms, with their tiers of shining windows and the
little sky vrhich held and rounded the limit of the
horizon without, seemed the limit of distance, the
All of the World.
[I think T was really in despair about ever getting
back to ... a normal life again
. . . Pinpricks
though, that's what it amounted to. I was really
very absorbed in my insanity.]
—Now her Mother had been dead these last three
years. But, Hilda heard her, recognized her voice,
answered her, conversed with her, her heart leaping
with tender joy, to listen again to the familiar,
long“loved voice of her Mother . . . She even
imagined she could see her Mother, wavering in one
spot which shone irridescent . . . where floor of
dormitory met the base“board.
[Something had to be rectified in our relationship
—
and then I was so happy when she came to me in my
insanity, the same good, interesting little mother
she'd been at her best. Day after day I was with
her. ]
According to the records, she was improving? for she
was dressed now, in a sheath“like, black, little
dress. She wore shoes, and her hair was braided and
bound with a shoestring.
She walked upright, and sat properly on a bench in
another Day“Room, where other patients of her own
category, sat . . .
But if the World had begun whirling, monotonous and
ordinarily again, and if things and incidents were
again to take their place and conform to natural laws
of cause and effect, much of Hilda's own life was
still far off, so dimly felt, so distant, like a
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drowning little craft, far out on the horizon of her
consciousness
. . .
Meanwhile the sound of her Mother's voice, and now
added to that, the voices of her Father, her youngest
sister, and her publisher, whom she had adored
. . .
talked to her, chided her, encouraged her. She was
gay or sorrowful according to the trend their
speeches took.
[Their repartee had a lot to do with my feelings. I
knew them as people so well, and they behaved as
themselves so perfectly, that I responded
accordingly. For example, quite often my father was
staring and he took a staring attitude there. Then
there was my brother Harry, I would be furious at him
and throw my shoes. He just chided me and told me
there was no need for my being there, and so on, much
as he would have. They were perfectly in character.
—It was the way you imagine yourself as the finished
creature you want to be, living among the advanced
mentalities you would like to live among. I gave
myself all kinds of credit for having these long, in-
telligent discussions— if only people knew what
brilliant thoughts.
—It upset me a bit because I didn't quite know what
to do with it all. It was like having a whole doll
house, a living doll house. My life was peopled, you
see. And you have a responsibility toward anyone you
know. Here I had all this responsibility and hardly
knew what to do with it.]
The Nature of Hilda's Schizophrenic Break
A number of psychologists regard acute schizophrenic
disorganization as a potentially adaptive response to a
developmental impasse. Systems theorists often see psychotic
behavior as an in some sense appropriate attempt to overcome an
insane family situation (Laing and Esterson, 1971; Bateson, et
al. 1956). At the intrapsychic level of analysis, Sullivan
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(1957, p. 316) considers schizophrenia a reversion to infantile
modes of thinking which opens the possibility of reintegrating
dissociated "systems of motives" within the mature self— "a
cosmic drama which struggles to find the solution to life prob-
lems in the same way that a nightmare does," Stierlin (1969)
speaks of a "reintegration at the base" which can be achieved
when the schizophrenia successfully renegotiates central con-
flicts of early development. Erikson (1959, p. 143) observes
"a human proclivity to a 'totalistic' reorientation when
. . .
reintegration into a relative wholeness seems impossible," He
considers the schizophrenic break an extreme expression of this
tendency: "a radical search for rock bottom— i.e., both the
ultimate limit of regression and the only firm foundation for a
renewed progression."
Epstein (1979, 1981) offers what may be the most par-
simonious and logically consistent theory of the adaptive
aspect of schizophrenic disorganization. He argues that, given
man's rich endowment with natural systems for recovery from
physical illness, "it would be strange, indeed, if a similar
developmental process did not apply to disorders of the mind"
(Epstein, 1979, p. 313). He views the schizophrenic break as
an extreme example of the natural tendency toward self-
correction, an "emergency reaction" to a seriously maladaptive
conceptual system. This view is based on Epstein's (1981, p.
2) assumption that: "In order to exist in a complex social
world, it is necessary for human beings to have an [implicit]
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theory of reality that includes subdivisions of a self-theory
and a world-theory . " Like any theory, the person's cognitive
structuring of his experience is hierarchically integrated,
with the basic postulates of his self-theory as "the nucleus of
the individual's more extensive theory of reality."
Epstein (1979, p. 315) reasons that, "if an overall
conceptual organization exists, it is possible for a total
collapse of that system to occur." Such a catastrophe can be
brought on, in Epstein's view, when the individual is
confronted with serious failure in one of the three basic
functions of a personal theory of reality: (1) to maintain a
favorable pleasure-pain balance, (2) to assimilate the data of
experience into a coherent conceptual system, and (3) to
maintain self-esteem. When collapse occurs, fundamental
perceptual and psychophysiological processes, no longer
integrated within an overall conceptual system, can go deeply
askew. The individual is then assailed by "raw" sensory data
and dissociated memories of past experience. Although
disastrous at the time, this involuntary dismantling of the
individual's psychic organization can provide an opportunity
for reconstruction of a more flexible conceptual system and
reintegration of dissociated past experience.
There are a number of advantages to Epstein s model
of schizophrenia. As an outgrowth of his research on the
mastery of anxiety (e.g., Epstein, 1967, 1976)— in which he
demonstrates a strong connection between the individual's
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cognitive structuring of a situation and his ability to inhibit
anxiety—Epstein's model provides a clear psychological ex-
planation for the most seemingly physiological symptoms of
schizophrenia, the bizarre disturbances of sensation and per-
ception: "V7hen sensory experience is not organized into
concepts, it is experienced with heightened intensity"
(Epstein, 1979, p. 318). By viewing schizophrenia as a revolu-
tion in the individual's conceptual integration, Epstein
provides a basis for analyzing the disorder in terms of other
models of non-incremental change presented in development
theory, such as Piaget's or VJerner's. He also opens new possi-
bilities for operationalizing the more abstract ard metaphori-
cal conceptions of schizophrenia as a radical "regression in
service of the ego” (Kris, 1955), "search for rock bottom”
(Erikson, 1956) , or "reintegration at the base" (Stierlin,
1969). Finally, Epstein's theory of personality, which holds
the maintenance of self-esteem to be a task of central impor-
tance, accounts for what a number of observers (e.g., VJhite and
Watt, 1973; Grinker and Holzman, 1973) consider the most common
precipitant of an acute break: a severe blow to the individu-
al's self-esteem.
I base my interpretation of Hilda's psychotic exper-
ience on Epstein's model of schizophrenia as the collapse of
the person's maladaptive integration of himself in the
world.
In accordance with the synthesis of intrapsychic and
inter-
personal theory which I have been developing, however,
I add
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two main extensions to Epstein's basic fraimework: (1) beyond
the failure to assimilate emotionally significant experience, a
prime reason for the person's schizophrenic break is that he is
unable to engage in what Piaget conceives of as accommodation;
and (2) the blow to self-esteem can take on such destructive
force because it endangers the person's basic attachment in the
interpersonal world, as represented in the ongoing "credit
balance" of his primary loyalties. These extensions add room
in an intrapsychic model for concepts from a systems perspec-
tive, in particular, they accommodate the double bind hypothe-
sis of etiology (Bateson, et al., 1956).
The double bind hypothesis is the most -widely
recognized contribution toward a systems perspective on
schizophrenia. It provides a clear picture of how ways of
relating can become ways of thinking. The basic elements of a
double bind include: (1) repeated exposure to contradictory or
mutually disqualifying injunctions communicated in (2) an im-
portant interpersonal relationship which contains (3) a
tertiary injunction against "escaping from the field," i.e.
against commenting on the communications, or "metacommunicat-
ing," in order to clarify or resolve the contradictions. The
assumption is that schizophrenics are people who have been
exposed to such levels of contradiction in their early rela-
tionships that they remain abnormally cautious in their ap-
proach to defining all future relationships. They learn to
rely on a defensive tactic of shifting the level of abstraction
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in messages, reading literal meanings into metaphoric
expressions and taking literal communications on a metaphoric
level as Hilda puts it, "I reinterpreted things a lot." The
psychotic break occurs, in this view, when the person can no
longer maintain this juggling of meanings and attempts to flee
the situation on a metaphorical level— "to shift and become
somebody else or shift and insist that he is somewhere else"
(Bateson, et a_l.
, 1956, p. 137).
The chief criticism of the double bind hypothesis is
that it lacks specificity——we are all exposed to some level of
ambiguous and contradictori»- messages in our formative relation-
ships. There is, however, a very specific quality of related-
ness implicit in the pathogenic effect which Bateson et a]., at-
tribute to the double bind situation: the tertiary injunction
against transcending the relationships could have such
destructive force only so long as the victim maintains the kind
of binding loyalty—or sense of rigid complentarity of self and
other—which evolves from a deeply anxious attachment. Hilda's
anxious attachment to Emily and her subsequent loyalty to the
definitions of her oedipal situation is a good example of the
evolution of this binding quality of relatedness.
In another respect, the double bind hypothesis is
overly specific as a general model of schizophrenic etiology.
The prohibition against "metacommunication" is just one example
of the severe restrictions on mutual regulation—or the absence
of what Boszormenyi-Nagy calls dialogue—which one experiences
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in a relationship based on coercively binding loyalties. Put
in Piaget's terms, the dilemma of the double bind is that the
victim feels compelled to assimilate all significant trans—
actions between self and other within the existing structure of
meanings presented in his early relationships. Because any
challenge to the standing definitions of self and other could
be perceived as a betrayal, the person experiences himself as
barred from accommodation— a prohibition which can extend to
the process of maturation and independent functioning itself.
In Hilda's life, this prohibition is what I have used
Boszormenyi-Nagy ' s term "counter-autonomous super-ego" to
describe. It is also manifested in her repeated experience of
being uncontrollably defined by her interpersonal context,
e.g., her fears of being forced into a homosexual relationship
in college, her persistent vulnerability to "suffocation in the
family atmosphere" and, of course, her experience of intimacy
as a form of entrapment.
To look again at the situation which precipitated
Hilda's psychotic break, she was confronted with major problems
of assimilation: she felt totally "discredited" in the
triangle, but experienced her own wish for differentiation as
unacceptable; she felt locked in a desperate fight with Susan
for "who I was being," yearning to replace Susan as the full
person and good mother of the relationship, and yet experienced
these urges as abhorently destructive; she desperately needed
to maintain her tie as the daughter of a good mother, but v;as
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constantly confronted by the fact of her own motherhood.
Without accommodation, that is, in the absence of any major
redefinition of her position in the real world of her relation-
ships, these problems were irresolvable
—and the situation a
double bind which she could neither live in nor escape. Barred
from altering her real circumstances, Hilda turned to the solu-
tions of dissociative thought. She attempted to escape first
through an imaginary transcendence of the world with Joe, and
then by departing from "her own tired self"—constantly
relating to herself through the shifts between highly abstract
and overly concrete modes of representation which Bateson et
al
. (1956) describe.
In this dissociative escape from her life situation,
Hilda, always acutely aware of the others' need for her to be a
certain way, experienced herself as destroying her most
significant attachment figures, and thus her own interpersonal
grounding in the world— "I murdered, I am murdered." She lost
her sense of integration within a secure configuration of
boundaries between self and other. Without any clear
delineation of self, Hilda had no stable reference point from
which to organize the data of her experience. Her systems of
conceptual integration underwent the process of rapid collapse
which Epstein outlines. As Hilda lost many of the schemata
which formerly enabled her to structure her perceptions, she
was bombarded by intense and chaotic stimuli. The physical
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world, as well as the interpersonal, became overwhelming to
her.
Under great stress, Hilda intensified her efforts at
finding a dissociative solution, attempting to reintegrate
herself entirely within a world of her own creation. This
movement toward pure assimilation is an extreme example of
Piaget's principle of seeking equilibrium through
disequilibrium—another way to m.ake Epstein's point that the
schizophrenic break introduces the opportunity for psychic re-
organization on a new level of adaption.
In reverting to the modes of relating carried forward
from her early childhood, Hilda opened the possibility of
reintegrating long problematic and dissociated aspects of her
self—she moved into the posi-
tion to reincorporate major portions of what Sullivan (1953)
calls the "system of not-me" v/ithin the structure of her mature
self. In turning away from participation in- the public world,
and restricting herself to symbolic interaction with her inter-
nal representations of significant others, Hilda provided
herself with a new basis of security—albeit divorced from
reality—which enabled her to take the gradual steps of differ-
entiation and integration leading ultimately to renewed parti-
cipation and accommodation in the world of real people.
This composite model of acute schizophrenia as an
adaptive struggle makes a number of the otherwise bewildering
aspects of Hilda's psychotic experience comprehensible. For
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the sake of clarity I examine these aspects one at a 'time, but
they should be understood, of course, as concurrent and inter-
dependent phenomena.
The altered experience of self .
Many of the elements of Hilda's psychotic experience
are like neurotic symptoms in that they represent a creative
synthesis of diametrically opposed needs. But while neurotic
symptoms tend to be circumscribed to a particular sphere of
functioning or object of desire, psychotic symptoms, unbound by
any strictures of conventional logic, can enable global
contradictions to coexist. Hilda's psychotic perceptions of
herself are a good example of such a global synthesis- of
mutually exclusive strivings.
On the other hand, she achieved her escape from an
untenable life situation through an extreme form of alienation
from her familiar self. She moved beyond the long standing
dangers of shame by "dissolving into the shadows herself,
liquifying into the shadow," and could look back at herself as
a distant and pathetic stranger, "left naked, alone, to fly or
cringe." She simultaneously reaffirmed her escape and punished
herself for such a forbidden act through her compulsive rituals
of dying. She even experienced her own body—an ever present
reminder of her old self— as concretely dead:
Her flesh appeared emaciated, blackened. Catching
sight of herself in the mirror, she saw ... a
little dead body, standing upright. "I have truly
died and decayed," she thought.
368
On the other hand, Hilda -was realizing aspects of
herself which had always seemed out of reach. She could
express joy in her body through her naked cavortings, and even
became "friends” with her own urine—taking the reacceptance of
aspects of "not-me" to an extreme. She could actually see her
"true self," and recognized it as good. Other aspects of long
sought goodness also became suddenly available to her. Hilda
began to experience herself as Christ and the embodiment of
pure motherhood. As her psychosis progressed, she began to
fuse these roles and organized them into her rite of dying and
rebirth—simultaneously acting out and punishing her wish for
transcendence. Still later in this first stage of her insan-
ity’, Hilda came to experience herself as the "finished
creature," able to engage in witty intellectual exchange, which
she had always wished to be—thus solving, at the wholly
fantastic level of interaction with her voices, the family
problem of "being on the surface and still being loyal at the
Scune time .
"
The divergent emotions which accompanied Hilda's
altered perceptions of herself were equally extreme. At
moments she experienced ecstatic release— "freedom from
personality"—and a sense of eternal well-being: "Terrific
happiness . . . was hers now—forever
.
" These feelings of
immense euphoria were balanced by an urgent dread that she
might lose her "soul" and become entrapped in a world of
unstable impressions each "dissolving into the other . . .
[in]
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one long awful moment without beginning or end." Hilda
presents these opposite emotions close together in her account,
with little or no transition, as if one side merged into the
other. Sullivan (1956, p. 318) considers this fluid eruption
of terror one of the central features of schizophrenic
experience. He feels that frenetic activity, such as Hilda
showed in the .early period of her onset, is a defense against
"an almost unceasing fear of becoming an exceedingly unpleasant
form, of nothingness by collapse of the self."
Sensory and perceptual disturbances
.
Most of Hilda's alter sensory perceptions fall into
one of three classes:
Normal perceptions registered with unusual intensity,
e.g., "the air from the open door struck strong as
wind," "the light was dim but penetrating."
The experience of stimuli impinging upon her,
sometimes flooding over into other channels of per-
ception, e.g., "suddenly in confusion faces forced
close, enlarged, darkened, blurred; a roaring filled
her ears."
The perception of objects with bizarre properties and
things not there, e.g., "street lamps staggered,
swaying . . . tree trunks moved eerily," "the ghosts
of murdered Susan and her mother swang crazily toward
her and away."
In accordance with Epstein's (1979) model of schizo-
phrenic disorganization, each of the three groups of
disturbance can be understood as a stage in the collapse of
Hilda's system of conceptual integration. In order to appreci-
ate the logic of Epstein's model, it is necessary to look
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briefly at its background in his work on the mastery of
anxiety. In a number of studies on anxiety in sport parachu-
tists, Epstein (1967, pp. 2-3) discovered a highly reliable
phenomena: "With increasing experience, there is a progressive
shift from monotonic gradients [of arousal] to inverted
V-shaped cur^^’es, the peaks of which are increasingly displaced
along the stimulus dimension [toward earlier and less prom.inent
threat-relevant cues]." He concluded that the individual de-
velops a gradient of inhibition which is steeper than his
gradient of excitation: "The inhibition is apparently highly
selective and discriminating, and intimately related to the
development of expectancies, or a cognitive model of the
stimulus situation" (Ibid .
,
p. 14). In other words, as the
individual structures his situation, he ceases to react
stronglv to predictable stimuli and becomes able to direct his
attention toward increasingly remote stimuli. This progressive
inhibition of arousal has obvious adaptive value: "As a
result, the organism is able to function at efficient levels of
excitation while expanding its range of awareness" (Ibid . , p.
36) .
In a schizophrenic break, this process of inhibition
is reversed. When the schizophrenic's conceptual organization
begins to disintegrate, sensory perceptions take on the
heightened intensity which Hilda experienced in the initial
stage of her onset. As the collapse of the person's
higher
level cognitive structures progresses, he loses the
ability to
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screen out" irrelevant stimuli, intense sensory perceptions
force themselves upon his attention. The loss of the capacity
for selective attention and anticipation is, in itself, anxiety
provoking—the experience of constant exposure to excessive
novelty. Because stress, beyond a certain level, can impair
cognitive functioning
,
a negative feed back loop may be set in
motion: heightened anxiety leads to further disorganization
resulting in a flood of unmodulated stimuli. The second group
of Hilda's perceptual disturbances, in which she experiences
I
her environment as overwhelmingly intrusive, represents this
stage of events.
Flooded by intense stimuli, the schizophrenic may
I
undertake extreme, and necessarily crude, defensive measures.
1
He can attempt either to avoid and block out stimulation or to
erect an emergency construction of his experience. These
I
operations, and the concommitant instability of perceptions,
I
are comparable to normal activity in the hypnagogic state
I
I
between full awakefulness and sleep: loud stimuli, such as an
' alarm clock, can be assimilated into a dream as a muffled and
I
I
I
remote signal, whereas very mild stimuli can elicit a startle
I reaction. The normal response to situations of extreme stress
I
provides an additional comparison: perceptions at the moment
j
I
of a serious accident often take on dream-like distortions;
j
victims of assault can misperceive major elements of their
I
j
situation, seeing weapons where there are none or blocking out
I
!
dangers which are there.
i
il
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Because Hilda's stressful situation was continuous—
"one long awful moment"— she was forced (1) to take radical
measures of withdrawal from external stimuli, spending whole
days huddled within her dress, and (2) to assimilate her
perceptions into schemata which had little basis in
conventional reality. As she reverted to developmentally
primitive schemata, objects in the environment lost their,
stable "ensemble of meanings" and Hilda began to confuse her
internal representations with external reality, i.e. to hallu-
cinate.
Two of Hilda's delusional perceptions require addi-
tional explanation: the feeling of being encased by the atmos-
phere, and her delusion of the world ending. The former is
closely related to her experience of "suffocation in the
atmosphere" of her family, that is, to her feelings of being
coercively defined by her context. At the time of her onset,
Hilda, having just returned from an abortive attempt at
transcendence with Joe, was suddenly oppressed by the mere fact
of perceiving a world of substantial objects. She experienced
the familiar stimuli of her environment as noxiously adhesive,
fusing her to an untenable situation. Her experience of being
encased by the atm.osphere is also very similar to her dream of
being engulfed by a gelatinous "incubus" or alter-ego. This
recurrent dream highlights a second factor which was operative
at the moment of her onset: Hilda was suddenly aware of her
own deeply unacceptable and dissociated impulses, and
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0xp0riGnc6d th0m as part of tha trap which was locking her into
th0 unlivaably discraditad position in har triangla. Intarnal
and Gxtarnal stimuli fusad into a dansa impadimant to changa,
"clinging to har as tha mass of agg mattar surrounds tha un-
born chick."
Hilda's dalusion of tha world anding may hava baan
savaral things at onca. On ona laval, it was a way of placing
a construct on tha mounting cycla of anxiaty, parcaptual
flooding, and cognitiva disorganization which Hilda was axpar-
iancing. Tha construct, howavar, saams axtrama, avan in light
of tha intansG visual, auditory, and olfactory parcaptions
which Hilda was attampting to organiza. On tha othar hand, tha
dalusion of a global catastropha was a natural axtansion of
Hilda's idaa that sha had dastroyad har grounding in tha intar-
parsonal world— "I murdarad, I am murdarad." Givan this
intarnally raal avant, Hilda's situation would hava baan analo-
gous to that of an infant who, upon ancountaring axcassivaly
noval stimuli, turns to saak his mothar, discovars har gona,
and bacomas ovarwhalmad by anxiaty—a numbar of clinical
obsarvars (a.g., Mahlar, 1968; Bowlby, 1973) aquata tha in-
fant's GxpariancG of intansa saparation anxiaty with tha faar
of total annihilation. At tha sama tima, tha psychoanalytic
assiimption of an affinity batwaan a faar and a wish saams to
hold in this casa. Daath had always hald a cartain attraction
in Hilda's ayas— it was rasponsibla for Isabal racaiving
from har parants. Hilda's parcaption of tha"doubla tha lova"
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world ending moved her immediately to call out for her father
and, very shortly, to make contact with God, a connection which
freed her, at last, to be Somebody Important.
One final sensory disturbance deserves note: Hilda's
indifference to the normal physical pleasures and pain.
Although she knows that she was often in a state of harsh
privation during the early weeks of her hospitalization, "in-
stanoes of bodily stress apparently left no mark or memory."
Even the exceptions, as when a fellow patient gave her a severe
bite on the thumb, were registered as strangely muted sensa-
tions: "the sharp sting of the teeth sinking into flesh and
bone made a little ache tug at her heart." It was only in the
late weeks of her onset that "sensations of cleanliness, ap-
peasement of hunger and thirst, warmth of clothing, were again
realized by Hilda."
Deficient perception of pleasure and pain is a
classic symptom of schizophrenia. Heath (1960) considers it
the fundamental disorder from which all other symptoms arise.
jj0 argues that, due to an inherited metabolic defect——the in-
ability metabolize a protein, Taraxein, which is released
during stress and assumed to interfere with functions of the
central nervous system— "schizotypical" people are unable to
"feel" as other people do. As a result, they become alienated
and uncertain of their own identity. When exposed to stress
which relates specifically to issues of identity, their
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marginal integration may collapse, and the full symptoms of
schizophrenia will become manifest.
Epstein's theory spans a middle ground between the
poles of "biological" and purely psychological explanation of
schizophrenic anhedonia. Although he suggests that pre-
schizophrenic individuals may well have a physiological vulner-
®^iiity to over arousal, which would lead to a crudely
modulated inhibitory system (Epstein, 1967)
,
he holds that the
collapse of the individual's "self-theory" is, in itself, suf-
ficient to account for the loss of normal perceptions of
pleasure and pain.
Boszormenyi-Nagy would take a position entirely the
inverse of Heath's:
Individuation through the formation of subject-
object boundaries probably precedes any other
"psychological" motivation. Being the source of the
experience of Selfhood, Self-Not-Self discrimination
is a prerequisite of the pleasure principle. [1965,
p. 39] .
The issue is not resolvable in a retrospective life
history. At least some aspects of Hilda's failure to register
physical needs seem, however, to be an expression of the more
basic need for self-delineation which Nagy posits. Hilda's
loss of hunger and avoidance of food, for example, was
intimately connected with her delusion of the world ending— "Do
the dead have to be fed?" In dying she had escaped her
encasing atmosphere and established a new, global self-delinea-
tion—she was not-of-this-world. In order to preserve this
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nascent boundary, it was necessary to "avoid all substance."
Food, because it represents an historically potent medium of
interpersonal exchange, struck her as especially dangerous
—
"poison"—and she renounced her desire for it.
Altered cognitive structuring
.
The collapse of Hilda's adult organization of herself
in the world was not simply a loss of cognitive integration but
the substitution of earlier modes of structuring for her adult
representations. Freud was the first to note this aspect of a
return to past forms of thought in psychotic disorganization:
In a psychosis the remodelling of reality is affected
by means of the residues in the mind of former
relations with reality; that is, it concerns . . .
ideas and judgments which have previously been formed
about reality and by which reality was represented in
the life of the mind [1924, p. 280],
This substitution is not a literal regression, but
the partial return of an adult person to developmentally
primitive ways of relating, as Sullivan (1953, p. 327) puts
it," a dissociated system which has broken cover in this way
can only very briefly continue to be free from being greatly
complicated by what rem.ains of the [mature] self-system."
Keeping this qualification in mind, it is still remarkable how
closely the cognitive structuring which Hilda describes
corresponds to the features which Piaget attributes to sensori-
motor and intuitive thought.
In addition to the primacy of assimilation over ac-
commodation and the loss of many of the relations which
charac-
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terize operational thought—e.g., stable concepts of time,
spstial relationships, and causality——Hilda describes a
striking reassertion of egocentricity in the psychotic organi-
zation of her experience. In her delusion of the world ending,
she universalized an internal crisis. Because she could not
see the outside world, due to the film over the window, it was
no longer there. Even in the later stage of this period, when
"the world had begun whirling, monotonous and ordinarily
again,” Hilda's immediate surroundings remained the boundary of
her reality: "Space, time, existence, seemed to be here and
here alone . . . the limit of distance, the All of the World."
Hilda's loss of object permanence was accompanied by
a loss of self permanence— "She existed in her own immediate
experience of Voices." .In the early stage of her break she
feared that a loss of contact with her "soul" or God's Voice
would mean annihilation of self— a reinstitution of the total
dependence in infancy between mother-schema and self-schema.
Even in the later stage, Hilda's emotional experience of self
remained labile and dependent upon her representations of
others, i.e.
,
her Voices: "She was gay or sorrowful according
to the trend their speeches took."
In addition to these major structural similarities
with the cognition of early childhood, Hilda describes several
more subtle characteristics of sensori-motor intelligence. For
example, many of the sensory experiences in her account seem to
lack the coordination of discrete perceptions which begin to
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appear as the child ''decenters'" objects in the physical world.
It is as if stimuli registered through undifferentiated,
' kaliedescopic, modes of perception and took on properties
arbitrarily dictated by her own sensations. The darkness had a
•"dense mass" and "heaviness"; she felt herself "drowning in its
thick pressure of arm black." The light in her cubicle was
"dim and perfumed and dusting, brushing, sounding, like a
molten moth's wing." Sunlight "felt like heavy pollen into her
eyes. She felt her lashes beat like frantic butterflies on her
eyeballs, and her pupils resounded like red bells against the
lids."
These perceptions lack what Piaget terms mobility,
i.e., they show a highly stimulus bound quality and an equating
of self state with object state. The loss of cognitive
mobility is the direct link which Hilda made between thought
and action. She experienced her wish to eliminate Susan as an
act of murder. She constantly acted out her fantasies, and her
ritualistic behavior enabled her to think of herself as the
things she wished to be. When a disturbing thought entered
awareness, as when an attendant asked about her children, Hilda
would feel compelled to act;
Her children! She pictured them at this moment . . .
Had she remembered to save them?
She lept to the center of the floor, tore the dress
from herself, lay naked writhing on her back.
"I must die again for each of them!" she screamed.
"Don't interrupt me! . . . God, where are You?
Voice, answer!"
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Hilda's regression to such early modes of
organization was adaptive in several respects. For one thing,
given the collapse of her adult systems of integration, her
reinstitution of primitive schemata provided Hilda with at
least some means of structuring her experience— it kept her
mentally alive. The particular stage which she reinstated, the
dawn of cognitive differentiation, corresponded, with her
central task at the time of her psychosis, self-delineation.
She threw herself into this task with a sense of mission,
spending whole days unravelling her dress— "believing that she
wove her very own body into the threads"—seeking to establish
a basis for rebirth—a perfect exemplification of Erikson's
notion of a radical search for the "rock-bottom foundation for
a renewed progression."
Reconstituted others .
Hilda's hallucinatory others were crucial presences
in her schizophrenic break. They provided security at moments
of overwhelming anxiety and held the key to her self
delineation throughout. Her first hallucination, the scene of
her familv moving to Hudson, answered her desperate question,
"Who am I," and expressed her longstanding wish for secure in-
tegration with her parents—to be forever "our Hilda" at the
best moment of family life. As this solution faded, Hilda
was
thrown into a symbolic reenactment of the central issues on
which her actual attempt at reconstructing her oedipal
triangle
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experienced global disaster. The Voice of Mind—Emily's idea
of the embodiment of goodness
—
presented Hilda, for the first
time, with a clear route for loving union with her parents:
die like Christ.
The solution of messianic identification is uniquely
suited to the dilemma of binding loyalties and unanswerable
injunctions faced by many schizophrenics. Christ is the
archetypical scapegoat. His suffering at the hands of his
community radically altered their economy of merit. He
absorbed all sins and opened the way for a permanent bond in
goodness. At the same time, their persecution enabled Him to
transcend a dark world and reunite with His heavenly family.
Hilda's "semblance of Christ" was likewise multipur-
pose. It was an act of universal atonement and a way to meet
all responsibilities to her loyalty figures, particularly the
responsibility to be a scapegoat. Her rites of death and
suffering also held promise to rebalance all accounts of merit
and, above all, to enable Hilda to be one with her primary
loyalty figures at their best—the blissful union which she
first hallucinated.
As Hilda's "dying" strengthened her connection with
the Voice of Mind, she established a basis for reconstituting
her sense of self. The Voice became what Boszormenyi-Nagy
(1965) calls "a Self-delineating intrapsychic object represen-
tation." It "taught" Hilda to see her "soul" and encouraged
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her to "guard it," to reconstruct her boundaries. It enabled
her to begin to restore the sense of meaning and continuity in
the interpersonal world which Erikson calls "basic trust."
With further progress in self-delineation, Hilda was
able to differentiate specific others from the global fusion of
good parental authority represented by the Voice of Mind.
Emily came to her as the "good little mother she'd been at her
best," and Hilda was able to re-immerse herself in the
"rectification" of their relationship which she had begun in
writing Beauty, I Wonder . Gradually she introduced representa-
tions of a number of other family members and friends, con-
structing what Cameron (1959) calls a "pseudOTCommunity" around
herself. She placed herself in the position to re-experience a
variety of self-other configurations and to attempt to reinte-
grate them into a coherent self. Hilda was, in effect, re-
socializing herself and repaving the way for a return to trans-
action with real others.
To conclude this discussion of Hilda's psychotic
experience, I would like to quote briefly from a remarkable
book by Boisen (1936), a chaplain at Worcester State Hospital
who brings a background in sociology and psychology , as well as
first-hand experience of schizophrenia, to his study of mental
disorder. In constructing his theory of schizophrenia, Boisen
draws on a similarly catholic assortment of material: statis-
tical data from a large sample of mental patients, detailed
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histories of several cases, biographies of historical figures,
accounts of religious conversion, and his own psychotic exper-
ience. The theory which he develops anticipates several of the
main ideas— in particular, Boszormenyi-Nagy
' s central concept
of loyalty—which I have brought together in analyzing Hilda's
psychotic experience.
Boisen (1936, pp. 59-60) assumes that: "certain
types of mental disorder are not in themselves evils but
problem-solving experiences
. . . even in definitely psychotic
cases, emotional disturbances may be purposive and constructive
. . . setting an individual free from what has been blocking
his development." He supports this hypothesis with a number of
examples of recovery from a schizophrenic break being followed
by a higher level of functioning. Boisen (passim ) observes in
these cases: "a reconstruction of the patient's world view
from the bottom up," "a reorganization of personality" . . .
"enabling the patient to incorporate disowned or 'repressed'
tendencies into the structure of the self."
Like Boszormenyi-Nagy, Boisen (1936, p. 176) places
central emphasis on super-ego relations in his view of
personality: "Just as truly as the child receives from his
parents a physical structure, so also does he take over from
his early environment a mental structure which is organized
around his primary loyalties." The schizophrenic break, as he
sees it, often results from a crisis in this "realm of personal
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relationship” which arouses fears of "isolation and destruc-
tion" and may lead to a "dissolution of personality."
The psychotic individual is characteristically one
who, accepting the standards and ideals planted by
his early ^ides, has found within himself such
marked deviation that he has been unable to face the
inner bar of judgment except at the cost of severe
emotional disturbance [Ibid
.
,
p. 60]
.
Boisen ( Ibid
.
, pp. 174-180) sees the schizophrenic's
concern with cosmic affairs as an attempt to "find the basis
for an ultimate synthesis of conflicting loyalties and
divergent standards." The schizophrenic, in other words, is
striving simultaneously to re-establish a sense of continuity
v;ith "those to whom he owes allegiance and with whom, he wishes
to be identified" and to "assimilate" previously disowned
aspects of himself.
Either Boisen had great insight into the
schizophrenic process or else we share— in company with
Epstein, Nagy, Sullivan, and Erikson—very similar misreadings
of meaning in the interplay of bad chemicals, metabolic
defects, and malfunctioning neurons.
Remission
When Hilda was several months into her second year of
hospitalization, she contracted erysipelas, an infectious
disease associated with intense fever. Following what she
understands was an almost fatal bout with this disease, she en-
joyed rapid improvement in her general functioning, becoming
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"self-contained" to the point that she was offered a "trial
release" from the hospital.
She experienced the tremendous heat and itch of
edematons f inflamed flesh on face, lips, and eyelids
[but] she was far too engrossed in her conversations
with God, Mother, and all those other visitants
. . .
to pay much attention.
She was placed in a camisole to safeguard the
bandages, and her bed v/as rolled into a room, v/hich
was locked. For days she was left there, with
pitcher and glass beside her on a table. Fluids were
given her, but no food.
She became still and semi-conscious. She dreamed
that she had died, risen through the glass of window
and frozen February night to an embankment of clouded
Heaven.
She felt the beat and strength of wings, lifting her,
caressing her and the playing, chorded voices of
those already dead and come to Heaven, asking her to
choose, to join, to remain.
As the fever lifted, she recognized that:
Her body, indeed, had become a thing apart from her-
self . . . She would receive it back to her con-
sciousness at times now, like a cringing, abused
animal, condoning with its hard cruel luck.
[I think at that time I began to feel sorry for
myself. I realized how long this had gone on, these
various effects, abuses, and I was sort of mothering
myself . . . And I did begin to be clearer and more
normal in my thinking.]
She was busy and well-behaved now assisting with bed-
making in the dormitories and helping set up the
breakfast tables early in the mornings. She was
working at a second piece of embroidery.
Hilds suggests that her fever had the therapeutic ef-
fect of a shock treatment. In terms of its symbolic meaning,
the* disease v;as a culmination of her rituals of suffering and
dying. Just as physical illness in Hilda's childhood had been
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the only reliable way to achieve contact with Emily as the good
mother, it now enabled Hilda to feel embraced by a benevolent
presence, transported into a blissful environment. At the same
time, it was now safe for Hilda to renew her association with
her body——former ly so unclean and full of dangerous impulses,
but now cauterized by the fever. It is as if Hilda had stepped
into her representation of the good mothering other and employ-
ed it as a "observing ego," guiding herself through the bed-
making, setting of tables, and embroidery projects which earned
her release.
Reentering the family
.
Hilda was discharged on the condition that Jacob take
j
custody of her. She moved in with her four sisters and younger
i brother who had remained with their father in New Jersey. The
I
I
family had lost their wealth in the market crash and, now in
the midst of the depression, were hardpressed to make ends
I
meet. Although Jacob no longer worked, he continued to commute
regularly to New York, maintaining "a pretext" of activity. He
I
also distributed a homemade elixir, "Dr. Mendahl's Oratone," to
i "a few out of the way places." Hilda, in viewing these
t
! activities, lost respect for her father— "attempting to be Mr.
I Somebody and telling a lie to do it."
Hilda experienced her reentry to family life as ex-
j
tremely jarring. She felt herself thrust back onto the
position of a bad self. Her feelings of abstract culp-
I ability revived as soon as she stepped into the house. The
I
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problem of experiencing a gulf between her public life and
private world— a remote concern in the hospital—became in-
c^®3.singly acute at home. Here family became strangers to her.
Reenmeshed in their atmosphere— "as if it were in a form of
purgatory peopled by my own sisters"—she felt cut off from the
good aspects of her public self: writing and motherhood.
Hilda's private world of voices became an important refuge.
But even relations with these internal others became problema-
tic; they mocked her efforts at participation in the world and
encouraged her to commit suicide.
The family! We are sprung into it . . .We accept
each member as an interpretive force on our percep-
tions. Yielding, acknowledging their egos and edgy
criticisms ... we depend to a degree, until we are
one of them, colored, tempoed, molded to them. What
our own influence has been, we seldom presume to ob-
serve . . .
—She had been left out of the book entirely, like a
torn page . . . to be forgotten, the rest of the
story reading well without her . . .
[On first entering the house] she caught a quick
glance at her reflection in the hall mirror.
"I am yet I." she reminded herself swiftly. But her
limbs trembled within her black skirts and her hands
turned cold. These were hesitatingly taken by the
hands of her four Sisters.
Until now there had been no fear of the opinion or
attitude of others.
But here, with the familiar countenances of her
Sisters, Brother, Father, with their voices,
gestures, inuendos of being, of herself born, her
flesh of them, her individuality broken from this
tree; she was suddenly assailed with the sharp ^sv;ord
of guilt, of shame, of self-consciousness. It's
thrust pained her almost to fainting. She felt a
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traitor to their good behavior, their solemn family
union, ^
Her body stiffened and she felt sweat at her temples
and arm-pits. She wanted to apologize ... How shelonged that her nature would be ... a part still of
their nature, her conceptions
. . , as simple, pure
and well-founded as theirs.
—They did not know, that was the point. The fact
that the family had a history of mental illness,
instead of facilitating their awareness, blocked
their conception of it. It had become a reversal of
the "family unit," "family conformity," a naughtiness
not to be easily forgiven.
—The attic was quiet, somewhat dusty
. . . Fitted
into two cleared corners were Isabel's and her own
cots ...
"I miss mother's motherhood. She took such good,
watchful care of us. I can feel her presence. Can't
you Isabel? ..."
For that brief moment her old self had appeared again
and spoken, but suddenly Hilda felt extremely tired.
The attic's swathed atmosphere, the dim light at the
window. Isabel's pale and worried countenance. She
wanted to cry out, "I cannot talk, I am too ill.
You'll never understand." And she heard her Voices,
her Mother, her Publisher, clamoring for attention,
"Don't worry, Hilda! We are here. Stay with us.
Speak to us."
—Her Voices, their insistent, tender remarks, their
closely personal themeings, made her desire to sink
into the dream again . . . flee in her imagination,
to forget this trammelling outside experience of
petty effort for petty return.
—She knew, however, with a sharp pang of self
criticism, that unless she associated now, in this
atmosphere with her Family as one of it's integral
parts, all would be lost . . .
"Ah!" Hilda remarked silently to God to Mind, "You
do not want me sane !
"
"But we do!" they clamored together, the Voices, Soul
and her Mind. "Be brave, Hilda! Conform! Accept
what is given you!"
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--Oddly enough, the home itself, made her feel a
victim of claustrophobia: It's shut and locked
policy of behavior, the Sisters conforming to the
day's duties of performing the household tasks, their
even, quiet way of mingling and meeting over the
chores
. . .
But their talk, once this was over, their chattering
and eating, the clatter of silver and china, the
polite offering and acceptance of food. Like
magpies, like birds flocked in the limbs of one tree.
What were they talking about?
—It was not that Hilda did not attempt to listen, to
absorb the conversations of the others. For verily
she did. While they talked to one another or even
spoke to her, she would knit her brows and feel for
that intimate understanding which communication
involved. But instead of a response, she found
herself resisting their mood, contending against the
meaning of their phrases. Their words like rapid
birds swopped, darted, dipped into the lake of her
consciousness . . .
To begin with, the subject of her experience at the
Hospital was closed. Once or twice she had attempted
mentioning . . . but they would check her with a kind
hand laid to the shoulder, a sisterly kiss to her
cheek . . .
And likev^ise the subject of her sorrow concerning
Richard . . . Her life with Phillip and Susan was not
a subject received with grace, for it was not correct
for . . . the home's conventional attitude. Least
said, soonest mended.
Nor would they sanction her worry concerning her
children. She longed to talk of them at times, to
think of them, to worry about their welfare. But the
family seemed to consider that this, too, was no
longer hers to discuss.
—Ahi That was itl She must not expect them to
understand, to know at all, to have even an inkling.
—So now began Hilda's new game of deceit. For such
it really must be called at this point. She dared
not let them know at all, what was her state of mind.
She msut cunning-wise seem one of them . . . Now
instead of Hilda's turn to be the patient, it seemed
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it must be theirs, for she felt she must guard them,protect them all from the sight and sound of her
'
mental illness
. . .
It was not easy
. . . her deceit of attempting normalbehavior was exhausting.
Her sisters
. . , without pall of worry, so bright,
so sure compared to Hilda's creeping, crawling little
self
. . . She must stand erect, face them, admit
nothing.
Her words sounded blunt, received by them like little
spoonfuls of distasteful food. Their own interested
phrases . . . tiimbling like brilliant brooks
. . .
into the pool of their combined sisterly communica-
tion.
She was fast becoming a submerged entity.
[I was hoping that in some way I would be more normal
toward them or they to me. In fact, it really fast
became worse. I had to hide mySelf
,
to be a person
who did not in any way allow herself to be seen . . .
People can do this to you . . . especially if you are
not living on really honest terms with them. They
can make you feel very imprisoned.]
—Still there was that Inner Soul, that thrusting
Mind, plus . . . her publisher, her dead Mother, all
patiently waiting near her. She could almost sense
their pulse and respiration. She . . . longed to
play, to be with them as one of them ... It seemed
more desirous to be absorbed by them than by the
outer world.
To tell the truth, she was frantic lest she lose them
altogether.
--She had moments of almost normal interest. She
would lift a book, turn its pages and find a lucid
sentence . . . stung again by the little wasp of
wanting to be a writer . . . She would imagine a
sentence, a paragraph, a page, a whole book again 1
"But," the voices would laugh, "What are you up to
Hilda? Don't lie to yourself, Hilda. You can't do
it.
"
She imagined the pleasure of no longer having to
strive . . . the relief of springing safe, no longer
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burdened by her groping self, from life and its
csllsr—like imprisonment to death's sweet Heavenly
freedom.
Her voices were telling her now that sleep would be
good, a long uninterrupted rest. "You may even meet
me somewhere." her Mother whispered. She" thought,
she argued and reargued the case of herself and a
possible reason for continuation of existing, here
where she felt unloved, unneeded, hampered and dumbed
by her Insanity.
• There was a small phial of carbolic acid, pinkish and
heavy-like syrup, on her father's shelves in the
basement ... She smuggled it up to her bed and day
after day she practiced tipping the uncorked bottle
toward her open lips.
"As if paralyzed, my arm and wrist will not bend
enough to permit the drops to fall," she thought
. . . She was smartly surprised when several drops
. . . flowed over her lips . . . The stuff was
rapidly burning, thickening, swelling her lips, her
tongue, the lining of her mouth.
She thought quickly and contrived the following "out"
to her dilemma. "Girls!" she cried, shouting down
the cellar stairs, "I've broken out with erysipelas
again. It's swelling my lips and my hand. Don't
come near me. It's very contagious."
Like her actual bout with erysipelas, Hilda's
suicidal gesture brought on a rapid improvement in her state of
mind: "All of Hilda's desire to eliminate herself was gone
. . .
She forgave herself and the others, facing the fact that
she was crippled and hampered by her lack of contact." Prior
to this reacceptance of her role as a patient, Hilda had been
betraying her binding loyalty to Emily, that is, the commitment
to support a perfect other by being a defective self. She, in
fact, had been covertly replacing Emily, reversing her role and
viewing the rest of the family as her "patients" "Now instead
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of Hilda's turn it seemed it must be theirs.” 'The more
effective Hilda's deception, and the more of her self that she
put into the role, the deeper her betrayal. Her Voices became
^^^ive mouthpiece for her counter—autonomous superego,
exhorting her to "conform,” sabatoging her independence, and
undermining her participation in the family. The flirtation
with suicide offered temporary appeasement, and perhaps also
served- as an impetus to remove herself from the home.
Hilda began to look seriously for a live-in job, "a
chance to become my own person again." She found a position
teaching in a progressive boarding school, but, after a brief
stay, was put off by the bohemian atm.osphere and "the lesbian
expression" which she sensed among the staff. Her next posi-
tion, as a housekeeper for a young couple with a four-year old
daughter, was initially more successful.
The second month was well advanced when Hilda's
voices began to torment her again. But she continued
conversing as need be with Mr. and Mrs. Maurer, and
caring for the child without this becoming evident.
She took to eating very little, boiling little
quantities of coffee many times during her working
hours, chewing on a heel of or slice of rye bread, as
she performed her tasks. She neglected none of the
work, nor the child at all, indeed, the child seemed
dearer to her than ever.
But the Voices talked to her continually. "Hospital!
Hilda!" they would say, "You must return. You are
not going to make a go of it."
The crux of the situation occurred one morning when
she discovered the child perched in the window-sill
of the bedroom, leaning thoughtfully over the sheer
drop of six stories, gazing into the court below.
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Hilda approached slowly, without allowing herself topanic; she lifted the child in her arms and boltedthe screen and held the child in her arms until Mrand Mrs
. Maurer returned ...
The next day, Hilda was suddenly panicked. She
explained to Mrs. Maurer that her head ached badlyShe was excused from the day's effort and Mrs. Maurer
stayed at home with the child.
The following day Hilda awoke at noon and she heard
^®^self screaming. She was screaming for her own
children. She could not stop.
Apart from her overall sense of panic, Hilda does not
remember her thoughts in this situation. It is possible that
she misread the threat to the child as her own impulse—
a
misattribution which would be consistent with her deep sense of
danger in mothering and, perhaps, encouraged by her Voices.
Hilda was sent home on the second day after the
window incident. On leaving the Maurers, -during the elevator
ride down, she began to enter the land of the dead: "She heard
no sound and moved in a miracle of space, unfeeling." This
reentry was more terrifying than her initial delusion in the
hospital: "I was so lost in it ... I was outdoors, there
were no attendants. I was totally alone." Hilda managed the
train ride back to the city where her family lived, but then
became totally disoriented. She wandered helplessly amongst
the "risen dead . . . their mocking, death-pale faces weaving
past her like shimmering visions."
A policeman took her home and her family returned her
to the hospital.
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Rehospitalization
Hilda at first had a sense of homecoming in returning
to her ward:
She was proud to show them the way up the steps,
through the halls and doors to the second floor",
the same familiar faces of the patients she had left
months before.
She was shocked, however, to find that she was meant to stay
for more than a few days.
The attendants said, "There's an old saying, 'Second
admission means life.'"
She was suddenly protected by a lethargy which
permitted little entrance from the outside
. . .
cottoned against the world of impression, essaying no
sentence and receiving none.
Like a mist, the past with its people
. . . were
swept from her . . . She no longer condemned, blamed,
nor repented.
Drifting on the tide of days, she arose with surge of
other patients, maneuvered her limbs into her
clothing, moved with them into meals, and returned
with them.
Hilda moved next into what she calls a "lethargy of
automatized activity." She applied herself to whatever routine
task was available on the ward, working past the point where
her knees became painful or her back stiff and aching. She be-
gan gradually to experience emotions again.
How many pails of water had it taken to do this task?
It seemed twenty, at least. She congratulated
herself, a small thrust of self-pride was laid like a
little token in the receptacle of her stupified ego.
She felt, dumbly, that somehow by continual, willing
effort she might atone for her guilt.
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Exactly of what this guilt consisted at this point,
she barely imagined. But for some reason, she knew
that now the cards had been laid on the table
She believed they had all read somewhere in the
charted records of her disillusionment and failure in
marriage and as a mother. She felt there was no more
to be said between herself and them
. . . The
verdict, "Guilty," had condemned her to this.
The trial of the back ward vears
.
Some months after her readmission, Hilda was trans-
ferred to a ward for chronic patients where she spent the re-
mainder of her ten years of hospitalization. The ward was
supervised by a Mrs. Destin and her "cohort," Mag Reardon.
As Hilda saw it, they ran their domain like a harsh penal
I colony, rot allowing the patients to speak unless spoken to and
' exacting constant labor from the able bodied. From the moment
I
of entering this ward, Hilda felt herself thrust into a new and
!
I suddenly external arena of conflict.
Whereas, previously she had been a subject to study
and help, now she was considered one of the regressed
1 types, to be used to best advantage and to be
I forgotten.
• Aware at once of the change of attitude, her wits
j
revived and her lethargy was dropped like a cloak.
I
No one need tell her that this was at last actual
i
imprisonment. She sensed it. She knew not how to
fight, but fight she would.
^ Hilda devotes a good portion of her manuscript to
! recounting the Dickensian exploitation and abuses which she
' underwent during these years. This is the part of her manu-
script which differs most from her interview account. She has
I
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a very hard time gaining perspective on this period— a problem
which she implicitly acknowledges in her introduction to this
section: How can this be told without exaggeration?"
The basis of her problem with perspective is that
Mrs. Destin and, especially, Mag Reardon, embody the antagonist
in the internal drama of self /other conflict which Hilda
carried forward from childhood. They brouaht to life old con-
figurations—e.g., oppressed servant to harsh master and
victimized self to sadistic other— in their most polarized and
rigidly complementary form. Because Hilda's experience of
undergoing these relationships was so strong, she has trouble
seeing her own doing^ i.e., in appreciating her active contri-
bution to defining and perpetuating the relationships. From
the moment of entering the ward, for example, she had a strong
sense of opposing an oppressor, but her serious fight occurred
almost entirely on an abstract emotional level. Hilda's
actions, in contrast, tended to be compliant and highly suppor-
tive of the relationship. She avoided several opportunities to
seek release from the ward and even returned as an employee
after her final discharge.
Hilda, in short, needed these women. Their
relationship provided her with a battleground in which she
could fight against the counter-autonomous and exploitive
forces in her life— a deeply self-delineating experience which
led ultimately to Hilda's recovery from schizophrenia, albeit
at the cost of colluding in her oppression for so many years.
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To begin with, Hilda was transferred to the region
where entrenched insanity was assumed a certainty.
"On this ward," said Mrs. Destin, "We have thosepatients listed under senile insanity, Hilda, which
means that this is their final home."
"But, don't list me so!" said Hilda politely
bringing forth a laugh. '
There is such a thing
,
as you with your education
,
must know, Hilda. We'll get it straight from the
start, then you need never ask the question again.
You are the victim of what is termed, 'premature
menopause,' which will naturally trend into senility
at an early age."
[I never allowed anyone to know I was having a
period. I saw women beaten to a flounder if they had
so much as a stain on their clothing. So I developed
a method of packing so that there would be no sign
. . . So they thought I never had one. I really
fooled them that way.]
"You are well educated, aren't you? Some college, a
good home, a lady, I believe. We expect the best
from you. This is a good home, too."
Ah! stated so! but the insight of the caught, the
trapped, the imprisoned, is canny. And singing, like
a reverbrating nerve, Hilda sensed the undercurrent
of these v/ords . Gone, gone, your home, your oppor-
tunity! Self destroyed, you may remain here with us
and pay dearly for your errored ways!
"Not that it's easy to understand," went on Mrs.
Destin, "How a young woman with such advantages could
take it upon herself to leave her good husband. But
you'll do as we order, and later perhaps, you'll
explain to us more about yourself."
"Why, Mrs. Destin!" answered Hilda quickly, "My life
is none of your business. Don't question me!"
Like a large pigeon puffing at breast and feather and
chortling at throat, calling its mate, Mrs. Destin
was joined by her second in charge, Mag Reardon.
The blow was so practiced, so studied and without
ire, [it] implied that the future was not to be
bandied with.
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Hilda was quickly inducted into what she calls "the
enmeshment of imposed order and silence" on the ward. She was
also quick to feel a strong connection between Mag Reardon and
herself
.
Each move of Mag's she watched. Not a moment
throughout the day did she lose track of her. She
accorded with her moods, performing each task swiftly
and willingly, and jumped, as if shot, if Mag let out
a low roar at a patient.
These were the characteristics of Hilda which Mag
learned to love. She batted [her pet cat] Buster and
Hilda equally, and in turn fondled and yearned over
them.
—It was the sudden joyful knowledge
. . . that here
was a strong enough, young enough physical body to
work, tame, and train that prompted Mag to attack
Hilda, like a bounding, dangerous dog, pawing,
batting, confusing her, with the threatening spark of
worse to come in her eye, but . . . almost caressing
her, like the lick of a great beast.
[Her attack had a certain amount of humor in it . . .
She didn't have a cruel expression, she had kind of a
gay, ioyful, "here I come, take it" look. And then
she'd get excited and become involved in almost
trying to be angry.
She was discovering discipline, she didn't know how
to, really. This was her form, ahead of the behavior
that she wanted from me—also it was sadistic—but
she thought if she beat me ahead of the day's effort,
that I would put forth a better day's effort.
So she would beat me first thing in the morning, when
she first came on duty. I'd already have gotten a
lot of the work out of the way . . . but I never let
her know that I was proud of my effort, I'd get it
double.
]
Hilda's main avenue of defense against Mag was the
balance of merit in their relationship, that is, she gained a
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sense of revenge in allowing Mag to accumulate a staggering
backlog of transgressions against Hilda.
For many was the time that Mag in the heat of her
demonstration would purr huskily, "Aye! Hilda! Why
won't ye strike back? So's I'll have reason for
reporting you to the Doctor and then you'll be
' transferred to the Violent Ward!"
At least Hilda had the poise and the strength of
spirit to make verbal return to this one. "Never,
never will I strike back!" she stated, knowing in her
heart that in this way was Mag more fully paid.
"You'll have it all on your own conscience." thought
Hilda. So far at least, she could retalliate.
Hilda
:
[When you have a state of mind like that, you're
thinking "Well now you've done it again, that's
another count against you, another count"— I think
the other person realizes this, you know. It adds
up. It was my silent, cruel, treatment of her, you
see
. ]
C.J. : That didn't stop her at all.
Hilda:
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Well finally (late in this period) I did stop her
when I said, "Murder me."
I was really becoming tired of it all, and I thought,
"how can I discipline her without doing anything
violent, and yet really discipline her" ... So I
decided the way to make her sorry was to make her say
she wanted to murder me, make her do it, try to do
it.
So I said, "You'd like to murder me"-- just casually—
"Well do it . . .Go get the broom, beat me, murder
me.
"
"You bet your life I will," she said.
ZknH shp did. she started beating me, beating and
beating me.
I'd look up and say, "I'm not dead. Go on."
I made her go on until she finally broke down and
wept.
C . J . : Weren't you frightened?
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* No
^
I W3sn*t, Sh© W3S sort of bssid© h©irsslf , Shs
t hsv© hsr full strBngth b©tiind. it~“it wasn't asbad as some times, when I had such welts and bruises
I had to bathe separately.
Finally she just put her arms around me and said
"Hilda, I hate you and love you more than any patient
I ever had." And that broke her spirit—It's a
terrible thing to do to anyone, make them bend to
your attitude, but I decided to do it to her because
she was just wearing me out.
Hilda's decision not to seek help from hospital staff
or family m.embers was complex. In accounting for it, she
focuses mainly on coercive aspects of her relationship with Mag
and Mrs. Destin. This situation replicated the binding effect
that Hilda had experienced as a child with Emily. Just as,
when caught in the throes of their mother-daughter antagonism,
Hilda had experienced Emily as blocking her from seeking re-
dress with Jacob, she believed that these women cut her off
from outside justice and turned the doctors against her.
When she asked if she might speak with the Doctor,
she was slapped smartly by Mag.
"Speak to him!" cried Mag, "And you'll suffer for
She requested the right to send letters home.
"Dare write!" stated Mrs. Destin, "Your letters will
be intercepted!"
—Now, never did she see the Doctors. For if they
passed through the Ward at a time when she was within
sight of them, she could note Mrs. Destin 's nod and
remark, which Hilda could sense without hearing.
She felt certain that the picture, Mrs. Destin
presented was distorted. And once, when the Doctor
approached her, laid his hand on her shoulder, she
started and ducked as though fearful of a harsh note.
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Hilda acknowledges that she accepted the situation
and passed up any number of opportunities to make her treatment
public. She explains this choice mainly in terms of her
feelings of shame, that is, that the ward, for all its
oppression, was, in fact, her rightful home. She felt it would
have been humiliating for outsiders to be made aware of her
treatment. Alongside her description of these feelings of
shame, however, Hilda's account suggests that constant
oppression from without enabled her to experience a sense of
goodness within. Enduring the persecution of ward life gave
her a sense of inner purity reminiscent of her childhood
identification with Joan of Arc, and her silent martyrdom
enabled her to feel "the mother in herself," protecting her
children from harmful knowledge.
—Strong set against divorce or separation, these
women were the law extreme as construed by her own
family.
— It could have also been that the sense of shame
with which Hilda was assailed, could have been a
barrier to her attempt at doing something about the
situation
.
—So, she knew well enough that the wrong picture had
been given the doctor, nor did she worry too much
about it, for the future was undone entirely now, and
each hour was a small, contrived battle, either
mental or physical or spiritual against the enemy.
For so she now placed them in her mind's category,
Mrs. Destin
,
the officer and Mag, the entire army,
while she herself, poor little knight, fought
valiently and silently alone.
Perhaps it was the mother in Hilda which prompted her
to not cry out for help in her new imprisonment. She
protected those she loved and knew from her dilemma.
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[It was very degrading, very. Suppose you knew that
this was being done to your mother, it would hurt you
so terribly. It would- spoil your picture of her
• • • It's a matter of losing face, their estimation
of me would have perhaps been altered altogether.]
Hilda's delusional community of others remained with
her through these years, but it underwent several changes. Her
voices regained the qualities of loving interest and uncondi-
tional acceptance which she had enjoyed in the days prior to
her first release.
At night, when she lay exhausted in her bed, the
darkness carrying waves of velvet lassitude, face
down, with her head in her arms, she would hear them
again, even so, "You are ours, Hilda." they would
whisper . . . through their ever-loving approach and
kind interest, she was able to contrive her attitude
to the next day's situation of effort, silence and
now and then the bout with Mag.
Because Hilda was beaten when she showed any sign of
conversing with her voices, she became secretive, restricting
herself mainly to times when she was in bed. She began gradu-
ally to separate her delusional intercourse with others from
her wakeful participation in the world, placing the people of
her voices within what she calls the "ever-recurring excitement
of the Dream."
At these times, when she drifted into dreams, she
felt the whirr of Angels' giant wings, swooping down
to her, lifting her. She felt herself held to the
bosom of the visitant. The peace that she
experienced at such a time seemed eternal . . .
She would find herself . . . rushing through peace-
instilled air . . . the fast escaping land beneath
her journey ... She would be rushed over the border
of Life into the country of Death, which . . . was at
last her Home.
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Free now 'from fear ... she would approach her
dearest friends and closest loves, held safe now in
Death's Valley.
It was more actual than the experience of wakeful-
ness. It penetrated her consciousness with a reality
which satisfied all of her questions and doubts,
fears and discouragements.
It is unclear exactly where in the dichotomy between
sleep and waking experience Hilda located the Dream. Her
written account seems to place it entirely in sleep, whereas
in the interviews, she describes the Dream as more a matter of
conscious prolongation of a hypnogagic state. VJhat is clear,
however, is that Hilda again recognized the distinction as
meaningful and that she began to experience a large degree of
control over her fantasy life.
C.J.: At this point, your experience with the Angel, the
Dream, this was a sleeping thing?
Hilda: I must have been asleep, though I can remember when
almost asleep and almost having it happen, thinking
"Oh that's beautiful—
"
C.J.: Is it hard to tell the difference, looking back at
this time?
Hilda: Excepting that when you are half asleep it doesn't
continue because you awake into awareness of what's
around you. When you are asleep you can make it go
on, wish that it continue and continue and continue.
Even wake up and go back to sleep and make it go on
again.
C.J.: And you could do this?
Hilda: Oh yes.
Hilda went on hearing voices for several years, but
far less frequently. The voice of God was the first to drop
away, reappearing only at moments of great stress. At
these
403
times he took on the characteristics of a stern teacher, en-
couraging her to analyze her situation and rise above it a
vague replication of the student/mentor relationship with her
brother James.
She would hear His Voice and His stern reminder thatthere was some reason for all of this, and His
command that she "think it out."
"You must be objective, Hilda." God would demand,
"Put yourself outside of your own hatred. Patience
is a virtue, only up to a certain point. If vou do
not become more clever, you shall be out-witted by
the ignorant."
Sometime in her second year on the ward, Richard be-
gan a series of annual visits to Hilda. They exchanged little
intimacy— "He did not question her stay at the hospital, nor
did she vouchsafe any information to alter his opinion of her
good care there"—but she felt that the fact of the visits al-
tered her situation on the ward in two ways. Mag and
Mrs. Destin "pressed her to the yoke of work even more strenu-
ously" but, at the same time, began to allov? her to accompany
the other patients on brief walks around the grounds. Hilda
saw the latter privilege as part of a studied campaign to keep
her in control.
Mag had it well in mind how to break Hilda . . . she
would slowly relieve her bound spirit, letting out
one bit of bondage at a time, always certain that she
had stern grip at the leash, that at any moment it
might be drawn tighter, firmer, should the need be.
—Thus she was held here, year in year out with
little or no hope. Richard's visits becoming a
traditional event, and her once-yearly interviews
with the Ward Doctor still monosyllabic, miserable
representations of her real self.
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She believed that no one would ever again know her.
That her individuality would forever be closeted,
hidden from all perception, by the stern imprison-
ment of Mag and Mrs. Destin.
A breakthrough occurred in Hilda's sixth year on the
ward. Mrs. Destin gave her a separate bedroom—reasoning, as
Hilda saw it, that "if we allow heir to rest quietly at night,
we'll get more work out of her.” Instead of using this seclu-
sion as an opportunity to becom.e reengrossed in her Voices, she
"decided to actually pray for her sanity and release."
She was permitted privacy from six in the evening
until six in the morning. Here, within the stillness
of the four small walls . . . she determined to
commune faithfully and regularly with her Heavenly
Father.
She determined to never again desire anything other
than complete soundness of mind, to never again utter
against any of the petty allotments given or withheld
from her, but instead to concentrate steadily on one
idea only: her complete recovery.
Evening after evening, stretched small and silent on
her neat bed, she prayed to her Heavenly Father. The
voices of her Insanity clamored for attention, but
she answered them not.
She believed that at last she had found the answer to
her problem. She believed that a miracle was
possible. And she held real faith in her Heavenly
Father, with the knowledge that should He decide that
she be freed from imprisonment, that so it would be.
Hilda was able to make this transition because she
had established a firm, albeit painful, connection in the
interpersonal world. Her inner self, although still closeted
and bound, was now viably good— it had been tempered and
purified in the crucible of her relationship with a relent-
lessly persecutory other. Through her constant
effort and
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punishment, Hilda had reestablished a tenable balance of
credits in her primary loyalty bonds. She was no longer
dependent on the delusional affirmation of her voices, and
could steel herself against the seductive gratifications of a
fantasy life. Because she had prevailed, internally, in her
long struggle with the maternal authority figures on her ward
—
and had not destroyed them in the process— she was able to
direct unambivalent attention to seeking recognition from a
higher father—no longer the entirely personal figure of her
Voice of Mind, but a representation of ultimate loyalty which
reconnected her with the broader fabric of social life.
Late in the year, she was informed by her unit doctor
that, barring a relapse, she could be released in six months.
Hilda's heart gave silent groan and cry, her nerves
shrieked and tore in hungry joy. She believed that
she shuddered badly, but bore on her clasped fists in
her lap and replied with steadfast calm . . .
Hilda, breathless, happy, with nonsensical poor
judgment, rushed beaming toward Mag, her jailer and
defender.
"He said no such thing 1" roared Mag, rising like a
threatening wave of angry sea, sweeping upon Hilda,
pinning her body to the wall, twisting her fingers,
the snap of bone in the forefinger of the left hand
could be heard.
At the end of the six months, Hilda approached the
doctor on his rounds and reminded him of the promise:
Now at this point occurred one of the great disap-
pointments of her entire commitment. The Doctor
stared at her unremittingly. He gave her no answer.
He explained nothing to Mrs. Destin. Where now was
the good of the past six months trial?
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Mrs. Destin gave the doctor a distorted report on
Hilda and, after he left, Mag took her into a back room and
beat her severely for "lying."
Hilda's miracle did finally occur. A change in the
upper level administration brought her to the attention of a
new "Boss Doctor."
When the Boss Doctor sat opposite her in the office,
and spoke to her quietly, it seemed as though the
miracle was after all the reasonable result of her
years of misery and loneliness.
"Hilda," said he, "You were always hidden on this
Ward. I never came face to face with you before.
Obviously you are quite well . . . But you are on
your own. Now what are your plans?"
"Merely, to work for a living," said she, "and I'd
like to earn enough to help my children."
"We'll talk it over and look into it at once," he
answered.
Now the repercussion to all of this was a sudden
physical collapse.
Hilda awoke the following morning with a weakness of
limb and faintness of breath, a heated brow and
shaking ague, which exhausted her totally. She was
found in a swoon of sorts, thrown across her bed.
Mag and Mrs. Destin tended her, bathed her forehead
and called in the Doctor.
——They thought of their days in the future without
her there to cajole and to temper, to depend on her
unceasing effort.
"We honestly don't know how we'll manage without you,
Hilda, you've been such a worker."
It was, no doubt, this remark that planted the seed.
Weeks later, after Hilda had fully recovered, the
Boss Doctor made another inspection of the ward.
Hilda ap
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proached him with the idea of hiring her as an attendant under
Mrs. Destin's supervision. He asked Mrs. Destin's opinion:
"Heaven be praised" stated Mrs. Destin, and she
turned as red as a beet. "It's got to be said. She
does as much work as several of them put together.
I'd love to have her here as my own. We hardly know
how we'll manage without her here."
Thus' was the miracle accomplished.
CHAPTER VII
SUMMING UP
Hilda’s Life
The second half
.
Hilda remained at Boxborough State Hospital, living
in a nurses dormitory on the grounds and working the evenincr
shift for the next 25 years. She earned a measure of distinc-
tion in her hospital work, progressing to the position of
L.P.N. and eventually taking charge of a ward of 90 women
during her shift. The hospital once nominated her for the
statewide award of "attendant of the year"—she came in a close
second.
The decision to remain at the hospital, and to return
to her ward as an employee, greatly eased Hilda’s reentry into
normal life, but it was still a difficult transition. For one
thing, society had changed. Hilda had essentially missed the
depression and the coming of the New Deal, and emerged into a
country in the midst of World War II. She was struck by the
sight of "all the boys [in uniform] going down the street, just
like we used to see sheep on the streets in Hudson, going to
the slaughter house." The larger world seemed to have gone
askew while she was restoring her own.
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Hilda's family had also changed markedly. Jacob had
died during the latter period of her stay on Mrs. Destin's
ward—news which she had received without strong reaction at
the time. Her siblings had dispersed to get on with their own
lives, Hilda's children, whom she had seen but once in her
years on the back ward—and then only to exchange a few words
were fast becoming adults. Although Hilda had a strong sense
of maternal obligation to all three, she hardly knew them as
people. Carroll and Harry had been raised by Richard and his
parents, Ruth by Susan and Phillip—they seemed like children
of other families,
Hilda felt protected from the flux of life by the
walls of the mental hospital—virtually a self-contained en-
vironment in those days. Institutional life relieved her from
grappling with many of the changes in life-style, fashion, and
the "jargon of the day" which she witnessed in her brief excur-
sions beyond the walls. She was particularly thankful not to
have to choose her own clothing—a choice always invested with
surplus meanings from the time that Emily assigned her a
"uniform" through the days of unravelling and reweaving her
"self" into the fabric of her hospital gov/n.
She maximized the insular quality of her life in the
early years of "getting out." She maintained a policy,
initiated in her latter days as a patient, of restricting
herself from participation in social activities, creating what
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she calls an "atmosphere of safekeeping" around herself.
Hilda: I was staying [on the v/ard] to save energy, I wanted
my mental and emotional energy for getting out. Ididn ''t want to be involved in all this expression of
movies and dances and fun life
—
you have to make
choices about what your energy is going to go to
. . . Well I never was sociable even after getting
out. I worked evenings so there was no question of a
social life.
From her Journal : She was 64 now ... down to a mere $5 a
week for extras, coffee and such, but keeping the
thing going on a nice basis, she could still help out
her daughter Ruth and her sons, paving for their
childrens' birthday gifts, a very little
. . . Her
board and insurance and dues removed automatically
from the check. Practically nothing spent, plenty
earned. Practically nothing used, a sort of' atmos-
phere of safekeeping.
Hilda's "meager arrangement" of life as a hospital
worker was not devoid of satisfactions. She describes several
in her Journal i
The mornings in her room, the needs, the meals in the
eating place, provided. The attempt to parcel out
her life here with the luxury it provides: time to
elapse, rest to ride on, thinking like waves of
sleep. Any waking with the evaluations and visions
which only moments of secure self and adjustment can
provide
.
In one sense, Hilda never fully recontinued the life
which she had left through insanity. She came to see her long
sojourn in the "Land of the Dead" as a sharp punctuation in her
development. It is as if, in the struggle to reconstitute her
world, she had bracketed all the most private and "real" as-
pects of herself, allowing only her new public self. to appear
in her ongoing participation in social life.
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I often think that my life really stopped when I went
insane
. . . that I was living up to that point—and
the fact that I was dreaming of dying, that the world
had gone, been taken away, people reborn—that, in a
way, actually happened in my mind ... I never
actually realized people again, my associations never
again happened
. . .
You know when you are born into a situation, and you
grow up, go to high school, go to college, and you're
there, you feel that you're a part of everyone else
. . . But in [my life at the hospital] that didn't
happen at all. In this -place, I was there, I had a
job, I was paid, I performed, I walked, I sat down, I
ate, I read, I took my bath every day—kept a nice
look on my face, kept a solid expression that I never
waivered from—it's a form of the living dead,
really. I still thought of them at times as the
living dead.
Ruth thought she could bring me out of it [at retire-
ment]
,
that she would bring me up here, where I could
kick up my heels, meet a few old gentlemen that I'd
fall for, all. of that jazz. And it never will again
happen, that's all.
Hilda, in other words, adopted a stable schizoid po-
sition in her return to normal life. A number of the passages
in her Journal at Sixty are vivid descriptions of the schizoid
problem: the experience of a well-defined, conforming, outer
self divorced from an inchoate and vulnerable, but far more
real inner self.
Impressions were received: lessons learned, how to
talk, and to conform, how to accept and follow all
rules of deportment off and on the job.
But she had no reality in her surroundings, no
placement in a group ... A social security number
and an L.P.N. Her cap, shoes, and uniform signified
her only identity.
It is as if you meet yourself . . . only in book,
on the screen," listening to your radio. No alter-
ego.
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Hilda:
—She was eternally alone
. . . Others were ever
exchanging in love or companionship, each experiencebeing coupled rather than singly seen. However, shehad become so used to viewing life alone
. . . thattheir fantastic dance of two or more struck her as
overdone, not actually realized, premeditated.
It seemed to be almost painful to watch it ... i
suppose I had a sort of longing for love. I would
see these people put out their feelers for each other
. . . i^nd I would think, "Oh, that's terribly
frightening," and it would hurt me. I would think,
"They're attempting to get out of where thev are into
some other spot."
— I felt very safe in there because nothing could
determine my life differently than the way it was
being determined bv the fact" that I was doing these
things
.
As the years progressed, Hilda grew increasingly dis-
satisfied with her "meager arrangement": "The whole thing had
levelled into a desert of loneliness, the pace she had prayed
for." She turned again to writing as a way to express her real
self. In contrast to the ecstatic and free flowing creative
process in her early works, this reentry into writing was very
difficult for Hilda. For one thing, she had to learn "to
think" again, to articulate her private feelings, to define
herself in an, at least potentially, public forum. She ap-
proached this task with trepidation. The youthful wish for
recognition had left her, and the thought of others reading
—
and misreading—her work was now unsettling. Hilda, in fact,
kept her current efforts, and her former identity as a writer,
secret from most of her co-workers for fear that they would
think she was "trying to be Somebody"— "that's just that odd
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little old one, that licensed practical trying to think again."
It had not been a pleasure to learn to think againPrevious to her insanity, her little books had seemedto write themselves. Whether you could call this
thinking is a [moot] point. During her insanity
. . . vacuity plus voice had filled in where thought
process had been
. . .
Later, when cleared of this, she stood on a knoll of
nervous reasonableness, and was accepted as an em-
ployee.
Now she should learn to think again
. . . Finally she
felt she could realize that she was here, that an "I"
existed, with all else outside of it.
—It must be kept a very dark secret held in the
shadows of everyday living
. . . Keep it from all of
them that you are thinking and creating, wanting your
own memoirs to bespeak your ego.
Hilda turned to explicit autobiography in these later
writings, first recounting her experience of psychosis, and
then producing, over a five-year period, her Journal at Sixty
,
a melange of current thoughts, reconstructed scenes from the
past, correspondence, and quotes from books which moved her.
Although her Journal covers the most salient features
of her experience at the time—the problem of an outer life
split-off from her inner self, and her concomittant feelings of
isolation—simply quoting from it gives an overly sharp
picture. The divorce between the work life and her emotional
life was by no means absolute.
Hilda took pride in the quality of her work, and was
constantly "competing with herself" to do better an attitude
which caused friction with her co-workers. She also felt a
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sense of commitment to her former community of patients,
quietly advocating a number of improvements in their living
conditions, such as compensation for work, occupational
therapy, and appropriate diet, which came to pass in her years
at the hospital. She could be moved by her patients' turmoil
and was very disturbed by the first death on her ward. Because
she feared that such an emotional reaction would interfere
with her functioning, she worked to establish an "objective
attitude" toward her charges. She felt most at home in caring
for the geriatric patients, "who were so old they were like
babies .
"
Although Hilda felt estranged from the rest of the
staff for many years— "the sane seemed unforgivably unimagina-
tive"—and was happiest when working alone, she was by no means
totally disengaged. She had one close friend, a woman named
Ellen, who acted as a confidante in her later years. Despite
the fact that Hilda and Ellen held opposite views on most
matters— "we altercated on everything we did"—they both re-
spected each other. Ellen often encouraged Hilda not to take
herself so seriously—advice which Hilda recognized as appro-
priate but found impossible to follow.
Outside of her relationship with Ellen, Hilda
experienced the exchange of personal information with co-
workers as fraught with difficulty. She had a very hard time
communicating the significance which she attached to past ex-
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perience "as though I were speaking in a foreign tongue."
[Another nurse] encouraged me to go into the whole
Phillip and Susan and how it had knocked me
out, the consequences of living an unconventionallife
.
And then she said, "But why do you insist that vou
were wicked?
I said, "I wasn^t really insisting, it was the family
that was insisting it
. . . Therefore I've taken that
viewpoint myself. And I'm afraid of telling people."
"Well, for God's sake," she said, "grow up!" [Hildalaughs]—here I was 60.
Hilda's other main area of difficulty was with women
in authority; she felt highly vulnerable to being undermined by
them. Both spheres of difficulty coincided in the person of a
nurse, Rhoda, who became Hilda's supervisor in the last few
years of her employment. Rhoda took over some of the adminis-
trative responsibilities which Hilda had enjoyed handling and
encouraged her to spend more time becoming personally involved
with the patients. Worse still, Hilda felt pressured by Rhoda
to share intimacies. With the addition of this pull for
intimacy, their relationship reactivated the experience of
lethal antagonism which had been dormant for Hilda through her
long years of safekeeping. She brings forth imagery from her
distant past to describe the distress which she felt in rela-
tion to Rhoda: "I had a terrible naked feeling with her";
"Rhoda knew how to touch off certain areas in my personality";
"Suddenly she would be after me like a bogie in the night,"
In her last year at the hospital a new worker was
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added to their shift and Hilda felt herself suddenly thrust
into the dangerous position in a triangle. Life on the ward
became unbearable for her and she retired from the staff.
Hilda: I always had respect for Ellen and she had respect
for me, because no matter how we battled or dis-
agreed, we wouldn't begin to flounder on each other
But Rhoda would abuse me and mistreat me with her
fondness—Do you see what I mean?
C.J.: Not exactly. Can you explain it a little more?
Hilda: I don't expect anybody to step outside of their own
personality, to offer me their emotional selves, when
there is no real reason for it.
C.J.:' And you felt that's what Rhoda did?
Hilda: Yes, and also [the other nurse]. She was trying to
excuse herself that way. And Rhoda too was trying to
excuse her mistreatment of m.e . They didn't have
respect for their own attitude toward me . . . And I
would turn on them that way too, I'd say, "You know I
had such terrible treatment [as a patient] here from
attendants that nothing you can do can ever hurt me."
C.J.; And what is it they would do that would hurt you?
Hilda: Well they weren't giving me my due as a person,
seeing me as I was, as a person. They were taking
their status as something they could kick me around
with, because of where they were ... It was a kind
of , hell.
Hilda's most difficult readjustment was with her
family. These were the years in which she crystalized her per-
ception of the dual risks in relating to her family: the
danger of being "written out" of their history, and the
possibility of being reenmeshed in the "blood-web." Because
she could move so quickly from feeling herself an intruder in
the lives of her siblings to becoming "suffocated in the
417
atmosphere,” Hilda was very circumspect in re-establishing
contact, adopting a policy of limiting herself to brief visits
with a well defined plan of departure. Within this structure,
she was able to experience some pleasure in renewing old rela-
tionships
.
It was painful for Hilda to reconnect with her
children. She felt a deep sense of responsibility for them and
longed to be involved in their lives. One of the main goals in
her life of safekeeping was to provide each child with a sum
equivalent to the cost of a college education—a major feat on
her small salary. Hilda could experience the positive aspects
of her bond in reviewing a cherished collection of photographs
which she kept by her bed. Live interactions, however, v;ere
often difficult for her to manage. She could be deeply hurt in
seeing her children's attachment to their surrogate mothers.
With the boys, she feared that Richard had "changed the story,:
putting her "outside the pale"— "When a person contrives to lie
about you it can get pretty deep." With Ruth, who had grown to
regard Susan as "mother," old feelings of jealousy and exclu-
sion from the Phillip/Susan triangle were reactivated. Because
all three children were progressing through adolescence—
a
stage which mystified and disturbed Hilda—even contact apart
from their family settings was often unsettling for her.
Ruth's adolescence was especially stormy. She went
through a period of conflict with Susan and Phillip, in which
she pleaded with Hilda to take her in. Hilda felt torn. She
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sympathized deeply with Ruth, but regarded any change in her
own lifestyle as impossible. To accommodate Ruth's wish, Hilda
would have been forced to leave the confines of the hospital
before she felt ready, and to abandon the spartan program of
accumulating savings which she was pursuing— "really my main
effort in life at the time." Ruth eventually ran away from
home and was lost to Hilda for a time.
Hilda was shaken by the prospect of retirement. She
feared that, in losing the security of the hospital life, she
might undergo a recrudescense of her psychotic symptoms:
I was so panicked that I could sit for hours just
staring. And I did begin to see things that weren't
there ... an invisible line holding the horizon
together . . . trees just staying in one position,
not a leaf stirring, the whole thing immobile.
Hilda also suffered several serious physical ailments
at the end of her hospital career and underwent surgery twice
—
events which she kept from her family— "I felt so terribly
alone .
"
Ruth, now back in Hilda's life, learned of her
distress— in part through reading her Journal—and encouraged
Hilda to leave the hospital and come live with her. Because,
with a husband and children, Ruth had no intention of using
Hilda's fund for college, she convinced Hilda to apply it
toward joint purchases of a portion of Phillip and Susan's
Altamont property. Ruth built a new home on the land and Hilda
moved into a two-room studio adjacent to it.
419
The long journey through insanity and hospital life
had come full cycle. With the return to Altamont, she embarked
on her final life effort: recapturing the past.
I am warned. This could be the last of summer
No one will disturb the ghosts I see here. Slim
white dressed sighing girl and avid boy entwined in
Isngth embrace ... Don't go. Stay here. The
warning may be quieted.
Hilda now
.
Altamont has changed greatly since the days when
Hilda first joined Susan and Phillip. The area is still
favored by artists and writers, with a few suir/iving from
Hilda's early days, but the current generation has made it the
rural outpost for a counterculture which strikes Hilda as
bizarre and perhaps dangerous. The landscape has also changed
markedly. The several large corporations headquartered in the
area have stimulated a sprawl of acre-lot development, leaving
only islands of forest in what was once open farm land. Hilda
lives on one of these islands.
Her studio is tiny, but well suited to Hilda's needs.
Her bathroom, bedroom, and kitchen are compressed into the
ground floor. A booklined stair well connects to her main
living space, a sparsely furnished room decorated with a few
carefully chosen paintings and pieces of memorabilia. The
brook in which Hilda once attempted to baptize Ruth runs behind
the studio and a bed of intermixed flowers and vegetables
borders the front. Hilda's quaint home is somewhat incongruous
420
next to Ruth's contemporary house and the swimming pool,
camping trailer, and assortment of cars and motorcycles which
surround it—an island within an island.
Hilda feels finally at home in the setting that she
has constructed:
This is here, this is mine, I move in it and I love
it.
When I first come back to it from being in town, I
can think, "Oh my god, what a crummy place." Then I
change all the furniture around, change the color,
try to take a few pieces of jim-crack stuff out.
But then I get used to it. I get up in the morning
and I'm happy it's here. I come in from outdoors and
I'm so embracing of it—very embracing of my life
here.
— I need a safe place to be. I feel that I have a
right here, a life right. I paid out enough money
for it and I also gave enough of real devotion to the
situation—one way or the other, either belligerently
or friendly [she laughs].
Most of Hilda's current activities are solitary.
Long walks—such as the one which she "stole" from Susan,
attempting to recapture her thoughts about Phillip—were a
regular part of her day when I first met Hilda but, since then,
have been curtailed by her deteriorating health. In recent
years, she has focused her efforts at revitalizing the past in
writing again, embarking on two projects: a history of her
early family and an imaginative reconstruction of Ruth's early
life. She has also begun to paint again, producing quite a
number of water color still lifes in the past three years.
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Hilda has a "conscientious feeling about staying in
touch with the world"; her radio, and especially television,
give her a sense of contact. She has a set of soap operas
which she follows, and watches the full two hours of news each
evening. She has occasional strong feelings in her one way
relationship with television personalities, e.g., "i can't
stomach Barbara Walters, the way she is always beleaguering us
with her eyes."
Hilda's sense of herself as a mother has gradually
solidified over the years. Her success in putting aside an
endowment for each child was a major contributing factor:
"that's the sad story of my motherhood—or the good story, I do
f
give myself all kinds of credit for saving that much."
although she often feels overwhelmed by the complexity of her
children's lives— "I came into this nest of grown up kids and
their problems"— she has developed a pervasive sense of
responsibility for them— "I take everything that happens to
anyone of them personally"—coupled with a sometimes fierce
loyalty— "I remind myself of [the dragon] Grendel, ready to
kill for her offspring." At the same time, she has a growing
recognition of her children's independence: "Perhaps I expect
too much [of myself]. After all, everyone is himself. Just
being a mother in the situation isn't enough to totally control
it's outcome .
"
While embracing her life, Hilda is by no means
completely at peace. Her feelings of integration in the inter-
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personal world remain fragile—the life issue on which she has
the least sense of closure:
Hilda:
C • iJ • :
Hilda:
I love my radio the good music, I love mv soap
operas. Now and then I find a book I like”
that s about the only relatedness I have, vou
see? And yet I get very lonely.
I do a great deal of long distance telephoning.
Is it easier for you to talk on the phone?
Oh yes . . . I'll call Carroll and have a few things
on my mind and say them as fast as lickety-cut.
He'll give me a few words—a wonderful thing,
voice— I don't have to be with people actually—Your
voice, for instance, boy that warms my soul , . .
If, when I died, I could telephone back, I'd be all
right [laughs] , It's enough, I suppose other people
feel they need more than that . . .
I think all of it is actually the fact that I haven't
got a person I can say, "I coupled my life with this
person.
"
"Are you really obtaining or losing?", this is an
argument I go through. If you were a great enough
soul and a creative enough individual, you could ac-
complish more in total abstinence from sex or
relationship. Just according yourself the thought,
finding the reading you think is right, finding in
people the points that you particularly want to find
. . .
making out of that the real life that you think
you should have lived.
It's a very time consuming thing, finding it. So
much time is spent— "Come out in the sun and watch me
diving," [my young friend] Madeline says. Well I can
take just so much of that, and then I have to go back
in and listen to my music and read a line or two.
You see I don't get the enjoyment out of life other
people do.
The strongest and most problematic attachment in
Hilda's current life is with Ruth, Hilda has from the start
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been most readily in touch with her love for this child:
I had a more emotional love for her than the twoboys, in some ways ... I sometimes thought I wasinventing
^
this love for her
,
every minute I was withher I delighted so in her presence. She has alwaysbeen very close to me as a person.
When Hilda first returned to Altamont with Ruth, they
moved quickly into the kind of "altercating" relationship which
she had had with her co-worker and friend Ellen. Hilda found
herself in conflict with Ruth over many of the details of daily
life. She kept trying, for example, to apply work habits which
she had developed as an attendant to Ruth's house—efforts
which brought a very negative reaction from her daughter: "If
you can't keep your cottin-pickin ' scrub water off my floors
. .
.
" Although conflicts over the mundane details of
housekeeping have been long since resolved, many of Hilda's
most distressing emotions still occur in relation to Ruth.
Hilda: I try to follow a mental hygiene remark given to me
by a doctor back in the hospital: you should give
yourself 20 minutes to worry in, and worry violently .
And if you can't get it all done in that time, stop.
C. J. : Do you worry much these days?
Hilda: I have moments of being awfully angry. Then I trace
it back to something that was said . . . suddenly
something is said that feels as if it's a vita 1 blow.
That that person's remark affects me in that way.
Immediately I can be very angry—Ruth says, "My,
you're feisty."
And I said, "Well Ruth, I don't think so. Ruth, do
you know me at all? V'7hy do you deliberately say a
thing like that?"
And she'll say, "You saw that in an entirely
different way than I intended it . . .
"
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C.J.: Does it help to trace it back, to reinterpret thething?
Hilda: Yes, it does.
The way I work it out is this: "I took that remark
to mean I'm not contributing enough"—very often it
comes down to this, not contributing enough effort,
expenses, so forth— I think, "Well, I could put itdown on paper."
And I say, "But I'm so good to you, Ruth, I'm so good
to you."
Ruth says, "But I'm glad you are" [Hilda laughs],
—But I think it's true she feels these things. I'll
say to her, "You tell me I'm misreading you, but I
don't think I really am. Someday I'll write a book
about you. I don't know how many people you are."
At times, I think she's at least ten different people
really, in her loyalties, her choices, her tastes,
her vocal behavior— I even hear her differently.
In addition to the eruptions of anger, feelings of
not contributing enough, and perception of multiple "people" in
Ruth, there are several other aspects of Hilda's experience of
their relationship which replicate—with distressing
precision
—
qualities from her early relationship with Emily.
Hilda feels, for example, that Ruth can disconfirm her own per-
ceptions in exactly the same way that Emily used to "wipe the
slate clean."
Many times I'll give my insights to Ruth and she will
disagree so totally that it wipes the slate clean.
Then I have to wait a long time before I get it back
again. I mean she can take away my own concepts,
very often.
The most deeply distressing aspect of Hilda's current
situation is her uncertain place in Ruth's life. She fears, in
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particular, that her daughter's attachment to her husband, Bud,
will cut Hilda off--the final problematic triangle in her life.
When Hilda meets with rebuff in her attempts at becoming more
involved in their lives, she feels herself isolated.*
discredited and, ultimately, vulnerable to disgualification as
a person—the risk of dissolving into ah abhorent nothingness.
Hilda: ‘ T think I am excluded from Puth's marriage to Bud,
totally
.
She once said to me, "Now I would like to know how it
stands. Who am I supposed to be loyal to, my mother
or my husband?"
—I had an idea that I was going to be part of the
family, but Ruth said, "You know, you like your
privacy and we want ours."
She called it an invasion of privacy if you walked
into their house, you see. That's absolutely not to
be forgiven, I don't do it . . .
I tried to explain it to Ruth and she said, "All of
my life I have tried to have a private life and was
never able to . . . but Bud and I are going to have
our private life"—This is the way she talks a great
deal, whatever it means, "a private life."
And Bud said, "Yes, I am going to Alaska and I am
tired of being responsible for you ..."
C.J. : Do you get angry at a time like that?
Hilda: It's like a shot. It's like being stabbed in the
heart, a terrible, terrible feeling ... I get so
furious and at the same time frightened ... I took
it as being a traitor to the situation. They were
taking me on as part of their life, and glad to do
it, and I always returned as much as I could.
—C.J.: When you were depressed and having thoughts of
suicide [last v/inter] what brought it on?
Hilda: Well it was just the kind of dissolving feeling of
not having a feeling of any kind of relationship that
was that important.
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I'd counted on a relationship with Ruth and, after
all, I had no right to ask for that, because she wasto Bud and so dead in earnest about it. And
I thought, "well maybe you are just a third wheel."
Hilda still feels that her symptoms of emotional dis-
tu^bsnce are close at hand. In addition to suffering occasion-
al period of depression, she often hears a ringing in her
ears
.
Hilda:
C. J.
:
•Hilda
C . J . :
Time is too short to get everything thought out and
written out that I would like to— I won't
. .
I hope I don't sound too awfully bitter about
anything. I'm quite as satisfied as the average
person, probably. I think really the way it is I'm
in a quandry much of the time.
Over what?
Over my life and the way that things turned out—
I
won't say that I would have done any different, under
any circumstances, in any of the choices I made.
—You accumulate, you don't lose any of it really.
It's all part of me.
—The one point that stands out when I go through all
of this is that I didn't get my friendships, and my
relationships, and my- social expression materialized.
—Quite often [my feelings of entrapment] are a
matter of some kind of loneliness, a fearful
situation that has gotten into a very bad bind. And
I have been very much alone in order for this to
happen. If I had a lot of friendship, people to say
"tell us about it," maybe it would all be talked away
from m.e. Maybe I wouldn't even, have gotten into this
form of relationship with the way my life seems.
—But don't you think it's surprising the way the
world turns out, the way life turns out—you can be a
person in the world and you can be so totally alone.
Does the fear of "flowing together" keep you from
getting closer to people?
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Hilda: I think It always has
. . . whenever I meet someone Ilike a lot
. . . For instance, [my friend] Madeline
asks me hundreds of questions about my life but I
would never think of asking her about herself and her
affairs
.
C • iJ • : What stops you?
Hilda
:
I just think we deserve that. We're put in this
world, and we have that right to be alone.
— I was deprived in my own thinking—depriving myself
of all communication, wanting to have somethina occur
and yet it didn't.
C. J. : And you felt guilty about it?
Hilda: Oh I always feel guilty when I'm not really a full
expression of myself. I feel that I'm short-
shrifting others as well as myself—Don't you think
it is a selfish way of being?
C . J . : I'm not sure. It seems odd that you felt guilty when
really you're the one who suffers.
Hilda
:
Well I always do. In fact, it's a way of making
myself suffer, kind of a masochistic tendency:
suffering because I can't communicate and not
communicating because I'm suffering.
—You're a certain person and you're caught in your
own trap, your ovm personality. Whether you're ever
going to escape it and . . . see yourself as you
would see someone else—someone else could see it so
plainly, just like a play—and you think of yourself
[as ifl in a dram.atic situation, saying: "You put
yourself there. You arranged it this way. You
manipulated that situation . . ."
But there must be some power that really does get you
in its control, really has you there, and you cannot
escape it . . . Perhaps if I went out and searched
for the right friendship I could have the strength
. . .
I don't know.
C. J. :
Our Relationship
Do you feel there is anything important I haven't
covered, anything missing that I'd need, to go out
and describe you as a full person?
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Hilda: What can I say
. . . One could talk interminably,
keep coming up with another memory, "Oh lookl"
To describe a person who thinks she's that important
to talk to Cartney this long
. . . I hang my head.
C , J. : You belittle yourself.
Hilda: Perhaps I'm partially oriental: miserable me
honorable you . . .
Actually I think I've held up pretty well. The way
I've done it is to clear the decks each week, not to
read, or think, or take seriously anything else so
that I won't. be prejudiced—when we do this together
this is it. In some ways almost as creative an
effort as writing, at least the way I write.
C . J. : Perhaps that's why you've always answered my
questions before they're asked?
Hilda: I'm sure its made the work better . . .
Meanwhile one forcive thing is that the family is not
in the least bit interested.
Ruth is a little bit. She says, "You seem so much
better since Cartney has been coming . . . Don't you
think unburdening yourself has done a great deal of
good? Your painting is so much better than it has
been for years—or ever."
C . J. : What do you think?
Hilda
:
I think it has improved.
And she said, "I think it's done a great deal for
you .
"
I said, "Who knows?"
I never was psychoanalyzed, perhaps its a form of it
. . .
And not really being directed—you were very
good that way. You didn't direct me along this line
or that line. I was very grateful.
There are several reasons why our work has been a
therapeutic event in Hilda's life. For one thing , my arrival
onto the scene provided her with an impetus, in what may be
the
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last years of her life, to integrate her past and present. As
Hilda puts It: "I can really see it again and create it again
and make it better, I mean make it happen again in a clarified
way." Our collaborative reconstruction of her history was also
a way for Hilda to relate herself to the future, to record and
finalize her story for posterity.
But perhaps the main factor in rendering our work
therapeutic for Hilda was the collaborative
• relationship it-
self. The most significant difference between our interviews
and Hilda’s autobiographical writing is that I acted as a far
more immediate and supportive audience than her internalized
image of her reader could ever be. With me, she was able to
explore aspects of herself which she had always considered too
private even to attempt to communicate. Because I worked con-
stantly to give her the feeling— if not always the fact—of
being understood, I indirectly encouraged her to continue
pushing into areas of experience which she had kept dissociated
or otherwise hidden. At its best moments, our relationship
provided her with a novel experience of recognition—being
"seen" without having her "slate wiped clean." This new level
of recognition, in turn, expanded the circumference of her
self-acceptance, enabling her to assimilate a wider range of
experience as part of herself.
As can be seen in the preceding excerpt, Hilda
idealized me. By investing me with attributes which she
prizes——e
,
g
. ,
intelligence, education, importance in the
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world—Hilda enhanced the value of the recognition which I was
offering. She gave me surplus credit which could, in turn,
flow back onto her. This income of reflected merit subtly
altered Hilda's relationship to many, perhaps all, of the
in her history. It gave her a sense of basic
justification which enabled her to reexamine past situations in
a new light. As the specter of diffuse culpability lifted,
Hilda began to take a more realistic look at her own hand in
shaping the course of her relationships.
Although at the end of our first summer of interviews
Hilda still spoke from the position of her transferential re-
lationship to me, she was able to make a joke of it— "perhaps
I'm partially oriental: miserable me, honorable you." In
doing so, she was inviting me to step aside from our ongoing
interaction and look back at the configuration of self and
other which she had constructed. The implicit premise of the
joke—what makes it funny— is that, despite the appearance of
great difference, we are actually very similar. This joke is a
small example of a major shift in Hilda's internal structuring
of our relationship which was at the core of her beneficial
change: the experience of being one and the same within the
overall context of being one and different. Put in alternate
terms, the most therapeutic aspect of our collaboration was
that it afforded Hilda an opportunity to experience a sense of
identification with me—and especially with the attributes of
merit which she projected onto me—within a relationship
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focused primarily on her own self-delineation. i believe it is
this opportunity which Hilda was really thanking me for in the
above quote. In any case, it is the gift which she chose to
pass on:
I say to [my friend] Nora, "tell me a little bit
about your childhood."
And she says, "Hilda I can't remember a thino about
it."
"Ridiculous," I say, "Of course you can."
Well since I have done this with her she has begun to
remember—it's very interesting
. . . She is awfully
crippled . . . very, very ill. But she is an inter-
esting, smart woman.
There was a reciprocal exchange in our relationship.
Hilda entrusted me with material—her recollections—which she’
has long considered vital, and a task—defining herself as a
person—which has always caused her great anxiety. In the
opening pages of her Journal at Sixty she writes:
When we state the truth, we relieve ourselves of a
hidden treasure. Once aired, it takes on frightening
proportions; another now handles our gift.
The fact that I was an immediate audience and active
participant in Hilda's current reconstruction of her life ac-
centuated her experience of giving up something vital. After
the last of our first series of interviews, Hilda came down
with a severe case of shingles. She later interpreted the af-
fliction as a form of mourning:
Just like after you and I talked for that simmer and
I went into the shingles, it was an expression, a
physical expression—you had really torn out of me a
great deal that was emotionally disturbing for me.
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without my realizing it. As Ruth said, "That's a wavof weeping." ^
In the first chapter I discuss, in the abstract, the
problems of identification and counter-transference inherent in
this work. I mention that the investigator's role as a
participant observer in the subject's life, and the bond which
conseguently develops, have positive as well as negative
implications. Because, in viewing the final product, it is the
letter which most impress me, I would like to focus briefly on
the inhibiting aspect of my feelings of identification with
Hilda.
As I now see it, the chief problem in this work stems
from my unconscious acceptance of Hilda's view of the fragility
of the material which she handed over to me, and of the
potential for causing grave damage in handling it. This uncon-
scious adoption of Hilda's viewpoint tended to make the task of
analysis take on overwhelming proportions. Although I was well
aware of the need to approach the material through an adequate
theoretical framework—the lesson of my first attempt at
writing her history— I elevated the standards of adequacy
beyond any practical limit. In an effort to do justice to
Hilda's material, I reversed the problem in my earlier work and
pursued an over-inclusive theoretical framework, attempting to
integrate concepts from a number of systems which in themselves
are forbiddingly complex. My pursuit of this quixotic goal
repeatedly pulled me away from the actual task at hand, the
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theoretical reworking of Hilda's material—and my theoretical
chapter in its first draft was a full 90-page digression from
Hilda's life.
My inhibition against aggressive handling of Hilda's
material applied on the level of the narrative as well. i had
an awfully hard time abstracting the flow of events in her
life, separatinci essential from non-essential details.
In preparing my manuscript, I did a great deal of
cutting and pasting of passages from xeroxes of Hilda's writing
and transcripts of our interviews. This activity now stands
out for me as concretizing my vague, and mostly unconscious,
feeling that in imposing definition on Hilda's life I was being
somehow destructive. This problem with definition was
compounded by the fact that Hilda and I share some similarities
in cognitive style, most notably a tendency toward obsessional
thought. Hilda presents at least two sides to her feelings on
practically every major issue in her life, providing me with
ample opportunity to bog down in weighing the alternatives. As
I would attempt to isolate quotes which express her real
feelings on an issue, a mound of interview transcripts, cut up
excerpts, and well-thumbed index cards would spread across my
desk each day. The job of choosing representative quotes fast
became oppressive. Through my identification with her, I ap-
propriated Hilda's own problems with self—definition . I
believe that I may have dealt with this burden in spots by
passing in on to the reader, that is, by presenting an over-
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abundance of quotes. In the name of preserving the context of
Hilda's views on her life, I may have presented too much of the
confusion as well.
In sum, the extent of my personal involvement in
Hilda's life magnified the difficulties in what was, to start
^ith
,
a problematic undertaking. It also makes it very hard
for me to evaluate the final product.. The one requirement
which I know I have met is what Freeman and Krantz call the
need, in a psychological life history, for an "expansion of
complexity." In the process, I have produced 3 work that is
cumbersomely long. My fear is that, in doing so, I may have
failed to communicate both the clear picture which I have of
Hilda as a person and the conceptual understanding of her life,
which I have developed with an equally strong subjective sense
of clarity. As a last effort at avoiding the latter possibil-
ity, I will give a thumb-nail sketch of my theoretical frame-
work and apply it to the four questions on Hilda's life which I
introduced in the first chapter.
The Theory in a Nutshell
The theoretical framework which I use to interpret
Hilda's development employs a broad range of concepts drawn
from cognitive, psycho-dynamic, and family systems theory. It
is built, however, upon two basic assumptions about human
motivation: (1) that there is an innate need for interpersonal
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attachment and (2) that the individual must organize the data
of his experience in service of mastery over the environment.
The need for attachment is primary. Without a secure
sense of grounding in the interpersonal world, an infant
becomes vulnerable to overwhelming anxiety. Under conditions
of prolonged separation, developmental progress may cease or
even be reversed. When a secure attachment is in force, the
infant begins immediately to explore his environment. Explora-
tion leads to schematization
,
i.e., the progressive structuring
of the individual's modes of relating to the environment.
Schematization advances through two basic processes: assimila-
tion, whereby new experience is incorporated within an existing
structure; and accommodation, in which an existing structure is
altered in order to integrate an expanded range of experience.
The two spheres of basic motivation are antagonistic
in that the need for a secure base of attachment competes with
the pursuit of mastery over the environment. At the same time,
however, they are deeply interdependent; progress in one sphere
builds upon and facilitates progress in the other. As the
child begins to "decenter" from objects in his environment,
i.e., to conceive of them as having stable properties indepen-
dent of his immediate relations with them, he becomes able to
see people as durable entities. As he begins to acquire ob-
jectified" concepts of space and time, his sense of attachment
becomes, at once, increasingly stable and newly mobile. The
ability to maintain internal representations of his
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interpersonal bonds begins to supplant the need for physical
proximity to his attachment figures. Stable representations of
attachment progress, through the self-delineating negativism of
early childhood, into internalized configurations of self-and-
other
.
Because the child's internal structure of self and
9^ronnds him in the interpersonal world, it takes on the
motivational force which Boszormenyi-Nagy calls an invisible
loyalty, that is, the need for attachment becomes a need to ad-
here to the conditions and definitions of relatedness as
communicated by the child's primary others. Success in meeting
the requirements of a loyalty bond is accompanied by feelings
of interpersonal worth or "merit." Loyalty bonds develop
through constant transaction and each party maintains an
internal record of his merit in the relationship.
Because the individual's ongoing "ledger of merit"
reflects his continuity in the interpersonal world, and
ultimately his sense of grounding in the world as a whole, it
is essential that he maintain a certain minimal level of merit
in relation to his primary attachment figures.
Healthy development leads to a state which Piaget
terms "mobile equilibrium." The individual is able to locate
himself in a familiar world, i.e., to assimilate the bulk of
his experience of the environment within his pre-established
schemata, while at the same time maintaining sufficient
flexibility to accommodate, to reorganize a schema, when he
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encounters novel or contradictory phenomena. This aualitv of
balance between integration and differentiation is paralleled
in his relations to the interpersonal world. A well adapted
individual maintains a sufficiently broad construction of
loyalties which enable him to encompass most of the people he
encounters. He feels continuity with, or a sense of being "at
home" among, a wide range of others. At the same time, he
remains sufficiently flexible to recognize the unique needs and
qualities of an other, and to adapt himself in order to
accommodate them——to engage in what Bos zormenyi—Nagy defines as
dialogue.
The maladaptive development which can lead to a
psychotic break of the sort Hilda suffered begins in anxious
attachment. When, for any number of reasons, the mother is
consistently unable to meet the child's need for attachment,
the normal patterns of homeostatic regulation in their
relationship become seriously distorted. Anger and fear of
separation become abnormally strong for the child. If the
mother's own feelings of worth are tenuous, she may seek to
enforce a rigid complementarity in the relationship, defining
her position as good mother in relation to bad child. At the
level of the family system, this complementarity sets the stage
for the induction of the child into the role of scapegoat. At
the intra-psychic level, it greatly exacerbates the dissocia-
tions which are a normal part of the early stages of self-
In order to avoid the catastrophic possibility ofdelineation
.
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alienating his primary attachment figure, the child begins to
construct a "false self," split-off from all the dangerous
longings, angry impulses, and gratifying fantasies which he
comes to regard as his "true self." Because the child strives
to keep his "true self" hidden from the world, he loses access
to the corrective influence of ongoing interaction. Divorced
from the process of accommodation, his "true self" remains an
inchoate and dissociated system of infantile modes of relating
to the world.
The final precondition for a schizophrenic break
falls in place when the child, through identification with the
mother, internalizes her needs as his own. The complementarity
between mother and child becomes binding. The child grows to
experience any serious attempt at moving away from his position
in the relationship as deeply disloyal, a vital blow to both
self and other. The development of a binding loyalty bars the
child from seeking an alternative base of attachment, such as
the father. Because maturation itself can be experienced as
threatening the complementary bond between mother and child,
the child's binding loyalty can take on the force of a
"counterautonomous superego," militating against any of the ac-
commodations which enhance differentiation and independent
mastery
.
A person who learns to relate to the world through a
"false self" loses the opportunity to develop the backlog of
merit which normally gives one a sense of durable continuity
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with his constituent others. Any internal or external event
which the person sees as severely discrediting can precipitate
a sudden loss of his sense of grounding in the interpersonal
world.
In Hilda's case the precipitating situation was
complex, involving a series of events which she experienced as
deeply discrediting, but it centered on her pregnancy and the
birth of her child. Hilda saw herself as suddenly exposed in
acting out her wish to supplant her rival in her current
triangle and, on a deeper level, attempting to usurp the
position of good mother in her rigidly complementary
relationship with Emily. She felt that
—
just as she had always
feared—exposure of her true self had destroyed a vital bond:
"I murdered. I am murdered."
With the loss of her most basic representations of
self-and-other
,
Hilda's entire system of organizing her
experience began to disintegrate— "the world ended." She was
beset by overwhelming anxiety and assailed by a kaliedescopic
array of unstructured stimuli. Hilda reverted to her
dissociated, infantile modes of structuring her experience and
began to relate on the basis of pure assimilation.
A schizophrenic break can have the adaptive aspect of
opening the way for what Stierlin calls "reintegration at the
base." Two processes stand out as central in the gradual
reconstruction which enabled Hilda to return to adult
functioning. In the early stages of her psychosis, Hilda began
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to reconstitute her internal representations of a good other.
This repopulation of her psychic reality enabled Hilda to
contain her overwhelming anxiety, and prepared the ground for a
reconstitution of self. Hilda's subsequent rituals of dying
and rebirth can be seen as a process of accommodation—albeit
wholly fantastic—which enabled her to reestablish the funda-
mental bonds with other which serve as a basis for self-
delineation.
In her second hospitalization, Hilda directed her
efforts at accommodation to the world of real others. She en-
gaged in self-delineating opposition with the authority figures
on her ward. Hilda reinstituted the split between a "false
self," which related her at first to her voices and eventually
to God—her ccm.posite image of the aspects of other most worthy
of her loyalty and identification.
Although Hilda's recovery represented a return to the
schizoid position, she had reconstructed a "false self" which
was far more viable—at least within the well structured social
world of the hospital—and redefined her private self to the
point that she could, in her later years, begin to experiment
with making it public through her writing.
This recap of my theoretical analysis answers the
first question which I raised in the opening chapter: what
happened in Hilda's psychotic break and how did she recover.
My answer to the remaining three questions can be summarized
briefly.
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Looking first at the problem of repetition, Hilda's
tendency to reenact the painful dyadic and triangular
relationships in her life can be divided into three aspects:
regressive, progressive, and static trends. Taking the latter
first, the fact that we see and feel what we expect to see and
feel has been abundantly documented in psychology. Because
Hilda's attention was restricted, throughout her early develop-
ment, to a relatively narrow range of interpersonal situations,
she tended to structure her subsequent relationships along
similarly circumscribed lines. The situations were Hilda's
template of an emotionally significant situation—the insight
in Freud's (1914, p. 370) statement that "transference is
itself only a bit of repetition." The pain in these situations
was entailed in their regressive aspect. Each repetition re-
immersed Hilda in the lethal antagonisms of her early
childhood. Alongside the fear which she reexperienced in these
situations—the danger of being deeply exploited or
eliminated—there was a wish to rebalance past accounts, e.g.,
to seek revenge, to atone for past transgression, or to usurp a
long denied love object. It was the strength of motivations of
this sort, together with their potentially destructive outcome,
which led Freud to view repetition as the expression of a death
instinct. None of Hilda's adult recapitulations involved the
degree of existential dependence, nor the deeply binding
loyalties, which held in her early relationships. She was
therefore less handicapped by ambivalence and able to devote
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herself more fully to m.astering her re-enacted situations of
difficulty—the progressive aspect of repetition. In her re-
lationship to Mag Reardon, for example, Hilda was able to
experience a sense of moral victory and achieve a level of dif-
f®^^sntiation which had never been available in her struggle
with her mother.
The two remaining questions—why she has such
difficulty experiencing herself as real and what makes her
encounters with others such a "dangerous interplay"—are both
problems of the schizoid position. In relating to others
through a "false self," she cuts herself off from experiencing
real interchange with another person. She focuses on
conforming to or resisting the demands and expectations of the
other. Interactions which cannot be fit into this structure-
may seem unreal. At the same time, many aspects of her "true
self," such as her strong feelings of anger or affection,
remain dissociated. She can experience these emotions as not
belonging to herself— for instance, her strong jealousy is a
"dragon" she encounters or her love for her daughter is
" invented .
"
There are two main forms of danger for Hilda in
social interaction: suffocation in the atmosphere and being
seen. The latter is the fear of having her "true self"
exposed, being subjected to feelings of intense shame and re-
jection. Her experience of suffocation is somewhat more
complex. It is the extreme expression of a daily problem for
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Hilda: the experience of being rigidly defined by her context.
In Piaget's language, Hilda sees one of the basic laws of
social life as "assimilate or be assimilated." Put in
Boszormenyi-Nagy' s terms, the rigid complementarity between her
-conforming "false self" and the coercive other cuts Hilda off
from experiencing the give~and”take of dialogue
,
and leaves her
vulnerable to experiencing herself as entrapped in being the
object to the other's subjectivity. In light of this deep
sense of vulnerability
,
Hilda ' s willingness to entrust me with
defining her life was an act of great courage.
The Work
Assessing the theory
.
The first and most important standard for assessing
the theory which I have drawn together is how well it fits
Hilda's life. The inability to make judgments of this sort was
one of the problems which plagued the life history movement.
Dollard (1935)
,
in the period when he was a proponent of life
history research and an avid freudian, constructed an elaborate
set of criteria for evaluating the fit between theory and data.
Freud's (1909) study of "little Hans"—a landmark case study
but hardly a model of life history—was the only work to score
highly on all criteria. Dollard, in other words, inadvertently
made the point that, if strongly committed to a viewpoint, you
can justify it in any number of quasi-objective ways.
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I see Hilda's life very clearly through the framework
which I have constructed. It answers the questions which I
have framed to my satisfaction. Whether anyone else should
find my interpretations satisfactory is very difficult for me
to judge.
Part of the problem is my expansive use of theory. I
was frequently aware that there was no logical end point to my
process of assimilating concepts into the framework I was
constructing—that I was building a ramshackle farm house and
not a high rise structure. In flounting the law of parsimony,
I put the satisfactory feeling of delivering a tightknit,
exclusive interpretation out of reach. I was often aware of
parallel or competing concepts which could explain an event,
perhaps equally well. This problem with exclusivity is, of
course, to some extent inherent in taking a whole life as the
unit of analysis— a point which Allport (1965) demonstrates by
analyzing a woman's history through three different psychologi-
cal perspectives, each clarifying some aspects of her life and
obscuring others.
The area of Hilda's life in which I am most comfort-
able with the fit between theory and data is her psychotic
experience. I see my framework as making sense out of apparent
nonsense. Following Epstein's lead, it gives a detailed
rationale for the often vague concept of schizophrenia as an
attempt at adaptive reorganization. In psychoanalytic terms,
it shifts the focus from viewing schizophrenia as primarily a
445
problem of ego/reality relations to one of ego/superego
relations. Although anticipated in Boisen's (1936) obscure
work, I believe that this reemphasis may be an original contri-
bution. At the same time that it focuses on the disturbance in
internalized self /other relations, it accounts for the bizarre
changes in cognition and perception. It also opens up a number
of avenues for further research. It would be interesting, for
example, to study the relationship of early attachment and the
eventual course of the schizophrenic disorganization, e.g., to
see whether it is possible to identify qualities of early
relationships which differentiate schizophrenics, such as
Hilda, who engage in a struggle for adaptive reorganization
from those who remain regressed. The theory also suggests that
Piaget's clinical experiments might be useful in analyzing the
course of the disorganization and in evaluating the effects of
treatment. Finally, the theory has direct implications for
therapy. It suggests that there is wisdom in the traditional
approach of providing the schizophrenic with a rigidly
structured milieu, against which he can engage in self-
delineating opposition, in combination with an unconditionally
supportive therapy relationship, within which he can begin to
reestablish his sense of unity with an other and continuity in
the interpersonal world.
I see my theory as least adequate in meeting the
ambitious goal of integrating intrapsychic and systems theory.
In a sense I begged the question by starting with a theory of
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family relations, Boszormenyi-Nagy
' s , which has a foot in both
frames of reference. Although I took occasional forays into
concepts such as scapegoating and the double-bind hypothesis,
for the most part I remained well within the intrapsychic
sphere of Nagy's complex model. I think, however, that I did
place the problem of integration—assuming that it is even
feasible—in the right ballpark. The dialectical perspective
in general— i.e., the model of self and other, private
experience and public behavior, past and present as mutually
entailing aspects of a total situation—and the view of the
self as an active organization of experience, in particular,
provide the underpinings for an integrated theory of
personality and social relations.
But the job is huge. My attempt at taking it on has
been a chastening experience. For one thing, the field which I
chose— a whole life—was too broad, and my focus on a first
person perspective too narrow. Were I to reattempt a synthesis
of intrapsychic and systems concepts I would restrict myself to
one of each, examining, say, the relationship between
differentiation and focus of control. I would also expand my
focus to include observation of the subject in public
interaction with others, for instance, using family interviews
to reconstruct the history of differentiation between Hilda,
Ruth, and Ruth's daughter.
On the other hand, the problem of achieving real
integration between interpersonal and intrapsychic m.odels of
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functioning inay bs so groat that ovidenco would only confuso
matters at this point. It might be necessary, in other words,
to devote a good deal more attention than I have given in this
to defining an alternate set of underlying assumptions for
psychology—a task which would overwhelm any analysis of data.
The future of life history research .
I I am tempted to attribute the problems which I have
encountered in writing Hilda's life history to the vehicle
itself, and to conclude that future attempts at psychological
life history would be simply a reenactment of past failures. I
I
have developed a full appreciation for the difficulties which
I
led the early proponents of life history research to abandon
Ij
I the endeavor. The problem of integrating narrative and
I
analysis looms especially large—and I am more understanding of
the awkward attempts at integration in other pieces of life
history research. This problem of integration has been a major
I
stumbling block for history in general. Henry Adams, at the
I
end of his nine volume study of the Jefferson and Madison
! administrations, concluded that historical explanation was
impossible. Many of Adams' successors have also turned away
I from narrative explanation. Recently, however, a number of
I
eminent historians have begun to view it as the antidote to the
I
j
conceptual deficiencies of the quantitative analytic approach
j
which has been holding sway (Wood, 1982) . Contemporary
' historians appear to be in the process of defining a model
(
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narration which synthesizes description and analysis, deductive
and inductive reasoning, evocation and explanation. If they
are successful, the model might be applicable in psychology
—
one reason to hope that the promise of life history research
might eventually be fulfilled.
there are special problems in reconstructing an
individual s history. Personal "time—binding'*—
—as discussed in
chapters two and three—becomes -very complex. It may take a
writer of Erikson's stature to produce an adequate life
history. I prefer to think that the task requires a special
stage of intellectual development. In writing Hilda's history,
I found myself repeatedly sifting through my store of
psychological concepts, and wished that I had either more or
less to scan. Although adequate treatment of a life requires
an expansion of complexity, it may need to be anchored in the
singleness of vision which comes either from relative ignorance
or wisdom. Perhaps more important than any quantitative
measure of knowledge, it is necessary to approach the work with
a clear sense of the limits—both personal and general—of what
can be integrated and coherently expressed.
My chief frustration in writing Hilda's history—the
difficulty in giving an integrated presentation of my
subjectively clear understanding of her life— is related to my
source of satisfaction with the work. On a personal level, the
work does fulfill one of the main promises of the life history
movement: to provide "a significant concept of the person.
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Whether I have made any contribution to general theory or not,
the long process of moving back and forth between the events of
Hilda's life and various theoretical models has shaped my
understanding of psychological development to the extent that I
now have a reasonably coherent view of the person as, in
Murray's terms, "an assimilating, adapting, integrating,
differentiating, and reproducing temporal unity." My success
at this personal level of conceptualization suggests that the
life history may have its primary value as a learning
experience—not a new idea, but one for which I have renewed
appreciation. It also suggests that understanding how, in
general, one arrives at such knowledge—that is, unravelling
the logic of clinical inquiry—may be the most important step
in defining a model of psychology which can make effective use
of the life history. My work on Hilda's life, despite its
limitations and the frustrations which I encountered, has
reaffirmed my belief that such a model is essential. The need
for what White called "the long view" and Allport termed "the
significant and essential unities of the life process" is as
great as ever, and it is difficult to see how it could be met
while the life history remains unapproachable.
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